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ABSTRACT 
The rapidly increasing worldwide usage of the Internet and the World Wide Web 
since the second half of the 1990s has affected the way geographers, built environment 
scholars and commentators look at concepts like space, distance, and the city itself. The 
possibility for real-world functions such as gathering, informing, communicating, taking 
decisions and performing economic transactions to be hosted by a new type of electronic, 
virtual space, has opened up new opportunities together with many new questions for those 
who are involved in planning urban spaces. 
One of the most interesting phenomena related to the emergence of 'urban' Internet 
functions is the creation - started around 1993-94 - of local public information systems 
called 'digital cities'. These systems were hailed as highly valuable 'cyber' additions to 
urban space and to the public sphere of Western cities. 
This thesis has constituted one of the first, systematic attempts to observe and analyse 
the 'digital city' phenomenon within the boundaries of the European Union. It has 
contributed to the creation of a much-needed typology of digital cities by surveying and 
analysing the contents of over two hundred early developments across Europe. 
Another important contribution has been going beyond the observation of the 
contents of the initiatives and, through in-depth case studies, analysing how a couple of 
advanced and exemplar experiments were being socially shaped, concentrating on the 
important - and often overlooked - processes behind the design and deployment of 
technology. 
Information and Communication Technologies are in constant - and rapid - 
evolution, and so are IT-based systems used to run several aspects of urban life. However, 
as the early phases of the development and acceptance of new technologies are crucial and 
able to influence later ideas and initiatives, the results and recommendations from this 
thesis can be seen as a valuable contribution to the study of urban technology in general. 
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Preface 
PREFACE 
With the growth of importance and prominence of the Internet in the second half of 
the 1990s, and the establishment of the World Wide Web as its main interface, visions on 
how to develop and deploy urban internet-based information systems that could benefit 
cities started appearing. 
A concrete possibility of using the internet to help regenerating urban environments 
seemed to exist. Several early and strongly symbolic examples, often referred to as 'digital 
cities', 'virtual cities', or "civic networks' were opening the way of what seemed to be a 
new 4movement' involving the implementation of civic cyberspace to benefit the physical 
city and its socio-economic environment. 
These new urban practices could be seen as potentially beneficial towards economic 
development and regeneration, by providing innovative tools for place marketing on the 
one hand, and an environment facilitating the growth of a better informed, up-to-date and 
clued up workforce on the other. Other benefits could be envisaged within the complex 
field of city management, as the internet could help delivering services - old and new - 
supporting transactions, conveying information to the population. Another extremely 
important area was the support of participation and public discourse, which would enhance 
the public sphere of fragmented Western cities and boost democratic processes. 
Urban cyberspace could then be seen as a crucial piece of technological innovation 
which could be able to deliver benefits in all those areas, and in a way become a sort of 
parallel, even enhanced public space of Western cities, complementing and revitalising the 
physical public space, seen by many as a feature in deep crisis. 
This research is about exploring the early stages - which tend to be also the most 
crucial ones - of development of web-based urban information systems - or digital cities - 
in Europe. 
The main 'core' fieldwork of the study was carried out between 1996 and 1997, 
although successive but minor observations on the case studies have been made in order to 
keep apace with the development and evolution of the initiatives considered. 
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In those years urban internet was a novelty, and it attracted considerable amounts of 
funding from the European Community, making possible the development of some 
apparently very complex projects. Current, successful paradigms seemed to point towards a 
model of 'holistic' intervention, involving efforts of creating general, all-encompassing 
Web sites which would present themselves as informational 'mirrors' of their host cities, 
and would therefore tend to address a variety of urban regeneration issues and problems, 
under the same 'digital city' label. 
Little empirical research was accompanying these developments, and a clear need 
was felt to gain more precise knowledge of the phenomenon, an awareness which could go 
well beyond the hype present in the media and boosted by the interests of the numerous 
growing new technology businesses and firms. 
The 'digital city' was here, but what was it really? 'What types of initiatives could be 
identified, and how was urban cyberspace being shaped? Objectives of a research on this 
topic had to be gaining an understanding of the scope and quality of the phenomenon, at the 
wider European scale, but also exploring the ways some 'best practice' examples were 
actually being constructed and managed. Were digital cities really 'holistic' or were they 
focused on some precise purpose? What actual potential for regeneration did these projects 
have, and were they being shaped to realise that potential? What was the vision behind 
some of them, and was it really compatible with the 'new public space' vocation that most 
commentators would assign to digital cities? 
The emergence of these systems in the European Union is investigated in this 
research, starting from an attempt at defining the phenomenon as a whole, and creating a 
typology of it, and then moving to the analysis of two exemplar case studies. It is a study 
on civic Web sites, and their configuration. It is an analysis of their features and contents, 
as well as a reflection on the processes and actors that were shaping them, and what this 
could mean for the realisation of their alleged beneficial impact on the planning of Western 
cities. 
xi 
Chapter I- Introduction 
CHAPTER 1- INTRODUCTION 
1.0 - INTRODUCTION 
The 1990s, and in particular their second half, were characterised by a surge in 
technological advances in Information and Communications Technologies (ICTs). Among 
these were increasing data transmission speeds, rapid evolution of microprocessors and 
their computing power, and possibly above all the emergence of the World Wide Web, an 
accessible way of distributing and utilising multimedia information over the Internet. It 
soon appeared to the IT industry as well as a range of commentators that the Web definitely 
had the potential of popularising the Internet, making its focus and mission shift from that 
of a mainly academic international networking system, to a multi-purpose - and nearly all- 
purpose - global information grid. 
This is exactly what started happening, as the number of Internet hosts - the 
computers permanently connected to it - started growing exponentially, together with the 
amount of information available on the new Web platform. 
Such a phenomenon was rather obviously bound to be seen as a 'revolution' of 
analogous importance to other previous milestones in human social history. Books started 
appearing arguing that, after the industrial revolution, humankind was facing an 
information revolution of vast proportions and significance, from business related texts 
such as Frances Caimcross' The Death of Distance (1998), to writings in Architecture 
History such as Charles Jencks' Nat is Post-Modernism? (1986 and revised in 1996), with 
its section on the 'Post-Modem Information World'. The conviction that society had to be 
interpreted as post-fordist, post-modem, information and knowledge-based, was being 
reinforced more than ever. 
Society was seen by many commentators to be changing fast and radically, partly 
because of the heavy impacts of the 'layer' of electronic information and its potential for 
I 'virtualising' functions that before would have been affected and shaped by the traditional 
limitations of physical distance, as well as time. 
1 
Chapter 1- Introduction 
Hype was dominant, as the enthusiasm for the potentially beneficial impacts of new 
technologies on all aspects of society was contagious, and hi-tech and telecommunications 
companies were for obvious reasons proactively encouraging this attitude. 
Visions of a future technological 'heaven' were juxtaposed to fears of a dystopian 
perspective on a socially polarised society, more unjust than ever, heavily controlled and 
commodified. 
Cities would have a central position in this wider debate, as ICTs were seen as 
revolutionising both spatial and socio-economic relationships, the main ingredients of 
urban environments. Again, even here, hype and speculation were prevailing, and even 
scholars and authoritative commentators were easily being carried away with making either 
enthusiastic or catastrophic predictions about urban futures where high technology was 
dominant. 
Within this climate, newspapers and the media in general had started using terms like 
'cybercity' or 'virtual city' to identify all sorts of - often very diverse - early experiments 
and ideas involving ICTs and cities. Martin Jacques from Yhe Guardian newspaper visited 
Kuala Lumpur in 1997 and argued "Modem planning is not just about roads and estates. 
It's about an 'intelligent network' linking our offices and homes" (Jacques, 1997). 
In the same year, Yhe Independent was reporting on a forthcoming experiment - 
sponsored by the two IT giants Gateway and Microsoft - to be held in a secret street in 
Islington, London, where the whole neighbourhood was going to be wired and provided 
with computers and software to communicate, becoming an 'Internet Street' (Arthur, 1997) 
In their timely book Telecommunications and the City, Stephen Graham and Simon 
Marvin highlighted the many different metaphors - and in a way buzzwords - used by 
scholars and commentators to describe the increasingly telecommunications-based urban 
space of western cities (Graham and Marvin, 1996; 72) 
One of the many metaphors that were widely employed at the end of the millennium 
was that of the 'digital city'. Although still used sometimes to label virtually'any kind of 
urban-related IT project, the 'digital city' definition was quickly associated mainly with a 
specific type of initiative: Web-based urban information systems and virtual communities. 
This was probably partly due to the success of the most famous 'digital city' paradigm in 
the whole of Europe: the Amsterdam-based DDS, De Digitale Stad. 
2 
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In a short amount of time many other 'digital cities' - or 'civic networks' as some 
would call them - were born all over Europe, constituting a potentially very interesting 
phenomenon of innovation in city management, economic regeneration, and community 
building. They could be seen as an attempt to establish a parallel public space -a 
cyberspace - in Western, fragmented urban societies. But these initiatives were very 
scarcely known or analysed, and their scope, characteristics, impacts, motivations, were 
generally taken for granted within the hype-ridden climate of the 1990s. 
WHAT THE STUDY IS ABOUT 
The purpose of this thesis has been to gain an insight on the phenomenon of digital 
cities. The work has had to deal with a variety of ways employed by civic institutions - 
both public and private - to try and exploit the World Wide Web of the Internet to benefit 
specific aspects of urban regeneration, as well as providing 'platforms' where the growing 
virtual fragments belonging to cities could be organised, presented, and given sense. 
On the one hand this has involved exploring something unknown, about which very 
little had been written or documented properly. This has meant searching for basic 
knowledge and awareness on the topic, stemming from literature that was dealing with the 
wider issues of ICT and society, in order to produce an early - but strongly needed - 
theoretical framework for the interpretation of the phenomenon. What really were digital 
cities? Could they be considered, as the hype from the press seemed to take for granted, as 
a identifiable new trend of urban development? How many of these virtual sites could be 
found in Europe, and what were their characteristics? What were digital cities offering to 
the inhabitants of their physical counterparts? To what extent were crucial issues of 
inclusiveness and social polarisation in the access and use of technology considered and 
addressed by these initiatives? 
On the other hand, as will be clarified in the next two chapters, concentrating on the 
immediately observable contents of some initiatives, however indispensable and desirable, 
has not been perceived as a complete enough method of studying the phenomenon. If 
nothing else, as technological development based on the Internet seemed destined to keep 
changing very quickly, some 'deep', qualitative approach to studying this topic, going 
3 
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beyond the contents in order to study some of the underlying social factors affecting digital 
city design and management, seemed like a very useful and enriching research strategy. 
Valuable and stimulating input from the sociology of technology, and its theories on 
the social shaping of technology, have added a very valuable dimension to this research. 
So, it can be said that the study has been about early attempts at establishing digital - 
or virtual - cities as innovative engines for urban change, regeneration, and community 
building. 
1.2 - HOW THIS THESIS IS STRUCTURED 
This research thesis is organised in sections, which correspond to the phases of the 
investigative journey undertaken. 
Chapters 2 and 3 analyse literature on cities, the urban public sphere, and recent 
technological developments in the domain of Information and Communication 
Technologies. Before the second half of the 1990's very little had been written on the 
specific topic of digital cities, and this seems to be still quite valid at the beginning of 2003, 
when this thesis is being completed. So, it has been quite natural to consider a wider 
perspective, and engage in wider literature about cities, telecommunications and the urban 
public sphere, in order to get suggestions and inspiration. The analysis in the second and 
third chapters generates a series of research questions that were necessary to envisage ways 
of approaching the search for knowledge and the methods underpinning the study. 
An explanation and justification of these methods -a combined strategy of surveying 
and case-study research - is provided in chapter 4. 
The fifth chapter deals with the initial exploration of the phenomenon, and provides 
results and answers relative to the need to identify the scope of the digital city 'movement' 
and how such initiatives could be categorised and analysed from the point of view of their 
contents, throughout the European Union. This is achieved through a survey-based strategy, 
centred on the observation of many 'web cities' and their contents. 
Chapters 6 and 7 move away from the survey approach and describe the qualitative 
investigations of two exemplar, leading edge, digital cities. These are linked to and extend 
from the survey presented in chapter 5, which provides for the choice, from a spectrum of 
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over 200 possible cases, some examples that are likely to be considered as 'best practice' 
ones. The Bologna digital city in Italy - named lperbole - (chapter 6) and the Bristol one 
(chapter 7), were chosen for the case study investigation. They both comply with the 
survey's criteria for advanced examples, and score high within it. 
Chapter 8 provides a comparison of the two case studies, extrapolating common 
trends and differences, and identifying a series of main issues, problems, and possible 
solutions that are related to the processes underlying the shaping of urban high technology 
initiatives, and can inform similar projects. 
Chapter 9 wraps everything up into a series of conclusive remarks, highlighting some 
important changes in the way advanced telecommunication and Internet technologies are 
perceived, that are happening after the turn of the millennium, and how these changes 
confirm, on the one hand, the relevance and timeliness of works such as this thesis, and on 
the other hand suggest the need for further, more refined research on the topic of urban 
telematics. 
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CHAPTER 2- 
CYBERSPACE AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE OF THE CITY 
2.0 INTRODUCTION 
Speaking about the 'city' is getting harder and harder. This is not just because 
contemporary cities have reached levels of extreme complexity, but because the notion 
of city itself is facing a crisis never encountered before. Can a complex network of 
streets, buildings and green areas, of slums and glamorous commercial zones be 
considered a city just because it hosts a large number of people? This question has 
engaged an extremely large number of architects, planners and sociologists is trying to 
figure out how contemporary urban space is evolving, and how the instruments and the 
practice to deal with it should evolve as well. A common feeling of inadequacy has in 
fact become the base of a wide debate about the present and the future of cities, and 
many are questioning the efficiency of the existing approaches used to plan, design and 
manage a town: 
"Having taken on board the theme of the crisis of planning, 
whether this is true or supposed, we have seen as useful, or even 
necessary, to verify whether the traditional planning 
instruments are still able to fuUll the needs of cities that are 
seeking their lost identity or lookingfor a brand new one" (Lo 
Piccolo, 1995; 19) [translation by author] 
This chapter reviews some of the crucial issues that relate to this crisis of identity 
of cities and uncertainty about the adequacy of planning. The main issues of 
fragmentation of space, society and political agency are examined together with their 
consequences on urban scenarios. Several tensions characterising contemporary urban 
life, and the way we analyse it, are highlighted. Among these, the tension existing 
between the 'global' aspects of contemporary society and economy, and the need for 
protecting local interests, cultures and communities, plays an important role, as do the 
gradual commodification of places often carried out by the 'global' agents and the 
consequent crisis of urban public space. The overall scenario in which these tensions 
have to be framed is a situation of conflict and transition between the centralised urban 
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control, promoted by a declining modernist planning, and the fragmented post- 
modernist vision of the contemporary city. 
The application of new telecommunication technologies, and in particular the 
electronic space that is referred to as cyberspace, could potentially play an important 
role in the restructuring and revitalisation of urban space. In the second part of the 
chapter, several different points of view about the relation between advanced 
telecommunications and the city are critically reviewed. The chapter suggests noticing 
how theoretical positions that can seem very different from each other, some seeing 
cyberspace as a solution to urban problems, others envisaging a major threat in the 
advent of virtual environments, are often flawed by a deterministic attitude. 
Nevertheless, many of the possible advantages and drawbacks of the application of 
cyberspace to cities would still have to be considered and taken on board, but as 
research themes addressing real innovation in contemporary cities, rather than as 
forecasts of possible futures. Within this chapter I claim that, to do this, a more nuanced 
vision of the relationship between technology and society has to be adopted, according 
to the theoretical position known as 'Social Construction of Technology'. This type of 
approach does not necessarily rule out the interesting, dystopian critique of the utopian 
and futurist positions made by many political economists, but it tends to integrate it 
with a more 'localised' vision, that acknowledges the influence of local actors as 
councils and firms, on the shaping of urban public cyberspace and its consequences on 
the city. 
2.1 THE CRISIS OF CONTEMPORARY CITIES 
The major problem acknowledged by Lewis Mumford, in the sixties, was "the 
sprawling giantism of the twentieth-century city, that was leading inexorably to 
megalopolis and thence to necropolis, the death of the city" (Mumford, 1960; quoted in 
Wilson, 1995; 147). In the contemporary scenario, though, we don't necessarily need to 
consider big metropolitan areas like Los Angeles or Mexico City to find signs of crises 
of identity and a sense of citizenship, as well as many other social problems linked with 
unemployment, multicultural and multiracial conditions, and a lack of communication 
among people. In other words, the 'cancer' that Mumford was envisaging for the big 
American cities has extended its influence to many average size cities around the world. 
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This is not necessarily a function of urban size. It is true that the growth of many 
metropolitan areas has radically changed the relationship between town and country, 
blurring or even dissolving the city limits. It is hard to perceive a city with no borders 
that moreover lacks a strong characterisation, because of the 'international style' of its 
suburbs, as a unique site, with its own culture and personality, capable of giving its 
inhabitants the sense of community and confidence they could need. But this is not the 
only cause for the 'fading out' of urban space. Many scholars find it hard to recognize a 
city not because of the absence of an edge, but because either the physical and the social 
space that were so far defined as 'town' have broken up into bits that seem independent 
and detached from each other: 
"It is often said that disappearance is the city's fate. But the 
"city" has already disappeared, andfor those like me who deal 
with urbanism, the problem is letting it come back. The city in 
which we live nowadays is not any more a city. It has many 
names: metropolitan conurbations, residential areas, industrial 
areas, commercial areas, holiday areas. Our life is organised by 
areas, but what we define a city has already been widely 
overtaken" (Magnaghi, 1995; 17) [translation by author] 
2.1.1 Cities gone to pieces 
So, the crisis is not just a matter of size. It is not only because the city, as a whole, 
has grown too much. Actually, it is also because the city is not a 'whole' any more or, 
perhaps, it is not like the majority of us expect a 'whole' to be. The borders between 
town and country, and even between different neighbouring towns are disappearing, yet 
new edges are developing inside the city itself. 
'Fragmentation' is probably the keyword when it comes to speaking about 
contemporary urban space, and this phenomenon can be observed in social life as well 
as in architectural production. A clear example of this is given by Christine Boyer 
speaking about recent developments in New York, and criticising an article written by 
the architectural critic Paul Goldberger, who 
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"... hopes to convince us that architects and planners are scene- 
makers, not social reformers; they need no longer be concerned 
with the difference between public, semi-public or private space 
in the city, and they generally have lost the need or desire for 
social accountability. From this point of view, architecture in 
the city is an autonomous artistic expression that has nothing to 
do with the social and economic plight of the poor. I would 
argue that this view is part of the reason why our collective view 
of the city has become fragmented into individualized pieces 
incompatible with the creation of a physical plan, and why we 
have no map of the city linking together the poorer 
neighbourhoods with the enclaves of the well-to-do. A plan or a 
map might draw us closer together and underscore our 
collective plight" (Boyer, 1993; 112-113). 
These words are a strong critique of contemporary planning and urban design, and 
the acknowledgement that the city is actually becoming a place with no map or plan, 
being rather a series of places divided by social and cultural gaps between which any 
type of communication is getting more and more difficult to be held. 
On one side there are the commodified and heavily controlled parts of the 
growing metropolis, such as shopping malls, office buildings, airports, entertainment 
sites. On the other side are those parts of the city that have problems in keeping their 
local and cultural characteristics, having to cope with deprivation at several levels, and 
find themselves isolated from the wealthy urban space. 
Sorkin calls them the "departicularized" space on the town, which is 
"Obsessed with the point ofproduction and the point ofsale, the 
new city is little more than a swarm of urban bit jettisoning a 
physical view of the whole, sacrificing the idea of the city as the 
site of community and human connection" (Sorkin, 1992; xiii). 
This lack of connectivity is to be considered from multiple points of view. The 
crisis of social connections, and some major changes in the way urban space is designed 
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and built, interact in a cause-effect circle, that transforms the city into a jigsaw of 
different pieces, sometimes indifferent to each other, yet contiguous. 
The 'spatial' side of this process was acknowledged several years ago by a range 
of architectural theorists. It was noticed that connections and paths tended to become at 
most 'by-passes' from one zone to another, losing that characteristic of micro-universe 
where the features of the neighbourhood and the whole city were displayed to the 
visitor (Norberg-Schulz, 1971). It cannot be denied, then, that space and society are 
interconnected, and that the lack of social connectivity affects urban space, and vice 
versa. 
As has been said before, the Los Angeles described by Mike Davis in his book 
City of Quartz (1990) offers a remarkable example of urban fragmentation of space and 
society: 
"Welcome to post-liberal Los Angeles, where the defense of 
luxury lifestyles is translated into a proliferation of new 
repressions in space and movement, undergirded by the 
ubiquitous 'armed response. This obsession with physical 
security systems, and, collaterally, with the architectural 
policing of social boundaries, has become a zeitgeist of urban 
restructuring, a master narrative in the emerging built 
environment of the 1990's "(Davis, 1990; 223) 
But such trends can also be observed in relatively small European cities like 
Newcastle, where the differences among 'rich' and 'poor' areas are increasing. The 
feeling of uneasiness for wealthy people and the lack of security that accompanies 
social polarisation lead to the fact that parts of the city have begun to be controlled by 
public CCTV security systems (Graham and Marvin, 1996). The territory tends to be 
organised into zones more and more disconnected from each other. The new 
developments tend to be designed as 'closed systems'. The Newcastle Business Park, a 
big complex on the banks of the river Tyne, for example, is completely indifferent to 
the deprived area nearby. Rather, it protects itself from its surrounds with high fences 
and video surveillance. Another example is the central 'Eldon Square' shopping centre, 
a pseudo-public space that has replaced a remarkable portion of the Newcastle city 
centre. It has its private police, a strict surveillance and closes at 5.30 p. m. Some have 
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observed that this process is generated by "corporate and state planners, [who] have 
created environments that are based on desires for security rather than interaction, for 
entertainment rather than (perhaps divisive) politics" (D. Mitchell 1995; 119). This need 
for security and the separation that derives from it, affect not only the characteristics of 
central business areas and shopping malls, but also increase hostility and suspicion 
among different residential areas, in which local communities tend to close themselves 
even more to the outcomers or to socially, culturally, economically different groups of 
people: 
"In areas of our cities where poverty and social diversity are 
concentrated, the signs of stress are pervasive, in the 
routinisation of violence, alienation and anger, of crime and 
stigma. This reinforces exclusionary tendencies, encouraging a 
defensive sense among the better-off, labelling these stressed 
neighbourhoods as 'outside, not part of the 'mainstream, and 
'other"' (Healey et al., 1995; 7) 
This change of scale, from the whole city to the particular community or even 
single individual, is both cause and effect of a major change in how urban space is 
managed. The fragmentation of space and society is strictly linked to a fragmentation of 
political agency, as described by Simin Davoudi: 
"City governments are no longer the key locusfor integration of 
urban relationships, but merely one of many actors competing 
for access to resources and control of agendas " (Davoudi, 
1995; 226) 
The traditional forms of urban governance are weakened by this change of 
approach towards government in general. Neo-liberal tendencies, by promoting the 
concept of a "lighter" public administration, have encouraged strategies of privatisation 
and deregulation. This has resulted in the "offloading to companies, voluntary 
associations and households of tasks formerly undertaken by the state" (Healey et al., 
1995; 5) This privatisation process and its relationship with the changes in the social 
fabric of urban places is also described by Dear as follows: 
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"At base, I believe that one of the most characteristicfeatures of 
contemporary urbanism is fragmentation. This finds expression 
in... patronage driven development: opportunities opened up by 
the collapse of government oversight. Paradoxically, such 
fragmentation at the same time encourages the proliferation of 
intense local autonomies. Related to this is an emergent 
privatism. During the 1980's a reassertion of individual rights 
over community obligations has resulted in a loss of 
community" (Dear, 1993; 7-8). 
Such a claim underlines both the benefits and the drawbacks of this phenomenon. 
If, in fact, on one side, new opportunities for individuals and for certain minorities can 
be opened by an increased lack of central control, on the other side it is evident that 
fragmentation can affect everything that was previously seen as a 'whole', at different 
scales. Local communities can, then, themselves live a growing condition of crisis, 
leaving space for the influence of well organised lobbies: 
"The instability and fragmentation of relations and networks 
represents threats to political community and allow powerful 
groups to impose their criteria and practices discretely and 
often unchallenged" (Mabbot, 1993 - quoted in Davoudi, 1995; 
27) 
2.1.2 Towns as goods: globalisation and city marketing 
Cities, then, have become a yet more complex arena, in which a decreased control 
over the individuals and marginalised groups has its counterpart in a remarkable 
influence on key decisions and town management by big corporate firms and private 
lobbies, that may have no real 'roots' in that specific reality. Cities are increasingly seen 
as places that can attract investment, rather than producing it endogenously. This, 
together with the lack of public funding and diminished public control, encourages the 
'commodiflcation' of places, the management of urban spaces as commodities that have 
to be 'chosen' and bought by consumers and investors: 
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"The perception of crisis is producing an explosion of interest 
in the city. Much of this is informed by the belief that the quality 
of a city can become an economic asset in the struggle to 
capture and retain mobile globalising company investment" 
(Healeyetal., 1995; 7) 
"As the economic fortunes of cities move to the top of the local 
political agenda, urban economic policy making, ýpublic private 
partnerships', and place marketing are emerging as driving 
forces in changing approaches to urban management. Central 
here is the desire to position cities favourably on the global 
economic networks dominated by the burgeoning multinational 
corporations" (Graham, 1995; 85) 
This can, sometimes, bring no apparent benefits to the local people. Rather, the 
interests involved in treating the city as a commodity can be opposite to those of the 
local population, as stated by Enzo Mingione: 
"The much expanded role of non-residents (e. g. businessmen, 
investors, tourists, shoppers, students, cultural visitors and 
commuters) complicates urban life andproduces a new type of 
socio-economic environment, no longer dependent nearly 
exclusively on the number of permanent residents (Martinotti, 
1993). It is on this ground that afracture between tax-payers' 
interests (mostly residents and local businesses) and city 
marketing interests (mostly oriented towards capturing, at 
whatever the cost, increasing numbers of city users and regular 
business visitors) is wideningjast and in some cases assuming 
greater importance than traditional class conflict" (Mingione, 
1995; 197) 
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2.1.3 The crisis of public space 
This conflict of interests between the city as a place and the city as a commodity, 
has some major effects on the parts of the town that used to belong to the community 
and that increasingly are used to produce money and to promote the image of the city to 
the outcomers. Elizabeth Wilson takes Paris as an example noting that: 
"The Parc de la Villette is designedfor tourists rather than for 
the hoarse-voiced, red-handed working men and women who in 
any case no longer work or live there. Thus it is in the great 
cities of the world at least, but also certainly in any smaller 
cities that can capitalize on an historic past, or an industrial 
peculiarity - not only is the tourist becoming perhaps the most 
important kind of inhabitant, but we all become tourists in our 
own cities... " (Wilson, 1995; 157) 
The public places of the contemporary town are increasingly being turned into 
lucrative areas, reflecting the interests of private capital. Because of this, they also have 
to be controllable. The comparison made by Wilson when she states that airports are 
"Increasingly indistinguishable from shopping malls" (Wilson, 1995; 157) can be 
reversed. If it is true that airports are being 'consumerised', being filled up with shops, 
downtown shopping malls resemble air terminals, as well, because of their strict 
surveillance that lacks only the metal detectors at the entrance. 
Most of these "post-urban" spaces, as Wilson defines them, are in fact rarely truly 
open zones. Access is carefully controlled and to be secure they actually need to be 
protected, closed areas with few connections and relationships with the city outside. 
They can be seen as a sort of modem medieval keeps, with surveillance cameras rather 
than walls, guarding the private properties of the new landlords. The difference with the 
middle ages is that outside public space is disappearing, the marketplace is becoming 
itself a fortress, and squares are what is among the buildings, rather than the buildings 
what surrounds squares. The 'death' - or the agony - of the city is then to be related to 
the crisis of its public, open bits. Therefore Christine Boyer defines the "City of Illusion 
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as calling something public space when indeed is not; focusing on the provision of 
luxury spaces within 'the centre of the city and ignoring most of the interstitial places" 
(Boyer, 1993; 113-114). 
2.1.4 Out of sight 
So, when we say that the city is 'disappearing', does it mean that it is dissolving 
and something else is replacing it, whether it is a big theme park or a landscape of 
fortresses? Are "the connections that make sense of forms" (Sorkin, 1992; xiii) being 
destroyed? Or are they just hidden? Elizabeth Wilson seems to suggest this when she 
states that 
"we must live in this realm ofsmudged boundaries, ofpollution 
and disorder, and the gentre of urban writing is beginning to 
recognize its romance. It was always the interstices of the city, 
the forgotten bits between, the corners of the city that somehow 
escaped, that constituted its charm, forgotten squares, canals, 
deserted houses -private, secret angles of the vast public space" 
(Wilson, 1995; 160). 
Words like 'ignored' or 'forgotten' actually suggest that, although the 
commodification of public space is a real fact, a very important cause of the crisis of 
contemporary cities is invisibility, and the related lack of communication between 
people. This phenomenon is itself deeply linked with the privatisation processes that are 
going on. As Sorkin notes, when he compares post-modem, commercialised spaces to 
theme parks: 
"The theme park presents its happy regulated vision ofpleasure 
- all those arýfully hoodwinking forms - as a substitute for the 
democratic public realm, and it does so appealingly by stripping 
troubled urbanity of its sting, of the presence of the poor, of 
crime, of dirt, of work. In the ýpublic' spaces of the theme park 
or the shopping mall, speech itsetr is restricted: there are no 
demonstrations in Disneyland" (Sorkin, 1992; 5) 
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This crisis of visibility has two different aspects that can be grasped from the 
previous quotations. The real city, and society, tends to be invisible in the highly 
controlled and commodified places. At the same time, these wealthy bits of urban space 
tend to marginalise the other areas, both economically - they absorb most of the 
investment - and socially. Public spaces and architectures, built with the purpose of 
gathering people, lose their attractiveness because of lack of safety, because they have 
no appealing features left, or simply because they have become invisible, forgotten, and 
nobody goes there and uses them. The times in which urban design and architecture 
were seen as capable of benefiting society as a whole, seem definitely gone. 
2.1.5 Beyond modernity 
Curing the illnesses of the fragmented urban space by building something new 
seems too difficult for architects and urban designers, and it can be even cause for 
further fragmentation. We are in a very particular phase of history, in which architects 
feel like losing that creative power that was believed to make them capable to modify 
the environment positively, making people's existence better through the use of 
materials, textures, shapes. 
A sort of uneasiness is felt for all the disciplines that imply actual intervention on 
urban space, not excluding planning. It is, in a way, the fall of the modernist ideals of 
rational management of space. In 1929, Le Corbusier, one of the masters of modernist 
architecture and planning wrote that 
"a town is pure geometry. When man is free, his tendency is 
towards pure geometry. It is then that he achieves what we call 
order. Order is indispensable to him, otherwise his actions 
would be without coherence and could lead nowhere. And to it 
he brings that aid of his idea ofperfection. The more this order 
is an exact one, the more happy he is, the more secure hefeels. " 
(Le Corbusier, 1929; 28-29) 
It is this dream of perfection, of harmony, transparency, and visibility achieved 
through the use of pure geometrical entities such as the right angle, together with the 
rational use of light and materials. It is the modernist determinism based on a 
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"overflowing confidence in science and technology" (Madani-Pour, 1995; 22) that is 
supposed to overcome chaos, producing a perfect, ideal, untouched city-machine that 
affects people's lives: 
"Then suddenly we find ourselves at the feet of the first sky- 
scrapers. But here we have, not the meagre shaft of sunlight 
which sojaintly illumines the dismal streets offew York, but an 
immensity of space. The whole city is a Park. The terraces 
stretch out over lawns and into groves. Low buildings of a 
horizontal kind lead the eye on to thefoliage of the trees. Where 
are now the trivial Procuracies? Here is the CITY with its 
crowds living in peace and pure air, where noise is smothered 
under the foliage of green trees. The chaos of New York is 
overcome. Here, bathed in light, stands the modern city" (Le 
Corbusier, 1929; 177 -original emphasis) 
But dividing and zoning cities, as well as designing white, hyper-hygienic, well-lit 
habitation, based on 'pure' anthropomorphic dimensions, was seldom, or never, 
possible in the ideal way imagined by Le Corbusier. Its partial application anyway did 
not improve society and quality of life as it was supposed to do. Rather, it is now 
believed that urban space developed its fragmentation possibly also because of this too 
idealistic approach. Barry Goodchild seems to suggest it when he says: 
"The big city continues to be seen as a place of excitement and 
innovation and also a place of danger, pollution and social 
segregation. Yet planning is now so deeply implicated in the 
creation of the city in the twentieth century, that the earlier 
hopes of town planning as an exercise in social reform seem 
deeplyflawed" (Goodchild, 1990,132). 
Are, then, town planning and architecture guilty of having produced the crisis of 
contemporary urban space? What we can say is that the way society, culture and 
economy have changed - and are changing - has ruled out any type of idealistic solution 
for town development and management. As Dear argues: 
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"For me, postmodernity encompasses a set ofperspectives on a 
most impressive intellectual dilemma: that Rationalism has 
failed both as an ideal and as a practical guidefor thought and 
social action; and that henceforth, we have to manage without 
such Enlightenment desiderata as decisive theoretical argument 
or sejr-evident truth. In Toulmin's (1990) felicitous phrases, we 
have moved from a mindset which emphasises the written, the 
general, the universal and the timeless to one which privileges 
the oral, the local, Particular and timely" (Dear, 1995; 28) 
The postmodern city has shown clearly that real life is somewhat different and not 
very compatible with the tidy, mechanical world seeked by the modernist architects and 
planners. Nevertheless, technology is still the object of enthusiastic approaches that tend 
to see its new developments as the long-awaited solutions for the problems of the 
fragmented urban space. The advent of information technology and advanced 
telecommunications systems, seems to open new perspectives for the management of 
cities and public space, encouraging a renewed deterministic and rationalistic approach 
by some scholars. New threats and old drawbacks, according to some critics, seem to 
emerge, as well. The next paragraphs will deal with these different positions, in order to 
recognise how an original contribution to the debate can be given, and how is better to 
approach the topic and carry out research about it. 
2.2 CYBERSPA CE ASA NEW WORLD 
One of the possible choices, when faced with any of the dimensions of the 'urban 
crisis', can be to leave physicality behind and to look for perfect or quasi-perfect 
'environments'. It is not the first time in which city-makers have to develop their ideas 
in unreal territories, trying to avoid the limits imposed by the physical world and the 
complexity of society. The history of architecture and urbanism is full of examples of 
virtual cities and virtual buildings represented on paintings and sculptures, or simply on 
drafts and designs that never become real. Marcos Novak has given just some of the 
possible examples saying that: 
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"Piranesi's series of etchings entitled Carceri, or Prisons, 
marks the beginning of an architectural discourse of the 
purposefully unbuildable. Against the increasing constriction of 
architectural practice, Piranesi drew an imagined world of 
complex, evocative architecture. ( .. ) Ledoux, Lequeu, BoulMe, 
each contributed to this struggle: as architectural practice was 
made more and more prosaic by the encroachment of utility, 
they responded by inventing a bolder and bolder imaginary 
counterpart" (Novak, 1991; 246 -original emphasis) 
Visionary architecture is indeed a relevant and interesting bit of history, and it has 
definitely influenced, as an avant-garde and a cultural sign of the times, the actual 
production and conception of the built environment and urban culture. 
But there are big differences between the virtual worlds known and used by our 
ancestors and some of those available now. Information technology has in fact made 
possible the creation of 'virtual worlds' that are not just ways to represent an 
alternative, ideal environment, and communicate its characteristics to the people. 
Through computer-based virtual reality, and the application of telematics, it is actually 
possible to do more than just display something: it is possible to interact and establish 
two-ways communication with both the objects and the people who share a certain 
electronic environment. In other words, these virtual worlds work and have functions 
that go beyond mere representation, whether we are speaking about world-wide data 
networks or local and more limited experiments. 
Telematics is not actually something new. The 'art' of networking computers 
using modems and telephone lines, or better hardware, has been practised for several 
decades by professionals and amateurs, establishing services and communities very 
similar to those existing among radio-amateurs. But the current success of telematics 
and the reason why everyone has been talking about it is that it has a name: Internet. 
Bom as a military network, developed for academic purposes, the Internet is now a 
'network of networks' embracing academic, business and private users all over the 
world. Statistics show that in October 1994 the number of users capable to use all the 
facilities provided by the Internet was 13.5 million, while 27.5 million people were able 
to use the basic e-mail service to communicate. In just three years (1997) these figures 
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had increased to 57 million Internet users and 71 million people with email access 
(statistics by the Matrix Information and Directory Service - MIDS). In January 2003 an 
'Internet Domain Survey' from the Internet Software Consortium (www. isc. org) could 
count over 171 million active 'hosts', that is computers actively connected to the global 
network. This figure probably does not take into account most of those machines, and 
households/people behind them, still connecting on a very part-time basis by dialing up 
their service provider. Each machine is very likely to serve more than one user, so the 
figures add up to an impressive growth rate. 
The Internet, and more generally speaking the so-called 'cyberspace', has then 
been increasingly seen by many as an alternative environment in which to experiment 
with virtual spaces that enable people to communicate among them and perform several 
functions previously bound exclusively to the physical world. 
2.2.1 The promised land of cyberspace: utopia and futurism 
So, cyberspace seems to embody both the characteristics of real and virtual space. 
It 'works', enabling people to do real things and it has not, at the same time, all the 
disadvantages of the material world. As Katherine Hayles states: "Being able to occupy 
a virtual space implies that one can have the benefits of physicality without being bound 
by its limitations" (Hayles, 1993; 179). Cyberspace looks like the place where it can be 
possible to 'build' the ideal city which modernism failed to produce for real, and this is 
really appealing for those architects, urban designers and planners who are looking at 
high technology as the instrument to overcome all the problems of communication and 
fragmentation - both social and physical - that affect contemporary cities. 
Cyberspace is here, and utopianist commentators claim that it is 
"The realm ofpure information, filling like a lake, siphoning the 
jangle of messages transfiguring the physical world, 
decontaminating the natural and urban landscapes, redeeming 
them, saving them from the chain-dragging bulldozers of the 
paper industry, from the diesel smoke of courier and post-office 
trucks, from jet fuel fumes and clogged airports, from 
billboards, trashy and pretentious architecture, hour-long 
freeway commutes, ticket lines, and choked subways... from all 
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the inefficiencies, pollution (chemical and informational), and 
corruptions attendant to the process of moving information 
attached to things - from paper to brains - across, over and 
under the vast and bumpy surface of the earth rather than 
letting itflyfree in the soft hail of electrons that is cyberspace". 
(Benedikt, 1991; 3) 
This is not just the definition of a technique, a tool that should be used because it 
provides alternative ways to manage cities and their functions. This sounds almost like 
a new religion, worshipping something that will change the way things are so 
dramatically and so positively that it deserves to be described with verbs like 
"redeeming" and "saving". It is actually a triumph of idealism, fed by the positivist, 
techno-enthusiastic attitude that telematics could be the ultimate solution for urban 
problems. Cyberspace is seen by architects like Michael Benedikt as a chance to 
revitalise architecture and urbanism, that type of creative process that has the power to 
generate spaces where it is good to live for everyone, the ability to turn cities into clean, 
unpolluted, citizen-friendly environments, both in electronic and physical dimensions. 
Benedikt stresses a concept of cyberspace as a dimension which transfigures the 
physical world, because it facilitates a process in which "architecture shifts from the 
traditional continuous city to a structure of relationships, connections and associations" 
(Benedikt, 1991; 249). A colleague of his, Marcos Novak goes even further, drawing a 
parallel between virtual space and his discipline saying that: "cyberspace is 
architecture; cyberspace has an architecture; and cyberspace contains architecture" 
(Novak, 1991; 226). The electronic environments can be, in a way, the actualisation of 
what before was considered just visionarism: 
"It is instructive to scan the manifestos (of visionary 
architecture) for premonitions of an architecture of cyberspace. 
Many have contributed to this effort, becoming the world'sfront 
line of imagination, building in words and images what we can 
not yet convince the physical world to bear" (Novak, 1991; 246) 
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And such commentators seem to go well beyond visionarism, because these new 
worlds are not mere representations: they have functions, people, interaction, and 
therefore they can host a new type of architecture that deserves its name: 
"A liquid architecture in cyberspace is clearly a dematerialized 
architecture. It is an architecture that is no longer satisfied with 
only space and form and light and all the aspects of the real 
world. It is an architecture of fluctuating relations between 
abstract elements. It is an architecture that tends to music" 
(Novak, 1991; 251). 
But the cyber-enthusiasts cannot be found only among architects. The hype for 
new technologies is extremely strong in nearly all the fields of human activity. Michael 
Ogden deals with politics, but his hopes for the future are not less optimistic than those 
of Benedikt and Novak: 
"Cyberspace is a conceptual 'spaceless place' where words, 
human relationships, data, wealth, status and power are made 
manifest by people using computer-mediated communications 
technology. It has been variously described as a new universe, a 
parallel universe created and sustained by the world's present 
andfuture computers and communication networks. A world in 
which the global traffic of data and knowledge, facts and lies, 
entertainment and alter-human agency take onform with tens of 
millions of voices and twice as many eyes in a silent, invisible 
concert of inquiry, deal making, dream sharing, and simple 
beholding. It is accessed through any computer capable of 
linking into the network; a place, one place, multidimensional, 
limitless, everywhere and nowhere, a place where nothing is 
forgotten andyet everything changes" (Ogden, 1994; 715). 
This new society, where the opportunities are endless and for everyone, as 
described by Ogden, belongs to what is defined as the "anything, anytime, anywhere" 
futurist myth on the positive impacts of cyberspace (Graham and Marvin, 1996; 88). It 
is the same idea of overcoming the problems of physicality that architects have 
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projected onto politics, social affairs and culture: "We're creating a womb for culture at 
large, for civilisation, and I think that's a potentially beautiful thing" (Rushkoff, from 
Once upon a Time in Cyberville, Channel 4 Television, 1994). Being able to get rid of 
distances and of the oppressive habits inherited by the industrial society, seems to some 
writers the key for a new, inevitable era, in which displacement wins over 
agglomeration. Cities are then seen as an inconvenient heritage that has to change 
radically, eventually to dematerialise into virtual space. That is the era of the 'electronic 
cottage', the 'wired' home that becomes workplace strengthening family and 
community bonds: 
"If the electronic cottage were to spread, a chain of 
consequences of great importance would flow through society 
(. ) Community impact: (. ) The electronic cottage could help 
restore a sense of community belonging, and touch off a 
renaissance among voluntary organizations like churches, 
women's groups, lodges, athletic and youth organizations. (. ) 
Environmental impact: (. ) Instead of requiring highly 
concentrated amounts of energy in a few high-rise offices or 
sprawling factory complexes, and therefore requiring highly 
centralized energy generation, the electronic cottage system 
would spread out energy demand and thus make it easier to use 
solar, wind and other alternative energy technologies 
Economic impact: (. ) if individuals came to own their own 
electronic terminals and equipment, purchased perhaps on 
credit, they would become, in effect, independent enterpeneurs 
rather than classical employees - meaning, as it were, increased 
ownership of the 'means of production' by the worker. (. ) 
Psychological impact: (.. ) work at home suggests a deepening 
of jace-to-jace and emotional relationships in both the home 
and the neighbourhood. Rather than a world ofpurely vicarious 
human relationships, with an electric screen interposed between 
the individual and the rest of humanity, as imagined in many 
science flction stories, one can postulate a world divided into 
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two sets of human relationships - one real, the other vicarious - 
with different rules and roles in each " (Toffler, 1981; 214-216) 
People were waiting for the end of the world in the year 1000, and towards the 
end of the second millennium many were claiming that another brand new world was 
going to replace or at least improve our reality. This optimistic and technocratic vision 
has not just been promoted by utopian scientists and artists. Industry has a great deal of 
self-interest, for obvious reasons, in encouraging such an enthusiastic attitude. It is not 
by chance that Bill Gates, chairman of Microsoft Corporation, has been speaking just 
the same language as those intellectuals who tend to blindly support the idea of a 
perfect relationship between the physical world and cyberspace. Asked in The Guardian 
about possible losses ofjobs because of the advent of information technology, he stated: 
"Until we have infinitely good education, infinitely good service 
everywhere and beautiful inner cities, there are jobs left to be 
done. The day that most important needs are met, society will 
shorten the work week and increase vacation time. As the world 
gets richer, some of its wealth will go to increasing relaxation 
time" (Gates, 1995). 
Thus, dominant discourses about cyberspace tend to be a mixture of cyber- 
philosophy and information technology commercials. These two points of view end up 
being the two sides of the same coin. Techno-intellectuals encourage people to buy 
technology and services, to think about them as a way to get empowered. So do 
Microsoft, IBM, AoL etc. 
No wonder that the cover of the first British issue of Wired magazine solemnly 
stated: "We have it in our power to begin the world over again", and this creative ability 
is claimed to be equally shared among virtually every person who does not retreat from 
the flow of progress. Being Digital (1995) is the title of a book written by Nicholas 
Negroponte, guru of technology and chief of MIT. Media Lab., but it is also an 
imperative given by all the media to those people who do not want their way of life to 
become obsolete. The status-symbol of the current era is going to be not a mere object, 
but information itself. Having access to databases and 'portals' with all the latest 
information, being able to tap into these databases even while you are one the move, 
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through several types of mobile devices, whether you really need this or not, and even if 
you cannot manage the sheer amount of information, is portrayed as making the 
difference. And, of course, industry is offering all of this, information and the objects 
you need to retrieve it, like state-of-the-art 'personal digital assistants' (PDAs) and 
second and third generation mobile phones that represent a convergence between 
mobile computing and mobile telephony, wireless yet in touch with the whole world. 
Being able to displace ourselves working from a park bench as in a Microsoft's 
commercial from the Nineties, is presented as just the beginning of a new era of 
freedom from the constrictions of physical world. How many people will receive a 
broadband Internet subscription, or a Multimedia Messaging (MMS) enabled mobile 
phone as a Christmas present, next December? 
2.2.2 Tech no-determinist dystopia 
In such a discourse, the parallel reality of cyberspace is seen as inevitable, and it 
is claimed that all of us will eventually spend a remarkable part of our time dealing with 
virtual environments, both for business and entertainment: "We are approaching an 
epoch within which a self-identity derived from 'real' 'embodied' experiences is unable 
to compete with ones derived from the 'erotic ontology' of hyperreal simulated 
disembodied cyberspace" (Burrows, 1995; 8). Groups and schools of thought were born 
and grown up to cope with the new forthcoming robotic era. Timothy Leary in 1990 
wrote on Pataphysics Magazine: 
"We are mutating into another species, from Aquaria to the 
Terrarium, and now we are moving into Cyberia. We are 
creatures crawling to the center of the cybernetic world. But 
cybernetics are the stuff of which the world is made. Matter is 
simply frozen information... " (Leary, 1990; quoted in Leary, 
1994; vii). 
A very common attitude in dealing with technological innovation, that is 
highlighted in Leary's statement as well as in the futuristic claims that were examined 
before, is determinism. Technology, and in particular cyberspace, is seen as the primary 
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cause for an evolutionary process that brings a whole series of dramatic consequences 
to physical space and society: 
"To technological determinists, the urban impacts of telematics 
and telecommunications are relatively straightforward, linear, 
direct and easy to pinpoint. Most are virtually inevitable. The 
decentralisation, or even dissolution, of cities; the free 
availability of highly capable communications in all locations; 
the shift towards city economies based on information; the 
growth of a culture based on tele-interactions; the shift to an 
'immaterial'urban life,, the growth of telecommuting - all will be 
shaped by new innovations in telematics in a deterministic and 
inevitablefashion. The analytical andpolicy issues suggested by 
technological determinist therefore centre around how society 
can adapt to and learn to live with the effects of 
telecommunications-based change, rather than focusing on the 
ways in which these effects may be altered of reshaped through 
policy initiatives" (Graham and Marvin, 1996,83) 
Techno-determinists are, then, concerned with the impacts of telematics and 
cyberspace, not with their shaping. Their efforts are focused on how society, and even 
single individuals, should learn to adapt to the new forthcoming condition, to mutate, to 
use Leary's evolutionary expression. 
And technological impacts on society are not necessarily to be seen as positive as 
Gates, Ogden, Benedikt and many others see them. Dystopian views are as strong and 
categorical as utopian ones. They depict a future in which people's freedom is 
diminished or put in jeopardy by advanced teleconu-nunications. 
Cyberpunk, for instance, is a literary and cultural movement whose vision is not 
actually very optimistic about future. Cyberpunk science fiction books like the ones 
written by William Gibson or Bruce Sterling in the 1990s, depict a world in which 
people live in a completely commodified hi-tech world, heavily ruled and controlled, in 
which inequality is sovereign. This literature provides: "stunning examples of how 
realist 'extrapolative' science fiction can operate as prefigurative social theory, as well 
as an anticipatory opposition politics to the cyber-fascism lurking over the next 
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horizon" (Davis, 1992 - quoted in Burrows, 1995; 2). In Gibson's novel Virtual Light 
(1993), the only alternative available against a society based on lies and social control 
through video surveillance and telecommunication networks, seems living in the 
interstices, in the marginalised slums of the city that scare the well-to-do's so much that 
some of them get to believe that those places actually host ghosts and cannibals: 
, "... And that bridge, man, that's one evil motherfucking Place. 
Those people anarchists, antichrists, cannibal motherfuckers 
out there, man... V heard it wasjust a bunch of homeless people' 
Rydel said, vaguely recollecting some documentary he'd seen in 
Knoxville, Yust sort of making doý 'No, man, Freddie said, 
'homeless fuckers, they're on the street. Those bridge 
motherfuckers, they're like king-hell satanists and shit. You 
think that you can just move on out there yourser. No fucking 
way. They'11just let their own kind, see? Like a cult... "' (Gibson, 
1993; 139, original emphasis) 
According to the cyberpunk movement, future society is going to be even more 
fragmented, continuing the processes that are in act at the moment, and information 
technology is not inverting the trend, rather it is boosting it. In this hopeless scenario, 
the problem is not any more 'putting the pieces of society and cities together', as that is 
impossible to do. Rather, technology is useful as a way to exploit fragmentation, being 
able to go - most of the times virtually - where others cannot go, and being able to see 
what others cannot see. Cyberspace is therefore a parallel but rather separate domain 
from the 'real' world, a new frontier that still provides degrees of freedom and chances 
to change the course of events, for those capable of interacting with the electronic 
dimension. Power in cyberspace is in the hands of big corporate companies that rule the 
world as well as of a group of brave, outlaw hackers who have learned to get 
advantages from such a society, and resist against the dominating institutions. It is a 
dystopian point of view, and it tends to be deterministic as well, as it envisages the 
unstoppable advent of a whole social system. The process of shaping technologies is 
one-way, and leaves no space for local political and social agency. The impacts cannot 
be changed, at most people can learn how to survive, adapt and eventually exploit 
something that was imposed to them. 
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Beyond the cyberpunks, a world of annihilation, rather than of empowerment is 
envisaged by the philosopher and planner Paul Virilio, who sees in the abolition of 
space and time, allowed by telematics, the disappearance of individual agency: 
"What remains to be abolished - and urgently - can only be 
space and time. ( .. ) At the end of the century not much will 
remain of this planet that is not only polluted and impoverished, 
but also shrunken and reduced to nothing by the technologies of 
generalised interactivity " (Virilio, 1993; 12) 
Virilio has also denounced the political threats that the development of 
cyberspace brings with it. To Virilio, virtual worlds can be the ultimate tool for 
globalisation. This, together with the fact that they "posses an incomparable power for 
suggestion", makes the advent of new tyrannies possible: 
"On leaving the White House in 1961, General Eisenhower 
declared that the military- industrial complex was a 'threat to 
democracy'. He knew what he was talking about, having set it 
up in the first place. In 1995, with the establishment of a real 
informational-industrial complexý and as various USpoliticians, 
notably Ross Perot and Newt Gingrich, talk of 'virtual 
democracy' in a tone which echoes fundamentalist mysticism, 
how can we miss the warnings? How can we fail to see the 
danger of a real cybernetics of the socio-political sphere? 
(Virilio, 1995; 4) 
2.2.3 Cyber-capitalism and the political economists 
Virilio's quotations have introduced us to a dystopian vision of a society in which 
telecommunication and information technology are the means to keeping or getting 
'global' power. Several critics, most of them dealing with the historical-materialist 
tradition, focus their attention on the ways in which capitalism is changing, upgrading 
itself to new conditions, and basically keeping on boosting and exploiting inequalities. 
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Far from willing to celebrate any type of saga of future cyber-heroes, whether they 
might live in a free society or in a noir, fragmented and dangerous city, Marxist 
researchers and political economists see new technologies primarily as the upgrade of 
instruments to control society: 
"Changes in mobility and communication infrastructure and 
patterns, therefore, are not neutral processes in the light of 
given or changing technological-logistical conditions and 
capabilities, but necessary elements in the struggle for 
maintaining, changing or consolidating social power" 
(S"ngedouw, 1993; 305). 
The political economic thinking of the Marxist researchers cannot then be ignored 
or underestimated. It constitutes an alternative view that, although it leaves few hopes 
for the future, focuses on the actual political-economic processes that are going on 
underneath the glossy cover of the technological hype, wherever it comes from. Their 
critique of the techno-enthusiastic positions of utopians and futurists has to be taken on 
board to avoid forgetting the influence that the macro-structures of society have on the 
shaping of technology and, more specifically, cyberspace: 
"In the zealous imagination of 'information age' ideologues, 
once political impediments are removed from communication 
technology's revolutionary thrust, its ability to bypass 
traditional time and space boundaries promises a cornucopia of 
comforts and conveniences. This would-be Idepolitization' of 
technology and economics is, rather transparently, itself a 
politically charged construction of reality that attempts to 
disassociate communicationlinformation institutions and 
industries from the human actors and beneficiaries involved in 
their design and development. In the technocratic model, it is 
not the who that matters, it is the how to, the technical processes 
downplaying the explicit social applications" (Sussman and 
Lent, 1991; x. - original emphasis. Quoted in Graham and 
Marvin, 1996ý 101-102) 
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So, the 'global village' in which everybody is able to enjoy the empowerment 
deriving from virtual space can be seen also as: 
Ff 
... a rapidly changing economic space determined by economic 
units whose size and transnationality places them above social 
pressures and political controls... [this] ... is a tendency that, 
favoured by the internationalization process and by high tech, 
attempts to impose the abstraction of a space of strategic 
decisions over the experience ofplace-based activities, cultures 
andpolitics " (Castells 1985; 31). 
2.3 TOWARDS A RESEARCH AGENDA 
So, together with the hopes for a society made better, fairer and more efficient by 
cyberspace, the literature about new technologies presents fears of inverse effects. Is 
cyberspace going to solve problems or is it going to increase them? Is fragmentation 
going to turn into integration thanks to the opportunities and visibility that cyberspace 
provides? Or is a cyberspace-mediated society tending to be even more polarised and 
unequal through a "new model of economic accumulation, social organization, and 
political legitimation" (Castells, 1985; 24)? Can local people find an environment that 
supports individualities and gives importance to peculiarities or will they dissolve in a 
global circus, where only powerful companies have voice? And what, consequently, 
will happen to public space and to 'public cyberspace'? Is democracy and 
communication to be boosted by virtual environments, or is information just condemned 
to commodification? Is cyberspace going to benefit real urban places, by giving them an 
extra dimension and making them work better, or will it be the negation of physical 
space, the detached world in which to escape from reality? 
The answers to these questions, whatever they could be, tend at present to come 
just from speculation, rather than from proper research. It is a fact that this embryonic 
phase of the development of the 'fifth dimension' of cyberspace is characterised by 
faturologists' claims of a generalised and all-encompassing kind, that unfortunately 
tend to underestimate or even totally ignore the need for research on the phenomenon as 
it is now, and as it is being shaped and developed. 
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There is need for social research in this field, also because of a widespread 
tendency towards determinist positions, coming from both the techno-enthusiast and the 
techno-scared. Determinism is probably the main weakness of both of these points of 
view. Whether they are optimistic or pessimistic about new technologies and society, 
they still share an attitude that makes them scrutinise the future, yet quite indifferent 
about present times. What is going on now is seen as a mere series of facts, something 
that will affect future but that cannot be affected, modified, or carried out in a different 
manner. Consequently, the message lying within this type of analysis is a sort of 
invitation not to be unprepared for the new oncoming electronic era. We must 'be 
digital' as soon as possible, eventually buying the necessary equipment, because the 
new arena for competition, whatever type of competition it is, will be cyberspace. Even 
if this can be a good piece of advice at an individual level, and getting to grips 
personally with information technology is possibly a good thing to do nowadays, the 
problem is that this attitude shows all its limits when it comes to dealing with society 
and cities. 
Political economists go beyond futurology of any kind, concentrating on the 
present processes that are affecting and restructuring society. But their vision does not 
leave many chances for local actors to affect these developments, as Graham and 
Marvin note: 
"Political economy often overplays the conservative effects of 
the structures of capitalism in shaping technology and neglects 
the degree to which social processes can change 
telecommunications development. It often ascribes simple and 
all-encompassing powers to abstract and macro-level capitalist 
structures, while neglecting the ways in which structures are 
themselves created by innumerable individual and institutional 
actions over time " (Graham and Marvin, 1996; 112-113) 
The questions to be asked, then, deal with the shaping of urban cyberspace, 
primarily at the urban level. How are the agencies in cities developing their own virtual 
places, how are they being shaped and what are the consequences of this process, in 
terms of provision of information, social access, and relationship between physical and 
virtual city? These are not matters of fact that will lead to a future to talk about. These 
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are processes going on or not yet started, that can be significantly affected by policies 
and choices, both made by public administrators as well as by citizens themselves and 
by industry's influence, in ways the political economists recognize. These processes, as 
we will see later on in this chapter, are also deeply affected by the 'visions' and the 
adoption of specific paradigms that underpin their existence. 
It is not, for instance, a matter of fact that cities will heal themselves by 'jumping' 
into the perfect world of virtuality. Katherine Hayles warns about this kind of escape 
when she claims that 
"... leaving the body behind equates to the belief that if the 
problems won't go awayfrom us, perhaps we can go awayfrom 
the problems. Is it necessary to insist that nothing could be 
jurtherfrom the truth? " (Hayles, 1993; 183). 
But we cannot as well take on board the catastrophic vision of an isolated 
"... individual who has lost, along with his or her natural mobility, any immediate means 
of intervening in the environment' ' (Virilio, 1993; 11) without checking what is actually 
going on in terms of urban cyberspace, and considering any sensible alternative 
application of new technologies that could consider carefully the relationship with the 
physical world and a whole range of opportunities. 
It is not, furthermore, a matter of fact that cyberspace is necessarily going to be a 
'realm of pure information' that overcomes the chaos of daily physical life. As Julian 
Stallabrass notes: 
"when and if this space really does become as public and 
immediate as television, what is to say that it will not become as 
cluttered and full of commercial garbage as anywhere else? " 
(Stallabrass, 1995; 18) 
Indeed, the more Internet usage grows, the harder it becomes to conceive 
cyberspace as an entity to be studied as something alternative to society - and detached 
from it. Bolter and Grusin for instance note that 
"In matters pertaining to the theology of cyberspace, we must 
declare ourselves agnostics. We do not believe that cyberspace 
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is an immaterial world, but that it is very much a part of our 
contemporary world and that it is constituted through a series of 
remediations. As a digital network, cyberspace remediates the 
electric communications networks of the past 150 years, the 
telegraph and the telephone; as virtual reality, it remediates the 
visual spaces ofpainting, film, and television; and as a social 
space, it remediates such historical places as cities and parks, 
and such nonplaces as theme parks and shopping malls. Like 
other contemporary mediated spaces, cyberspace refashions 
and extends earlier media, which are themselves embedded in 
material and social environments" (Bolter and Grusin, 1999; 
182,183) 
These observations call for research that is focused 'here and now', rather than on 
speculation on possible urban futures. Understanding urban technology is possible only 
through the lens of contemporary times and the social, political, economic, artistic and 
cultural processes that are embedded in the development and usage of cyberspace itself. 
2.3.1 Technology is not a fact 
In sum, all the theories and predictions about our digital futures are affected 
basically by the same problem: on the one hand they try to describe as inevitable certain 
aspects of future technologies that are still to be shaped. On the other hand what has 
been shaped, and the Internet for instance is more and more becoming part of the fabric 
of everyday life, is getting so ubiquitous that it ends up being taken for granted and not 
investigated and analysed. Research needs to be constantly carried out, to know how 
urban technology is evolving, what type of choices are driving its development, many 
of them related more to actual physical space and society than to the self-contained 
cyberworlds. Enthusiastic or not, the idea that underpins the determinist positions is 
about technology developing itself, with its own momentum, its own character, its own 
logic. Technology is seen as an independent factor that has its own shape, and the only 
thing that makes a difference is whether we decide to use it and how. But Guthrie and 
Dutton note that 
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"Like policy, technology is a social construction. ( .. ) However, 
in the case of technology, these policy choices too often are 
obscured or overlooked because people focus only on decisions 
about the adoption or non adoption of a technology rather than 
also attending to decisions about design and implementation of 
the technology that influence its use and impact" (Guthrie and 
Dutton, 1992; 575) 
The massive amount of hype about the information era makes people question 
how technology will affect society, politics, urban life. But this way to see things is 
flawed by the fact that technology itself is deeply affected by social, political, economic 
factors. "The idea of a 'pure' technology is nonsense. Technologies always embody 
compromise" (Bijker and Law, 1992; 3). This means that we must be aware of a two- 
way relationship between society and technology, and stop considering the latter as an 
independent variable. To borrow some concepts from Bijker and Law, it could be said 
that cyberspace 
FF 
... might have been otherwise: this is the key to our interest and 
concern with technologies. Technologies do not, we suggest, 
evolve under the impetus of some necessary inner technological 
or scientific logic. They are not possessed of an inherent 
momentum. If they evolve or change, it is because they have 
been pressed into that shape. But the question then becomes: 
why did they actually take the form that they did? This is a 
question that can be broken down into a range of further 
questions. Why did the designers think in this way rather than 
that? What assumptions did the engineers, or the business 
people, or the politicians, make about the kinds of roles that 
people - or indeed machines - might play in the brave new 
worlds they sought to design and assemble? " (BYker and Law, 
1992; 3). 
2.3.2 The importance of the early stages: change Vs stabilisation 
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These remarks suggest that an investigation of technologies, and in particular of 
innovative technologies at an early stage of development, should consider very 
seriously what is behind the technology itself, what choices are being made, who is 
making these and of course why certain choices are prevailing. This consideration is 
crucial especially for the early phases of design, development and deployment of 
technological innovation, as brilliantly explained by Langdon Winner: 
"Consciously or not, deliberately or inadvertently, societies 
choose structuresfor technologies that influence how people are 
going to work, communicate, travel, consume, and soforth over 
a very long time. In the processes by which structuring decisions 
are made, different people are differently situated and possess 
unequal degrees of power, as well as unequal levels of 
awareness. Byfar the greatest latitude of choice exists the very 
first time a particular instrument, system, or technique is 
introduced. Because choices tend to become strongly fixed in 
material equipment, economic investment, and social habit, the 
original flexibility vanishes for all practical purposes once the 
initial commitments are made. In that sense technological 
innovations are similar to legislative acts or political foundings 
that establish a framework for public order that will endure 
over many generations. For that reason, the same careful 
attention one would give to the rules, roles, and relationships of 
politics must also be given to such things as the building of 
highways, the creation of television networks, and the tailoring 
of seemingly insignificantfeatures on new machines. The issues 
that divide or unite people in society are settled not only in the 
institutions and practices ofpolitics proper, but also, and 
less obviously, in tangible arrangements of steel and concrete, 
wires and transistors, nuts and bolts " (TVinner, 1985; 30-31) 
So, the best time to study innovation in urban cyberspace technologies, as indeed 
in any other technology, seems to be the early stages, as this is the time when 
characteristics and trajectories are particularly flexible, and tend later on to get 
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'stabilised' and fixed in an adopted, and much less changeable, form. It is then and there 
that meanings, specific visions and interpretations of society and reality, that come of 
course from specific social actors, are embedded into artefacts or initiatives, and 
influence their future configuration and use. The phenomenon of digital cities seems to 
be therefore ideally positioned, in chronological terms, to be studied under this 
perspective. 
2.3.3 Technology as a process of social construction 
But how could urban technology be looked at, if social factors and visions have to 
be taken into account? The sociological approach known as Social Construction of 
Technology (SCOT) provides a very effective framework that can be used to investigate 
processes of design, creation, deployment and stabilisation of technologies, and seems 
very suitable for multi-disciplinary studies. Wiebe Bijker explains that 
"In the SCOT descriptive model, relevant social groups are the 
key starting point. Technological artefacts do not exist without 
the social interactions within and among social groups. The 
design details of artefacts are described by focusing on the 
problems and solutions that those relevant social groups have 
with respect to the artefact. Thus, increasing and decreasing 
degrees of stabilisation of the artefact can be traced. A crucial 
concept in SCOT (as well as in the Empirical Program of 
Relativism, EPOR, in the sociology of scientific knowledge, to 
which SCOT is closely related) is interpretative flexibility. The 
interpretative flexibility of an artefact can be demonstrated by 
showing how, for different social groups, the artefact presents 
itself as essentially different artefacts " (Bijker, 1992; 75- 76) 
Social constructivism has been often used within historical analysis of the 
development of technologies, for which it is a very powerful approach. Narratives on 
the social construction of bicycles (Pinch and Bijker, 1987), refrigerators (Schwartz 
Cowan, 1985), or weapons (Fallows, 1985), just to bring a few examples, have been 
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brilliantly presented, and serve as an inspiration for knowing more about the 
technological developments of other artefacts and systems. 
It can be argued, however, that a social constructivist perspective, or at least using 
elements from this approach, can be extremely effective and enlightening - though 
possibly harder to carry out - in real-time scenarios, when a new development is just 
going to happen. The insight that these kind of studies can provide could indeed help in 
explaining technological development as it happens, and above all draw suggestions on 
ways to improve the processes that are at the base of the establishment of a determinate 
technological system. 
2.3.4 Interpreting and 'problematising' technology 
So, in approaching the investigation of new technological implementations in 
cities, it is beneficial to look not just at the system itself, but at what generates the 
need(s) for it, the problems it is supposed to solve, the solutions it is supposed to 
provide, and whom and what visions are promoting a certain setup, or a set of 
alternative ones: "Having identified the relevant social groups for a certain artefact, we 
are especially interested in the problems each group has with respect to that artefact. 
Around each problem, several variants of solution can be identified" (Pinch and Bijker, 
1987; 35) 
As Pinch and Bijker argue, different ways of seeing - or interpreting - reality, 
create different perceived problems, as well as seeked solutions, and eventually 
different 'versions' and competing interpretations, and indeed different actual 
configurations, of the same technological object: 
"We think that our account - in which the different 
interpretations by social groups of the content of artefacts lead 
by means of different chains of problems and solutions to 
different further developments - involves the content of the 
artefact itseIr' (Pinch and Byker, 1987; 42) 
Obviously these problems are - or can be - social and relational, not merely 
technological or functional. So, the social network or actors involved in the 
establishment of a technology, with the 'technological entrepreneurs' who promote 
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certain 'solutions' in the first place, have to come to terms with their own roles and 
social, economic, political benefits they could derive from an initiative. The social 
dynamics behind the technological deployment are most important: 
"The contributors also assume that technologies are born out of 
conflict, difference, or resistance. Thus most if not all the case 
studies describe technological controversies, disagreements, or 
dijficulties. Yhe pattern is that the protagonists - entrepreneurs, 
industrial or consumers, designers, inventors, or professional 
practitioners - seek to establish or maintain a particular 
technology or set of technological arrangements, and with this a 
set ofsocial, scientific, economic, and organisational relations 
(Bijker and Law, 1992; 9, original emphasis) 
This concept of 'interpretative flexibility', and the social dynamics related to it, 
seems most important for approaching an investigation of Internet-based urban 
infort-nation systems, given the fact that a 'digital city' is very much a concept - and a 
technological object - in need of a definition, and that this definition is likely to come 
during the development and deployment of the cybercity itself. 
2.3.5 Technology contributes to its own shaping: the importance of 
'paradigms' 
Interpretations and visions can also stem from technology itself, or better from the 
existence of previous or parallel technologies or working practices, that can affect the 
shaping and the establishment of a new system. As noted by Guthrie and Dutton in their 
famous study on early development of public information initiatives in the US: 
(I K" 
. EAisting technology presents a variety of opportunities, 
problems and constraints that shape thefuture of technology 
(MacKenzie & Wajcman, 1985). One way in which existing 
technology shapes new technology is by providing mental 
models of solutions. ( ... ) Technological paradigms are the 
widely accepted, exemplarpuzzle solutions, employed as models 
or examples, which replace explicit rules as a basis for the 
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solution of the remaining puzzles of technology development. 
( .. ) The technology designers in our case studies coped with 
developing these new community information utilities by 
viewing the projects as analogous to existing exemplar 
technologies with which they were familiar" (Guthrie and 
Dutton, 1992; 583) 
This yet again reinforces the consideration that technology cannot be looked at as 
a self-standing fact, but as a development shaped by many different factors. Any piece 
of urban technology, however apparently revolutionary or innovative, is very probably 
the product of a process of interpretation and negotiation between competing visions 
and needs. This involves the presence, and indeed the influence, of previous 
technologies, early experiments that have become 'exemplar', and accepted practices 
that can be 'projected' into the new artefact or system. 
2.3.6 Changing technology in a changing city 
All of these considerations encourage us to do research in order to get knowledge 
about a phenomenon that too often is seen as a pure fact with few things to understand, 
other than learning to use computers and networks. It opens the possibility of examining 
technologies from a wide and multi-disciplinary point of view, going inside cyberspace 
though not being an engineer or a programmer, and staying outside and yet not trying to 
look at it as a sure threat. Possibilities open for exploration of design and policy choices 
and alternatives to them, for a constructive type of criticism that might lead to the 
formulation of design and policy recommendations. As William Mitchell states, 
"Massive and unstoppable changes are under way, but we are 
not passive subjects powerless to shape our fates. If we 
understand what is happening and if we can conceive and 
explore alternative futures, we can find opportunities to 
intervene, sometimes to resist, to organize, to legislate, to plan 
and to design" (Mitchell, 1995; 5). 
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The next chapter will focus on several aspects of the relationship between 
cyberspace and public urban space. The main topics of the commodification of 
information, social access to urban cyberspace and the relationship between real and 
virtual places will be developed, in order to identify key research themes in the way this 
new dimension is being developed. In particular, attention will be focused on the state- 
of-the-art virtual environment, the Internet subsystem called World Wide Web, and its 
applications on towns. 
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CHAPTER 3- EXPLORING THE DIGITAL CITY 
3.0 INTRODUCTION 
At the end of chapter 2 we acknowledged the need to avoid a deterministic 
approach when considering the complex relations between telematics, the city, and 
traditional urban public space. Consequently, the necessity was identified to focus the 
research work on the actual aspects of the shaping of cybercities, rather than on the 
efforts of foreseeing possible future developments of the phenomenon. 
Assuming that a virtual town is not to be seen as the product of a neutral 
technology, as argued in the previous chapter, a series of socio-economic factors 
contributing to and affecting the shaping of cybercities must be carefully examined. 
This is one concern of the current chapter, as it highlights the suggestions that come 
from other researchers as well as trying to find the gaps in the knowledge of the 
phenomenon of digital cities, mainly due to either lack of empirical research and a too 
deterministic attitude in writing about virtuality. 
The chapter starts from considering the confusion that exists about terms like 
'digital city', cybercity', 'virtual city' etc. A first step in the research should be defining 
a typology of digital cities in order not to study different phenomena as if they were 
homogeneous. 
Second, the problems related to ownership and to the presence of private firms 
digital city development are examined and a parallel between the commodification of 
public space and of cyberspace is drawn. Third, issues are considered which relate to 
the differential access to urban cyberspace, and the social polarisation that can derive 
from different approaches in designing virtual towns. In the fourth part the point of 
view changes, from the aspects of the shaping of the virtual city as mere electronic 
territory, to the relation that it can develop with its physical counterpart. The 
interactions between physical and virtual space are considered from the point of view of 
the 'defragmentation', or integration of the city either as a group of communities and as 
a piece of built environment. 
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All of these issues help in trying to identify the key research questions that have 
to be investigated and answered in order to get an insight about how digital cities are 
being shaped at this early stage of development of urban cyberspaces. 
Finally, closing the circle, considerations are made on a possible way to approach 
the construction of the much-needed typology of digital cities in the light of the topics 
and issues faced in the chapter. Relevant criteria for the classification of initiatives, as 
well as important issues that are going to lead the rest of the study, are highlighted. 
3.1 TOWARDS A TYPOLOGY OF CYBERCITIES 
3.1.1 Spatial metaphors work well 
As was said in the previous chapter, cyberspace is seen by many as a potential 
new type of public space, in which interaction among people can be set free from the 
problems generated by physical space and by the contemporary fragmented city. 
Several kinds of so-called 'virtual communities' are developing, as more and more 
people are getting connected to the Internet or to other types of networks, beginning to 
share a virtual space that allows them to communicate without the need to meet in some 
physical place. "Perhaps people explore these networks for the conviviality that they 
find hard to discover in contemporary cities because of the shift towards 
commercialisation, the 'packaging' and 'theming' of urban landscapes, and the wider 
"fortressing" of affluent neighbourhoods? " (Graham and Marvin, 1996; 230). This 
search for a safe and enjoyable environment, together with all the hype about the 
positive effects of cyberspace on cities that can be found daily on the different media, 
has made the spatial and above all urban metaphor, a dominant characteristic of the 
early development of many virtual sites present on the Internet. 
It has become a sort of fashion, or even convention, to associate certain sites on 
the World Wide Web with the idea of a precise public place or territory, such as a 
square, an avenue or even an entire city. Consequently, a whole generation of self- 
claiming 'digital cities', 'cybercities', 'cyberdistricts', 'virtual squares' and 'electronic 
agoras' has flourished on the Net. Actually, the spatial metaphor fits so well, giving an 
identity to electronic services, that speaking about a World Wide Web 'site' comes 
42 
Chapter 3- Exploring the digital city 
natural. No surprise then that Time Warner decided to call their interactive chat 
software for the Internet The Palace, and chose to provide people the ability to create 
their own virtual palaces, containing 'rooms' and 'objects' to interact with, that can be 
visited by several guests at the same time and that can actually become virtual gathering 
sites. 
Having downloaded the software from the Internet and registered, at the cost of 
20 dollars, every user was able to create his/her own 'world', deciding the shape and the 
rules that visitors will have to deal with. This piece of software, born in 1995, was not 
successful as a commercial enterprise, and Time Warner eventually gave up the 
subscriptions scheme. However, it became rather successful as free software tool for 
creating virtual chat rooms, and it still is at the moment of finishing this work. It can be 
downloaded from www. thepalace. com. 
3.1.2 It is hard to be a digital city 
However, visiting a Palace cannot mean going into a public space Just because it 
allows a rough type of communication among different people. Rather, it is much more 
similar to visiting a private house - hence its very appropriate name 'palace' - in which 
the landlord is definitely in control of everything. Although it is a very smart and 
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possibly useful piece of software, in a way it represents the mirroring within cyberspace 
of post-modem fragmentation over public, democratic places. Do you want to meet me? 
Come to my house and behave yourself.. 
Another interesting case was the Barclaysquare, a WWW site launched in May 
1995 using the metaphor of the square to present what was actually a virtual shopping 
mall and, basically, a good looking graphical menu leading to a series of shops on the 
Intemet. 
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Figure 3.2 - 'Barclaysquare, an early experiment of commercial virtual environment 
Barclaysquare was successively modified and eventually abandoned, but other 
similar examples have been developed using the marketsquare metaphor, to the point of 
developing sophisticated three-dimensional, fully navigable virtual shopping malls, 
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through VRML (Virtual Reality Modelling Language) technology, such as the 
'Envisage' Shopping Mall. 
Fde Edt V- F-t. Tk, H* 
Search F"tes %, Jý W*da r' 
Wp: /Jýe. cmjý ItH 
JGO 
Shopping Helpj Fmo Drawing 
C$othn CorrpLws EWý 
_fLnancial 
Flý 
sm, ce 
S-- Traý*l M. 11 0", c. 
AýAUO .... - (bthdýy. -.,.. y, tc) R-d. S. - thm I.. 
p-d,, p ... -I-d O, de., 
WA Tr. & C,. w. ANIS WorldwAe 
Onb- Cl .... fi, dAd. Th. -1d. fi,. t muhud 
. it. f-jp-al bw ...... I 
I 
c (I Rw rmanno)0pavv page WP! 1/&n$Q"e. COftVý " Lhk~ Z- 
Figure 3.3 - 'Marketsquare, another example of urban metaphors used for commercial sites Fie Edt V- FýW T0.6 H* 
kj Back -. -1 . 5ých Fýtn %A, 
"Meda r, 
c, Ntp ljý er,, saqe, NjýýoppM-d Cý 
E-Swe HOW 
ý'Q.. b, 
Tý. * DO. - '0 
M.., 
I 
p., 
u. n. 
c, D- V IýC-t 
Figure 3.4 - The 'Envisage' virtual mall, based on three-dimensional VRML technology 
It is hard to say how Barclaysquare could be referred to as a square. Was it 
possible to meet people there'? To play saxophone begging for some money? To shout 
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your ideas about politics or society? To know other people's ideas? To fall in love? 
Obviously nothing like this was feasible in such a virtual, commercially-oriented place. 
Your credit card number was your only personal characteristic that could be considered 
relevant in such a 'piazza', and you would be able only to meet goods on sale, or rather 
the descriptions of goods. 
These two examples, the first very 'personal' and smart, with a possibly good 
level of interactivity, the second much less interactive and controlled by a big private 
company, have something in common. They both showed that speaking about 'squares' 
and 'streets', 'palaces' and 'halls', 'cities' and 'districts' could be in cyberspace as 
ambiguous as in real physical space, and that it did not imply that certain labels 
corresponded to genuinely 'public' sites. And sometimes even considering those 
telematic services as 'places' is really hard and may look inappropriate, since they are 
really only glamorous menus, as can be understood by this description made by Michael 
Batty of a certain 'cybercity': 
"In short, Cyberville is an intelligently organized entry point to 
the Meb for users who wish to focus on the sort of services one 
can access electronically. For example, ifyou click on the stock 
market, you can eventually find yoursetf at MIL T 's AI Lab 
where they have an experimental stock market analyzer, indeed 
of you click on any of these items, you can begin to travel the 
Web moving from site to site according to the structure 
embedded into each homepage, but directed initially by 
Cyberville" (Batty, 1995) 
It is a fact that many different systems can be implied by names like 'cyberville' 
or 'cybercity' . Some can be actually defined as 'cities as menus', useful to access 
several worldwide services, and borrowing the spatial metaphor just because it works 
quite well and it is appealing for potential customers/visitors. Others can be configured 
as stand-alone virtual spaces, completely displaced, having potential for human 
communication and sometimes being even organized like a city, with a 'virtual' council 
and mayor, but with a very weak relationship - or even no relationship at all - with the 
real world and its problems. They actually look more like a game or a new type of 
hobby, with a potential for socialisation, for computer addicts, rather than something 
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that could replace or in any way have an influence on real towns. The case of 
Cybertown, for instance, is paradigmatic, as this initiative has been a very successful 
and evolving entertainment site with a very effective use of the urban metaphor. 
Cybertown (www. cybertown. com) provides a place for playing games, establishing a 
4virtual' presence and identiy, including a three-dimensional virtual apartment, 
shopping, socialising and even having a virtual pet [picture of Cybertown]. 
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Figure 3.5 - 'Cybertown'l a complex, interactive virtual environment with no links with any 
physical space 
Cybertown is nowhere, apart of course from the fact that its software must reside 
in a server located somewhere, but this is irrelevant to its 'inhabitants'. It is of course 
virtually everywhere, as it can be accessed by any Internet terminal, but surely being 
4everywhere' means that it has no specific relationship with any physical place, its 
culture, or the people who live there. Further, there are digital cities that constitute an 
attempt made by real city councils or private finns, to regenerate communication among 
citizens and between citizens and the administration, to give new life and visibility to 
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the different local communities, to give visibility and a sense of reliability to the whole 
town itself in order to be able to compete at a national or even international level. These 
two very different approaches can be defined as the building of 'non-grounded' and 
'grounded' digital cities: 
"First, non-grounded web cities use the familiar interface of a 
"city" as a metaphor to group together wide ranges of Internet 
services located across the world. Second, "grounded" virtual 
cities are actually developed by local agencies to feed back 
positively, and relate coherently, to the development of specific 
cities. Such virtual cities can be configured either as glossy 
advertising and promotional spaces, with no useful information 
for residents, or as civic services providing public electronic 
spaces supporting political and social discourses about the city 
itsey" (Graham and Aurigi, 1997) 
Digital cities of the latter type are the object of this research, as they are seen by 
the councils and agencies that are promoting and implementing them as potential 
instruments to improve life in the physical town. Nevertheless, the presence of 
sometimes radically different types of virtual cities, and the frequent abuse of such a 
definition, creates the need for a rather precise categorisation of cybercities, in order to 
spot those that actually have a direct relationship with public urban spaces, getting rid 
of the confusion and the approximation coming from the uncontrolled hype offered 
daily by the media. 
As a result, a first research theme arises here. How can we develop a typology of 
digital cities, and what are the main differences among them? And what are their 
relationships with the built environment of cities? 
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3.2 ISSUES ON COMMODIFICATION 
3.2.1 The commodified space 
The case of Barclaysquare, and the many others similar to it, suggest the need to 
think about one of the most important processes to consider when observing how virtual 
sites are being shaped: the transformation of public space into a commodity, into 
something that can be sold or that can be an instrument to sell things, a phenomenon 
called "commodification". There is no doubt that the Internet, born years ago as a 
military and academic network, has become a mass phenomenon and that many private 
firms have been getting more and more interested in it. "Nearly 40% of the networks 
connected are in the commercial domain, with less than 30% in the educational, 
illustrating the economic importance of the net and the intense debate currently 
concerning its ownership, funding and possible privatisation" (Batty and Barr, 1994; 
703) wrote Batty and Barr on Futures, and the figures have kept continuously 
increasing. 
The World Wide Web in particular, the graphical and hypertextual sub-system of 
the Internet, has been increasingly used as a powerful tool for trading at all levels, and it 
is a good in itself. A whole market developed quickly in the late 1990s around the offer 
of network spaces, Web sites design, development of increasingly secure software for 
transactions over the Internet. Report like Brands on the Web, made by Forrester 
Research, a Massachusetts-based consultancy, predicted that "by 1997 three-quarters of 
the top 200 brands in the United States 'will promote themselves online'. A quarter are 
doing so already" (Azhar, 1995). This trend reinforced itself in the following years, 
with the Internet becoming a crowded marketplace where people would spend their real 
money and buy goods, rather than just being targeted by electronic advertising and 
promotion: 
"The future of e-commerce continues to brighten, according to 
Jupiter's research. Driven by online population growth, 
increased spending by buyers, and higher percentages of online 
shoppers (142 million consumers or 65 percent of the online 
population will have made a purchase online by 2007) Jupiter 
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expects online retail spending to reach $105 billion by 2007, 
accounting for 5 percent of all U. S. retail spending and 
influencing 34 percent of all U. S. retail spending" (Greenspan, 
2003) 
Even the Internet itself has been going towards privatization, as envisaged by 
Batty and Barr. A big milestone for this can be identified in what happened in the 
United States in April 1995. The National Science Foundation, a government-funded 
organization that used to manage the so-called 'Internet backbone, the American 'gate' 
of the Net, handed over the managerial reins to three commercial carriers: Sprint, 
Ameritech and Pacific Bell, and it was noted that although "the changeover should be 
transparent for the users... its symbolic significance is immense" (Cottrill, 1995). 
3.2.2 Not Big Brother 
All of this clearly demonstrates that the Internet, and particularly the World Wide 
Web, has been more and more influenced by the private sector. This does not mean 
necessarily that the Net should be seen as the actualisation of the Orwellian 'Big 
Brother', a centralised system able to heavily control our lives. Nick Land claimed that 
"Yhere is a very similar pattern that you find in the structure of 
societies, in the structures of companies and in the structure of 
computers, and all three are moving in the same direction. That 
is, away from a top-down structure of a central command 
system giving the system instructions about how to behave, 
towards a systems that isflat, which is a web, in which change 
moves from the bottom up" (Land, from Visions of Heaven and 
Hell, Channel 4 Television, 1994). 
But, apart from its very optimistic conclusions, does this imply that a space based 
on telematics is going to be democratic and truly public? The absence of a central 
control room might even simply highlight a high level of fragmentation, in which 
specific 'fragments' end up being privileged respect to others. As the postmodern city is 
characterised by disaggregation and influence of the private sector on specific, 
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appealing and profitable bits of public space, this can be true for cyberspace, as well. 
Schiller for instance noted that 
"Carrying over into cyberspace as sponsors flexed their 
muscles, in turn, are practices that have long since become 
customary throughout conventional media. Who said advertisers 
have an obligation to support all the publishers that may choose 
to throw in with them? Advertisers clustered around the most 
heavily trafficked Web portals, where they could reach the 
largest needed audiences; by one account, these leading sites 
raked in nearly three-fifths of Internet ad dollars by 1998. The 
effect was, predictably, to putfinancial pressure on less popular 
sites, much as advertisers'preferencefor the cost efficiency of a 
municipality's leading newspaper once helped to transform 
newspapers into local monopolies " (Schiller, 1999; 133) 
The problem with commodification, both in physical and virtual space, is not 
trying to avoid a sort of 'big brother effect'. It is more likely to be dealing with the co- 
existence of public and private in the same spaces, and in the balance between the often 
diverging interests of the two sectors. It is realising that the system cannot be 'flat', as 
Land tried to describe it, and that economics count in determining geography and the 
relevance of place, including cyber-places. It can also be dealing with the processes that 
allow a square hosting homeless people as well as drug dealers, to becoming a shopping 
mall or a sports centre with no pushers but no poor people at the same time. In the case 
of Berkeley's People's Park described by Don Mitchell, the local university decided to 
create volleyball courts taking control of the space: 
"Activists and the homeless people who used the Park promoted 
a vision of a space marked byfree interaction and the absence 
of coercion by powerful institutions ... The vision of 
representatives of the University (not to mention planners in 
many cities) was quite different. Theirs was one of open space 
for recreation and entertainment, subject to usage by an 
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appropriate public that is allowed in" (D. Mitchell, 1995; 115 - 
original emphasis) 
There is also the strange situation that is created by those sites that tend to be 
hybrid, being referred to as semi-public or semi-private, that generate, eventually, a loss 
of space for whole categories of disadvantaged citizens. 
"In the course of the 1980's the distinction between public and 
private space became less and less clear, with the multiplying of 
ýrivate public spacesý- that is, privately owned and managed 
spaces offered for public use. (.. ) In fact is probably more 
appropriate to interpret the ýprivate public space'phenomenon 
as a sign of a tendency towards the privatisation of public 
space" (Bianchini, 1988,, 5). 
Although this quotation by Franco Bianchini dealt with privatization processes 
going on in actual cities in Britain, it is easy to claim that problems of the same kind 
could affect virtual space, and that we should be concerned about them, while observing 
how cybercities are being built up. 
3.2.3 Promotional spaces 
The more we observe virtual worlds the more it seems possible to draw a parallel 
with some aspects of the physical ones, rather than presenting them as a revolutionary 
replacement of the latter. For example, Christine Boyer speaks about public spaces 
strongly influenced by the private sector, and often shaped by it: 
"The city these spaces represent is filled with a magical and 
exciting allure, landscapes of pleasure intentionally separated 
from the city's more prosaic or threatening mean streets. 
Controlled by the rules and values of the market system, these 
places offer a diet of synthetic charm that undermines critical 
evaluation. ... As old-style 'ý7ublic space" declines and popular 
control of the streets becomes a thing of the past, a new-style 
')gublicity" or 'ýpromotional space" evolves on which the 
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reputation of the sponsoring corporation is visualized and its 
production of "civic values "promoted" (Boyer, 1993; 119). 
This raises the question of whether similar types of urban design are actually 
taking over cyberspace. Electronic space suits these publicity needs; it is potentially a 
very effective 'promotional space', as demonstrated by the higher and higher number of 
private firms interested in advertising themselves on the World Wide Web. Therefore, 
virtual sites could become something very similar to those shopping malls that "... were 
characterised by a tendency to confine public social life to 'certain locations, certain 
hours and certain categories of 'acceptable' activities" (Bianchini, 1988). This aspect of 
the debate has been particularly alive in the U. S., where 
"We find mall aspects in theme parks, themed environments. 
These provide safe, secure environments where people can 
interact. It looks very much like public life, but in fact it really 
isn't, because the environments are owned and controlled and 
heavil regulated by, generally, very large global corporations" y 
(Dewey, from Once upon a Time in Cyberville, Channel 4 
Television, 1994) 
And cyberspace has been seen as the ideal evolution of this kind of therned and 
heavily controlled spaces as Fred Dewey states: 
FF [3 - 
.r eople interact somewhat randomly, but the actual experience 
is entirely manufactured - all of its terms are defined ahead of 
time, the experience is very similar to that of going through 
virtual reality. While this provides a kind of vitality, at the same 
time it's based on leaving behind the mess of real urban life. 
Everyone expects, somehow, that the Cyberworld is not going to 
have these kinds ofparameters and controls. This is extremely 
unrealistic, I think" (Dewey, from Once upon a Time in 
Cyberville, Channel 4 Television, 1994) 
3.2.4 Merging public and private 
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If this is a fact to be considered, and the worries about an only apparently public 
space can be shared, it is true as well that the commodification, or should we say 
privatization, of spaces, supposedly public, is not just a recent phenomenon. The Greek 
agora or the Roman forum, often taken as examples of our lost capacity to create 
democratic spaces, were themselves places of exclusion and control, as Don Mitchell 
remarked, and in a way they were commodified, in the broad sense of 'controlled by the 
interests of an elite'. 
"The public that met in these spaces was carefully selected and 
homogeneous in composition. It consisted of those with power, 
standing, and respectability (. ) In Greek democracy, for 
example, citizenship was a right that was awarded tofree, non- 
foreign men and denied to slaves, women andforeigners. The 
latter had no standing in the public spaces of Greek cities; they 
were not included in 'thepublic"' (D. Mitchell, 1995; 116) 
The city of Florence in the fifteenth century, to make another example, was in 
itself a very controlled city, and the magnificent palaces we are able to visit today were 
private residences or offices that could not be accessed by everyone. Consequently, the 
beauty of the public places of Florence is due to a composition of private elements 
owned by the mighty families who used to rule the town, or semi-public spaces like 
churches and chapels, or the streets themselves, that were characterised - and still are - 
by rows of shops, banks and workshops owned by a powerful class of traders and 
craftsmen, able to have a strong influence over the decisions concerning public space in 
the city centre, during the Renaissance period as well as in the twentieth century. 
It is extremely important, therefore, to get rid of the excessive idealisation about 
public urban space, as it cannot be seen as a pure realm untouched by private interests, 
unless we commit ourselves to rethink completely the basis of western civilisation. On 
the other hand, we must not underestimate the legitimate worries about the current 
situation, in which the quasi-public is shifting towards the completely private, and many 
cities are being increasingly characterised by fortified spaces, while the open ones are 
being abandoned. It is in a way a matter of shades, of control and equilibrium between 
the economic boost coming from the private sector and the need for public, accessible, 
local culture friendly space. Policies have to be thought from this perspective of a 
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reality in which public and private merge and interact generating a very complex 
situation, as it has been claimed by Elizabeth Wilson: 
f? 
... urban industrial society has always provided spaces that are 
neither public nor private, yet both: classically the cqfiý, the 
museum or concert hall, the department store. The airport and 
the mall are latterday equivalents. We therefore need a more 
nuanced way of discussing space than the dichotomized 
public1private conceptualization... " (Wilson, 1995; 159) 
This overlapping of public and private is what determines the actual shaping of 
places and it is to be considered when it comes to observing cyberspace and digital 
cities, especially if the virtual sites we are interested in are those with a strong link with 
real towns, as are civic networks and councils'Web sites. Despite the hype, cyberspace 
is not a pure realm. Thus a digital city is likely to be shaped by both private and public 
interest, and by the interaction between the two operated through policies and market 
dynamics. Citizens surfing the Internet will never find themselves in an ideal, market- 
free world. To engage with the Internet they have had to buy the necessary equipment 
on the market, possibly to subscribe to a private Internet provider, and they eventually 
access the highly 'promotional' spaces we were talking about before. Consequently, 
Internet dwellers choose, with every click of their mouse, between public and private 
elements, pages, interconnected virtual spaces. The problem with virtual urban space 
could be seen as being able to create 'squares' with availability of shops and civic rights 
at the same moment, goods and information, sales and free human interaction rather 
than completely private and controlled malls in which the only option is buying 
something, whatever it is. The ideal, trade-free, interests-free square would probably 
turn into an empty place, as it has already happened in the real world. 
And the dynamics of this process need observation, as well as the policy choices 
that can affect them. The risk of the private sector having too strong an influence in the 
shaping of public cyberspace was well acknowledge in the TV program Visions of 
Heaven and Hell, broadcast by Channel 4 Television in 1994: 
"The technology of the future may be more user-friendly, but it 
will still be supplied to us by companies that have their own 
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commercial interests and alliances. What is best for them and 
their shareholders may not be best for us" (Visions of Heaven 
and Hell, Channel 4 Television, 1994) 
There is no doubt that private money can help local administrations in 
regenerating parts of the city, but some choices can be questionable. Several needs can 
be met, but many others can be definitely ignored depending on the relative interests 
and on the advertising capabilities of certain places, as suggested by Christine Boyer: 
"If private capital is able to subsidize and sponsor the public 
arts program in Battery Park City, for example, where sculpture 
gardens, horticultural displays and decorative lighting have 
been designed, then we must also be aware that since the late 
1980's public parks throughout the city are littered with broken 
glass, trash and abandoned cars, while the employment of 
maintenance workers has been reduced dramatically and the 
expenditure oftens ofmillions ofdollars delayed" (Boyer, 1993; 
117) 
This could happen in cyberspace, as well. A poorly regulated private intervention 
in the shaping of public sites could result in the improvement of only those aspects of 
the service that have an appeal for trading, selling, promoting goods or anyway for the 
business sector, possibly leaving behind non-lucrative social needs and features. 
It is not by chance that a certain utopian and blindly enthusiastic thinking about 
virtual space is based on a strictly capitalist vision of a self regulated market, in which 
the people's needs are identified with products to buy and with the values of the society 
of consumption: 
'We are dictating what products we want, and they have to 
follow suit. (. ) The people, the CEO's running the companies, 
are not the dominators of culture. We, the individuals, are the 
dominators of culture, and they are our servants. They are 
slaves to the dollar" (Rushkoff, from Once upon a time in 
Cyberville, Channel 4 Television, 1994) 
56 
Chapter 3- Exploring the digital city 
According to Rushkoff, being the dominators of culture means being able to 
influence the market by purchasing goods. This implies also that those who are not able 
to buy are to be considered out of the social dynamics, completely impotent in front of 
the market based society. According to such a vision, people ratify their existence as 
well as some form of visibility at the very moment they can act as consumers. And also 
among those who can spend money, the ability to 'dictate' how cyberspace should 
develop seems to be proportional to how wealthy they are. Rather than denying the 
commodification of virtual space, as it tries to do, this point of view confirms some 
possible basic inequalities when it comes to dealing with the Net as a deregulated 
marketplace, as clearly stated by Elizabeth Wilson: 
"Economic and social inequalities remain as gross as ever, yet 
the global shopping mall renders them curiously invisible. 
Those without the passport of money are simply in absence... 
Invisibility is a crucialfeature of modern inequality" (Wilson, 
1995; 158) 
All of this suggests that the phenomenon of the commodification of public areas 
can affect cyberspace-based sites and services even more than the corresponding 
physical places, because of the intrinsic 'promotional' potential of virtual space and of 
the interest of the private sector in investing in cyber-activities. Signs that the ICT 
industry is inevitable very keen on 'cherry-picking' customers and offering faster and 
better service to those who are rich, are not difficult to notice. Nevertheless, as 
suggested by Wilson, this is partly inevitable and does not necessarily spoil the social 
potential of cyberspace in creating virtual public spaces, bearing in mind that the 'pure' 
public as the absence of any kind of private influence is actually just a concept that does 
not find a correspondence in the real world. 
A question therefore arises when considering how digital cities have been shaped 
in the early stage of their development, about the relationship between public and 
private sectors. How have these sites been shaped in terms of the merging between 
common and particular interests? How have the different public administrations been 
trying to regulate the presence of private actors in the process of shaping and managing 
public cyberspace? And what has been the influence, if any, of the private actors in the 
design and management processes of these sites? 
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3.2.5 Competing cities 
The phenomenon of the commodification of cyberspace has not just been driven 
by the action of private firms that advertise themselves on the Net, or use it to sell 
services and products. Although the competition among traders and corporate societies 
is on computer networks, a similar phenomenon has been occurring in cities themselves, 
especially in the western world, although not exclusively. 
Problems like safety and pollution, together with dramatic changes in the 
economy and labour organization, are inverting the growth process of many 
contemporary cities. Dilys M. Hill got to the point of claiming that: 
"In the electronic age the centuries-old rationale for cities is 
vanishing. People and employers find it cheaper to move work 
elsewhere, and residents depart. If nothing is done to make 
cities safer and more attractive, their decline will mean an 
increasingly polarised population of rich and poor, with a 
deterioration ofpublic services and increased racial tension" 
(Hill, 1994; 243) 
While Hill acknowledged some crucial social problems that can be generated by 
this exodus of wealth from cities, this statement seems too extreme and hardly matching 
what is happening in reality, as cities are possibly more than ever on the agenda, and 
keep growing rather than vanishing. It seems credible, however, that rather than 
witnessing a scenario of vanishing cities, we have to redefine geographies and the 
dominance of determinate centres on the basis of their capacity to regenerate 
themselves, as well as exploiting the potential of new technologies. 
Still questioning the relevance of the city as a place facilitating human proximity, 
some researchers tended to see the ability of being 'displaced' and moving anywhere, 
by being 'wired' to the Net, as a specific, positive aspect of freedom for the new 
century: 
"People can live almost anywhere they wanted withoutforgoing 
opportunities of association or useful and fuyi'lling 
employment.. important social needs would be all available 
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fron-line "without waiting "in-line ".. whenever and wherever you 
need them" (Ogden, 1994; 723) 
But 'almost anywhere' actually means that it is possible to move only to those 
places, or those cities, that are able to offer certain facilities and characteristics. At the 
same time it means that sites with poorer features than others are cut off, and that 
certain areas will suffer from being 'technologically excluded'. Economies of scale, 
however, suggest that cities that gather many people are much more likely than remote 
rural locations to be endowed with high technologies at cheap-ish prices. Cities can also 
offer at the same time the considerable advantage of physical proximity, and the ever- 
important face-to-face interaction that this can allow, together with electronic 
communication potential. Consequently, cities - above all - find themselves in a big 
competition, often transcending national borders, to acquire people and wealth, as was 
clearly stated in the brochure advertising the 1988 Remaking Cities Conference, 
organized jointly by the American Institute of Architects and the Royal Institute of 
British Architects: 
"Businesses and individuals - increasingly free to locate where 
and when they want - select cities with the finest features and 
benefits. 71ey look for history, culture, safe neighbourhoods, 
good housing, shops and education, and progressive local 
government. Cities are competing, and their edge is livability" 
(quoted in Boyer, 1993; 125) 
What are the main ingredients of 'livability', that can attract people to one city 
rather than to another? Several of them have been listed in the previous quotation, but 
as mentioned before a new variable is getting more and more relevant: communication. 
In the post-industrial era or, as many have begun to call it the 'infon-nation age', the 
ability to get wired and stay in the flow of the worldwide information is a crucial 
feature. It allows towns to retain or attract more and more firms, some of them being big 
corporate giants looking for more convenient places where to establish their regional, 
national or even continental headquarters. This is why: "many cities... are trying to gain 
a competitive advantage by getting themselves wired with fibre optic cables before their 
rivals do" (Batty and Barr, 1994; 701). 
59 
Chapter 3- Exploring the digital city 
It is not only the big firms which are interested in the technological facilities 
offered by a city, in terms of hardware capabilities and bandwidth, in order to keep their 
contacts with the rest of the world. Many medium and small sized firms and enterprises 
can benefit from 'city software', too. Civic and regional networks, cybercities and 
cyber-counties, can in fact provide vital bits of information for local businesses. 
Facilities to allow remote communication with banks, the public sector, customers and 
other firms are seen as a dramatic feature of contemporary urban and metropolitan 
areas. Together with these practical advantages, the ability of local agencies to endow 
their place with a forward-looking images and a feeling of future-proofness, has become 
a very necessary feature within this competitive climate. 
Providing civic networks and World Wide Web digital cities is a chance that has 
been considered by an great number of councils and regions, in the U. S. as well as in 
Europe. And for the reasons stated so far many, if not all, virtual towns have been 
aiming at providing business opportunities, as demonstrated by the case of Nottingham: 
"Nottingham claims Emnet is the country's first regional 
commercial computer network. Unlike earlier rivals, such as 
Manchester's Host, it is aimed at the business community. 
Developed by New, a computer consultancy, it uses the World- 
Wide JVebfor trading and marketing. For companies like Boots 
and NatWest, who have their own pages, it provides a vehicle 
for home shopping or banking. Emnet might also become a 
develo ment agency, advising on telecommunications 
technology. " (Hanna, 1996) 
But these business-oriented digital cities could become places that are 
commodified indirectly. Although they have been designed by the public sector, their 
aims can be other than benefiting the city as a whole and relieving it from 
fragmentation. Big companies like Boots or NatWest are not always necessarily 
interested in local social problems and, as the primary aim of the system is business, it 
is likely to be tailored to their needs, rather than to those of the communities living in 
the area. 
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Can there be at least an advantage in terms of jobs to local people? Perhaps, but it 
is fair enough to be doubtful about it. Speaking about investments in American towns, 
Christine Boyer noted that: 
"... these super corporations have neither loyalty to a specific 
nation nor social accountability to any one locality. Many of 
these transnational corporations are major investors in the 
redevelopment of old American downtowns. Investment today, 
however, may bring abandonment tomorrow" (Boyer, 1993; 
115) 
From this, a distinction must be drawn between cities that have been 
implementing their business-oriented web pages hosting mostly big corporate 
companies and those that have been actually seeking synergies with medium and small 
local firms, retailers and enterprises. The latter have stronger links with the city and its 
citizens, they are active part of the local economy that can actually bring permanent 
benefits to the community. 
The choice to design a civic or regional information system, whether it is based on 
the Web or on another technological platform, in which the main purpose is providing 
information to and from business actors, can lead to the final choice of the 
commercialisation of the information offered. Although making businesses pay to 
retrieve data and advertise themselves on a public network can seem a perfectly sensible 
choice, the commodification caused by competition between cities can go as far as 
seeing the Web 'public' sites as a good way to make money, independently by who is 
using the service: 
"Governments are a major provider offree information, and 
there are fears that commercial pressures, coupled with 
Congress's fervour for cost-cutting, willforce official agencies 
to chargeforpublic information. Already, some companies have 
teamed up with cash-starved local authorities in the U. S., with a 
view to chargingfor qJficial information" (Cottrill, 1995) 
This tendency, for some public administrations, to commodify the infon-nation 
offered on information technology systems, together with those design choices giving 
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clear priority to businesses rather than to citizens, can be crucial in the shaping of 
cybercities. It can influence their aims and their effectiveness, reversing perhaps the 
expected results of increased social cohesion and better communication between the 
public and administrators. This leads to two key questions to address: 
How have municipalities and policy-makers been relating their digital cities to 
their local economies? Have they been aiming to revitalise local enterprises and local 
economic actors or have they been just selling cyber-places to big corporate companies, 
based elsewhere? What policy processes have been used to engage with local small 
firms and large multi-site firms? 
How have designers and managers of digital cities been addressing the tension 
between the need to earn revenue from the information that is made available and the 
need not to restrict social access? 
3.3 ISSUES ON ACCESS 
3.3.1 If it is public, I can go there: Access to cyberspace 
All the problems related to the commodification of public cyberspace lead us to 
make a further step in this analysis about the shaping of digital cities: the consideration 
of issues about access and social polarisation. This can be actually regarded as a central 
problem in the implementation of civic networks and cybercities, above all because of 
their supposed ability to re-establish or anyway improve communication among citizens 
and between citizens and public administration. 
In this effort to create a new type of common space, considering issues about 
property and private influence is a necessary but not sufficient step. As William 
Mitchell stated: 
... urban public space is not merely un-private. (. ) A space is 
genuinely public, as Kevin Lynch once pointed out, only to the 
extent that it really is openly accessible and welcoming to 
members of the community that is serves. It must also allow 
users considerable freedom of assembly and action. And there 
must be some kind of public control of its use and its 
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transformation overtime. Yhe same goesfor public cyberspace, 
so creators and maintainers... must consider who gets in and 
who gets excluded, what can and cannot be done there, whose 
norms are enforced, and who exerts control" (TVMitchell, 1995; 
125) 
So, to invert the current trend towards social and spatial fragmentation, public 
space must offer a potential for gathering people while avoiding discrimination. But 
space, like technology, is never neutral. Through its physical organization it can present 
itself as unfriendly for certain disadvantaged categories like, for instance, elderly 
people, children or disabled. Is the cyberworld so different a type of space to 
automatically set itself free from these limits? 
Much concern has been expressed about the threats to democracy in cyberspace. 
Ogden stressed that: "More people must learn about the intellectual, social, commercial 
and political leverage presented by participation in the communications revolution that 
is cyberspace - while the freedom to do so still exists" (Ogden, 1994; 714). Similarly, 
one of the enthusiastic 'gurus' of cyberspace, Howard Rheingold, had some doubts 
about the future: 
"But telecommunications gives certain people access to means 
of influencing certain other people's thoughts and perceptions, 
and that access - who has it and who doesn't have it - is 
intimately connected with political power. Yhe prospect of the 
technical capabilities of a near-ubiquitous high-bandwidth Net 
in the hands of a small number of commercial interests has dire 
political implications. Whoever gains the political edge on this 
technology will be able to use the technology to consolidate 
power " (Rheingold, 1994; 2 78) 
This point of view, although arguably true, contains the weakness of considering 
technology neutral or even positive in itself. In this view cyberspace has been seen as a 
pure, absolutely good development, that might become eventually corrupted and 
misused. Electronic democracy could turn into electronic dictatorship by the action of 
some 'big brother'. Otherwise, the Net has been and is a wonderful place, offering 
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plenty of opportunities, and the implications how it has been shaped are not very much 
considered. Neither is the social context in which cyberspace has been developing. That 
is probably why Ogden himself claimed emphatically: "It's here and it's now and it's no 
longer just for computer scientists; it's computing for the masses. Welcome to 
cyberspace! " (Ogden, 1994; 714). 
3.3.2 "it costs too much" 
But what can the masses do? Before welcoming people to a virtual world, it is fair 
enough to detennine who can actually afford to access that space. Observing the crisis 
of the 'real' public space in Britain, Franco Bianchini noted that: 
"A study carried out in 1987 in a large Sheffleld council estate, 
with male unemployment and car ownership rates of 30.4% and 
15% respectively, found that '(it) costs too muchwas byjar the 
main reason given by residents for what prevented them from 
going out" (Bianchini, 1988; 5) 
Why should cyberspace not obey the same rules? If those disadvantaged citizens 
are discouraged from going downtown because of their very low budget, could they not 
find problematic accessing the 'electronic downtown, for the same reasons? 
Being able to 'surf the net' from home implies a series of expenses. You need to 
buy a personal computer and a modem, subscribe to an Internet provider for access to 
either narrow or broadband, and definitely own a telephone. If a municipality chose to 
charge citizens for the use of its system, as was envisaged in the previous section about 
the commodification of cyberspace, that could possibly be a heavy additional cost. But 
there is evidence that many families living in deprived urban areas cannot even afford to 
pay for the first and most basic facility, the telephone line: 
"In Cruddas Park, a Newcastle upon Tyne council estate of 
some 3,000 households, it has been estimated that the 
connection rate is just 26 per cent. As recently as last year, the 
government still considered non-connection to be primarily a 
rural problem, but the geographical and social extent of the 
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unphoned phenomenon is now, quite clearly, a key problem in 
our marginalised urban areas. " (Dyer, 1995). 
How, then, can be these families be expected to fulfil the hyperbolic prophecies of 
Timothy Leary when he stated: 
"Yhe social andpolitical implications of this democratization of 
the screen are enormous. In the past, friendship and intimate 
exchange have been limited to local geography or occasional 
visits. Now you can play electronic tennis with a pro in Tokyo, 
interact with a classroom in Paris, cyberj7irt with cute guys in 
anyfour cities ofyour choice. A global fast-feedback language 
of icons and memes, facilitated by instant translation devices, 
will smoothly eliminate the barriers of language that have been 
responsible for most of the war and conflict of the last 
centuries" (Leary, 1994; 76) 
The 'new breed' Leary was talking about are included in that privileged minority 
that can, first of all, afford all the necessary expenses to spend perhaps hours every day 
playing tennis with a Japanese or attending a virtual class somewhere else. Sheridan M. 
Tatsuno goes further, envisaging a 
ff 
... multimedia city, a global networked city in which information 
is pushed down the social pyramid to the poorest person. It is 
notjust a high-tech media city like Hollywood or Silicon Valley, 
but also a low-tech, high-touch city like Bangalore, New York's 
Harlem, or Lima's barrios "(Tatsuno, 1994; 201) 
but just after this he clearly shows the limits of his utopia saying that: "Indeed, the 
ultimate multimedia city is not a place, but a state of mind. It is a city in which 
information is easily accessible to the average person" (Tatsuno, 1994; 201). 
And it is certainly hard to recognize those who live in the barrios as 'the average 
persons', as well as the concept of creating a useful cybercity not as a place, but as a 
(state of mind'. Could this change? The idea that technological progress will make 
computers and electronic appliances cost less and less, becoming affordable for 
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everyone, is one of the main arguments underpinning the hype about cyberspace and 
cyber-democracy. But, although computer prices seem to lower constantly, it must be 
said that to run up-to-date software, more and more computing power is required. The 
Internet itself evolves continuously. If it was possible - when it all began - to download 
information using a 80286-based PC and a low-spec modem that would now cost 
literally a few pounds, accessing state-of-the-art sites requires much higher computing 
power, sophisticated graphics cards, and above all a lot of communication speed, such 
as a broadband connection. This is also due to the ever-increasing sophistication of the 
World Wide Web, that has evolved from a relatively simple environment made of static 
text and images, to a truly dynamic, multimedia domain. Simpler sites have quickly 
become obsolete for most of the information present on the Net, as firms and 
institutions publish in increasing sophisticated ways, literally forcing users to upgrade 
both hardware and software. The result of all of this is that the costs to be 'up and 
running' are not actually changing that much, but that older and cheaper devices are 
actually set aside and made obsolete by the market-driven technological evolution. As 
Julian Stallabrass notes: 
"There is no interest in selling electronic commodities at the 
price the world's poor can afford, nor is there likely to be. The 
idea that high-band global networking will become truly 
universal in a world where only a fifth of the population 
currently have even telephones is laughable" (Stallabrass, 1995; 
11). 
This is not true just for the third-world countries. We have already seen that 
deprived citizens in Britain could have similar problems to access cyberspace. More 
generally, the idea of a free market offering cheap telematics for everybody is flawed 
even in this wealthy part of the world. For example, research carried on by Inteco in 
1995 in five European countries, including Britain, indicated that: "... the home PC 
boom, on which most manufacturers are counting, is thus illusory. This year in the UK, 
about 77 per cent of sales will go to householders upgrading their existing PCs or 
buying additional ones", and that, concerning cyberspace: "It found that only 10 per 
cent of Internet access was from home, indicating that 'surfing the net' is 
overwhelmingly done on other people's phone bills" (Bannister, 1995). Although since 
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the mid-nineties new commercial offers, such as 'flat' or unmetered Internet tariffs have 
appeared on the market, facilitating at least some to accessing cyberspace more and 
more often, it can still be argued that universal access is far from being achieved, and an 
elite of privileged people has been using the Net and, consequently, influencing its 
shaping. The first, necessary requisite to dwell in cyberspace is wealth, and this has 
been a crucial problem addressed by those organisations determined to create civic 
networks able to involve as many citizens as possible. This leads to a further research 
question. 
How, then, have policy makers been dealing with the access problems to their 
civic cyberspace, for those who are economically disadvantaged? Through what policy 
instruments have the socially disadvantaged groups been given access to digital cities? 
3.3.3 Being visible 
But although having access to the Internet and to the information that is contained 
within it, is a primary condition to be a cybercitizen, it is probably not enough. 'Access' 
in fact does not mean just 'being able to go somewhere'. Especially for public space, it 
implies the possibility to use that place, being able to express yourself without, of 
course, harming others. If we go back for a moment to the definition given by William 
Mitchell who said that: "It. must also allow users considerable freedom of assembly and 
action" (Mitchell, 1995; 125) it becomes clear that, beyond the first step of 'getting 
there', the ability to be an active, involved participant of cyber-life plays a very 
important role. 
And this must have been the feeling of Howard Rheingold when he first 
approached the virtual community called The Well: 
"... I soon discovered that I was audience, performer, and 
scriptwriter, along with my companions, in an ongoing 
improvisation. A full-scale subculture was growing on the other 
side of my telephone jack, and they invited me to create 
something new" (Rheingold 1994; 2) 
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This positive personal experience made Rheingold himself provide a wide 
generalisation when he stated in a TV interview that: "When you plug that computer 
into that telephone, you've not just created a printing press, but a gathering place, a 
place of assembly, a place where people can exercise free speech and debate with each 
other" (Rheingold, 1994, from Visions of Heaven and Hell, Channel 4 Television) 
But talking about 'that computer into that telephone' brings with it a great deal of 
over-simplification. Provided, as was said previously, that someone could afford to have 
both computer and telephone line, and maybe a broadband connection, would he or she 
be educated enough to use them properly? As Graham and Marvin noted: "Network 
traffic is also often dominated by the technologically 'converted': a very small and 
extremely unrepresentative set of people" (Graham, Marvin, 1996; 232). This means 
that culture and education, and more specifically computer literacy, can have a 
substantial influence over the ability to become an active dweller of cyberspace. 
Therefore, the access related issues are not limited to those of direct economic 
nature. Access involves problems inherent to the whole of the social sphere and dealing 
with it requires the adoption of a more sophisticated viewpoint, rather than just 
considering those who can 'have it' and those who cannot. 
The point is that, even if you can afford 'surfing the Net', this does not make you 
someone who can express himself or herself. The hopeful statement that "The Mirror 
World [a virtual, software copy of a city, according to Gelertner] isn't snoopware. Its 
goal is merely to convert the theoretically public into the actually public. What was 
always available in principle merely becomes available in fact" (Gelernter, 1991; 19) 
ignored the danger that the 'public' in cyberspace can be easily, and in fact is, an elite 
of people who, for several reasons, are more suitable than others to adapt themselves to 
the virtual world. 
Indeed, being visible and empowered is something that implies the ability to 
participate, taking active part in what goes on in the digital community. As Hoogvelt 
and Freeman noted: "Communities online grow from communication rather than 
information retrieval" (Hoogvelt and Freeman, 1996; 3; original emphasis). Digital 
cities "need to stress interactive communication (through e-mail etc. ) rather than just 
passive information consumption" (Aurigi and Graham, 2000; 494). 
Ken Cottrill, quoting from a survey published in 1995 by the US Census Bureau, 
gave clear evidence for this, noting that 
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"White households with incomes above $75,000 are three times 
more likely to own a computer than households with income 
between $25,000 and $30,000. The survey reveals that among 
racial groups, Asian and Pacific Islanders are the most likely to 
own a home computer, followed by white households. Computer 
ownership is least likely in black households. Not surprisingly, 
education correlates closely with computer ownership. Less 
than 5 per cent of households headed by those without a high 
school education (the 14 to 18 year-old level, roughly up to A 
level) have a computer. A household headed by someone with a 
degree is 11 times more likely to own a computer than one 
headed by someone who lacks a high school education. The 
study also found that older households were much less likely to 
own a computer with a modem. Households headed by over-55s 
accountfor a third of the sample population, but only about 15 
per cent of home computer users" (Cottrill, 1995). 
Even if this report dealt with computer ownership, and not with the use of 
computers themselves, it made clear that it was much more likely that a wealthy, 
educated and relatively young person could publish things on the Internet, rather than 
someone who could even access the Net, but who had a very hard time in learning how 
to effectively communicate ideas in cyberspace, because of his/her education level, 
computer literacy, age. This can lead to an even stronger social polarisation in the city. 
As Doreen Massey feared, speaking about mobility: 
"It is not simply a question of unequal distribution, that some 
people move more than others, and that some have more control 
than others. It is that the mobility and control of some groups 
can actively weaken other people. Differential mobility can 
weaken the leverage of the already weak. The time-space 
compression of some groups can undermine the power of 
others" (Massey, 1991; 26). 
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What could this mean in terms of cyberspace? It suggests that those who are 
marginalised in the present society could become even more invisible in cyberspace, not 
because of an 'official' exclusion of them obtained for instance by charging for the use 
of a cybercity. It would be a sort of natural selection, that would as well naturally make 
'hyper-visible' those who are already in a good social position. 
Public administrations wanting to create virtual versions of towns and regions 
would probably have to deal with this problem if they wanted to assure that as many 
people as possible can participate in cyber-life. They would have, for example, to 
consider how to teach the 'culturally disadvantaged' to publish their ideas and at the 
same time make efforts to increase the user-friendliness of the system itself. A question 
then raises about this issue. 
How have the creators of cybercities been shaping public cyberspace in terms of 
user-friendliness, and how have they been coping with the problem of computer 
illiteracy? 
3.3.4 Dividing people? 
Gender differences could also be crucial in hi-tech environments, that are 
traditionally male dominated, as stressed by Katherine Hayles, "the next time you are in 
a shopping mall, check out the video arcade. Most of the patrons are teens and preteens. 
How many are male? If your experience is like mine, nearly all" (Hayles, 1993; 183). 
As well, a virtual world with a masculine component and character that is much 
stronger and present than the feminine one, could definitely be unwelcoming for 
women, or simply not interesting. Roger Burrows stated that: "With respect to gender 
relations in particular there is good evidence to suggest that cyberspace is a sexist male 
dominated (non) place" (Burrows, 1995; 10). Again, the fact is that cyberspace is not 
neutral: it always has a character, and the visitors' ability to interact with it, getting 
visible and expressing themselves can be heavily affected by what type of environment 
they can find there. 
This suggests that virtual spaces are not necessarily safe from the risk of 
becoming fortified, protected and somehow elitist places, even if they are offered for 
free, even if they are not directly controlled by a big corporate company. It is the 
70 
Chapter 3- Exploring the digital city 
establishment of a certain group as the dominant community of that place that can 
discourage others to participate, to get visible, as stressed by Brown when he stated 
that: "ethnic groups collect in their own electronic communities, libertarians speak only 
to libertarians" (Brown, 1994). The myth of the virtual community as a place where 
differences are naturally overcome and everyone gains an unlimited freedom of speech 
is evidently flawed. 
Further social fragmentation could then be the result of the development of a 
virtual town, not simply because of the commodification of its virtual spaces, but as a 
consequence of the self-generation of a series of electronic ghettos: 
"Yelematically linked communities could fragment our larger 
society, enabling each of us to pursue isolation from everything 
different, or unfamiliar, or threatening, and removing the 
occasions for contact across lines of class, race and culture" 
(Calhoun, 1986, quoted in Graham and Marvin, 1996,232). 
This does not mean, though, that any attempt to establish public spaces on the 
Internet has to be considered an agent of fragmentation. How cyber-participation is 
shaped will determine its effectiveness. As suggested by Bianchini: 
"It is clear that, bY Providing opportunities for citizens of 
different genders, ages, classes, races and lifiestyles to meet in a 
variety of informal ways, social cohesion, mutual respect, and 
understanding could be enhanced" (Bianchini, 1988; 7). 
Policies about gathering places in cyberspace can be crucial in determining how 
conferences and groups develop themselves, and this can be strongly influenced in the 
design phase, too. Creating extremely specialised areas in a digital city can possibly 
lead to fragmentation. But the regulatory aspect can be extremely important in this 
matter: the policies and their application should aim at managing virtual communities 
that "must provide not only a sense of belonging and wholeness for their members, but 
incorporate and tolerate diversity" (Murray, 1993 - quoted in McBeath and Webb, 
1995; 8). Many choices about language and jargon used in civic cyber-debates, as well 
as the way information is presented could dramatically affect participation and a 
particular care should be taken when dealing with these matters. 
71 
Chapter 3- Exploring the digital city 
A further question to be asked, consequently, is: how have the policy makers been 
coping with diversity in cybercities? Which technological means have they been using, 
and how? 
3.4 THE SUPERIMPOSITION OF CYBER AND PHYSICAL 
3.4.1 The danger of the ideal city 
I have just envisaged the possible risk of a heavy polarisation of urban 
cyberspace, with on one side a relatively large elite of 'haves, and 'cans' who can 
afford to pay for it, to develop the necessary skills and to 'survive' in its groups, and on 
the other side the 'have not's' who are forced to stay outside of cyberspace or at most to 
use it in a very passive way. 
This can lead us to some considerations about the crucial relationship between 
physical space and virtual space or, more precisely, between the built city and the 
electronic one. The access related problems prove in fact that it is at least doubtful that 
the digital city could become a mirror of the real one, especially in social terms, if 
careful policies are not applied. 
Despite this, the hype about cyberspace has produced claims that tend to ignore 
social exclusion and to present a quasi perfect parallel between real and virtual world, 
caused by the integration of the two: 
"The division between technology and nature is dissolving as 
the analytic categories we draw upon to give structure to our 
world - the biological, the technological, the natural, the 
artificial and the human - begin to blur" (Stone, 1991; quoted in 
Burrows, 1995; 4) 
The fact that computers are increasingly able to deal with several aspects of 
perception, such as pictures, sounds, moving images and even tactile sensations, makes 
cyberspace be seen as a more and more accurate model of the reality: "The more 
information a computer can process, the more of the world it can turn into information" 
(Visions of Heaven and Hell, Channel 4 Television, 1994). And the virtual copy of the 
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real world, moreover, "looks safe indeed compared to urban decay" (Once upon a time 
in Cyberville, Channel 4 Television, 1994). This search for safety and 'perfection' has 
been the cause in the USA of the production of spaces for entertainment that, rather than 
reproducing some fantastic environments as medieval castles or pirate islands, have 
been trying to simulate reality as it should be, according to those who shape them. As 
argued by Mike Davis: "Today, however, the city itself - or rather its idealization - has 
become the subject of simulation" (Davis, 1992; 17). Criticising the creation of City 
Walk, a tourist attraction set up at Universal Studios in Los Angeles that presented a 
crime-less and poverty-less version of some real L. A. areas, Davis claimed that 
'Designed by master illusionist Jon Jerde, City Walk is an 
'idealized reality, the bestfeatures of Olvera Street, Hollywood 
and the Mest Side sinthesized in 'easy, byte-sized pieces' for 
consumption by tourists and residents who 'don't need the 
excitement of dodging bullets ... in the Third World Country' 
that LosAngeles has become" (Davis, 1992; 18) 
'Idealization' is probably a keyword when it comes to considering how a place 
that should 'mirror' or even replace reality is being shaped, and the temptation to force 
things to look better and safer than they are has of course its serious drawbacks: 
7 think in fact we already much live inside a 'virtual' 
environment, and what's really being impoverished by this is the 
world of real experience, and people interacting with each 
other" (Dewey, from Once upon a time in Cyberville, Channel 4, 
1994) 
And Davis himself warned about those that he called 'urban simulators' noting 
that 
"Indeed, some critics wonder if it isn't the moral equivalent of 
the neutron bomb: the city emptied of all lived human 
experience. With its fake fossil candy wrappers and other 
deceits, City Walk sneeringly mocks us as it erases any trace of 
our realjoy, pain or labor" (Davis, 1992; 18) 
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Although the 'simulator' Davis was talking about was a built area, with well 
defined physical properties, it was considered something that distanced itself from 
reality. Being physical does not imply being real, at least in social terms, and a urban 
renewal project that works like a filter, segregating and discriminating entire layers of 
the society could end up being 
tr ... an architecture of deception which, in its happy-fiace 
familiarity, constantly distances itsetC from the most 
fundamental realities. The architecture of this city is almost 
purely semiotic, playing the game of grafted signification, 
theme-park building" (Sorkin, 1992; 4) 
Urban cyberspace can fit very well into this definition of 'architecture of 
deception'. Its supposedly 'public' spaces tend to be completely iconized environments. 
They are even more 'purely serniotic' than those of the physical places described 
before, and therefore they are extremely suitable for idealisation and for excluding those 
parts of urban reality that are somehow inconvenient. Moreover, the ability of 
computers to keep things tidy dealing with large amounts of data in a very short time, 
has allowed the hype about virtual cities to go further, envisaging a new way to 
approach urban space. Going 'out' into the 'virtual version' of your town, instead of 
using the real environment, not only has been seen as safer, but could give you a feeling 
of control and 'supervision'. 
"When you switch-on your city Mirror World, the whole city 
shows up on your screen, in a single dense, live, pulsing, 
swarming, moving, changing picture. This bigpicture is the 'top 
surface' of the Mirror World. You can dive deeper to explore, 
but you start out from the big picture - with the big picture on 
your screen. When you'refinished doing business in the depths, 
you return to the surface - to the big picture - on your way out. 
Whenever you use a Mirror World, the image of the whole is 
available, and inescapable" (Gelernter, 1991; 30 original 
emphasis) 
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But, to echo the concerns for the fragmentation of the real city examined in 
chapter 2, is the 'whole' really a whole? In his enthusiasm, Gelernter failed to 
acknowledge and to address all the problems related to the shaping of the access to 
cyberspace, that could be cause of social exclusion. He spoke about seeing "everyone 
and everything, without changing out of your pajamas" (Gelernter, 1991; 23), but it has 
already been argued that speaking about 'everyone' is utopian and simplistic, and that 
particular efforts are needed to try and involve a large part of the population in the 
advanced use of computer networks. That is a very hard task. 
It is evident, then, how dangerous it could be forgetting that a computer-based 
system, such as a digital city, is not necessarily to be seen as a mirror of the real urban 
situation. Rather, it is very unlikely to be like that, especially if nothing is done to 
overcome all the problems about the commodification of the information and those 
related to the ability to access the system and to get visible on it. Henderson 
acknowledged this and claimed that 
'A danger is that the abstraction can become the reality, and 
real world decisions can be made without due regard to the real 
world" (Henderson, 19K quoted in Hayles, 1993; 179) 
This is really a key issue. A cybercity is likely to be an idealised place. But the 
'dark side' of idealisation, as we have seen, is 'selection'. Selection of the 'positive' 
aspects and mechanisms of the city, and concealment of the inconveniences, exclusion 
of the 'bad' or apparently useless bits of the urban and social structure. This can, in 
extreme cases, lead to a quite restricted lobby of educated and wealthy computer- 
literates to be superficially considered as the 'citizenry', with disastrous consequences 
for the decision-making processes. It can also lead to the ultimate concealment of what 
is better not to see, both of the built environment and of the social situation. 
What, then, would the techno-citizens who Gelertner was talking about, see on 
their monitors? What would they be able to grasp about reality from the 'image of the 
whole'? And above all what would they miss completely, which people would they not 
be able to meet in the 'Mirror World' and hear from them. Which communities would 
they ignore the existence oV 
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3.4.2 Virtual, yet as real as possible 
Andrew Shapiro focused on these problems speaking about two different possible 
designs of a digital city. The first, that he called Cyberbia, is a commodified space in 
which reality is highly idealised, and no disturbances can happen as "... you can shape 
your route so that you interact only with people of your choosing and with information 
tailored to your desires" (Shapiro, 1995; 10). He therefore proposed an alternative type 
of digital city, called Cyberkeley, conceived to guarantee freedom of speech and the 
presence of public spaces that he defined as 'virtual sidewalks': 
"Consequently, it should be clear that Cyberbia - like suburbia - 
simply allows inhabitants to ignore the problems that surround 
them off-line. In Cyberkeley, by contrast, people may be 
inconvenienced by views they don't want to hear. But at least 
there are places where bothersome, in-your-jace expression 
flourishes and is heard. These publicforums are essential to an 
informed citizenry and to pluralistic, deliberative democracy 
itseU" (Shapiro, 1995; 10) 
And these public forums, he argued, could improve communication among 
people: 
'As on a real public sidewalk, a virtual pedestrian can try to 
ignore what's there and pass right by. Most probably will. But 
some will be enticed to listen and even to argue" (Shapiro, 
1995; 12) 
These claims focused on one single aspect of the whole relationship between real 
and virtual city, although important, that is freedom of expression. This was probably 
due to a particular sensitivity of the Americans towards the topic of censorship, further 
increased by the debate around the communication decency bill proposed by senator 
Exon and approved in the USA in the 1990s. Shapiro's article dealt only marginally 
with some of those crucial problems related to the access to the system, that were 
examined in the previous paragraph. The existence of public forums and virtual 
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sidewalks is certainly important, but it is important as well how many people would be 
able to be active users of them. 
Nevertheless, the idea that "people may be inconvenienced by views they don't 
want to heat" is very interesting, to the extent that it stresses the need not to over- 
idealise the digital city and, rather, to look for a way to link cyberspace to all aspects of 
urban life. In other words, even if it can sound like a paradox, there is a strong need for 
(reality' in virtual space. 
The necessity to link together real society and cyberspace was also suggested by 
Julian Stallabrass when he examined the phenomenon of Bulletin Board Systems. Real 
conununities were seen as the only pre-condition that could justify and underpin the 
future development of the virtual ones: 
"... the virtual community demands a real one prior to it in order 
to function successfully. That communities can for the moment 
flourish is due to the still relatively closed and tecnophile nature 
of the Net, which is just what gives it its coherence, and means 
that it is hardly the identity-free utopia that some claim 
(Stallabrass, 1995; 14) 
Claims such as these raise some serious doubts on the techno-enthusiastic visions 
of a future characterised by a beneficial shift of the physical world towards its 
virtualization. Rather, a particular emphasis has been put on the need to shift the 
extremely virtualized environments towards all those aspects of reality and of personal 
experience that they could tend to leave behind. If cities need technology, technology 
itself has been seen as useless or even dangerous without a strong link with the real 
urban environment. 
3.4.3 Re-materiallsing cyberspace 
The relationship between real and virtual is not uni-directional, and if it is true 
that virtual spaces might be useful to give visibility to physical ones, it is true as well 
that the physical world cannot be seen simply as an object to be displayed on our 
monitors. 
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Peter Cochrane argued, for instance, that: "... we will have a transition from the 
information society to the experience society. It will be about 'being there' ... Then we 
will be able to enter the real world from a distance" (Cochrane, Visions of Heaven and 
Hell, Channel Four Television, 1995). But William Mitchell warned that, anyway, it 
would be only possible to have: "Virtual bodies that can sense and act at a distance, but 
that also remain partially anchored in their immediate surroundings" (W. Mitchell, 1995; 
43). 
To what extent could and should virtuality replace the physical experience of the 
city? In an article titled Being Aere, David Brittan took as an example Chris Turner, 
from Olivetti Research Laboratories in Cambridge: 
"Do you need to see a video image of someone just to be asked 
outfor a beer? Well, you don't - Turner admits - but don't you 
think is rather criminal that you can't? ý In his view, the advent 
of two-way video on computer workstations is a matter of 
manifest destiny" (Brittan, 1992; 43-44). 
The Olivetti engineer was not really right when he envisaged the increased use of 
special, sophisticated two-way video on workstations. Despite this is widely available 
through the use of webcams and cheap of free software like Microsoft Netmeeting, 
there is little or no evidence that it is bound to be used heavily within contiguous office 
environments. But above all his enthusiasm for the replacement of some basic human 
contacts with a video link made him define 'criminal' the lack of multimedia interface 
between two adjacent offices. This attitude was probably due to that same phenomenon 
that McBeath and Webb defined as 'fascination and absorption' saying also that: 
"When we are involved in a group conversation in cyberspace 
we are not in intimate relation with the otherpersons but with 
the excitement of anticipation of what is going to come on 
screen next, or what one is going to say in response, but 
ultimately always with the magic of the immediate presence of 
the image into which we are incorporated" (McBeath and Webb, 
1995; 12) 
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Scepticism about the ability of virtual social life to replace more traditional forms 
of interaction has been shared by many researchers, and the need to return to physical 
places, or better not to try and escape from them, has been expressed from several 
points of view. Allucquere Rosanne Stone, for example, noted that "Cyberspace 
developers foresee a time when they will be able to forget about the body. But it is 
important to remember that virtual community originates in, and must return to, the 
physical" (Stone, 199 1; 113). 
In terms of urban life, the ability to go out and meet other people can then be 
considered an experience that should not be replaced and cancelled by any kind of 
electronic relationship: 
"We argue that public interaction on streets and in public 
spaces offers much more than can ever be telemediated. Real 
face-to-face interaction, the chance encounter, thefull exposure 
to theflux and clamor of urban life - in short, the richness of the 
human experience of place - will inevitably make a virtual 
community a very poor substitute" (Graham and Marvin, 1996, 
231) 
Overcoming the limitations of the physical world by living 'electronically', does 
not seem to be a satisfying answer to the problems of fragmentation and mobility of 
contemporary cities. Rather, it seems to introduce new, heavier limitations to social life: 
"Going out, going to work, going to school or to church, going 
away to college, and going home are economically significant, 
socially and legally defining, symbolically freighted acts. To 
change or eliminate them, as electrocottages and cybercondos 
promise to do, is to alter the basic fabric of our lives" 
(TVMitchell, 1995; 103) 
Or it can be seen as an overestimated form of entertainment, which has been given 
too much importance in social terms. Here is how McBeath and Webb criticised the 
hype about the so-called 'Multi-User Dungeons' (MUDs), on-line fantasy games often 
described as an interesting example of virtual world, constituting: "... living laboratories 
for studying the first-level impact of virtual communities" (Rheingold, 1994; 146): 
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"In the case of Multi- User-Dungeons and Furry-MUCKs, which 
are part discussion groups and part fantasy games, users are 
just engaging either with on-line Dungeons and Dragons, or 
developing in conjunction with others an adult version of Brer 
Rabbit stories. Yhese arejust glorified children's games of make 
believe. Participation in MUCK's and MUD's may require use 
of the imagination but it does not secure the affective 
dimensions ofcommunity" (McBeath and Webb, 1995; 8) 
It is clear enough, then, that any technocratic view of the future of cities, tending 
to assign to cyberspace the role of the new, exciting place for human interaction and 
debate, due to replace the wom-out physical town, is just simplistic. Even if it was 
possible to overcome the inner pitfalls of a cybercity that were examined before, such as 
commodification of information, and polarisation due to uneven access and 
participation, digital cities ought not to be conceived as being capable to create brand 
new communities, replacing the city itself. The previous claims suggested that, rather, 
digital cities should be 'physical space-oriented', encouraging people to go out, and 
helping the 'real' city and the 'real' communities. 
3.4.4 A circular relation 
The contributions reviewed so far suggest that cyberspace does not seem to have 
the potential to create communities and consequently an alternative city that is able to 
compete, in ten-ns of the richness of its experience, with the traditional, yet problematic, 
urban public space. It has been argued that physical reality is still the basis on which 
virtuality can develop, especially from the point of view of the individual human being. 
It has been argued, above all, that the physical city is important to validate cyberspace 
itself and to give it a reason to exist, a social purpose other than that of being a place for 
entertainment or a private club for technophiles. 
We noticed how Andrew Shapiro recommended that many aspects of reality, even 
the disturbing ones, could find a place in the virtual city, constituting its 'public spaces'. 
This is an important point indeed, but this concept should probably be extended to the 
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possibility for a digital city to involve and promote the physical one. This is why 
Stephen Graham argued that 
"The challenge to planners and local policy makers is to try and 
construct the meaning(ul, accessible and local virtual cities 
which support the positive publicly-supported urban vision of 
trying to re-connect the often fragmented elements of cities 
together" (Graham, 1995 (2)) 
And, highlighting the fact that the two dimensions of physicality and virtuality 
should never be considered independent from each other, William Mitchell saw the 
problem from the point of view of the architects who are used to deal mainly with 
physical space, observing that 
"Increasingly the architectures o physical space and ?f 
cyberspace - of the specifically situated body and of its fluid 
electronic extensions - are superimposed, intertwined, and 
hybridized in complex ways. The classical unities of 
architectural space and experience have shattered - as the 
dramatic unities long ago fragmented on the stage - and 
architects now need to design for this new condition" 
OVMitchell, 1995; 44) 
These two points of view are in a way complementary and can help us in 
understanding the circular relation that virtual and physical public space share. If it is 
true in fact that the vision of cybercities replacing real ones and creating new electronic 
communities is to be considered simplistic, it is true as well that the ability of 
cyberspace to give visibility to people and places should not be underestimated, and that 
it can be a tool to "re-connect the elements of the city" as Graham (1995) suggested. At 
the same time, design issues about cybercities could involve not just how they are 
shaped electronically, but - as argued by Mitchell - how architects, urban designers and 
planners might decide to manage the overlapping, the 'superimposition' of virtual and 
physical elements. It is a circular relation because the city goes into cyberspace and 
cyberspace goes into the city, influencing each other. 
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Rather than creating communities, a digital city could be used to link the existing 
local communities together, to give them the visibility that has been lost because of the 
problems of communication in the city: "When networks and information servers are 
organized to deal with information and issues of local concern ... they act to maintain 
more traditional, site-specific communities" (W. Mitchell, 1995; 116). Cyberspace could 
be used not as a replacement of the town, but as a reference to real people and real 
places, even those that might have been forgotten or that might be considered either 
unsafe or not interesting. That would mean recovering through communication an 
awareness of the richness of the places that exist already, but that have become hidden 
fragments. These bits of the city could then be referred by public cyberspace, being set 
up as 
it ... visible, accessible and at 
least occasionally unavoidable. 
Through regulation offinancial incentives, Congress might be 
able to get users of commercial and academic on-line services 
to pass through a public gateway before descending into their 
private virtual worlds" (Shapiro, 1995; 12) 
This public gateway that forces users of electronic services to see things they 
would otherwise avoid, simply because they do not belong to their specific activities, 
could possibly suggest an alternative type of digital city that focuses on public space, 
rather than on providing services, as many of the 'cities as menus' discussed in 
paragraph 3.1.2 actually do. And for the cybercity to deepen the relation with the real 
one, not only people might be promoted, but physical places also, to produce a 
geographically referred virtual town, the city going into cyberspace and cyberspace 
promoting the city. 
3.4.5 Cyberspace in the streets 
Other proposals have added to the debate, stressing the idea of cyberspace 
merging with the built environment, enriching it with a new communication technology 
and using the appeal Information Technology has to attract people to the streets again, 
whilst trying to overcome the access problems for those who cannot or do not want to 
use telematics at home: 
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"There is complete dissociation of the two [physical and virtual 
space] if the electronic public space is only accessible from 
personal computers in homes and businesses. Another 
possibility is to associate access points with civic architecture; 
put an electronic information kiosk in the lobby of city hall, or 
in the public library, for example. The Berkeley Community 
Memory and Santa Monica PEN systems have demonstrated the 
possibility of amore radical strategy by placing rugged 
workstations in places like laundromats, and at congregation 
pointsfor the homeless; these workstations thus begin to play a 
public role much like the traditional one of fountains in the 
public spaces ofRome" (JVMitchell, 1995; 127) 
These reflections can lead to a very different way to look at the relationships 
between physical and virtual space. Rather than considering these as two separate 
environments that somehow could even be seen as antagonist or alternative to each 
other, place remains one, and integrates, combines, or as Mitchell would argue, re- 
combines, its physical and electronic fragments together in new 'smarter' 
configurations: 
"Building these programmable places is not just a matter of 
putting wires in the walls and electronic boxes in rooms (though 
that is a start). As the relevant technologies continue to develop, 
miniaturised, distributed computational devices will disappear 
into the woodwork, Keyboards and mouse pads will cease to be 
the only bit-collection zones; sensors will be everywhere. 
Displays and effectors will multiply. In the end, buildings will 
become computer interfaces, and computer interfaces will 
become buildings" (JVMitchell, 1995; 105) 
This of course can be applied to cities as well as buildings. The recombination of 
bits of the built environment and electronic bits can be seen as an ongoing phenomenon: 
'We will characterise cities of the twenty-first century as 
systems of interlinked, interacting, silicon - and software - 
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saturated smart, attentive, and responsive places. We will 
encounter them at the scales of clothing, rooms, buildings, 
campuses and neighbourhoods, metropolitan regions, and 
global infrastructures " (Mitchell, 1999; 68; original emphasis) 
Considerations on the recombination of elements of space and cyberspace have 
even prompted Thomas Horan to envisage guidelines and principles for tackling the 
design of 'recombinant' places. Horan suggests throughout his book Digital Places: 
building our city of bits that attention should be given to the understanding 'digital 
places' as the "interface between electronic flows and physical places", and designing 
and building "synergistic combination[s] of physical place and cyberspace" (Horan, 
2000; 14 andl7) 
All of this widens the issue of the relation between physical and virtual. 
Cyberspace going back to the physical can imply not only promoting real spaces and 
people through telematics, but materialising telematics themselves, and using 
cyberspace terminals - the doors to the electronic world or, better, to the electronic 
version of the world - as elements of the real city, making traditional sites value-added 
places, as Magnaghi envisaged: 
"The real squares, of course, will not disappear, replaced by the 
virtual ones. Rather, we will have to bring cyberspace to the 
real squares, as a system of communication and additional 
knowledge. But we will have to recover completely the 'wisdom 
of the sites' and to produce a new process of settling down: to 
bring cyberspace to people and not people to cyberspace" 
(Magnaghi, 1995; 23 - translation by the author) 
This relates to this analysis of the digital cities on the Web. It is, in fact, another 
aspect of the design of a digital city, that can moreover have a particular relevance 
about the shaping of public space. Public space might in fact become a hybrid between 
physical and virtual, and the consequences could be interesting. Access can also be 
heavily affected by decisions to take cyberspace terminals to public areas of the town, 
and as it has been said, access is a crucial issue for the whole justification process of a 
cybercity. 
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Differences in the shaping of virtual towns should then be examined not only in 
relation to commodification and ownership, or to access to the service. How virtual 
cities are placed in relation to the real, local urban environment should be studied. Two 
sets of questions arise from this. 
How have the designers of cybercities been trying to establish public debate and 
to give visibility to local communities, even those representing the deprived bits of the 
city? And how have they been shaping virtual towns in relation to the fragmentation of 
both social and physical space, to link the bits together? Have they been referring 
cyberspace to real space? And how? 
Have designers and policy makers been trying in some ways to bring cyberspace 
to the streets, integrating it with real places? And how? How the development processes 
and the planning processes that are shaping real urban places could relate to those 
shaping the electronic space? 
3.5 WRAPPING IT ALL UP 1: ISSUES FOR A TYPOLOGY 
Section 3.1 had raised the issue of the need for a typology of web-based digital 
cities, in order to move the first, yet significant steps, in understanding the scope and 
nature of the phenomenon. The reflections produced in this chapter have helped 
focusing on a series of main principles that could be used to classify and evaluate urban 
internet-based information systems, and that can inforin and shape the first phase of the 
investigation. 
3.5.1 Considering ownership 
This point simply needs to be identified for the many digital city initiatives 
available on the Internet. Knowing who owns and runs certain digital cities could - and 
yet it could not - suggest detenninate correlations between digital city perfon-nance and 
the shape and type of ownership. 
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3.5.2 Considering informativeness and serviceability 
Digital cities can be regarded as a particular breed of urban information system. 
So, obviously the type and richness of the information provided and - where applicable 
- services implemented, seem crucial aspects to observe and analyse. These are 
basically the 'contents' of the digital city as an information repository and a service 
platform, and without these it would be very likely that the usefulness of the system 
itself would approximate zero, ending up being a sort of an empty virtual box. Urban 
regeneration as well as the empowerement of citizens need effective information 
provision. Although this would not be a sufficient condition for a 'best practice' case, as 
indicated below, it would definitely be necessary, and has to be observed. 
3.5.3 Considering social access and participation issues 
As extensively noted earlier in this chapter, the ability to access and use the 
information, services and virtual spaces of the digital city is not something that can be 
just taken for granted. Several barriers exist for accessing new technologies effectively, 
depending on levels of economic wealth as well as education and training. Age and 
gender have also been noted as possible discriminatory factors that could keep people 
from the fruition of an allegedly public virtual environment, as pointed out in the 
Interim Report of the High Level Experts Group of the European Union titled "Building 
the European Information Society for Us All", where it is recommended that attention 
should be given towards the inclusion and facilitation of use of 'information society' 
services by disadvantaged social groups such as "the elderly, early and 'active' retired 
people, the unemployed and women" (European Commission, 1996; 35). 
It has also been noted how the notion of 'access' to community-related ICT 
initiatives and digital places needs to be regarded as not just the ability to retrieve 
information from a Web page, but also - and above all - as the empowerment of 
participating in an active way in what goes on within a digital environment. Access and 
participation are therefore strictly related, to the extent of being regarded as sides of the 
same coin, participation being 'active' or 'pro-active' access. This is obviously possible 
only whenever the technology enables people to communicate, rather than just 'read' on 
a screen. So a typology of digital cities would have to consider the presence of facilities 
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enabling rich bi-directional flows and communication as a crucial factors that could 
differentiate some initiatives from others that tend to stick to the commercial, 
elementarily interactive model of 'press button to purchase', or in the case of digital 
cities 'press button to read the information'. 
3.5.4 Considering 'embeddedness': the relation with the host city 
The review of the literature has also highlighted how relevant and important the 
relationship between the 'digital' city and its physical counterpart can be and, 
consequently, the ability of the virtual city to address 'real' geographically-based 
communities and the issues that matter to them, rather than to electronically displaced 
groups. The choice of this research, as explicitly declared earlier in the chapter, is to 
examine the former type of digital city, the one that has a clear and possibly strong 
relation with its host town, an urban information and communication system that could 
be defined as 'grounded' (Graham and Aurigi, 1997), or 'embedded'. It has been argued 
that initiatives of urban ICT that privilege the relationship with the local economy and 
communities can be a key innovation factor for regenerating cities, rather than making 
them somehow weaker or obsolete. Organisations like Telecities in Europe, or UK 
Communities Online in the UK were established to allow knowledge exchange and 
facilitate the development and deployment of 'grounded' projects. Dave Carter, a 
policy-maker from Manchester and one of the founders of Telecities, has for instance 
highlighted the importance of nurturing local telematics, as "a critique of what might be 
termed the 'Utopian School' of future 'cyber-lifestyles' which sees cities becoming 
depopulated, 'instant electronic democracy' replacing the need for governmental 
structures and services and a dominant 'ruralist' lifestyle emerging" (Carter, 1997; 139) 
Other commentators stress "the advantage of community networks in comparison 
to other forms of virtual community, which have only intermittent or an absence of 
shared geographic space" (Wakeford, 1996), where 'community networks' clearly 
identifies place-based communities able to reap the benefits of telematics and the 
Internet. 
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So, an important aspect to survey about digital cities will be their 'embeddedness' 
(or 'groundedness'), and therefore how locally-relevant their information, services, and 
participation facilities are. 
3.6 WRAPPING IT ALL UP 2: VISIONS THAT SHAPE THE 
DIGITAL CITY 
In this chapter a wide range of issues that can characterise the shaping of a digital 
city initiative have been analysed. The review of the literature has demonstrated that the 
black box of the 'cybercity' needs to be opened up and watched closely and carefully. 
The fact of embarking in the creation and deployment of a cybercity does not imply 
beneficial consequences or impacts per se, and cyberspace effects and relations with the 
urban environment can vary dramatically depending on a series of design issues and 
policy choices. Approaching the study of the digital cities phenomenon should then 
imply first of all an observation carried out with a particularly open mind. Different 
systems can be shaped in radically different ways, so that virtual cities can work for 
even opposite purposes, and possibly produce opposite results both on the social and 
urban scenario. 
This again suggests how important are the observations made in Chapter 2 on the 
need to consider the ways technologies are socially constructed. Different approaches 
towards the same problem, and different ways of seeing the problem or the task itself 
will inevitably lead to different technological trajectories and, with them, urban futures. 
It is crucial in the study, once the more 'visible' or observable parts of the 
initiatives have been surveyed, to go beyond that and get knowledge of who the actors 
are who are shaping these experiments, what visions, needs, and expectations inspire 
them, how they see the the city and innovation in it. An approach is needed, linking the 
more digital city-specific reflections of this chapter with the more general consideration 
of the social construction of technologies from Chapter 2, and looking at how socio- 
political and economic factors, as well as interpretations of the city, the role of 
government, and the role of businesses and citizens, affect the adoption and shaping of 
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new technologies. This will require in-depth case studies and more qualitative work, 
which will be the other methodological tool characterising this investigation. 
In the next chapter I will define more precisely a methodological approach to 
carry out the analysis of what digital cities are at present and how they are being 
shaped, in order to answer the questions that have been raised so far. 
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CHAPTER 4- HOW TO FACE THE TASK 
4.0 - INTRODUCTION 
This chapter deals with the design of a research strategy for this project, on the 
basis of the needs and questions raised in the previous two chapters of critical literature 
review. It acknowledges that the review of the literature generated two sets of questions 
whose nature is different, and addresses the consequent problem of answering those 
questions by using two different methods of research. These two distinct strategies are 
described and justified in detail within the chapter. As the research involved carrying 
out an European survey and comparative case studies in Italy and the UK, this chapter 
also briefly takes into account the problems that could be raised by a cross-national 
study, and how these problems were addressed within the work. 
4.1 - DEVELOPING A RESEARCH PROGRAMME 
The literature review presented in the two previous chapters, clearly shows how 
limited, at the empirical level, is the actual knowledge about cyberspace and its 
relationships with the public realm of our cities. This lead to the generation of a 
relatively wide set of research questions, trying to address issues related to the scope 
and the basic characteristics of the 'digital cities' phenomenon, as well as trying to 
understand the processes underlying the several design choices. The range of questions 
raised in the literature review cannot be fully answered by adopting a single method of 
research. What was adopted was a 
"... research programme incorporating more than one research 
strategy - which might be termed a combined strategy. A 
common pattern is to have a mainly survey-based study 
accompained by a set of case studies. The surveys provide a 
general, representative, picture; the case studies, chosen often 
on the basis of the survey, illuminate, enrich and bring to life the 
surveyfindings. " (Robson, 1993; 125) 
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This type of programme is very pertinent to the way the research approach for this 
project was designed. In the following paragraphs the two distinct but inter-linked 
strategies will be justified and described in detail. 
The combination of the two different research strategies is also justified by the 
presence of a series of research questions that require, for completeness, to be addressed 
through both descriptive and explanatory research. The "shaping and design" of the 
same aspects of digital cities, in fact, involves the identification of features that can be 
observed and even quantified, and also of the choices and processes that lay beyond 
these and which require qualitative, explanatory strategies to be investigated. 
In other words, whenever possible, it was seen as desirable that descriptions of 
observed facts should contribute to strengthening the understanding and explanation of 
policy processes, interpretations and envisaged trends. Descriptive and explanatory 
features eventually reinforced each other. 
4.1.1 -WHY A SURVEY? 
A first phase of research was necessary to understand 'what' the digital city 
phenomenon was, in order to be able to construct a typology of the initiatives. This 
meant looking for 'direct' answers that are based on the observation of facts, 
specifically the observation of the ways digital city initiatives were designed, and of 
what they offered to the end-user. In other words, some of the questions were 'what' 
questions that above all aimed at obtaining descriptions, rather than explanations. A 
picture had to be drawn describing the scope and geography of the phenomenon. What 
could be found on the Internet that defined itself as a city-related bit of cyberspace, and 
where these sites were based, had to be observed. Another important element of the first 
phase of the study was to describe the way in which initiatives were designed. What 
features did the various initiatives offer that could constitute an addition to the public 
realm of cities? Although this phase did not aim at collecting people's opinions, it could 
still be referred to as a survey-based research. Beyond certain conventions that tend to 
identify this strategy with opinion polls, surveys do not necessarily imply interviewing 
and can be just observational (Robson, 1993; 123), as was the case with this specific 
investigation. To get these factual 'snapshots' of reality, surveying was seen as a 
particularly appropriate strategy, as it 
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"entails the collection of data on a number of units and usually 
at a single juncture in time, with a view to collecting 
systematically a body of quantifiable data in respect of a 
number of variables which are then examined to discern 
patterns of association" (Bryman, 1989; 104, quoted in Robson, 
1993; 124) 
Understanding 'what' European city-related web sites were, was also extremely 
useful to identify potentially interesting cases that would be worth being examined more 
deeply. This allowed the establishment of an even more coherent relationship between 
the two phases of the whole research. 
In fact, as previously noted by Robson, the choice itself of what case studies 
should be carried out was infonned by the survey results. The results of survey research 
were "used to direct the researchers to individuals as instances for depth observation" 
(Fielding and Fielding, 1986; 84, quoted in May, 1993; 90). In this particular case the 
initiatives that were chosen for case studies were Iperbole - in Bologna, Italy - and 
Digital City Bristol in the UK. 
4.1.2 - WHY CASE STUDIES? 
Many of the questions stemming from the review of the literature can be 
described as 'how' and 'why' questions. In particular, the Social Construction of 
Technology (SCOT) perspective involves the construction of a history of the initiatives 
to investigate the ways choices have been made and why a certain technological 
phenomenon has developed in the way it has. In order to do this, an investigation of the 
context in which some exemplar digital cities were being developed was indeed 
necessary. These issues could not be addressed only by surveying as Yin noted clearly, 
66surveys can try to deal with phenomenon and context, but their ability to investigate 
the context is extremely limited" (Yin, 1994: 13). This meant that in-depth qualitative 
investigation would be required. 
Answenng most of the 'how' questions implied that a series of statements by 
those who are involved in shaping the digital city initiatives had to be collected, not just 
to describe facts, but to understand the ways decision makers were interacting with the 
projects and with each other. Other questions, that still asked 'how' certain processes 
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worked, implied examining the differences in the interpretative flexibility of the 
different subjects involved in the shaping of the initiatives. Generally, the 'how' and 
'why' questions that were a fundamental part of the research, could be defined as 
questions of an explanatory nature. As Yin noted: 
"In contrast, 'how' and 'why' questions are more explanatory 
and likely to lead to the use of case studies, histories and 
experiments as the preferred research strategies. This is because 
such questions deal with operational links needing to be traced 
over time, rather than merefrequencies or incidence. Thus, if 
you wanted to know how a community successfully thwarted a 
proposed highway, you could not rely on a survey or an 
examination of archival records but would have to conduct what 
in the final analysis would be a history or a case study. " (Yin, 
1994; 18) 
In this research the topic to be studied was: "a contemporary phenomenon within 
its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not 
clearly evident" (Yin, 1994: 23). In fact, digital city initiatives were being presented as 
implementations of telematics technologies within the urban arena, in which the actors 
involved - such as local authorities, for example - were both part of the context and 
active shapers of the phenomenon. At the same time, the aims of the technological 
object 'digital city' were directly related to the city to which it belonged, that is 
obviously an important element of the context. Furthermore, studying the development 
of digital cities was clearly a situation in which: "the relevant behaviours cannot be 
manipulated" (Yin, 1994; 19), thus ruling out the options of undertaking some type of 
experiment. It could also take advantage of direct observation of contemporary events 
and systematic interviewing, characteristics that distinguish case studies from history 
(Yin, 1994; 19). 
Therefore, all of these considerations pointed towards case studies as the most 
appropriate research strategy to deal with a large part of the research questions. 
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4.1.3 - RESEARCH QUESTIONS VS METHODOLOGICAL 
APPROACHES 
The following table summarises the whole set of research questions and the ways 
they have been dealt with, in terms of the design of the project's research strategy. 
The overall research question: 
How are cities developing their own virtual places, how are they being shaped 
and what are the consequences of this process, in terms ofprovision of information, 
social access, and relationship between physical and virtual city? 
Through 
Exploration of design and policy choices and alternatives to them, for a 
constructive type of criticism that might lead to the formulation of design and policy 
recommendations 
ISSUE/RESEARCH QUESTION SURVEY CASE 
STUDIES 
Social Construction - basics _ 
Who is involved in the shaping of the digital city x 
(entrepreneurs, enrolled people)_and why? 
How is the initiative developing and is it stabilising? x 
What paradigms were adopted and what is changing 
now? 
How do the several actors see the assets and x 
weaknesses of the initiative. How are they willing to 
chanqe it? 
Need for a typology 
What is the scope and scale of the digital city x 
phenomenon within the EU? How can we map the 
phenomenon of virtual cities? 
How can we develop a typology of digital cities? x 
issues related to commodification of information 
Co-existence of public and private interests. Who x x 
owns and/or manages the sites? 
How are policy makers trying to regulate the x 
presence of private sector? 
What is the influence of the private actors over the x 
d. c.? 
Strategies for economic development 
How are policy makers relating the d. c. to local x x 
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economy? What facilities are they providing for local 
firms? 
Social Access to digital cities 
What level of interaction are the digital cities offering x 
to allow active participation by the users? 
How are they coping with the tension between x x 
earning revenue and social access? Are they 
integrating advertising in their sites? Are they 
charging for publishing on the sites? 
What are they providing in terms of active free x 
access to information i. e. web publishing and 
participation to debates? 
Policy instruments to give access to disadvantaged x 
How are they coping with education and computer x 
literacy problems? 
How are they coping with the polarisation coming x 
from diversity and group closure? 
'Embeddedness' and relation real/virtual 
How are they trying to establish/en courage public x x 
debate within the city? 
Are digital cities somehow restricting access to local x 
people? 
What language(s) is being used? Are local people the x 
main target? 
How are they trying to give visibility to local people x x 
and communities, including the deprived ones? 
Are digital cities providing actual local information x 
and services, and to what extent? 
Are they trying to reduce social and physical x 
fragmentation? 
How are they relating real planning to digital x 
development? 
How are they integrating real places with digital x 
features? 
4.2 - THE SURVEY STRATEGY IN DETAIL 
4.2.1 - WHAT SAMPLE (EXTERNAL VALIDITY ISSUES) 
As previously noted, a survey was designed to address those questions raised in 
the critical literature review that have a "descriptive" nature. Through addressing these 
questions it was also possible to generate scores that allowed the building of a typology 
of the Web City phenomenon within the European Union, according to the criteria 
mentioned in the previous chapter. 
95 
Chapter 4- How to face the task 
Before considering the descriptive questions that contribute to the generation of 
the typology and its categories, which will also be described in chapter 5, a series of 
general considerations are necessary. It is important to examine the way the survey itself 
has been carried out, and the limits - some inevitable, other imposed on purpose - of 
the sample examined. 
Ruling out 'non-grounded' digital cities 
It was defined in the critical literature review that the object of this research were 
World Wide Web sites that had a direct relationship with a city or town in the EU, 
presenting themselves as 'mirrors' of that urban space, providing information about it 
and even electronic 'meeting' spaces. 
Consequently, a first choice was excluding those 'web cities' that - although 
residing on servers physically based in the EU - presented themselves as Internet sites 
without any special relationship with a real place. Several examples of this type of site 
can be made, such as 'City Island' or 'Fortune City', which were both placed in 
England, but completely disembedded from any particular location, sort of 'stand-alone' 
Internet pages that exploited - sometimes very successfully - the spatial metaphor of 
the city. This exclusion stemmed from the objectives of the research itself, as it aimed to 
analyse how specific digital cities were being shaped to establish a relationship with the 
urban public sphere of specific towns and cities. The presence of a real urban 
environment directly related to the web city examined, was a crucial feature here. For 
this reason, the search for web cities to analyse had been conducted using indexes and 
directories of real cities on the World Wide Web, and so excluding 'stand-alone' digital 
cities. 
Searching for citizens-related sites 
Once it was defined that Web sites somehow linked to real cities had to be 
surveyed, it came to seariching for the relevant digital sites. No truly comprehensive 
index or directory of digital cities existed. This is a quite normal occurrence for the 
Internet, as pages are bom and die continuously. Moreover, unless the manager of a 
certain information site registers it in some directories or search engines, it is much 
harder to find it without having previous knowledge about it. This clearly indicated that 
conducting a really comprehensive, all-embracing survey of web sites of some type 
would have involved the use of huge human resources, in order to obtain a 'picture' of 
the situation. Resource and time constraints played a major role in determining the way 
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the surveyed sites were searched for. For the reasons identified above, a selection of the 
several indexes and search engines of the Internet had to be done. It was decided to rely 
upon 'City. Net' as the primary source of links to web cities. City. Net was a worldwide 
directory of web presence of cities. It listed cities by geographical area and/or nation, 
dividing the sites relevant to each city by categories that appeared particularly helpful 
for the selection of those to be included in the sample. As the survey dealt with web 
sites that presented themselves as information sites mirroring the real city and 
supposedly useful to the citizens themselves, all the pages listed under the 'Travel and 
Tourism' category were not considered. Exceptions were made for some sporadic cases 
in which the sites had some very explicit words in their titles, such as 'Virtual City' or 
'Virtual Community' etc. This was necessary because there could have been a mistake 
in the categorisation by City. Net, and some of those sites could actually have been of 
interest to the research. 
Additional sources of information were also considered, and the survey did not 
rely solely on City. Net. 'Yahoo', perhaps the best known directory of Web sites on the 
Internet, was used in conjunction with City. Net. This was to deal with the fact that some 
administrators of civic sites could have chosen not to register with the latter. It was a 
good choice, and in several cases gave significant results, and helped to identify the 
sites that otherwise would have been overlooked. In some cases, to further increase the 
accuracy of the search, national directories of civic Web sites were used, when known. 
This happened for the case of the Dutch Digital Cities page, at http: //www. dhp. nl/ , and 
for the CCTA Government Information Service in the UK. 
Further sampling choices 
Some of the other limitations, as well as the definition of the final version of the 
survey's record, originated from the results of a preliminary investigation. Not being 
aware of the scope of the phenomenon of digital web cities in Europe, and being in the 
need of testing the initial propositions of the survey, an experimental, pilot investigation 
was carried out. This pilot phase of the survey will be dealt with in the next section, but 
it has to be noted that, during the pilot survey, an overall observation of the City. Net 
directory entries for EU cities was done. At the beginning, in fact, no limitations - apart 
from that of the EU boundaries - were decided, in order to keep an open mind about the 
most appropriate and feasible methodology for the study. 
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The preliminary observation of the City. Net directory was necessary to pick, for 
each country, a random site for conducting a pilot study. This observation led to a first 
important consideration. Due to the high number of cities that seemed to have at least 
one relevant Web site, and to the fact that several of them seemed to have many sites 
each, it was decided to limit the field of the survey. 
Mainly due to constraints of time, it was decided to consider only EU cities 
having about or more than 200,000 inhabitants. The 'about' here is necessary, as 
consistent data about the population of EU cities could not be found, either in atlases 
and other publications. The list of the cities to be surveyed was constructed by using 
several sources, providing partial lists. Some publications were in fact listing, in 
particular cases, entire regions or provinces as well as the major cities of Europe. 
Another problem was the different years to which the several census data refer to, a fact 
that inevitably produces inconsistencies, and the age of the publications used. For these 
reasons, to be sure not to exclude cities that had about' 200,000 people, all the urban 
centres in doubt were included. The publications used to retrieve the data about the 
population of EU cities were: 
Sallez A. (1993) Les Villes, Lieux dEurope, Datar/Editions de I'Aube 
Urbanisation and the Functions of Cities in the European Community (1992) 
European Commission 
Compact Enciclopedia Geografica De Agostini (1989), De Agostini Editore 
Atlante Enciclopedia Geografica Garzanti (1979), Garzanti Editore 
Atlante Enciclopedico Touring, Vol. II (1987), Touring Club Italiano 
Italian atlases were chosen after having looked at several British ones in the 
University library. The former were much more detailed and included data about cities' 
population. This search of EU publications and atlases resulted in a list of 167 locations 
in 14 European countries (Luxembourg does not have any big city). 
Another limitation to the sample came for cases of cities having more than three 
digital counterparts. It was decided in fact to limit the analysis to a maximum of three 
Web sites per city. In the relatively few cases where more than three sites were present, 
it was made sure to give a priority in the selection to those that looked more complex, or 
that were presented as 'official' sites of the city. it seemed that these limitations would 
lead, however, to the collection of data on at least 200 web sites. The actual final result 
confirmed this forecast, as 213 city related pages were included in the survey. 
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by: 
External validity of the survey 
Summarising, the sample of NVeb sites chosen to conduct the survey was affected 
9 the deliberate choice not to include either non-grounded sites and tourist- 
oriented sites, as these were seen as not appropriate for the purpose of the 
research itself; 
9 the fact that a reliable and exhaustive list of the city-related Web sites in 
Europe was not available, and that the sites had to be searched on the 
Internet. Therefore, the whole 'population' was not easily definable; 
9 the obvious resource constraints, especially time related, that imposed 
limitations on the number of sites that could be surveyed. This lead to the 
choice of including (and searching for) only those sites that 'belonged' to 
medium-large and large cities. 
For these reasons, a couple of considerations have to be made about the external 
validity of this first phase of the research. Within the larger 'population' of digital city 
related sites, the sample employed is a 'non-probability' sample, as it excludes 
completely all of those sites belonging to cities and towns smaller than 200,000 people. 
This implies that the results of such an investigation are "acceptable when there is no 
intention or need to make a statistical generalisation to any population beyond the 
sample surveyed" (Robson, 1993; 140). However, the results can be ýdefinitely 
generalised within the field of large European cities. Indeed, the sites surveyed 
constitute an acceptably reliable sample, as care was taken to identify them and include 
nearly all of the 'appropriately' research related ones. It can then be claimed that the 
survey draws a reliable and clear picture of how the World Wide Web technology was 
used at the beginning of 1997 to design and run citizens related sites in large cities in 
the EU. Consequently, it was possible and acceptable to construct a typology of the 
initiatives, and draw a series of conclusions from it. In order to do so, however, another 
important issue had to be addressed: the internal validity of the study. 
4.2.2 - SURVEYS RECORD, PILOT PHASE, AND INTERNAL 
VALIDITY 
The main tool that had to be developed and employed to carry out the survey is 
the record containing the variables to be examined for each of the World Wide Web 
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sites. This constituted the basis for the construction of the survey's database, and it can 
be considered the equivalent of a 'questionnaire' used within an opinion survey, or 
anyway a survey that involves human respondents. It contained fields that gave answers 
to the descriptive questions coming from the critical literature review, i. e. 'what', 'how 
many', and some descriptive support to several questions of the 'how' type. In general it 
addressed questions that could be answered by quantitative analysis and results. The 
combination of several of the answers to singular questions, could be used to recognise 
a series of trends towards the provision of urban information and services, the 
'participativeness' of the site, and the 'groundedness' of the site within its real urban 
counterpart. Quite obviously, as noted by Robson, the design of the questionnaire - or 
in this specific case of the survey's record - was of crucial importance for the validity of 
the whole study: 
"If the questions are incomprehensible or ambiguous, the 
exercise is obviously a waste of time. Yhis is a problem of 
internal validity where we are not obtaining valid information 
about the respondents and what they are thinking, feeling or 
whatever" (Robson, 1993; 125; original emphasis) 
Although, because of the nature of the investigation itself, several of the problems 
typically related to lack of homogeneity or biases in interviewing were not present, 
other issues that could have prevented the study from 'obtaining valid information' had 
to be taken into account. 
Record design and its refining through a pilot phase 
Above all, the way relevant contents of the city related Web sites were organised 
into a system of variables was of paramount importance. Although the same person 
surveyed the totality of the sampled sites, ambiguous variables were still a possible 
problem, as well as non-exhaustive questioning that could have left out some important 
characteristics that had not been envisaged in the initial design of the record. To avoid 
these problems, a very small-scale, pilot survey was carried out on a subsample of 14 
sites - one for each of the EU countries, excluding Luxembourg - randomly selected 
within 'City. Net", employing a first version of the record. As noted by Kidder, piloting 
is useful to check how the survey: 
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"works and whether changes are necessary before the start of 
the full-scale study. The pretest provides a means of catching 
and solving unforeseen problems in the administration of the 
questionnaire, such as the phrasing and sequence of questions 
or its length. It may also indicate the need for additional 
questions or the elimination of others" (Kidder, 1981; 162; 
quoted in May, 1993; 76) 
The survey's record actually evolved from the early version used in the pilot 
investigation to the definitive one, following the assessment on how appropriate and 
objective the several variables were when researching 'on the field'. Surveying the 
subsample of 14 sites gave two extremely important results: 
Indications on how the record should be changed and optimised 
An awareness of potential language problems in surveying sites from certain 
countries 
While the second issue will be dealt with in the next paragraph, it is appropriate 
now to provide a description of the survey's record and the changes and adaptations it 
underwent. 
All of the variables included in the survey's record described aspects of city 
related Web sites that could be directly observed by browsing their pages on the 
Internet. Dealing uniquely with factual, descriptive issues, and not opinions, they had to 
be as objective as possible, involving the least possible of personal judgement. Some 
were useful to put the observed site in context and address some of the issues related to 
who owns and runs the sites, and whether there are attempts to generate revenue 
through digital cities. Most of them, though, had to relate to and 'feed' one or more of 
the three general criteria adopted to construct a typology of the initiatives, in order to 
classify the sites by their tendency to be 'informative', 'participative', and 'grounded'. 
Consequently, the several variables had to deal with observable facts such as: 
Evident limitations of access to information 
Richness of information and services provided 
Level of interaction and communication allowed 
Language(s) used to present the information 
Presence of public discourse oriented features, such as public discussion 
forums 
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" Availability of publishing spaces for self-representation and expression 
" Availability of trade and advertising spaces for firms 
" Local orientation and vocation of many of these aspects 
Comparing the two versions of the survey's record, it can be noticed how a couple 
of variables were completely eliminated, while others had to be changed and expanded 
to allow for clearer and more reliable results. In detail, these changes were applied to 
the record: 
'Access (economic side)' was eliminated as not relevant. It was acknowledged as 
a consequence of the pilot study that no sites were going to charge for simple access to 
them. Otherwise they probably would not have been on the Internet, but on 'closer' 
systems. In any case, revenue would have been raised otherwise, through advertising or 
selling web spaces. 
'Interface' was eliminated because it was not possible to easily assess, on an 
objective basis, the friendliness and 'weight' of the sites' interfaces. That would have 
required either a heavy involvement of subjective judgement (that had to be avoided) or 
some type of quantification of interface features. This second option could have been 
interesting, but it would have implied a long process and perhaps the writing of some 
automated routine that would, for instance, 'count' the Kilobytes to be downloaded for 
each of the pages of the whole site. This was definitely beyond the feasibility of this 
study. 
'Personal Pages and links' had to be expanded and divided into two separate 
variables: 'Information Providers' and 'Individual Pages'. This was definitely one of the 
gcore' variables of the whole survey, affecting the results heavily. The pilot phase 
showed that the initial 6 options used in the record were not enough to cover the range 
of possibilities. The new division and expansion allowed an increased precision in the 
compilation of the survey, without affecting considerably the time taken to fill the 
record. The word 'links' had to be eliminated from the definition of the variable, as it 
was noted how easy, non-committing and often not substantial it was for the sites to 
make some casual links to other sites that provided some kind of information about the 
city. Also, the purpose here was to assess above all how the sites themselves were trying 
to encourage local participation by offering free or charged spaces. 
'Urban Public Services, Local Information' was, in its first version, quite 
ambiguous and unreliable. It was immediately noticed that options like 'wide range of 
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services' or 'limited range' had to be defined more clearly and not to be left to personal 
judgement. Although some degree of personal judgement would have probably 
remained, the second version went into much more 'objective' detail about 'what' areas 
of information were being provided, to be chosen within a list of twelve. It also took 
into account whether the contents of each of them could be considered just a shallow 
description of a certain topic or were actually more complex, up to date and potentially 
more useful than what could be already found in brochures and telephone directories. 
Finally, it embedded a simple and straightforward scoring system that would generate a 
synthetic result. This specific set-up was of great help in keeping the results as objective 
and as consistent as possible, throughout the whole survey. 
Finally, a minor but still significant modification was applied to 'Access 
(selectivity)', changing its name to just 'Selectivity' and removing the last option of 
Web sites 'fully limited to local registered users'. It was noted, as in the case of the 
economic side of access, that no sites with this characteristic were going to be present. 
The choice of opening a WWW site in itself announced the intention of making at least 
part of the information widely accessible. 
4.2.3 - CROSS-NATIONAL ISSUES IN THE SURVEY 
As stated in the previous paragraph, one of the potential problems that had to be 
considered for the internal validity of the study was the wide range of languages that 
could potentially be found throughout the EU. The relative ability of the investigator to 
understand correctly the contents of the Web sites had to be taken into account. It has to 
be considered, however, that what was required by the survey was not the 
accomplishment of complex interviews. What was important, to correctly fill the 
survey's record, was understanding some basic things about each of the sites, and 
observe what types of information were present and how 'deeply' they were developed. 
Also, the observation and analysis of the main contents of the city-related Web sites 
were relatively easy tasks, as far as languages are concerned, as digital cities tended to 
have relatively standardised contents. Moreover, my understanding of languages such as 
Italian, French and Spanish helped in limiting the problem. Further help came from the 
fact that most of the sites, especially the Greek and the Northern European ones, had a 
bilingual structure, presenting the information - or at least a relevant part of it - in 
English too. This, together with the use of dictionaries, helped in setting up brief 
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glossaries of the relevant tenns in Gennan, Dutch, Swedish or Finnish, that could be 
used to quickly realise what certain pages were dealing with. 
4.2.4 - TECHNICAL PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED 
On few occasions, mainly in Italy and Portugal, sites were found extremely slow 
to download. Some were found not to respond at all. Repeated attempts were made to 
connect these few cases, to see if trying to download their pages at different times of the 
day could help. Sometimes it did, but there still were 4 sites -3 Italian and I Portuguese 
- that could not be browsed, despite many attempts. These 4 sites have been excluded 
from the survey. Fortunately, though, the number of non-responding sites was 
extremely low, and this problem did not endanger the validity of the whole study. 
4.2.5 - SURVEY ANALYSIS 
Linking the specific questions to the variables 
As Robson argues, "a simple means of exploring many data sets is to recast them 
in a way which counts the frequency that certain things happen, or find ways of 
displaying that information" (Robson, 1993; 318). This was basically the way data have 
been dealt with to get answers to the several descriptive research questions. Since the 
need was to obtain descriptions, above all, rather than complex causal relationships, it 
was felt that there was no need for particularly sophisticated statistical techniques, and 
the production of a series of frequency distribution charts for the most meaningful 
variables was helpful enough. 
Scoring system for the construction of the typology 
It is necessary to describe the way the typology of initiatives was constructed 
stemming from the variables. As it has been mentioned before, the information 
collected through the survey's record had to feed the three general criteria adopted to 
construct the typology. Therefore, nearly each of the variables produced results which, 
apart from being used to describe specific phenomena by histograms and pie charts, had 
to generate a score determining how 'informative', 'participative' or 'grounded' a 
certain initiative was. Some of the variables actually generated more than one single 
score, as they were considered to affect more than one aspect of the typology. For 
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example, the provision of public forums was an indicator of a participative vocation. At 
the same time, the local orientation of the forums' topics could indicate the efforts of the 
initiative to create a strong relationship with the real city and its communities. This 
meant that the 'public forums' variable generated two different scores affecting two 
different sides of the typology. The scores were assigned to each option in order to 
make a maximum result of 100 possible for each of the three typological aspects. 
Within each of the aspects, the relative difference of 'weight' of each variable's score 
depended on the importance that that specific variable - and the options within it - was 
judged to have for the typological aspect it was affecting. To make a clear example - 
and the most extreme within the whole analysis - although the provision of tourist 
information and organisational pages clearly affected the 'informativeness' of a certain 
Web site, the presence of reliable public information and services was much more 
important to determine how 'informative' that initiative was. The lack of a good result 
within this last variable, even in the presence of the previous two, would have meant 
that the initiative would be scored as only moderately informative. Therefore, it seemed 
appropriate to introduce differential 'weights' within the scoring system, and that, in 
this specific case, the variable 'public services and local information' would produce a 
much higher score than even the other two added together. 
The single scores, once added, allowed the researcher to 'quantify' how 
informative, participative, and grounded each of the Web sites tended to be. It was then 
decided to recognise a threshold that would allow differentiation between strong and 
weak trends contributing towards the three attributes generating the typology. In other 
words, it was decided that, for instance, an informative initiative had to score 40 or 
over, the same applying for the other two 'attributes'. 
The intersection of the results for the three attributes would then determine the 
, type' of digital site each of the initiatives was going to fall into. A frequency 
distribution of the types was then used to produce a typological pie chart showing the 
general trend in European large cities. 
It has to be stressed at this point that the reliability of this scoring system had to 
be tested somehow, not to produce inaccurate and misleading results. Iteration here was 
the key to increase accuracy and reliability. Once the typology had been 'calculated', as 
explained above, a sample check over some of the "edge' sites (those sites producing 
scores that were very close to the next category within the typology) was carried out. 
Around 20 sites were visited again, and the results coming from the spreadsheet were 
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compared with the overall, holistic impression coming from the new visit. This process 
turned out to be extremely useful to understand that some of the initiatives that had 
fallen into the 'brochures' category could actually be more appropriately defined as 
'civic databases' (the adjacent category). This obviously led to a review of the whole 
scoring system, and the application of several adjustments to make it more accurate and 
reliable. A table describing all the typological categories and how they related to the 
main survey criteria can be found at the beginning of the next chapter. 
4.3 - CASE STUDY STRATEGY IN DETAIL 
4.3.1 - UNIT OF ANALYSIS - WHICH CASE STUDIES? 
Once it was decided that, as stated previously, the explanatory nature of many of 
the questions was leading to the adoption of a case study strategy, the next issue to 
address was to define the unit of analysis and the case studies themselves. 
As Yin notes: 
"Selection of the appropriate unit of analysis results from your 
accurately specifying the primary research questions. If your 
questions do not lead to the javouring of one unit of analysis 
over another, your questions are probably either too vague or 
too numerous - and you may have trouble conducting your case 
study" (Yin, 1994; 23) 
In the specific case of this research, the unit of analysis was sharply defined by the 
research questions as those initiatives known as 'digital cities' and the people directly 
involved in shaping them and taking decisions over their design and development. 
Obviously, these specific initiatives are being developed within a broad and complex 
context, and several socio-political and economic factors were also affecting the shaping 
of the initiatives. These had to be considered to correctly analyse the case studies. 
Nevertheless, the imposition of a rather sharp boundary was necessary to avoid the 
temptation to "collect everything" (Yin, 1994; 22). 
106 
Chapter 4- How to face the task 
Which case studies? 
The analysis of the survey proved to be extremely helpful in determining the most 
interesting and advanced examples of digital cities and thence suggesting a group of 
possible case studies. 
Within this group, two initiatives were selected for comparison: Iperbole in 
Bologna, and Digital City Bristol. The observation of the Web sites related to these 
initiatives, carried out for the survey, had already provided some basic knowledge of 
these two projects. It was evident that Bologna and Bristol were two of the most 
developed and interesting digital cities in Europe. Iperbole Bologna proved this further 
by winning the so-called 'Bangemann Challenge' award for public administrations in 
early 1997, and it was one of the most prominent members of the 'Telecities' group, 
promoted by the EU. 
A series of pragmatic factors had also an influence over the choice of the case 
studies. The fact that the researcher is Italian suggested that a case study in Italy was 
particularly viable, both technically and economically. An Anglo-Italian comparison 
was also quite desirable. Analysing the development of digital cities in two quite 
different contexts would be extremely interesting and valuable to give the research a 
cross-European dimension that would not be restricted to a comparison between similar 
northern-European situations. 
Also, the availability of good contacts and links with key-persons involved in the 
shaping of the two projects was a crucial factor for the choice of the case studies. As 
Yin argues: 
"Key informants are often critical to the success of a case study. 
Such persons not only provide the case study investigator with 
insights into a matter but also can suggest sources of 
corroboratory evidence - and initiate the access to such 
sources" (Yin, 1994; 84) 
Both in Bologna and Bristol the presence of a known person who happened to be 
at the very centre of the initiative was extremely beneficial to the conduct of the case 
studies. Through these informants it was possible to select the sources of information - 
mainly interviewees - and optimise the whole process without having to conduct 
redundant exploration. In Bologna, the good relationship established with the lperbole 
project manager, Leda Guidi, was vital in gaining access to interviewees such as the 
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(city manager' of Comune di Bologna (Bologna City Council), who otherwise would 
have been extremely difficult to approach. A similar thing happened for Bristol, where 
the previously acquired knowledge of Erik Geelhoed of Hewlett Packard Laboratories 
opened up opportunities to be introduced to prospective interviewees both in Bristol 
City Council and the University of West of England. 
4.3.2 - CROSS-NATIONAL ISSUES IN CASE STUDIES 
As the choice of the case studies led to a cross-national comparison between an 
Italian and a British initiative, a series of potential benefits as well as problems for the 
research had to be considered. 
Potential benefits 
First of all it is useful to stress how this specific research could be defined as truly 
comparative, thence being subject to the relative benefits and problems. Pickvance and 
Preteceille note that the analysis of multiple case studies does not necessarily mean that 
a study is truly comparative. A proper comparative analysis would seek to "explain the 
observed differences or similarities in phenomena in two or more cases" (Pickvance and 
Preteceille, 1991; 199), rather than presenting, and concentrating on, a series of 
individual case results. This specific research aimed at comparing the several aspects of 
the two case studies, taking advantage of the benefits deriving from it. Among these 
May recognises what he refers to as the 'import-miffor' view and the 'difference' view. 
The first of these two benefits implies that by "producing findings on the practices of 
other countries, we are better able to see the basis of our own practice" (May, 1993; 
157). The second implies that "comparative analysis is undertaken to explain and 
understand difference" adding in many cases "an understanding and explanation of the 
complicated relationship between economic, social and political systems" (May, 1993; 
157). Although it can be argued that the 'import-miffor' view is more effective when 
comparing countries that are similar (Teune, 1990; 58), May argues that 
(ion a less instrumental dimension, this also allows us to reflect 
upon our own social systems and cultural ways of behaving. It 
thereby possesses the potential to challenge our 'background 
assumptions' (Gouldner, 1971) by producing findings on 
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different social contexts and cultural practices" (May, 1993; 
157) 
Since the investigator is an Italian residing in England, these arguments seem to 
acquire a particular strength and effectiveness in the specific case of this research. The 
challenge ended up, in fact, being double sided, as the gap between 'home' and 'away' 
was obviously much more nuanced than would have happened if the researcher had 
been a British person. It was not just the contribution - in terms of similarities and 
differences - of the Italian case to question and enrich the researcher's knowledge on 
the British system. It worked the other way round too, allowing publication and 
participation to conferences in Italy as well. And it had significant consequences in 
lessening some of the main risks of ethnocentrism and lack of equivalence in the 
analysis. 
Potential problems 
A major risk when undertaking cross-national comparative research is to design 
the whole study from a point of view that works well for the investigator's country and 
culture, but overlooks or misinterprets crucial aspects of the other nations and societies 
that are being object of study. As Anner argues: 
"A second major methodological task in comparative research 
is to devise and select theoretical problems, conceptual 
schemes, samples, and measurements and analysis strategies 
that are comparable or equivalent across the societies involved 
in a particular study" (Armer, 1973; 51; quoted in May, 1993; 
161) 
Strictly related to this theme, there is the issue of the so-called equivalence of 
meaning, which deals with language related problems. May notes that: "Language 
differences, even if researchers have a proficient understanding of a language, require a 
cultural understanding of words to allow for the equivalence of meaning" (May, 1993; 
162). In other words, whether it is, for example, the interviewer who is proficient in the 
interviewee's language or vice versa, the two will still tend to think and interpret what is 
being said following their cultural framework, with some potential risks of 
misunderstanding. Examples of this can be the non-existing difference between the 
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words and concepts of 'policies' and 'politics' in non Anglo-Saxon countries (Cropper, 
1986), or the potentially equivocal use of the word 'agenda' by Dutch managers who 
actually mean 'diary' by it (Lawrence, 198 8; quoted in May, 1993; 162). 
Again, the particular fact that an Italian researcher from a British university was 
going to deal with an Anglo-Italian comparison was somehow reassuring on the point 
that, at least, some aspects of these problems could be minimised. From the point of 
view of language, culture and relative knowledge of society, everything seemed to be 
relatively easy to deal with, and no misunderstanding was possible when talking in 
Italian with the interviewees in Bologna, or reading Italian documents. But this does not 
imply that the case studies did not need to be designed and carried out to be sensitive to 
some of the issues above. Some deeper awareness of the differences between the two 
socio-political systems, especially at the level of local authorities, was anyway 
necessary. The efforts towards this awareness are already reflected in the literature 
review. Another problematic aspect was that literature reviews tend to be usually based 
on mainly English and American writings, which are likely to introduce an ethnocentric 
view per se. This was avoidable by trying to use Italian literature as well. The scarce 
availability of papers on digital cities and urban cyberspace written in Italian, though, 
made this 'adjustment' only partially effective, as English language literature still 
remained, by and large, the main component of the preparation work. 
4.3.3 - UNEVEN DEPTH AND MANAGEABILITY 
Differences in the urban context between Italy and the UK were going to play a 
part in affecting the relatively uneven depth of the two cases. Although it could have 
been expected that the British case had more chances, for eminently practical reasons of 
manageability, to be explored in more depth than its Italian counterpart, what tended to 
happen is actually the opposite. It has to be specified that Bologna Iperbole was almost 
exclusively a council-run initiative. Consequently, the fact that municipalities in Italy 
still retain a strong, central role in local policy-making meant that, once the key-person 
within the council was known, it became relatively easy to gain access to other people 
and documents related to the project. The same could not apply in a more fragmented 
situation like the Bristol arena, in which the initiative of the digital city was run by an 
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ever-enlarging partnership of local actors. This complicated things when it came to gain 
access to certain prospective interviewees. 
Another important element of diversity came from the uneven development of the 
two initiatives. While lperbole was in fact a relatively mature - although still changing 
and developing - example of digital city with an audience of several thousands of 
households and a growing team of developers behind it, Bristol turned out to be still in 
its early, under-funded experimental phases. This obviously meant that, for example, 
while it was possible to collect a press review about Bologna spanning several years, 
very few documents of any kind were available for Bristol. The interviewees in Bologna 
also tended to be more receptive towards a series of questions that they themselves had 
started wondering about, while some of the same themes found several of the Bristol 
actors still unprepared. Still, the choice of Bristol could be considered one of the best 
possible in the UK at the time. 
Obviously, it would have been desirable to be able to carry out more than two 
case studies. A larger number of case studies would have used more effectively the 
logic of "replication" (Yin, 1994; 45), by selecting more cases either with similar or 
contrasting contexts and characteristics. However, in practice this would have become 
unmanageable, given the constraints of time and resources within the overall combined 
strategy involving a survey and case studies. The gain in generalisability and the 
European breath given to the whole research by the survey's results, had to be paid for 
by less allocation of time and resources to case studies, thence limiting them to only 
two. As Richard Williams argued, "given resource limitations, it may not always be 
possible to design research projects around theoretically ideal comparisons" (Williams, 
1986; 36). 
4.3.4 - GENERALISABILITY OF CONCLUSIONS 
The fact that the replication process was limited to only two case studies indicates 
in itself that wide generalisability could not be achieved by this phase of the research. 
This does not mean, though, that the results of the analysis will not be of any use for 
future research and policy-making in the field of digital cities and urban cyberspace. A 
certain extent of replication had taken place, and the comparison of the two case studies 
could well provide useful elements for analysing more broadly the phenomenon in 
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future research works. Moreover, the fact that the most successful digital city initiatives 
- like Bologna and Bristol themselves - tend to become paradigmatic examples that 
influence the development of many other 'younger' experiments (Aurigi, 1998) 
suggests that this comparative research could end up being more externally valid that 
might be expected. 
4.3.5 - CASE STUDY PROTOCOL AND DATA COLLECTION 
As Yin notes: 
"Having a case study protocol is desirable under all 
circumstances, but it is essential ifyou are using a multiple-case 
design. The protocol is a major tactic in increasing the 
reliability of case study research and is intended to guide the 
investigator in carrying out the case study" (Yin, 1994; 63) 
Of the sections that Yin recommends should be included in a case study protocol, 
the ones relating to case study questions - "the heart of the protocol" (Yin, 1994; 69) - 
and to the field procedures were considered and prepared for this specific investigation. 
In particular, a list of questions and sub-questions was prepared, bearing in mind 
that these questions "are posed to you, the investigator, not to a respondent" even if "in 
some instances, the specific questions also may serve as prompts in asking questions 
during a case study interview" (Yin, 1994; 69). This list of questions was the basis for 
the carrying out of each of the case studies, and turned out to be a good framework to 
prepare each of the single interviews. Interviews could be prepared by referring to the 
whole set of questions in the case of key, central interviewees, or to just parts of it in the 
case of secondary persons. 
The adoption of this 'protocol' of questions helped all phases of the case study 
research and provided a framework useful to analyse the collected evidence and even a 
series of 'key-frames' for the successive writing of the case study narratives. Above all, 
it constituted, together with the case study database derived from it, a central, binding 
element for the whole research, allowing it to maintain a chain of evidence. This is a 
crucial feature of case study research, according to Yin, who states: 
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"The principle is to allow an external observer - the reader of 
the case study, for example - to follow the derivation of any 
evidence from initial research questions to ultimate case study 
conclusions. Moreover, this external observer should be able to 
trace the steps in either direction (from conclusions back to 
initial research questions or from questions to conclusions)" 
(Yin, 1994; 98) 
The questions and sub-questions that constituted this operational and 
interpretative framework were organised in the six main themes, as follows: 
I- SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE DIGITAL CITY - RELEVANT 
SOCIAL GROUPS 
" Who are the promoters/entrepreneurs? 
" Why did they decide to start the project? 
" Objectives? 
" Who are the "enrolled" people/social groups? 
" How were they enrolled by the promoters? 
" What paradigms were adopted by the promoters to describe the initiative? 
" What were the social groups' expectancies from the d. c.? 
" Why were they enrolled? 
" What could they provide? 
" What did they "ask" for? 
" What concerns did they have about the initiative? 
" Are there other actors constructing/influencing the project? (e. g. press) 
" What type of influence are they having? 
" Whom is perceived as influential/important by the promoters? 
" Who is facilitating the initiative? 
" Why? 
" Who is resisting/fighting the initiative? 
" Why? 
" Who is criticising the initiative? 
" Why? 
2- SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE DIGITAL CITY - EVOLUTION, 
(DE)STABILISATION 
0 What has been a success in the d. c.? 
0 What has been a failure in the d. c.? 
0 Who/what is affecting this in practice? 
0 What needs to be rethought? 
m What is changing with respect to the initial set of intentions? 
0 What should change? 
0 Have the expectations changed? 
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" How? 
" Are the interpretations/paradigms changing? 
" How? 
" How are the relations among actors changing? 
" Who is still interested/involved? Why? 
" Who is not interested any more and why? 
" Are there any newcomers attracted by some changes? 
" What is seen as an opportunity/path to follow for the d. c.? 
" Who should be enrolled at this stage (and is not)? 
" What is seen as a threat for the d. c.? 
" Can the initiative be considered stabilised as a "black box"? 
3- THE CRISIS OF URBAN PUBLIC SPACE (AND THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF PUBLIC SPACE) 
0 What is "public space"? What characteristics and functions should it have? 
M Who should be able to be active in a public space? 
0 Who should not? 
0 What should be allowed/desirable in a public space? 
0 What should not be allowed in a public space? 
0 What interaction can private firms have with public space? 
0 How is the real city seen in terms of public space? 
0 Does it provides public spaces? 
0 Do these public spaces lack anything? 
0 What are the needs of the city in terms of public space? 
0 Is something/someone jeopardising public space in the city? 
0 Is the digital city initiative about public space? 
0 Does the d. c. have any of the characteristics of public space? 
0 Does it lack any? 
0 What is being done to make the d. c. "public"? 
0 What could put this in jeopardy? 
0 is it genuinely an ambition of the d. c. to support public discourses? 
0 Can private actors be present in public cyberspace? 
0 To what extent? How is this being regulated? 
4- ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (AND THE TENSION LOCAL- 
GLOBAL) 
" Are there objectives for economic development? 
" What are these objectives? 
" How is local economy being related to the project? 
n How are global markets related to the project? 
m How is the relationship between local "closure" and global "openness" dealt 
with? 
5- RELATIONSHIP PHYSICAUDIGITAL CITY 
m What does the city need that can be provided by the d. c.? 
m What does the city need that cannot be provided by the d. c.? 
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" Are there any early "effects" of the d. c. over the physical one? 
" "Positive" effects? 
" "Negative" effects? 
" What do planners of the 'real' city think of the digital one? 
" Do they know about it? 
" Do they think of it when they consider physical and functional planning? 
" Why? 
" How is the interface physical/digital being conceived/developed? 
" What characteristics/aspects of the physical city are lacking in the d. c.? 
" What type of consequences could this lack have? 
" Is there any plan to fill some of these gaps? 
" What is pointless to "mirror"? 
6- THE USERS OF THE DIGITAL CITY - CONSTRUCTION OF THE 
USERS 
" What different categories of users are conceived? 
" Target(s) of the digital city 
" Who is the d. c. aimed at? 
" Who should the d. c. be aimed at? (And it is not at the moment) 
" Who should be kept out of the d. c. and why? 
" Who are the users? 
" How are they being identified? 
" What is important to know about the users? 
" What are the users' needs? 
" What is important to offer to the users/let the users do? 
" What is important not to offer to the users/let the users do? 
" How is use being sustained, stimulated and developed? 
" What strategies? 
" What targets? 
It is quite straightforward to be able to link these six case study questions to the 
more general research questions included in the table at the beginning of this chapter. 
The viability of this link is obviously essential for the coherence of the whole research. 
4.3.6 - DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE 
Although it was quite clear from the beginning that the primary source of 
evidence for the case studies were going to be interviews to the several actors involved 
in the shaping of the digital cities, the collection of documents as secondary evidence 
had to be considered. In fact, many of the questions included in the case study protocol 
could have been dealt with by using documents to support (or question) the findings 
from the interviews. As indicated by Yin himself, "A major strength of case study data 
collection is the opportunity to use many different sources of evidence" (Yin, 1994; 91). 
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This was particularly true as far as the history of the initiatives was concerned, as well 
as for the sixth theme related to the end-users of the digital city. 
The search for relevant documents started before the actual visits for the 
interviews, as documents could constitute a preliminary knowledge basis of the 
initiatives. Some documents existed in electronic form, distributed on the Internet, and 
in those cases it was particularly easy to retrieve them. 
Unfortunately not much documentation was collected, especially in the Bristol 
case, and probably in both cases access was not allowed to more confidential and 
informal documentation, such as meeting notes and reports. However, in the case of 
Bologna Iperbole, obtaining a copy of a relatively extensive press review as well as of 
the commented results of a users' survey was extremely useful to complement, and in 
some case prepare, the interviews. Bristol Digital City was unfortunately too 'young' 
and still considered little more than an experiment by its developers. This meant that no 
users$ surveys, for instance, had been carried out, and the documents available were 
limited to promotional material that had been just released at the time of the case study. 
4.3.7 - INTERVIEWS 
As mentioned already, interviews were the primary source of evidence for the 
case studies. In Bologna, eleven in-depth interviews were carried out with ten 
individuals, during December 1996. In Bristol five in-depth interviews were carried out 
with five individuals, during November 1997. 
All of the interviews were informal and semi-structured. They were guided by the 
questions - or in some cases part of them - included in the case study protocol. The 
overall approach was, and had to be, very open, in order to let the interviewees speak 
freely about their own personal interpretation of the initiative and the way they 
perceived it. 
Each interviewee was also asked to suggest other possible sources of evidence, 
such as other people worth interviewing or documents they could access to. 
In general, attempts were made to establish a relation with each of the 
interviewees that could be of mutual exchange and reflection about the initiative object 
of the case study. The fact that digital city initiatives were still little more than 
experiments, meant that most of these people had not had the chance, sometimes, even 
to reflect and think about some of the themes proposed in the interviews. The efforts to 
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create a relaxed and 'collaborative' atmosphere helped to avoid an excessively 
defensive attitude from the interviewees. 
In both cases, the presence of a key person, central to the project was invaluable. 
In general, the interviewees were chosen according to the information that could be 
found in the documents retrieved prior to the field trips, and following suggestions by 
previous interviewees, in particular the key persons. They all fall into the category of 
the 'shapers' of the initiatives, being involved as main entrepreneurs or partners in the 
development of the digital cities. In Bologna it was also possible to interview two end- 
users who were active and participating in the initiatives with their own World Wide 
Web pages. 
4.3.8 - DATA ANALYSIS METHODS 
The analysis of the data was organised in two phases, one the consequence of the 
other. First, it was necessary to create a 'case study database' including and classifying 
the evidence obtainable from the interviews and the secondary evidence - when 
available - coming from the documentation. The case study database was organised and 
structured following the key themes defined in the case study protocol. Each of the case 
studies had its own database, that in practice ended up being a word-processed file 
organised by the headings present in the protocol. The second phase stemmed from the 
analysis of the database, and became somehow the link between the database and the 
writing of the case study narratives. An effort was made towards the integration of the 
several bits of evidence for each of the protocol questions, to construct an answer to the 
question itself. As Yin argues, it can be actually useful, 
"to have the case study investigators compose open-ended 
answers to the questions in the case study protocol. ( .. )The 
questions and answers, in modifiedform, can even serve directly 
as the basis for the final case study report. ( .. ) Each answer 
represents an attempt to integrate the available evidence and to 
converge upon the facts of the matter of their tentative 
interpretation. The process is actually an analytic one and is an 
integral part of the case study analysis" (Yin, 1994; 9 7) 
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4.3.9 - CASE STUDY NARRATIVES 
Once the questions of the case study protocol were answered, a proper narrative 
for each of the cases, going back to the original research questions could be created. 
These 'stories' could show how the two initiatives were being shaped, why and by 
whom. They could also show the perceived weaknesses and strengths of the initiatives, 
their level of 'stabilisation', and sometimes-unexpected lack of involvement of some 
potentially crucial actors. 
4.3.10 - COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY ANALYSIS 
When dealing with multiple case studies, especially when qualitative data is the 
main source of evidence, one of the risks is to end up avoiding doing a true comparison, 
limiting simply to a presentation of the several stories as a collection of case studies 
(Masser, 1986; 20). To deal with qualitative data and compare two or more case studies, 
the use of a series of possible techniques is recommended by various authors. Robson, 
for example, notes that: "Display, summary tables and the like are useful strategies for 
making sense of qualitative data" (Robson, 1993; 399). Drawing together the two case 
study narratives employed these tactics to try and achieve a true comparative analysis, 
and try and explain differences and similarities between the two cases. 
4.4 - CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has set the necessary research strategy to address the complex and 
heterogeneous set of questions raised in the critical literature review. As different types 
of questions were raised, it was important to design a complex and integrated strategy 
that could deal with the wider topic of digital cities from multiple perspectives, 
employing a survey to define a broader picture and case studies for in-depth qualitative 
research. 
The next four chapters will describe what the results of these two separate tasks 
were, whilst the last part of the thesis will try and integrate these results to provide some 
general conclusions and recommendations. 
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CHAPTER 5- SURVEYING WEB CITIES IN EUROPE 
5.0 INTRODUCTION 
Whilst the previous chapter has described in detail what kind of research strategy 
was adopted to address the questions asked in the literature review, this is the first of 
four chapters that will show and analyse the outcomes of that strategy. In particular, this 
chapter deals with analysing the results of the survey work that was carried out to 
answer the series of 'descriptive' questions about the development of digital cities in the 
EU. These questions and what was looked at to address them are listed in the following 
table: 
QUESTION WHAT WAS LOOKED AT 
What is the scope and scale of the Number of sites per city. Number of 
digital city phenomenon within the sites in the different countries, and 
EU? How can we map the density of sites per country. 
phenomenon of digital cities? 
Co-existence of public and private Ownership of sites 
interests. Who owns and/or manages 
the sites? 
How are policy makers relating the Provision of Web spaces to firms 
d. c. to local economy? What facilities and presence of detailed tourist 
are they providing for local firms? information related to hotels and 
other enterprises. 
What level of interaction are the Overall presence of facilities for 
digital cities offering to allow active interaction and participation 
participation by the users? 
How are they coping with the tension Presence of direct or indirect 
between earning revenue and social advertising on the sites. 
access? Are they integrating Commercial offer of Web spaces to 
advertising on their sites? Are they firms and individuals. 
charging for publishing on the sites? 
What are they providing in terms of Availability of public forums and 
active free access to information i. e. discussion areas. Provision of free 
web publishing and participation to Web spaces for non-profit 
debates? organisations and/or individuals. 
How are they trying to Availability of public forums and 
establish/encourage public debate discussion areas geared to local 
within the city? How are they trying to issues. Provision of free Web 
give visibility to local people and spaces for local non-profit 
communities, including the deprived organisations and/or individuals. 
ones? 
Are digital cities somehow ýrestrictinq Presence of areas of the sites that 
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access? Are they reserving areas to have access restricted to local or 
local people? speciall selected people. 
What language(s) is being used? Are Use of local and/or foreign 
local people the main target? languages (usually English) on the 
site. 
Are digital cities actually providing Provision and overall depth of local 
local information and services, and to information and services. Provision 
what extent? of free of charge Web spaces for at 
least local non-profit organisation. 
Drawing from the previous issues, 
how can we develop a typology of 
digital cities? 
Figure 5.1 - Table of survey-related issues 
5.1 A TYPOLOGY OF CITY-RELA TED WEB SITES IN THE EU: 
A KEY TO READ THE PHENOMENON 
As explained, the answers to these questions could also be used to produce scores 
that would define whether each initiative was 'informative', 'participative' and 
'grounded'. The combination of the scores on the three attributes would then generate a 
typology of city-related Web sites in Europe. Figure 5.2 shows how the typology was 
defined: 
informative Participative Grounded 
0 =Yes 
0 =No 
'DIGITAL BROCHURE' 0 
'INFORMATION SERVICE' 0 0 
Tourist/Investors Kiosk 0 
Civic Database 0 
'ELECTRONIC PLACE' 0 0 
Cyber Mall 0 
Cyber Square 0 
'HOLISTIC - URBAN 
ANALOGY' 
9 0 
Global Cybercity 
Embedded Digital City 
Figure 5.2 - Table of ideal t es of city-related Web sites Yp 
The definitions for the various 'ideal' types of city-related Web site were chosen 
to find effective analogies with existing artefacts or places present in the physical world. 
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So, for instance, a site that scored poorly both for 'informativeness' and 
'participativeness' was very likely to end up being an electronic version of an 
advertising brochure with shallow information of practically no use to the citizens. At 
the other end of the scale, the 'holistic' types, and especially the 'Embedded Digital 
City' could represent an attempt, or a trend, towards a fuller use of the capabilities of 
Information and Communication Technologies for the social and economic regeneration 
of their host cities. 
As stated before and shown in Figure 5.1, the typological distribution of the 
initiatives is the ultimate consequence of the survey work, being generated by the scores 
derived from the observation of several characteristics of the Web sites. Therefore, it 
could seem logical to show it at the end of this chapter, after all of the single questions 
had been dealt with. However, the choice here is to show the typology first, within the 
answer to the first question about scope and scale of the digital city phenomenon. This 
is because some of the research questions can be addressed in a much more meaningful 
way by comparing the general results relative to all of the sites with those relative to the 
'Embedded Digital Cities' only. The 'Embedded Digital Cities' are the closest attempt 
towards the establishment of a civic electronic environment that tends to be useful first 
of all to the local people and inclusive at the same time. They are the ultimate object of 
this whole study, and it is very important to examine how many they really are, where 
they are and how and by whom they are being shaped. Although the case studies 
explained in the next two chapters will address more deeply some of the questions 
relative to the social shaping of two examples of 'Embedded Digital City', the results of 
the survey are nevertheless useful to: 
Understand how the World Wide Web technology was being used in Europe to 
create sites that claimed to be useful to the citizens of large towns. 
Understand where the 'proper' virtual cities were located; reflect on possible 
causal relationships that affected the geography of digital cities, and explore what 
features these initiatives were actually based upon. 
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5.2 SCOPE AND SCALE OF THE DIGITAL CITY PHENOMENON 
5.2.1 THE OVERALL PICTURE 
The first question to address, and the main one as well as far as the survey was 
concenied, was about the scale of the phenomenon. How many Web sites could be 
found between the end of 1996 and the beginning of 1997 in the larger cities of the EU 
that were clanning somehow to be there as public spaces and services for the citizens? 
The first results of the survey were extremely meaningful, as they indicated that 
the phenomenon of 'urbanising' the World Wide Web was already quite vast. Within 
167 cities considered for the survey, 213 working Web sites were found, which meant 
an average density of 1.27 city related Internet sites per city. 
Web sites per city (EU) 
60 
50 
43 
40 
30 
20 
10 
0 
None 
57 
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45 
2 
Figure 5.3 - Civic Web cites per surveyed city 
22 
3+ 
If we start looking more in detail at the numbers in Figure 5.3, we can reallse that 
these Web sites were well distributed, leaving only 43 cities (which is slightly less than 
26% of the total) without a fully working mitiative. Moreover, more than half of the 
cities that hosted some kind of civic Web initiative, actually had more than one site 
offering Internet based information and services about the place itself. If we also 
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consi r that all the tourist oriented only sites had been excluded from this particular 
study from the beginning, we can understand that the phenomenon was numerous and 
important, and that the Internet was already widely used to set up information sites 
about cities. 
Could it then be argued that the digital city movement was somehow a mature 
phenomenon and that informative and inclusive civic digital sites were being 
established as tools for social and economic regeneration of Western European cities'? 
Not quite. If we just go beyond the mere basic figures and associate them with the 
results of the typological classification of the initiatives. 
Typology of EU Web Cities 
8.9, 'e 
'ý(, 34'ý,, 
2C 
" Brochure 13 Civic Database OVisitors Kiosk 0 Cybersquare 
I " Cyber Mail 11 Holistic Virtual City 0 Global Cybercity 
Figure 5.4 - Typological distribution of Web cities 
Figure 5.4 shows that less than 10% of the total of tile sites could be considered as 
'Embedded Digital Cities'. The chart reveals also that among the surveyed sites, there 
was a general lack of 'participatory' features. In fact, if we sum the values of the last 
four categories, those that were providing facilities to encourage participation and 
expression, we can observe that less than 15% of all the city related Web sites were 
showing in their design some concern towards public participation and discourse. Oil 
the other hand, a vast majority of over 56% of the surveyed initiatives was definable 
under the label of 'Digital Brochure', while another 20.66% was formed by 'Civic 
Databases'. This overwhelming prevalence of sites that simply provided mono- 
directional communication, together with the fact that most of these sites had very little, 
and often not very useful, information, showed quite clearly that the Internet was used 
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mainly as a cheap publishing medium, with overall advertising or propaganda purposes. 
This type of attitude that made potentially innovative initiatives - or at least using an 
innovative medium - stick with old models, could be referred to the findings of Guthrie 
and Dutton, and to their definition of 'broadcasting paradigm' guiding similar Initiatives 
in the US. As they argued: "Implicit in this paradigm is the idea that the owners of the 
communication channel control information content and broadcast what Is beneficial to 
them" (Guthrie and Dutton, 1992,584). 
In summary it can be argued that the phenomenon of the urbanisation of 
cyberspace was wide but shalloN,,,, and that few initiatives were designed to encourage 
and support public discourse and a wider access of citizens and firms to the benefits of 
the Information Society. 
5.2.2 GEOGRAPHIES OF DIGITAL CITIES 
Another relevant set of results that helps defining better the scope of the digital 
city phenomenon in the EU is the distribution of sites per country. Figure 5.5 shows the 
general results by country in terms of absolute values - that is how many sites were 
surveyed - as well as density, as some smaller or less dense countries naturally have 
fewer cities bigger than 200,000 people. 
City-related Web sites and density by country 
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Figure 5.5 - City-related Web sites and density by country 
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The figures show that although the majority of the Northern European countries 
hosted more city related sites than their Southern counterparts - which was a somehow 
expectable phenomenon - the divide between North and South of Europe was not very 
sharp. In fact, among the countries that had a higher density of sites such as Sweden 
(2.33 per city) or Denmark (2.5 per city), Greece had a comparable position with 2 sites 
per city. Italy did not perform badly at all either, with 28 surveyed initiatives for a 
density of 1.33 sites per city which was actually higher than Germany's one (1.3 spc). A 
case apart seemed to be France, which had a relatively small number of city related sites 
and one of the lower densities in Europe with respect to the number of large cities 
present in the country. Although this could strike as something unexpected, as France's 
long standing involvement towards technology innovation and telematics in particular 
was well known, perhaps the phenomenon can be explained by considering the 
influence that already existing telematics applications such as Minitel could have over 
new developments in that country. The diffusion and widespread use of Minitel in 
France, due to facilitating policies not adopted in other European countries, was 
probably reducing the need for more sophisticated electronic environments on the 
Internet. Minitel can be an extremely slow communication system, and it was obviously 
much less graphically appealing and versatile than the World Wide Web. Despite this, 
the well established familiarity of the French public with the service, together with the 
very low costs involved in using it, were probably making it more than enough for day 
to day information broadcast and interpersonal communication. 
As we have already seen in section 5.2.1, whilst the general figures seem to show 
a relatively well developed phenomenon, being able to consider the outcome of the 
typology-making work helps to assess the situation more deeply. This is even more 
important when we consider the distribution by country of the 'Embedded Digital 
Cities' only. Figure 5.6 shows how the supposed divide in the use of the Internet for 
urban regeneration purposes between North and South of Europe weakened further. The 
facts that Italy, as well as The Netherlands, had nearly a quarter of the total digital cities 
in Europe at the beginning of 1997 (the latter with an outstanding density of 62%), and 
that the UK, for instance only had 3 virtual cities out of 52 surveyed Web sites, tell a 
different story. 
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Figure 5.6 - Digital cities and density by country 
Again, the fact that the Internet was apparently used to provide 'civic' electronic 
sites does not mean that this was actually happening anywhere. Moreover, these results 
by country indicated that most possibly, different political and economic conditions 
were strongly affecting the way the Internet was being used to design and shape city- 
related sites. The findings relative to the next research question help us to explore some 
of the connections between political and economic agency and the development of 
digital city initiatives within Europe. 
5.3 OWNERSHIP OF DIGITAL CITIES 
Which agencies were promoting the digital city phenomenon? A question about 
agency was extremely important at this stage, though agency related matters are 
examined much more deeply in the case studies. However, looking at who was mainly 
involved in the shaping and running of city related sites could help recognise some 
trends as well as starting addressing the problem raised in the literature review about the 
possible 'commodification' of virtual spaces by private companies. Was the presence of 
private forces going to have negative consequences for the role of cyber-cities towards 
public discourse, access and aggregation'? If this were to be found to be the case, should 
civic cyberspace be regulated and run exclusively by public sector actors? 
Although giving a sharp and definite answer to this type of question seemed 
impossible, given the relative youth of the phenomenon of civic cyberspace, the 
62 
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findings of this study seemed to suggest that it was not possible to make any 
generalisation about a clear difference between the ways different actors were shaping 
their sites. Prevalence between public and private sector in creating city related Web 
sites could not be recognised either. In figure 5.7, the result relative to the whole of the 
EU shows that there was a balance between sites that were completely private and 
others that had been set up with at least some 'public' participation. Even more 
interestingly, figure 5.8 shows that when it came to seeing who run 'proper' digital 
cities, a very similar situation was being highlighted. 
EU 
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Pbrtugal 
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Greece 
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Figure 5.7 - Who runs the Web cities 
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This demonstrated that, at the European level, it could not be argued that the 
initiative of privately owned companies or organisations would necessarily produce a 
more shallow and exclusive urban cyberspace, when compared to what public 
authorities or universities did. Indeed, many local authorities were running sites of the 
'brochure' and 'civic database' type. Therefore the dualism between city-marketing 
interests and the benefits for the actual local residents, highlighted in chapter 2 for 
physical cities and policies, was mirrored in cyberspace. Many electronic spaces ended 
up being used by local authorities and universities very often just as a way of 'selling 
the city' to potential tourists, investors and students, or at most as a way to broadcast 
carefully selected and relatively shallow information. 
However, going beyond these average European results again helped reveal a 
series of crucial differences between countries. Still by looking at Figures 5.7 and 5.8 
we discover how the same type of actor behaved completely differently in different 
countries. 
The differences in ownership of digital cities in those four countries that had more 
than just one example of the 'top' type were extremely sharp. Whilst Gennany reflected 
rather precisely the average European results, the other three countries saw a prevalence 
of a specific 'owner' of digital city initiatives. In Italy local authorities seemed to be 
extremely active in promoting complex civic sites, to the extent of being nearly the only 
actor taking care of establishing digital cities (or 'civic networks' as most Italian 
councils prefer to call them). This was after all not very different from what happens 
with policies concerning physical urban space, as exclusively public intervention and 
management of space is still central in a country where councils do not have to share the 
decision making process with the private sector. Therefore the majority of the holistic 
digital city initiatives in Italy saw in fact the local councils as the main actors and 
decision makers on the fortunes of 'public' cyberspace. Not that the private sector was 
completely absent from the picture, but the nature of many of the so-called partnerships 
that could be found in Italian digital cities was often limited to a technical collaboration 
from some IT firms, that did not participate in the policy making process at all. It is hard 
to describe these kinds of partnerships as true joint ventures. They were based on a 
precise and strict hierarchy that kept the local council at the very top of the pyramid, as 
a client that paid one or more service providers to help develop and manage its own 
initiative. It was the council that decided what to publish on the site and who to allow 
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access, while the technological partner profited from the initiative - sometimes coming 
from EU funded projects - and from the chance of experimenting new technologies. 
The inverse happened in the Netherlands, where a more conservative way of 
government implied that local authorities had been "determined to make the public 
sector retreat from what they see as its exaggerated aspirations to regulate society and 
care for its needs" (Blair, 1991; 48). The result of this was that the ratio between public 
and private digital cities that was observed in Italy was reversed in favour of the latter. 
Another aspect that can help to explain the prevalence of privately run digital 
cities in the Netherlands can be related to the fact that earlier experiments in technology 
could become paradigmatic 'catalysts' for further developments. In the Netherlands, in 
fact, a sophisticated digital city initiative was bom in 1994, De Digitale Stad (DDS) in 
Amsterdam. DDS was originally subsidised by the Dutch government, but soon it had to 
rely on advertising revenue and space rented out to commercial and non-commercial 
infon-nation providers (Brants et al., 1996; 241). This attitude of the governerant to 
'leave on their own' this kind of initiatives echoes what Bekke has defined as a second 
form of privatisation in the Netherlands, where 
"Initially the government might retain someform of involvement 
in terms ofregulatingfinances, which would diminish over time. 
One could think of entrusting swimming pools, libraries and 
socio-cultural services to companies or private institutions" 
(Bekke, 1991; 127) 
Although a progressive 'detachment' of DDS from the reality of Amsterdam 
could be observed, for primarily commercial reasons, this experience, and the ways it 
had developed, strongly influenced the development of digital cities all over Europe, 
and especially in its own country. It had been standing as a model to replicate or at least 
to take into consideration, setting a rationale for the development of private, often non- 
proflt but self-sustaining digital cities. This, as well as the likely influence of Minitel in 
France, mentioned before, indicated that the relation between technologies and society 
is actually circular. Initiatives can be influenced and shaped by socio-political and 
economic factors and also existing initiatives can stand as a 'precedent' and affect the 
ways certain policy related decisions and choices are taken. 
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The situation in the UK was another example of how context affected the 
development of digital cities. First of all a consideration has to be made that, despite 
being the country with more city related Web sites in Europe, together with Germany, 
the amount of actual digital cities was low. This could be possibly explained by the fact 
that neither local authorities nor private organisations generally played a role in creating 
high profile civic sites by themselves. These actors were involved, but the fact was that 
in the UK the emphasis was mainly put on the power of partnerships to create socially 
and economically viable initiatives. Councils did not see the 'mission' of creating and 
maintaining inclusive and communicative urban 'bits' of cyberspace as their own 
exclusive vocation, as tended to happen in Italy, and had indeed very little money and 
resources to put in it. Therefore their choice was, in the majority of cases, to use the 
World Wide Web as an information service or an electronic brochure often managed by 
their Economic Development sections of planning departments. As we observed for the 
Italian case, here the condition that local authorities were in control of the agenda for 
the management of the physical territory was mirrored. And it tended to be a very 
different situation indeed, compared to that of Southern European countries. As we have 
already noted in Chapter 2, the fragmentation of agency in the management of UK cities 
is very pronounced, leaving local councils unable to play a hegemonic role in the 
decision-making processes affecting spatial, social and economic regeneration of the 
city. It can probably be argued that the slow start of UK's digital city initiatives, due to 
the more troubled establishment of actual partnerships, could be a sign of a still 
relatively low compatibility and synergy between the interests of the private and the 
public sector in running and managing cyberspace. At the same time, the situation of the 
UK looked like a very interesting benchmark for the long term future of digital cities 
just for the same reasons, as social inclusiveness, economic sustainability and marketing 
ethos had to co-exist in the same initiatives. 
5.4 RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CITY-RELA TED WEB SITES 
AND LOCAL ECONOMIES 
Observing the relationship between a digital city initiative and the local economy 
of its host town was certainly a complex task that could not be fulfilled by simply 
looking at the Web site of the initiative. The strategies and choices that, for instance, the 
economic development department of a city council planned to make in the medium and 
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long term through the digital city were not necessarily shown by the current Situation of 
the site. However, the presence of certain facilities could still be an indicator of tile level 
of attention that who was running a city-related Web site was putting towards the 
matter. And that level of attention seemed low in the surveyed sites. 
From the point of view of the broadcasting of information useftil to local 
businesses, only 8% of the sites tried to provide a relatively extensive coverage, whilst 
63'Vo of the city-related Web sites did not offer any economic and business Information 
at all, as shown in Figure 5.9.29% of the sites tended to offer what has been defined in 
this study as 'just descriptions'. That was a type of information that did not need to be 
updated often, as it aimed mainly at describing how well organised, competitive and 
popular among enterprises that place was, so as to try to encourage investment from the 
outside. Again, the 'brochure' paradigm that had driven many of the initiatives was 
revealed here. As we have already noted, the dualism and tension between the need to 
encourage residents' interests and the need to market the city - or aspects of it - to 
external revenue sources was present in digital initiatives as well as it is in physical 
planning and city management. 
Economy and business related information 
Just descriptive 
29% 
Not availabl 
63% 
Figure 5.9 - Economy and business-related information 
Comparing tile results shown by Figures 5.10 and 5.11 can also help to recognise 
this tension, as most initiatives were much more concerned to attract tourists to the city, 
through offering the relative information, than to provide Web spaces. These spaces - 
either fi-ce or charged for - could have represented an integrated and recognisable 
marketplace and showcase for the host town's firrns, as well as a chance for many small 
and medium enterprises to be encouraged and perhaps trained to start exploiting ICTs in 
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their business. However, 74% of the surveyed sites did not consider hosting firms or 
organisations. Even as far as the tourist information was concerned, hotels and other 
partly tourism related businesses such as restaurants, had sorne kind of presence (often 
just an entry in a list) only in 34% of cases. 
Web cities in the EU 
provision of web sites to organisations 
Charged 
16% 
Not present 
74% 
Present 
26% 
At least 
No-profit org. 
free 
10% 
Figure 5.10 - Web cities and provision of web sites to organisations 
Tourist Information 
Not available 
17% 
Extensive list 
of Hotels and 
uutfll lt:: z: iz5uz: i 
34% 
Just 
descriptive Only some 
33% listed 
16% 
Figure 5.11 - Web cities in the EU: tourist information 
Therefore, it can be argued that in general the supposed 'urbanisation' of 
cyberspace by city related Web sites did not try to create particular opportunities for the 
local economies of the host towns. It often failed to encourage the use of Information 
and Communication Technologies by local enterprises. From the point of view of data 
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retrieval, little and poor information useful to firms was available, while even less sites 
had been designed to 'let businesses in' and give them visibility in a sort of a virtual 
square or marketplace, where they could actively use the Internet. The relationship 
between these Internet based initiatives and the local economies was basically weak. 
Among those few sites classified by the survey as proper digital cities, 89% offered 
Web spaces for firms and organisations, still leaving a significant 11% of complex, 
sophisticated initiatives completely indifferent to relating themselves with third parties 
and trying to provide some type of virtual space for local enterprises. 
5.5 LEVEL OF INTERACTION OFFERED TO ENCOURAGE 
PARTICIPATION 
This aspect of the sites, which will be detailed in the section about specific 
participative features, is summarised by Figure 5.12. The chart gives a very clear picture 
of the situation as it was at the time of the survey. Again, the fact that 73% of the city 
related Web sites were offering at most the chance to write comments to an anonymous 
'webmaster', tells a lot about the wide adoption of 'broadcasting' paradigms instead of 
more bi-directional and participative choices. Writing to the 'webmaster' was used 
normally to make comments on the Web site itself and perhaps suggest improvements, 
but was obviously useless to create real communication at the urban level. Another 14% 
of sites published multiple e-mail addresses, for instance e-mail addresses of city 
councillors and representatives, allowing users to communicate with a limited set of 
people. This measure also meant that only those users with a valid e-mail account could 
send mail and express their views. Therefore, the e-mail only facility was limiting the 
numbers of both recipients and of the potential senders, discriminating against those 
who could have accessed the Web site from a public computer but did not have their 
own e-mail. Further, e-mail messages are usually private (unless posted in a 
tnewsgroup'), and this meant that e-mail only facilities could establish a one-to-one 
exchange of ideas that would be completely missed by other people. This left only 13% 
of the sites providing some advanced, more sophisticated and inclusive interaction, such 
as debate areas and newsgroups, real-time chat areas and mailing facilities for those 
who did not have e-mail accounts of their own. 
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Web Cities in the EU - Level of Interaction 
No Interaction at 
Highly 
all 
Interactive Interactive 
10% 
4% 9% 
E-mail 
addresses (Z7 14% 
Webmaster only 
63% 
Figure 5.12 - Web cities in the EU: level of interaction 
Therefore it can hardly be said that Web based civic information systerns in 
Europe tended to be communicative, failing often to encourage exchanges between 
users and more generally bi-directional flows of information. The overall trend was 
towards mono-directional broadcasting, with the facility to call a single, unknown, 
operator to leave messages about the service. In substance, it looked like an adoption of 
a model much closer to cheap television or radio than to 'Rheingoldian' virtual 
communities, despite the hype often used to present and promote the phenomenon. 
5.6 TENSION BETWEEN REVENUE GENERATION AND SOCIAL 
ACCESS 
We have seen in section 5.5 that few city related initiatives on the Web tended to 
foster an active relationship with local economic actors. Most failed to make full use of 
new Internet technologies to encourage or support local economic development. What 
about the sites' own economics then'? Were the Web sites trying to cope with their own 
economic sustainability by generating revenue, and was this going to affect directly the 
chances of economically disadvantaged people and organisations to have access to these 
systems'? World Wide Web sites could generate revenue in two main ways: hiring 
advertising spaces - often in the shape of banners somewhere in the pages - and hiring 
disk and Web space to customers who want to publish their own pages and Web sites. 
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The survey looked for these features in the sites to determine whether information was 
directly or indirectly paid for. 
The charts in Figures 5.13 and 5.14 show the percentages of sites using 
advertising or sponsorship banners, or simply hosting firms' names for sonic reason and 
possibly getting some revenue out of it. The general results in tile first chart demonstrate 
quite clearly that a huge number of city-related sites still did not bother with trying to 
make money directly from the Web. Some were probably relying on some other type of 
funding, as it happened for several local authorities' sites getting money from tile 
participation in sonic European Community project. Others, such as a large part of the 
'brochure' sites, were probably far too cheap to run to even need some type of income. 
Indeed this seems to be one of the reasons for the relative lack of interest in making 
revenue. It has to be specified that Web sites offering advertising space were included in 
those using banners etc., even if they had not got any actual advert yet. If we look at 
Figure 5.14, that represents the same type of results, but limited to the complex, proper 
'digital cities', we can see that a much higher percentage of sites was looking for some 
type of economic self-support. Many of these more sophisticated sites were surely 
facing higher and more frequent expenses, given the level of services offered, and could 
not afford not to think about getting some money back, mainly through sponsorship. 
Web cities in the EU - Advertising 
Direct on 
pages 
16% Indirect, 
through 
presence of 
firms 
Not preseCnt 
15% 
69% 
Figure 5.13 - Web cities in the EU: advertising 
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Digital Cities in the EU - Advertising 
Direct on 
Not presen, 
42.9% 
pages 
33.3% 
direct 
(presence of 
firms) 
23.8% 
Figure 5.14 - Digital cities in the EU: advertising 
Confirming the trend highlighted by Figure 5.13, Figure 5.10 shows that the same 
percentage of 16% of sites that were using direct advertising applies to those selling 
Web spaces to firms and organisations, even if the actual sites could be different in the 
two cases. Another 10% of sites could well be selling spaces for commercial purposes, 
but were offering free of charge hosting to non-protit organisations, showing a 
sensitivity towards the problems of social access, at least of community relevant 
organisations. The second chart in Figure 5.16 also shows that all of the commercial 
efforts were being aimed at firms and organisations, but not at all at single individuals. 
In the very few cases where initiatives were trying to shape themselves more as virtual 
communities, offering individual Web spaces, this facility was not charged for. 
In the light of these results it can be argued that the tension between earning 
revenue and granting social access was not a big issue for the early city-related Web 
sites in Europe. This was mainly due to the poor sophistication and complexity of the 
majority of the initiatives, which were not aimed at becoming commercially oriented. 
At the same time, as we will see better in the next section, access was for the same 
reasons granted but scarcely useful. Other initiatives - by local authorities mainly - 
were still not looking for direct revenue, offering the digital city as a service paid for by 
taxpayers' money and European funding. However, very few cases offering more 
advanced services and facilities did try to cope with the tension, and resolved to do it by 
subsidising the free access of individuals and non-profit organisations by selling 
advertising and publishing space to commercial firms. 
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5.7 FREE ACCESS AND PAR TICIPA TION 
The importance of letting, people actively use ICT facilities for bi-directional 
expression has been clearly highlighted in the critical literature review. However, the set 
of survey results that we have so far examined already suggests that few civic Web 
initiatives were taking this need into account, and that mono-directionality was 
prevalent with respect to the provision and management of bi-directional 
communication facilities within digital cities. To have a more detailed account of the 
extent to which public visibility and debate were allowed and encouraged by the several 
sites, we can look again at Figure 5.10 and consider the results shown in Figure 5.15. As 
we have already noted before, the offer of free Web spaces for self-representation was 
relatively poor for organisations and even poorer for single individuals. In fact, only 
4.23% of the surveyed sites - therefore a smaller percentage than the 'digital cities' 
themselves - offered free of charge pages that could be used by people to publish more 
or less whatever they wanted. Non-profit organisations, often playing an important role 
within local communities, were just slightly more considered by the civic Web sites, as 
only in 10% of cases they were offered the chance to publish pages for free (see Fig. 
5.10). 
Individual Pages 
Not Present 
or Limited 
to staff 
96% 
Free ofcharge 
G 4% 
Publicly 
available 
4% 
Figure 5.15 - Web cities in the EU: individual pages 
If the publishing side was neglected by most initiatives, the support of public 
discourse and debates did not obtain more consideration. As Figure 5.16 shows, only 
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9% of the sites implemented some type of forum or debate area, where users could leave 
publicly readable messages or reply to some left by others. This was evidence that very 
few digital civic initiatives were designed and run to actually provide citizens with all 
extension of the public realm of their cities in the shape of electronic meeting and 
debate spaces. But this consideration must be complemented with another piece of 
results, which is the answer to the survey-related question 7 about support of public 
discourse at the local level, on local topics. 
Web Cities in the EU - Public Forums 
Available 
9% 
Figure 5.16 - Web cities in the EU: public forums 
The local 'dimension' of Internet publishing and debating was an important aspect 
to consider when it came to dealing with digital cities. Their ability to be 'grounded' in 
the place they were supposed to belong to could be seen as a crucial feature to affect the 
regeneration of the 'real', physical city. For example, it has been noted that the most 
famous and paradigmatic digital city of Amsterdam, called De Digitale Stad (DDS), had 
been gradually tending to offer more non-local discussion platforms, because of the 
need to attract foreigners and with them 'blue chip' sponsorship. This had resulted in 
shifting its role fi-om being locally oriented to being more a 'placeless' virtual city, thus 
weakening its relation with the 'real' city of Amsterdam and its inhabitants (Graham 
and Aurigi, 1997; 41). The extent to which Web city initiatives tried to revitallse the 
public sphere of the real city would then be 'measured' by looking at the provision of 
truly locally oriented debate areas and publishing spaces. 
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Web cities in the EU - Individual Pages 
Not present 
or limited to 
staff 
95.77% 
ublicly 
Available 
4.23% 
Mainly local 
1.88% 
Globally 
available G 
0.47% 
Strictly local 
1.88% 
Figure 5.17 - Web cities in the EU: individual pages and local targets 
This means, as shown in Figures 5.17 and 5.18, that the already low percentages 
of sites doing something to support public discourse and self-representation decreased 
further. It was especially the case for debate areas, where one third of the 9% of sites 
offering them was catering for 'general' non-local topics. Only 6% of the initiatives, 
then, were offering discussion areas geared at local issues, still often sharing resources 
with more general debates. On the other hand, the majority of the very few sites 
providing free Web space for individuals ended up offering a free service to locals, 
rather than trying to attract a more global type of community. It has to be noted that this 
seemed indeed more a consequence of the pre-existence of more attractive 'global' 
services on the Internet. 
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Web Cities in the EU - Public Forums 
Only general, 
global issues 
3% 
Not Available 
91% 
C 
ailable 
9% Also geared 
to local issues 
6% 
Figure 5.18 - Web cities in the EU: public forums and local targets 
The presence on the Internet of already well established and organised non- 
grounded virtual places hosting people from around the world - such as for Instance the 
enormous 'Geocities' site - made a similar offer from smaller sites redundant and less 
visible. This obviously meant that in offering publishing space to individuals, it was 
pointless trying to compete with these well organised enterprises at the global level. In a 
way, the supposed local character of the surveyed initiatives, made them unattractive 
and relatively meaningless as 'virtual homes' to people from other places, who wanted 
to be 'seen' and listened to by a global audience. On the other hand, the bonus for local 
people was evident in addressing local audiences and identifying the virtual space with 
their physical home. This explains why, in chart 5.17, there is a 1.88% of initiatives 
being strict on offering Web spaces to local individuals, and at the same time another 
1.88% (a relevant percentage within the total 4%) not imposing this kind of limit whilst 
not actively trying to cater for non-locals. 
This seems to suggest that the few advanced digital city initiatives that were 
trying to support public debate and self-representation were ending up doing it with a 
local, grounded vocation. However, sometimes the choice of general topic oriented 
debates was not helping to link the electronic communication possibilities with tile 
problems of the physical city. In a way it could be argued that digital cities, or better the 
few sophisticated ones, were trying to attract mainly local individuals, but failing 
sometimes to effectively deal with local debates. More generally, however, very few 
sites were actually addressing the problem in some ways. The majority of them was 
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completely ignoring the possibility of creating electronic extensions of the public sphere 
of the host physical city, giving people a chance to be locally visible - at least in the 
electronic environment - and have a say in a series of public debates. 
5.8 ACCESS RESTRICTIONS 
A measure that digital city initiatives could have adopted is to restrict access to 
their whole sites or to specific parts of them. It is technically feasible in Web sites to 
restrict access by password or 'domain' - for instance allowing in only users who are 
connecting from computers belonging to a specific group. This could be done for 
example to reserve areas to certain categories of users. At one end of the spectrum, in a 
way, there could have been access restrictions based on charges for information, so that 
a certain digital city could have opted for asking its users to subscribe to the information 
service. This would have lead, as noted in chapter 3, to an increase of the social 
polarisation between the economically advantaged subjects and those who were not. But 
access restrictions could have been used for other purposes as well, perhaps working in 
a somewhat opposite direction. Creating areas reserved to residents only would have 
shown a concern to run a service potentially faster for the local people, thence less 
expensive, and definitely locally oriented, within that local-global dualism in urban 
management that we have already noted about several times. Figure 5.19, however, 
shows that both these options were not taken into consideration by nearly all of the 
sites. 
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Web Cities in the EU - Access selectivity 
Sections 
Sections reserved 
reserved to special 
to locals categories 
10/- no/ 
Fully accessible 
97% 
Figure 5.19 - Web cities in the EU: access selectivity 
It could be said that this is an expectable result, as the choice itself of using the 
Internet and the World Wide Web for setting up a civic digital site, rather than 
implementing more technically 'local' solutions like a 'BBS' style system, shows a 
clear will to 'go global'. Although this consideration is certainly true, we have to 
consider nonetheless that the Web was more and more becoming a de facto standard for 
a multimedia-capable distributed information and communication system. In fact, 
several pre-existing community information systems created as BBSs were gradually 
ýmigrating' to the Web because of its better and more flexible interface. Therefore there 
were going to be more and more community oriented Web sites finding themselves 
facing the policy choice of 'opening' to the world - and perhaps offering a worse, more 
congested service to their theoretically targeted local users - or keeping access to areas, 
or the whole site, restricted. These results show that, at the moment of the survey, only 
1% of them had decided to implement some sort of 'locals only' pages, whilst the 
overwhelming majority had decided to exploit the advantages of global presence 
potentially offered by the World Wide Web. At the same time, making people and firms 
pay to view the information was not seen as a fair or feasible option, and at least 98% of 
the sites remained completely free to consult. 
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5.9 USE OF LANGUAGES 
Another factor affecting the possible participation of local people in the 'life' of 
the digital city was the use of local or foreign language. Again, the tension between 
local interests and global role of the Internet was central here, and it was important to 
observe how city related Web sites were being shaped from the point of view of 
language use. Figure 5.20 shows how the surveyed sites dealt with languages, and 
generally indicates that only 9% of cases were trying to 'speak' exclusively to a global 
audience, ignoring the needs of local people and especially of those who were not so 
well educated to be able to sPeak English. English has to be mentioned as 'the' foreign 
language used by the majority of the sites, while other languages were Much less 
implemented. 
Web Cities in the EU - Language(s) Used 
Foreign 
Localas much 9% 
as foreign 
23% Local 
51% 
Mainly local 
17% 
Figure 5.20 - Web cities in the EU: languages used 
However, Figure 5.20 shows that while 51% of the initiatives were using 
exclusively their local language, a significant 40% were implementing a foreign one (as 
already noted, usually English) to address a global audience. However, tills 
phenomenon could also become - perhaps in many cases involuntarily -a means of 
welcoming foreigners living in the city, thus enhancing the multiethnic potential of the 
sites. But this has to be seen as almost an involuntary phenomenon, as English only was 
the omnipresent foreign language. Also, if we observe what was happening to those 
sites where English was the local language, that is UK and Irish initiatives, we find that 
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very few had other languages, and no relevant immigrants' ones were actually 
implemented, like for instance Bangladeshi or Hindi. 
Indeed, the results shown in Figure 5.20 could be somehow 'corrected' by 
excluding British and Irish sites, which had the convenience of naturally speaking tile 
global language, and therefore were improperly - at least in some cases - raising tile 
number of the sites implementing only local idioms and therefore addressing local 
audiences. This leads to Chart 5.21, where the 'local only' option lowers significantly 
from 51% to 36% and very probably reflects more faithfully the actual trend in 
European Web sites. 
Language(s) Used (Excluding UK and Ireland) 
Foreign 
12% 
Local 
36% 
Localas much 
as foreign 
30% 
C 
Mainly local 
22% 
Figure 5.21 - Web cities in the EU: languages used, excluding UK and Ireland 
However, still only 12% of the initiatives were discriminating against local users 
or at least the not well educated ones, while the others were mainly (or equally) working 
in the local idiom, making it possible for citizens to consult them. 
In substance, it can be argued that as regards language, local people were the main 
target, even if the majority of the sites was concerned about attracting foreigners as 
well. The fact that nearly all of the initiatives using also foreign languages were 
implementing only English, and in Some cases cover only a small part of the pages 
present in the site, is significant. It tells that the aim was attract foreign Investment and 
tourists from the rich Western countries, rather than setting up Information and 
communication sites that could be more easily used by the immigrant communities that 
were already part of many multiethnic European cities. 
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5.10 PROVISION OF LOCAL INFORMATION AND SERVICES 
We have seen that when it came to constructing a typology of the initiatives 
surveyed in this study, the amount and quality of information provided were a crucial 
characteristic to distinguish complex digital cities from more 'brochure-like' systems. 
We have also seen that another important issue was how 'grounded' this information 
was, as otherwise it became pointless to speak about relationships between real and 
electronic places. Any Web site distinguishing itself as the digital counterpart of a 
certain urban place would stop making sense if it did not deal with its host place at all. 
Indeed, the presence of more or less sophisticated and complex infon-nation was 
an extremely important set of results to analyse, especially if we consider that many of 
the surveyed sites ended up being not really 'communication-oriented' and mainly tools 
for broadcasting data. What these tools were actually being run for, was also revealed 
by looking at the amount and quality of information and services offered to citizens and 
users. Figures 5.22 and 5.23 distinguish between two different types of information 
present in the surveyed sites. Basically, a distinction was made between the presence of 
information 'broadcast' by the actors who run and control the initiatives - we could call 
it 'centrally' broadcast information - and the presence of guest information providers 
such as organisations and firms, participating in the life of the digital city. These two 
types of information provision were examined differently, as it was assumed that the 
third party pages belonging to organisations and firms were going to be quite narrowly 
focused and for this reason exhaustive. Therefore what was checked was their presence 
and how locally oriented they were, as external information providers could have been 
for instance big corporate firms advertising globally available services with little 
relation with the local communities' life. On the other hand, it had been noticed during 
the pilot phase of the survey that centrally managed local information could vary 
between being very shallow - almost non-existing - or quite deep, and therefore the 
quality and quantity of it had to be observed and not taken for granted. As stated, these 
observations lead to the results in charts 5.22 and 5.23. 
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Web Cities in the EU - Offer of Local 
Information and Services 
No offer at all 
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Wide Range 
9% 
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Figure 5.22 - Web cities in the EU: offer of local information and services 
Figure 5.22 shows the general shallowness of the contents of the Web cities in 
terms of local information provision, as 66% of the surveyed sites ended up not offering 
information or just providing what in the chart Is defined as 'summaries and 
descriptions'. Information of this kind was made of generic descriptions of aspects of 
the city, mainly geared at advertising that urban space as particularly suitable for 
investment or tourism. For example, certain sites could give information about business 
in the city just describing how many profitable enterprises were already based in that 
area, or how keen the local council was to support firms. By doing just this, they were 
failing to offer actual updated information and services that could be of some use to the 
local businesses. Another example was providing descriptions about the cultural 
heritage and history of art of a certain city, without informing about what was actually 
going oil in terms of cultural events, let alone the chance of, for instance, purchasing 
tickets via the Internet. Needles to say that citizens are likely to know something already 
about tile monuments they see every day, and that they would probably ignore an urban 
information system that does not provide something more useful to them. Another 
aspect that has to be highlighted, as it is not clearly shown by the chart, is that if tile 
provision of information was generally scarce, interactive services, like tile ability of 
performing money transactions to purchase goods or pay local taxes, for instance, were 
completely absent. This means that a vast majority of the initiatives were even failing to 
address those that could easily be envisaged as the most basic information needs of 
citizens, such as public transport timetables or information on local events, prioritising a 
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brochure-oriented type of inforniation. Again, this shows the dualism between global 
interests and local ones, and the fact that the former prevailed in many of the initiatives. 
Web cities in the EU 
provision of web sites to organisations 
Not present 
73.71% 
Mainly local 
10.33% 
Present 
26.29% 
Global 
Strictly local 0.47% 
15.49% 
Figure 5.23 - Web cities and provision of Web sites to local organisations 
Figure 5.23 displays the sarne results that were shown by Figure 5.10 on the 
provision of Web sites to organisations, by the IIIII initiatives, but it specifies whether these 
organisations and firms appending information to the sites were locally based (or 
related) or not. As the chart shows, when it came to participation from external 
providers of information, nearly all of them ended up being local, small and medium 
enterprises and non-profit organisations. Indeed, over half of the initiatives that were 
offering web spaces to third parties had opted for these spaces to be available only to 
locally based organisations. But even in those cases where no special rules were 
specified, the overwhelming majority of the participants ended up being local anyway. 
This is expressed by the 10.33% of 'mainly local' information providers shown in the 
chart. These results demonstrate that whenever facilities for self-representation were 
offered by digital cities, these chances were being taken by local actors willing to 
participate in the initiatives or just to advertise themselves to local audiences. Quite 
possibly, the big 'global' subjects were not in need of acquiring scattered Web spaces, 
and were considering, in any case, sponsorship of the initiatives. On the other hand this 
could also imply a lack of confidence from big corporate companies with respect to tile 
alleged local 'penetration' and effectiveness of this kind of Web sites. It seemed that 
whilst the small and local - including local authorities themselves - were struggling to 
acquire global visibility, those who already had it were sceptical or however not very 
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interested in the alleged potential of digital cities for addressing local markets and 
communities. 
5.11 PUTTING ITALL TOGETHER 
What kind of broad empirical picture was offered to us by putting together the 
answers to the research questions addressed by this survey? What was the scope and 
potential of the digital city phenomenon in Europe at the beginning of 1997? Were 
Web-based initiatives going to establish some type of extension to the public sphere of 
our cities? 
On the one hand we have already answered these questions by constructing and 
analysing a typology of the initiatives, derived from a scoring mechanism related to the 
single aspects of the analysed sites. The results of this typological exercise have been 
described at the beginning of this chapter. 
However, it is useful to briefly summarise the results organised by four main 
themes: 
* The 'owners' of the initiatives and the contexts in which they were being 
developed 
" The efforts made to establish a public, actively accessible cyberspace and 
encourage debate and exchange 
" The relationship between the initiatives and local economies 
" The relationship between the initiatives and local citizens and 
communities (i. e. how grounded they were) 
These themes were central for the whole research, and are present in the following 
analysis of the two in-depth case studies. These conclusions can therefore link the 
survey very well to the next bit of the research. 
5.11.1 Ownership and socio-political and economic contexts 
We have seen that the 'digital city' phenomenon was developing in Europe in a 
way that highlighted a weaker divide between Southern and Northern European 
countries than could have been expected. Some southern countries like Italy were 
indeed at the leading edge of the developments in terms of sophistication of the 
initiatives, together with northern countries like the Netherlands. Rather than contrasts 
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in quantity and complexity of the initiatives, the main differences between countries 
were to be seen in ownership and agency. For example, whilst the public sector in Italy 
was driving the most complex and interactive experiments of virtual cities, the opposite 
tended to happen in countries where local authorities had a less primary and central role 
in urban governance. In these countries, like the UK or the Netherlands, sites run by 
local authorities alone tended to be mono-directional information services tackling a 
very limited range of urban information and communication problems. Many possible 
functions and benefits of digital cities were left to the initiative of private (often non- 
profit) organisations and sometimes joint-ventures between public and private, where 
the public sector did not have however a hegemonic role. Within this scenario, the low 
number of initiatives in France constituted an interesting anomaly that could possibly 
have a 'technological' explanation, as the presence of an earlier very successful 
information system like Minitel could have generated a lack of interest towards Internet 
based technologies in the urban context. 
These observations suggest that the socio-political and economic settings of each 
country, and the consequent different relations between public and private sector, had a 
strong influence in the shaping of the initiatives. Despite the establishment in Europe of 
trans-national bodies like 'Telecities' and 'European Digital Cities' setting the aims of 
the movement and encouraging initiatives to exchange ideas and experiences, it was 
very hard if not impossible to define a 'model' European virtual city and its dynamics of 
development. 
5.11.2 The establishment of public, participative cyberspaces 
We have seen that the level of complexity of the majority of the initiatives, 
especially for what concerned the provision of bi-directional communication facilities, 
was very poor. Very few sites ended up even addressing the issue of providing debate 
facilities and facilitating communication and exchange among citizens and between 
citizens and local authorities. Very few initiatives offered free of charge Web spaces to 
individuals and (at least) non-profit organisations, to allow self-representation within 
the city. Therefore, while we can speak of a widespread phenomenon of city-related 
Web sites, we cannot do the same as far as the concept of public cyberspace is 
concerned. Most initiatives ended up being mono-directional billboards or brochures, 
not spaces where interaction was possible. Very few examples could actually have the 
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potential of enhancing the public sphere of their host cities and towns, by adding a 
parallel electronic dimension to it and encouraging public discourse. 
5.11.3 The relation between digital cities and local economies 
There is no doubt that marketing was one of the main elements of virtual cities. 
However, it seemed that in the overall majority of cases the main marketing activity 
performed by the sites was that of promoting the city to potential investors and tourists. 
On the other hand, local firms and enterprises were seldom encouraged to take 
advantage of the electronic space of the digital city in any way. The information 
provided that could be useful to businesses was poor or non-existent in most cases, and 
few initiatives were actually offering Web spaces to firms and organisations. This 
somehow represented a contradiction. In fact, cities were being marketed to investors as 
ideal places to establish an activity, while at the same time the Web sites were showing 
that the actual provision of hi-tech services and information to firms already operating 
in the area was scarce to say the least. 
The generally'low sophistication of most initiatives was probably the reason why 
they tended not to attract advertising and representation of major global firms and 
businesses, which possibly did not see the virtual city Web sites as actually able to 
6penetrate' effectively their local communities. It should also be noted that in some 
cases virtual city initiatives had to compete with other 'virtual business parks' already 
established on the Internet and usually better organised. In general it could be said that 
in those few cases where facilities for businesses were provided, a few local firms and 
organisations took the chance of being in the virtual cities, mainly with the purpose of 
acquiring a 'global' visibility for free or at a very cheap price. But the overall 
impression was that virtual cities did not look 'good' enough to the majority of 
businesses, as their ability of actually creating a local market by addressing local 
audiences was doubted. 
5.11.4 The relation between the initiatives and the real cities and 
communities 
The previous observations about digital cities and businesses, and digital cities 
and public space, already suggest that the majority of the initiatives had failed to 
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develop a very strong relation with their physical counterparts and to somehow work 
towards the needs of the communities dwelling them. This impression is reinforced 
when we consider that even from the point of view of simple information provision, let 
alone bi-directional communication, we have seen that most initiatives had the depth of 
a brochure, rather than that of a complex civic inforination system. The phenomenon of 
the tension in city government between the interests of the local people and businesses 
and the need to market the city to investors coming from elsewhere was mirrored in 
virtual cities. Web sites were not exempt from this kind of problem. Indeed, very often 
this was the main reason for their existence, as the potential of the Internet was being 
exploited to gain global visibility rather than take care of local citizens and firms. 
Moreover, although local languages were prevalent, no resident immigrants' idioms 
were adopted, whilst English was widely used to address foreign audiences. 
5.12 CONCLUSIONS 
As we have seen, the results of the survey work indicate that the digital city 
phenomenon in Europe was at the beginning of 1997 very much in its early days. The 
widely practised exploitation of the urban metaphor in the construction of Web sites did 
not mean in most cases that a cyber-place was being established to enhance and co- 
operate with the real physical urban space. Indeed, very often, supposed digital cities 
ended up being nothing more than electronic brochures. However, a few initiatives 
tended to stand out of the less interesting mass of city-related sites. These were 
classified in the survey as the 'holistic', 'embedded digital cities'. Embedded digital 
cities tended to be complex, providing virtual spaces for debate and self-representation 
as well as relatively deep and extensive information geared above all at the citizens. 
This was the type of initiative that could be most relevant to the purpose of this 
research, and it was natural, after having determined where the interesting examples of 
Web-based digital cities could be found in Europe, to examine them better. Once having 
performed the general analysis allowed by the survey, some more in-depth investigation 
in a limited number of cases was necessary to acquire more knowledge on the processes 
of construction of digital city initiatives and on their characteristic beyond what could 
be observed through Web-browsing software. Two embedded digital cities were chosen 
as case studies, Bologna Iperbole in Italy and Digital City Bristol in the UK. The next 
three chapters analyse and compare these two case studies. 
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CHAPTER 6- IPERBOLE: AN ITALIAN COUNCIL TAKES 
THE INITIATIVE 
6.0 INTRODUCTION 
In January 1997, a series of European awards, collectively known as 'The 
Bangemann Challenge', were given to projects and initiatives that were recognised as 
making a particularly positive contribution to the shaping of the European Information 
Society. The Italian city of Bologna was amongst the winners with an Internet site that 
Bologna city council refers to as a 'rete civica' (civic network), but that could well be 
classified as an 'embedded digital city', according to the results of the survey described 
in Chapter 5. The name of the Bologna site was - and still is - Iperbole, an acronym for 
'Internet Per Bologna e I'Emilia Romagna' (Internet for Bologna and Emilia Romagna), 
and at the time of the award it had already existed for about three years. Because of its 
successes and the reputation that it gained, Iperbole became one of the most frequently 
referenced examples, together with Amsterdam's De Digitale Stad, of advanced digital 
cities in Europe. This chapter is based on the field research on Iperbole that was carried 
out between the end of 1996 and the first half of 1997, visiting Bologna, collecting 
documents and interviewing the key actors involved. The next pages aim at constructing 
a critical history of this initiative, by looking at how it was shaped and by whom in its 
first three and a half years of life. To offer a framework to the reader, as well as 
addressing the research questions in an effective way, the narrative is divided into 
sections. We first deal with the initial phase of life of the project, who promoted it, how 
it was described and envisaged, and who was 'enrolled' to become an involved actor in 
the design and shaping of the initiative. But at the time the interviews were carried out a 
kind of 'second phase' of development, with some remarkable differences from the 
initial agenda, was underway, as the whole project was being questioned and rethought. 
The last section is dedicated to the analysis of how the perception and interpretation of 
Iperbole was changing, and how it was evolving towards a more mature and stabilised 
part of urban technology. Between the first and last sections, three other sub-chapters 
deal with specific themes such as the construction of electronic public spaces and the 
relation with the real city, the relation of the initiative with local economic 
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development, and the 'construction' of users and the strategies employed to facilitate 
access. 
Inevitably, there can never be a clear divide between these themes, and it is a 
natural thing that most of the data collected relate to more than just one topic and 
answer more than one question. 
6.1 THE CONTEXT 
Bologna is a major Italian city geographically located in a position that makes it a 
natural node between Central Italy and Northern Italy. It can be considered a medium- 
sized European city with population slightly less than 400,000 and a quite dense 
hinterland, if we consider that the whole of the province had in 1997 over 900,000 
inhabitants (data from Comune di Bologna and Istat-Census). 
Traditionally, the whole region of which Bologna is the centre, called Emilia 
Romagna, is one of the richest regions of Italy. The province of Bologna is also a low 
unemployment area, with a rate of 4.6% in 1998, dropped from 5.3% in the previous 
year, which was much lower than the national average of 12.3%. Another important 
characteristic of Bologna is the presence of one of the oldest and most famous 
universities in Europe and the World, which still attracts a large number of students, 
about 100,000 people who are a "town within the town" (Rovinetti, 1997). 
Bologna and the whole region of Emila Romagna have gained a reputation in Italy 
and abroad for their efficient and often innovative approach to public administration. 
Since the post-war period, the several 'comuni' of Emilia have had an uninterrupted 
sequence of left-wing oriented governments, largely dominated by the Italian 
Communist Party and, after its re-forming and re-naming, by the so-called Left-wing 
Democrats (Democratici di Sinistra). Only in the local elections of 1999 a change of 
government took place, with a centre-right coalition mayor taking over. These local 
governments have worked throughout the years to increase the efficiency of public 
administration, while often undertaking initiatives seen as progressive and socially 
inclusive. For instance, Bologna offered free bus services during the 1970s, and had 
many initiatives like the 'centri anziani', neighbourhood centres for elderly people, that 
are very popular as meeting and activity places. These centres are still extremely 
successful and regarded as examples of best practice. Probably due to the general 
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political orientation of much of the population, Bologna and Emilia Romagna are areas 
where co-operatives and non-profit enterprises are particularly numerous as well as 
strong. This makes initiatives that are run to be inclusive and participative particularly 
feasible and able to rely on a large number of volunteer workers, as well as funding 
from local authorities. 
All of these factors, already present in Bologna, could be recognised as fertile 
ground allowing the development of an initiative like Iperbole, aiming to exploit the 
possibilities offered by the emergence of the 'infon-nation society' for the benefit of the 
general public. Also, the presence of a strong public administration together with a 
prestigious university - and the fact itself that some influential people operated in both 
the environments - allowed important synergies and consensus to be created around the 
initiative. 
6.2 CITYCARD AND BEYOND: THE EARLY DAYS OF IPERBOLE 
1perbole is an evolution from another project, called 'Citycard', which started in 
1993 as an EC-funded project under the ESPRIT programme. Citycard was project 
number EP8123, and had been initially conceived as an experiment of teledemocracy 
and public participation in decision-making in cities. The project manager was a 
relatively small software house based in Bologna, called Omega Generation and 
specialised in natural language analysis and artificial intelligence. Three European 
countries - Italy , Spain and the UK - were involved in the project, all of them with a 
technological partner working together with a public administration. In Italy the 
partners were Omega Generation and Bologna City Council, in Spain the municipality 
of Barcelona was working with Lagotex LDA, and in the UK Wansbeck District 
Council was liasing with Mari Computer Systems, an IT firm based in Gateshead, Tyne 
and Wear. 
The name of the original project itself gives a clue to what the experiment had to 
be about, at least in the initial intentions of the promoters. Citycard drew its inspiration 
from a pre-existing initiative in Bologna, that was working well (and still is at the time 
of writing) called 'CUP card'. This is a magnetic card that every resident in Bologna 
receives free of charge from the municipality, and that can be used at 30-40 appropriate 
manned 'access points' scattered around the city to book medical services in Bologna. 
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The initial idea for Citycard came from Maurizio Matteuzzi, chairman of Omega 
Generation as well as lecturer at Bologna University, who decided to write a proposal 
for an EC funded project, envisaging the possible use of 'civic' smart cards to survey 
citizens through a network of kiosks. Such an ob ective, however, had the potential to j 
be extremely controversial. Some partners in the project, Wansbeck above all, according 
to some of the interviewees (Guidi, 1997; and Matteuzzi, 1997) very soon rejected the 
feature of the civic 'referenda' as unacceptable and a possible threat for personal 
privacy of the end-users. Maurizio Matteuzzi himself seemed not too convinced of his 
own initial proposal. He was aware that, beyond the hype of the teledemocracy issue - 
extremely useful apparently to gain approval and funding of the project by the EC - lay 
the problem of the un-representative groups that would have used the system. During 
the interview, he minimised the importance of the initial idea about referenda, claiming 
that 
"these were not meant to beformal referenda. They were ways 
to gather opinions, for which thefact that the respondents could 
be representative of the whole population was not so important. 
We were aware of who was able to respond and who was not, 
and we aimed at something more qualitative than quantitative" 
(Matteuzzi, 1997). 
This was a problem that was going to characterise the participative features of 
Iperbole as well. If the results of surveys, consultations or just debate among citizens 
were not to be considered reliable and representative, then did this kind of exercises 
make sense in the first place? As was the case for Citycard's referenda, which were 
soon shelved by the partners of the project, a very similar problem was going to happen 
with Iperbole's discussion areas, as we will see further on in this chapter. 
But in 1993, and even more in 1994 - the year in which Iperbole would take over 
Citycard - the emphasis on the potential of IT for enhancing the urban democratic 
processes was far stronger than any concern for actual effectiveness of communicative 
tools of this kind. Citycard was an initiative undertaken by the best-regarded left wing 
local administration within the whole country, and it was something involving high 
technologies. Two politicians with a strong vision for IT initiatives were among the 
main actors determining the birth of Citycard and its initial orientation towards public 
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participation: Stefano Bonaga and Renzo Imbeni. Bonaga, as we will see better in the 
next section, was a local decision-maker, member of local government who teamed up 
with Matteuzzi in launching the idea. He remained in a central position within 1perbole 
as well, at least in its first phase of development. Imbeni had been an extremely 
successful and popular mayor of Bologna. He had recently become MEP with PDS, and 
his support within the EC was fundamental for the success of the Citycard funding bid 
of 2.5 billion Liras (Visani, 1993). The local as well as national press, mainly left-wing 
oriented - and very popular - national newspapers like La Repubblica and L'Unita 
started getting enthusiastic about the potential of the phenomenon. Most - if not all - of 
the articles written about the embryonic Citycard were extremely positive and 
sometimes hyperbolic towards the initiative and what it represented. These articles 
showed how strong was the emphasis towards the political and participative aspects of 
the experiment, that were seen as its primary purpose. Stefano Rodota, a prominent and 
very respected politician of the PDS, interviewed by La Repubblica argued that "Good 
use of these technologies could allow an increased involvement of the citizens in 
decision-making and design processes" (Rodota, quoted in Marcoaldi, 1993; 3 1). A 
month later, Valerio Varesi, another journalist of La Repubblica, would reinforce this 
discourse by talking of Citycard in terms of "direct democracy... a continuous Swiss- 
style referendum". He was so enthusiastic that he went so far as to compare the potential 
social benefits of this network of civic terminals with those of complex benefit systems 
such as the 'atelier de la loi' in France or Legal Aid in the UK (Varesi, 1993). 
This climate of easy enthusiasm for IT initiatives that involved local democracy, 
together with the broader - and very agitated - political climate of the 1994 general 
election, were the ideal ground in Bologna for getting consensus for the development of 
a long-term project like the lperbole civic network. The new project in fact - though not 
formally - was going to replace and re-define Citycard, as its initial propositions for 
direct democracy had quickly proven unfeasible but, above all, undesirable. 
6.3 LAUNCHING IPERBOLE: ACTORS AND VISIONS 
In early 1994 the Iperbole project for a civic network was launched in Bologna. 
As we have already briefly mentioned, the context offered many reasons to several 
actors to get involved and/or support this initiative, so that it could actually take off. The 
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fact that Citycard had already been funded by the European Community was certainly a 
major facilitating event. 
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Some crucial actors had formed the original project-managing group in Bologna. 
Stefano Bonaga as a member of local government, Maurizio Matteuzzi and his firm 
Omega Generation, and the Ufficio Comumcazlom col CIttadmi (Office for 
Communication with Citizens) of Bologna City Council. Each of these core members of 
the project had of course some very good reasons to promote the initiative and work 
towards its success. The following paragraphs will explore why 1perbole was part of 
these actors' strategies. 
6.3.1 THE VISION FROM STEFANO BONAGA 
Stefano Bonaga is professor of Philosophy at Bologna university, a well-known 
intellectual who has been linked to a circle of friends all previously belonging to 
extreme left-wing political groups. Among his best friends and possibly advisors was 
Franco Berardi, nicknamed 'Bifo', a left-wing writer and intellectual relatively well 
known nationally as a sort of a cyber-guru, writing on alternative lifestyles, cyberpunk 
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culture, and innovative forms of democracy. Indeed, while I was interviewing Bonaga 
in his flat in the historical centre of Bologna, Bifo turned up and introduced himself, 
though he did not take part in the interview itself. 
Bonaga certainly has been the main source of inspiration for the 1perbole project 
in its early days, as well as its most prominent promoter. Sensitive to the relevance for 
local governance that the emergence of the information society could have, Bonaga 
envisaged mainly two reasons why the Council should have got directly, quickly and 
heavily involved in setting up a public Internet system for the city. 
The first reason was tackling complexity and fragmentation in urban governance. 
The challenge here was to create an environment that could empower single citizens but 
above all organised groups of citizens, to self-represent and participate in the decision- 
making processes within the city. Still in 1997, when the interview took place and he 
was in a much more marginal position within the project, if at all involved, he was keen 
to stress that 
"My position stems from the fact that in a complex society it is 
extremely dffcuIt to know how the system works, being able to 
take decisions ( .. ) Actually, even in Bologna the urban social 
system is far too complex for the administration to be able to 
satisfy people's needs. There is a deficit of resources as well as 
knowledge. Is it then possible to run and administrate the city 
effectively? My answer is no, it is not possible unless we manage 
to cope with complexity, broadening our knowledge base and 
the number of those involved in decision-making. I am not 
referring to direct democracy, but rather to a broadening of 
representation. We increasingly need forms of seýf- 
representation, and the Net can allow people to organise 
themselves beyond traditional structures like unions or certain 
associations. People can speak beyond traditional 
representation forms, and beyond differences in wealth and 
social status" (Bonaga, 1997) 
The second main reason for creating 1perbole was the need for universal service. 
Bonaga actually saw telematics networks and the Internet as another utility - and a very 
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important one indeed - that needed public intervention to assure that public access to 
ICTs would be genuinely public. The project was then seen as an instrument to promote 
the use of the Internet with people from all social classes in Bologna. This was of course 
meant to be a necessary condition for the accomplishment of the first objective of 
enhancing urban governance. Interestingly enough, Bonaga would not consider 
solutions in which public and private sectors would work in partnership. Although as 
we have already noted Iperbole was set up by several actors, the Council would retain a 
leading role and be, in fact, the only policy-maker in the shaping of lperbole. Especially 
in its early days, the influence of the private sector was regarded as undesirable, as it 
would have introduced market-generated divides between information 'haves' and 
'have nots': 
"We thought that thefunction ofpromoting the use of telematics 
had to be reserved to the public sector rather than to the market. 
The latter would have obeyed the rules of wealth and cultural 
level, and the process would have become exclusive rather than 
inclusive. A market-driven promotion of mass telematics would 
also have been much slower" (Bonaga, 1997). 
This vision will generate one of the strongest policy initiatives of the first years of 
Iperbole, the offer of free Internet connections to all citizens who applied for it, as we 
will see later in this chapter. 
6.3.2 THE OFFICE FOR COMMUNICATION WITH THE CITIZENS 
What Stefano Bonaga had envisaged needed to be put in practice and given a 
precise role within the municipal machine. Leda Guidi, from the Servizi di 
Comunicazione coi Cittadini (Office for Communication with Citizens) became - and 
still is - the manager of the whole project, under the supervision of Alessandro 
Rovinetti who was the director of the Office. Guidi saw her office's involvement as an 
obvious thing, claiming that 
"The Servizi di Comunicazione were the ideal place to 
accomplish the project, as we had already a strategically very 
similar series of activities. For us implementing 
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IperbolelCitycard was just adding a new tool to do what we 
were already doing" (Guidi, 199 7) 
Indeed, the role of Leda Guidi soon became central to the whole project. Having 
to organise and run the civic network, liasing at the same time with the policy makers, 
the developers, and the potential users of the system gave Guidi all-round knowledge of 
Iperbole and the processes that were shaping it. She was actually at the helm. Therefore, 
for the carrying out of this case study, she was the overall key person to rely on, and the 
source and facilitator of all other contacts with prospective interviewees. 
Guidi and Rovinetti entered the project as the operative unit that took it on board 
and managed it within the Municipality. Though the general vision from Bonaga was in 
principle shared, especially by Guidi, because of their position they had a conception of 
the project that was much more centred on the role of the Council and its relationship 
with the citizens of Bologna. Guidi for instance described Iperbole's aims as a way to 
enhance the relationship between citizens and public administration, but stressed the 
project's value as "A tool for administrative transparency and the internal efficiency of 
the Council" (Guidi, 1997). Although the emphasis here was quite obviously focused on 
aims that were more practically and directly related to the way the Council worked, 
there was still a general belief that bi-directional communication and support of public 
discourse was going to have a central role in Iperbole. 
6.3.3 OMEGA GENERATION 
Omega Generation was a relatively small software house, directed by Maurizio 
Matteuzzi, who is also a professor at the University of Bologna. As already noted, 
Omega was one of the original partners to begin the Citycard project accessing the 
European funds available in the ESPRIT programme. Obviously Omega had 
commercial interests that justified its participation in the project. They could be among 
the first to develop a public civic network in Europe, experimenting in the field several 
routines and ideas they had, as well as getting new ideas from the continuous feedback 
of their partners and the end-users. 
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Figure 6.2 - The Omega Generation Web site 
This allowed Omega to successfully exploit this experience and market the 
software created for it as a package named 'MV lperbole'. This package including web 
design of pages for civic networks and specialised routines for the management of bi- 
directional communications between citizens and public administration, was being 
marketed mainly towards other cities and towns in Italy. Several Italian local councils 
wanted to follow suit the example set by Bologna. Obviously, the very software 
solutions that were being implemented in Bologna and were being offered commercially 
by Omega Generation were certainly of great interest. Cities like Ravenna, Vicenza and 
San Marino, together with regions like Val D'Aosta became clients of Omega 
Generation embracing the lperbole paradigm. 
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What is of interest for this research is the fact that the expertise that Omega could 
offer was, again, centred on bi-directional communication and the electronic analysis of 
language. Omega were able, for instance, to set up a system by which citizens could 
email the city council on specific inquiries and problems without having to know whom 
to send the message to. The software Would facilitate the process by comparing the 
contents of the email with a matrix of keywords and then direct the message to the right 
recipient. Matteuzzi was also very much in favour, and able to provide technical 
assistance, of the establishment of discussion forums, using the well-known Internet 
4newsgroups' technology, to encourage public dialogue in the digital city. 
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As Leda Guidi claimed in one of the interviews: "In Bologna we found an 
extraordinary convergence of political and industrial objectives. The particular 
itical and policy ones" (Guidi industrial objectives were going to suit very well the poll 1 1, 
1997). 
6.3.4 CINECA, THE UNIVERSITY AS INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDER 
CIN ECA was the third piece of the i igsaw that lperbole needed to operate. As the 
project management and the supply of I ion were coming from the council, the 
software development from Omega Generation, the provision of Internet connectivity 
and the relative technical assistance came from CINECA. This organisation is a public 
entity, being a consortium created by several universities in Italy to provide centralised 
high profile computing facilities and fast computing speed. CINECA is based In the 
immediate outskirts of Bologna and was seen as the ideal partner by the project 
management team in the Council. Several reasons were presented for this choice, that 
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was going to be a controversial choice indeed, provoking an OLItraged reaction fi-oni 
several private Internet Service Providers (ISPs) is the Bologna area. 
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Towards the end of 1993 and the beginning of 1994 CINECA was in an expansion 
phase, opening up its services to non-scientific uses (Matteuzzi, 1997; Lanzar'n', 1997) 
and this was obviously presenting opportunities for collaboration with the Municipality. 
Another reason, on the technical side, for contacting CINECA was that In that very 
period, it had established a direct Internet connection with Paris (and from there to the 
rest of the World) that was considered quite fast and efficient (Guidi, 1997). 
As far as the consortium was concerned, as it was exploring ways of 
differentiating and expanding its activities, it saw joining the 1perbole team as an ideal 
chance to develop new synergies. Marco Lanzarini, director of CINECA, stated in his 
interview that "It happened naturally that we found ourselves dealing with these people, 
Favorites Media 
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and this was for us a stimulus to think that we were ready for this kind of step" 
(Lanzarini, 1997). 
CINECA entered as a non-prof it partner as, according to Lanzarini, the Council 
was paying sums of money to them that were just supposed to cover the costs of 
material and human resources involved. Lanzarini would however recognise two 
possible benefits that made it worth the effort for his organisation: in the short term it 
was enjoying a strong enhancement of its image. In the medium and long term 
Lanzarini was not excluding the possibility for CINECA to become a successful ISP, 
able to compete in a local marketplace that it had significantly contributed to create 
(Lanzarini, 1997). 
The choice of CINECA as a partner, and its (enrolment' in the network of actors 
involved directly in the shaping of Iperbole, however justifiable it could have been, 
reflects a prevailing attitude from the main decision-makers within the project. Bonaga, 
Guidi and the Council were acknowledging a great divide between public and private 
initiatives and providers, and opting for a set up that could be as public as possible. 
Leda Guidi would affirm that "CINECA could provide a series of warranties because it 
was a public sector company, with a non-profit ethos rather than proper market 
objectives" (Guidi, 1997). This perception of a clear and strong divide between public 
and private interests on the Net, would inform most of the early management and 
policies related to the civic network in Bologna. This attitude will contribute to shaping 
a digital city in which the private, commercial sector will be almost totally absent. This, 
together with other impediments coming in as consequences of the general political 
climate, will limit the potential of Iperbole towards the support of public discourse 
considerably, as we are going to see later on in this chapter. 
6.4 NEW MEDIA, TRANSPARENCY AND ELECTIONS: 
INTERPRETATIVE FLEXIBILITY IN THE ACCEPTANCE OF 
IPERBOLE 
Having described briefly who the main entrepreneurs were in the Iperbole project, 
and what their own visions were, it is important to get a prespective on how the 
initiative was described to gain support and acceptance within the current political 
climate. In other words, how was it possible for Bonaga, Guidi, Matteuzzi and Lanzarini 
to have the decision-makers in Bologna on their side? 
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Certainly some starting conditions were favourable to the acceptance of Iperbole. 
The fact that Bonaga, for instance, would play a double role as a local politician and 
mayor's advisor as well as the key vision-maker and creator of the project, was 
undoubtedly a facilitating factor. In his interview, Bonaga made jokes about the 
easiness of having Iperbole accepted by saying: 
"One of the big advantages that we had when we proposed the 
project [to the City Council] was that nobody was really able to 
understand what we actually wanted to do, and this gave us the 
green light" (Bonaga, 1997) 
This might be true, of course, and indeed the weak reaction of the local political 
opposition to this project could be a sign of this. However, claiming that the reason for 
the Council to support Iperbole was just a matter of ignorance would be grossly 
reductive. 
Two main ways of interpreting the initiative can be seen as playing a major role in 
convincing politicians as well as the press and the Bolognese public opinion to welcome 
Iperbole. The first is the construction of the image of cyberspace as the alternative, left- 
wing medium that could contrast the predominance of centre-right wing use of 
television. The second is the need for administrative transparency, being promoted by 
central government. 
6.4.1 CYBERSPACE VS TELEVISION, THE NEW FRONTIER OF THE 
LEFT WINGERS 
As we saw before, Iperbole was bom in 1994. This was a very special year for 
Italian politics. General elections were held in March, and this was the first time in 
which two major coalitions were going to face themselves. A change in the electoral 
law, after a national referendum held the previous year, had ruled out 'pure' 
proportional representation, and meant that parties had to form coalitions to be able to 
compete. Together with this, another major change had occurred: the phenomenon 
known in Italy as 'Tangentopoli', that is a chain of scandals and prosecutions for 
bribing major political characters, mainly belonging to the two ruling parties of 
Democrazia Cristiana (Christian Democrats) and the Partito Socialista (Socialist Party). 
Tangentopoli's main effect, in political terms, had been the total apparent annihilation 
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of these two parties and the 'displacement' of a vast number of voters, who had ended 
up lacking their previous references. This situation generated another crucial event: the 
establishment of a new party called 'Forza Italia', placing itself in the centre-right area 
of Italian politics, trying to fill the gap left by the demise of DC and PSI. Forza Italia 
was created and led by Silvio Berlusconi, a well known media, housing and financial 
tycoon who had previously supported Bettino Craxi's Socialist Party. The elections of 
March 1994 were indeed won by the right-wing coalition led by Berlusconi, who had 
managed to offer a convincing alternative to many former Christian Democrats as well 
as Socialist voters. He was boldly presenting himself as the ultimate defender of 
freedom against the alleged risk of a Communist drift, as well as promoting a series of 
neo-liberal, Thatcherite policies. 
The involvement of Berlusconi in Italian politics immediately provoked strong 
criticism from the left wing parties and, in particular, the former Communist Party now 
called Partito Democratico della Sinistra (Left-wing Democratic Party). The fact that 
Berlusconi, among his businesses, owned the three biggest private terrestrial television 
networks in Italy, was seen by his opposition as an extremely dangerous situation, in 
which the right-wing coalition could produce a phenomenal amount of propaganda and 
advertising for free. Indeed this had been, according to the PDS and its allies, the factor 
that had made the difference in the elections, together with the improper public use of 
surveys and statistics by Forza Italia, to justify its policies and programmes. Berlusconi 
was certainly surrounded by extremely good professionals who were able to exploit 
television and uni-directional communication. The use of this became more evident, 
fulfilling the fears of the left-wing opposition, when the Polo delle Liberta (Freedom 
Coalition), the coalition led by Berlusconi, got into power. Their win meant that, as the 
ruling government, Berlusconi and his allies could also exert power over the state- 
owned television network, RAI, by nominating its managers and news directors. 
It is not within the scope of this thesis to investigate these events in-depth, or to 
construct a critical analysis of the use of Italian television in 1994. However, the context 
set up by these events clearly shows how the left-wing parties came to be extremely 
sensitive about the political use of the media, perceiving a situation in which the most 
powerful, uni-directional medium of national television was being misused to their 
disadvantage. According to left-wing leaders, voters were being cheated by Berlusconi's 
propaganda machine, and television was showing more than ever how unreliable and 
anti-democratic an instrument it could easily become. 
167 
Chapter 6- lperbole: an Italian council takes the initiative 
Within this context, computer mediated communication and the rise of the 
Internet could easily be seen as some kind of fascinating alternative to the power of 
television in Italy. Moreover, whilst the perception was that the battle for television had 
already been lost to Berlusconi, telematics were still a pretty unexplored and virgin 
territory. Finally, computer networking was something that had been developed locally 
in other countries, such as the TreeNet' experiments in the US, and that was going to 
be developed locally in Italy as well. lperbole therefore came at the right moment, and 
could be interpreted in a very positive way by Bologna's mayor and its allies: an 
initiative by a progressive left-wing dominated local government that was going to 
show the way to innovative communication and democracy. 
Stefano Bonaga, as the municipality's 'assessore alle innovazioni istituzionali' 
(Institutional Innovations Secretary) and the official advisor to the mayor on these 
matters, could therefore successfully promote an interpretation of Iperbole as the new 
frontier of the local exercise of democracy. It is also understandable why he and the rest 
of the Iperbole team put a very strong emphasis on the need for universal service 
identifying the Council as the only entity able to grant access to all. Within this 
interpretation of the initiative and the reality that was surrounding it, only a publicly- 
owned network could guarantee genuine and reliable communication, which television 
had already betrayed. 
The major left-wing oriented newspapers would contribute to this vision of a 
(good' use of new media by Bologna. L'Unita, the official and well respected national 
newspaper of the PDS wrote: 
"The politicians have talked of electronic democracy (a EC 
funded project is being set up in Bologna that will allow 
experiment with telematics surveying and referenda) and of the 
importance of a democratic government of IT A warning 
against widespread berlusconism " (Visani, 1994) 
La Repubblica, the second most widely read newspaper in Italy, made use of 
similar arguments to launch a frontal attack against Berlusconi. An article of 1994 
(Smargiassi, 1994) used the news about the Bologna experiment to criticise the right- 
wing government every few lines. Another one drew an Orwellian scenario by stating 
that 
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"Against the risk of a Berlusconian Big Brother, the centre-left 
mayors put many little computers. From the political point of 
view this is called "teledemocracy'. It is not a uni-dimensional 
communication, from the top to the people, but the ability to 
dialogue'-'(La Repubblica, 1994) 
In his interview, three years after Iperbole's birth, Maurio Matteuzzi plainly 
acknowledged that the use of this paradigm was one of the main reasons for lperbole's 
early success. He stated: 
"In that particular moment [during Berlusconi's government] 
everybody was talking about information monopolies, and the 
paradigm of bi-directional communication was opposed to 
television. This gave Iperbole a political character that went 
well beyond our initial intentions. If the initiative was proposed 
now, it would be very unlikely to have the same effect 
(Matteuzzi, 1997). 
The ever-present hyperbole about quick diffusion of new technologies was also 
reinforcing the paradigm of 1perbole as an innovative tool for democracy that was 
_inevitably 
going to beat the arrogance of television-based communication. L'Unith had 
no doubts affirming that "Within one or two years the way to be a citizen will be 
completely changed by ownership of computers and modems. These are now expensive 
devices, but tomorrow they will be like our homes' doorphones" (Curati, 1995). 
6.4.2 COMPUTERS AND BUREAUCRATS: THE CHALLENGE OF 
'ADMINISTRATIVE TRANSPARENCY' 
Another important, different 'selling factor' for 1perbole stemmed from the need 
for more transparency in the way public administrations worked. As Alessandro 
Rovinetti explained in his interview, the 1990's saw the beginning of a new concern for 
facilitating communications between public administration and the citizens (Rovinetti, 
1997). In a country like Italy, traditionally strangled by long and over-complicated 
bureaucratic processes, being able to make things easier and above all clearer for the 
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citizens was - and indeed still is - perceived as an absolute priority for the renovation 
and regeneration of the country itself. 
Computers started to be seen as the fundamental tool to transform bureaucracy 
and the relationships between administrations and people. Thanks to the hype 
dominating the debates about the potential of Information and Communication 
Technology, civic networking experiments such as Iperbole were seen as something that 
was going to re-define what being a citizens could mean. The power of the Internet was 
seen as something that was going to make it inevitable that the Council would change 
and improve, since using the civic network and ICTs in general was going to empower 
people and make them more aware, better informed, more critical, and more politically 
active. Rovinetti, talking about the difficulties of the bureaucratic machine to adapt to 
the speed of electronic communication, defined the problem as "a complex organisation 
[the City Council] that now has to respond to an extremely exigent telematics elite" 
(Rovinetti, 1997). 
In particular in 1996, after the fall of Berlusconi's government and the 
appointment of Romano Prodi as the new PM, Franco Bassanini, a PDS member who 
had just become Ministro della Funzione Pubblica. (Minister of Public Affairs), started 
issuing directives and laws to try and make bureaucracy faster and more accessible. 
Bassanini's team included, certainly not by chance, the Bolognese Rovinetti. In the 
following years Bassanini and his team developed the idea of a national network for 
public administration, deriving the idea from the experimental local civic networks like 
Iperbole. This would give further momentum and motivation to people like Rovinetti, 
and part of the bureaucratic Bolognese machine, as himself noted in 1997: 
"Sooner or later our network will 'come across' the Public 
Administration Unitary Network. This project is being taken 
forward at national level, and the Unitary Network will try and 
integrate itseýrwith the pre-e-xisting local networks. Those cities 
that will already have such initiatives will then have a clear 
advantage respect to those that have been waitingfor directives 
and intervention from central government" (Rovinetti, 1997). 
Already Iperbole was proving to be a successful project in the administrative 
arena. As stated in a report at the end of 1996: 
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"IperbolelCityCard system has been selected as infrastructure 
for the 'Polyfunctional services in accessing the Public 
Administration', a national project promoted by the Ministry of 
Public Affairs to co-ordinate the activities of different parts of 
the Public Administration in making available updated 
information and services to the citizens through the Internet 
(Bellagamba and Guidi, 1996) 
6.4.3 BOLOGNA IN THE LEAD 
As ever, Bologna was strongly promoting its image of innovative, creative local 
authority within Italy as well as the rest of Europe. Of course Iperbole was not just an 
initiative that was allegedly going to promote democracy, public participation and 
administrative transparency. It was above all the first to do so supported directly by a 
municipality. The most direct Italian 'competitor' of the Bolognese network was at that 
moment what was happening in Milan with the 'Rete Civica Milanese' (RCM). But 
RCM was an experiment launched and run by the Computing Science department of 
Milan University, and it was not directly promoted by the City Council. In the rest of 
Europe other experiments had been going on, and in particular Amsterdam DDS was by 
far the most famous of all, but DDS itself had been funded with public money for a 
limited amount of time, and it had been managed by a private, although non-profit, 
company. 
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Figure 6.6 - The lperbole home page 
Therefore, Bologna City Council was going to be regarded yet again as the most 
innovative and progressive municipality of Italy, and definitely one of the best of 
Europe as well. The involvement in CityCard had also resulted in Bologna joining tile 
EC 'Telecities' programme as one of the founder cities. All of this had a political 
weight that went well beyond the local dimension. Bologna had been, since tile end of 
the War, a stronghold of the left wing, and it was going to prove again how skilled and 
full of good ideas left wing administrators were. So, when the former mayor Renzo 
imbem resigned in 1993 to become a MEP, from his new position lie kept facilitating 
the development of CityCard, shortly to become 1perbole. The new mayor Vitali 
immediately embraced the still embryonic initiative and embedded it in Ills policy 
programme (Guidi, 1997). Vitali had to 'validate' himself relatively quickly as a worth 
successor of the extremely popular Imbeni, as in 1995 new local elections were going to 
be held, under an electoral system asking citizens to give direct indication of tile person 
to become mayor. 
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Being first meant, among other things, that at least in the short and medium term 
the project would have been economically viable thanks to the funding coming from the 
European Commission. Matteuzzi estimated that by 1997 CityCard/Iperbole had cost 
the Council about I billion liras, but that 70% of this money had come from the outside 
as EC funds (Matteuzzi, 1997). 
6.4.4 ENCOUNTERING A WEAK RESISTANCE 
These characteristics of low-cost initiative that was going to win several 
international awards, within a general climate in which criticising telematics 
innovations would have looked like trying to stop an unstoppable progress, are probably 
reasons for an almost non-existent political opposition to the project. Criticising 
Iperbole would have been unpopular per se. All major interviewees provided similar 
information about weak opposition to 1perbole among local politicians and within 
Council sessions. Guidi said that only a few enquiries and criticisms from local 
politicians were generated, and that the answers provided by the 1perbole management 
team always ended up being satisfactory enough (Guidi, 1997). 
However, as we will see better in the next sections of this chapter, weak 
opposition came at a price that could be regarded as extremely high, as something 
directly jeopardising the spirit of the initiative itself. making 1perbole as neutral and free 
from conflict as it could be, in other words, influencing its contents and limiting 
political confrontation to a bare minimum. 
Therefore, the only serious attacks to the initiative were going to come from local 
Internet providers, as we will see better in the section dealing with the end-users and the 
strategies to 'enrol' them. 
6.5 TRYING TO CONSTRUCT PUBLIC CYBERSPACE 
We have already seen how its promoters as well as a mostly friendly press 
described the potential of CityCard/Iperbole. Communication and participation were 
presented as the main benefits that would revolutionise the way local democracy was 
practised and achieved. When asked about Iperbole's potential to be a parallel, 
enhanced type of 'public space' for Bologna, Guidi, Bonaga and Mateuzzi all agreed 
that indeed this was the main purpose and merit of such an initiative. Matteuzzi for 
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instance spoke of "electronic citizenry involving communication" adding that "as we 
used to speak of rights to mobility, now we have to address these new rights" 
(Matteuzzi, 1997). Guidi defined Iperbole as "much more than having another local 
newspaper: Iperbole is having a shared space" (Guidi, 1997). Constant reference to the 
potential of Iperbole for supporting the enhancement of public discourse could be found 
in the literature as well. Stefano RodotA, a well-respected left-wing politician had 
already praised CityCard in 1993 by saying that "good use of these technologies could 
allow an increased involvement of the citizens in decision-making and design 
processes" (Marcoaldi, 1993). 
Both aspects of communication among citizens as well as communication 
between citizens and the local administration were highlighted as crucial components of 
a refreshed public participation to be achieved in the city. In 1995 Bonaga declared his 
commitment in the newspaper La Repubblica, by claiming that "The Bolognesi 
connected to the network will be able to write directly to the mayor: a virtual mailbox 
will allow them to dialogue with mayor Vitali" (Sarti, 1995). Still in 1995, in the 
official documentation for the European Community about CityCard (although locally 
the project had already become Iperbole) a great emphasis was put on the function of 
public debate areas called discussion groups, or 'newsgroups', from the name this 
technology has in the wider Internet. The document argues that 
"There is still more democratic promise to CityCard because it 
will be designed to enable citizens to discuss issues among 
themselves and to pass on proposed solutions to local problems. 
Discussion groups will even have the facility to produce edited 
documentsfor passing to the authorities " (ISPO EC, 1995). 
Indeed Iperbole had achieved much in terms of number of users and the amount of 
information provided on the network by the end of 1996. A growing number of citizens 
was getting connected, and the 7000 households of end of '96 were expected to double 
by the end of 1997 (Guidi, 1997). We will see later in the chapter how these figures 
were not just met, but increased further in the following months and years. This unique 
result was mainly achieved thanks to a policy aiming to establish universal access by 
subsidising households' Internet connections, as we will see better in the section 
regarding the promotion of usage. At the same time all sorts of organisations based in 
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Bologna were taking advantage of the free availability of space on the Council's World 
Wide Web server, becoming in fact information providers themselves, and contributing 
to increasing the complexity - and usefulness - of the civic network. At the beginning 
of 1997 these autonomous 'information providers' producing Web pages were about 
460. Bonaga noted how "the capacity for producing information by the citizens should 
not be underestimated, if we think of comparing this with a more 'traditional' situation 
in which the Council would produce information and the citizens would just consume 
it" (Bonaga, 1997). In general the offer of Web spaces to organisations was going to 
turn out as a very beneficial move. For instance, Giovanni Pesce, responsible for an 
voluntary organisation called AICE, assisting people suffering from epilepsy, claimed 
that 
"AICE has built on the Web a directory of social and health 
services for disabled people. Sometimes, by offering this 
publishing chance, the Council acquires information that it 
would be already supposed to have. So, through this initiative, 
we help each other" (Pesce, 1997). 
On the discussion groups side, many areas for debate had been set up, well over 
30 in 1997. These groups, initially open to Iperbole's members only, were then made 
available to people connected through other Internet providers, as it was noted that 
Bolognesi had the right to access the Net through the provider they preferred, still being 
able to participate in the discussions. The groups' topics were extremely diverse, 
ranging from discussions about local political and planning-related issues to more light- 
hearted areas about jokes, sports or a sort of a virtual car-boot sale. 
Despite these good starting points, though, it cannot be said that the establishment 
of an electronic space - or a series of spaces - supporting public discourse within the 
city was going to be an absolute success. Three main reasons can be identified, that 
were going to limit considerably the practical potential for 1perbole to be a powerful 
tool for enhancing the public sphere of Bologna: 
The limits imposed by the Council to freedom of speech and participation 
The difficulties for the bureaucrats and personalities to adapt to a totally 
new way of dealing with the public 
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The endemic, technology-independent public participation problems that 
could not just be 'fixed' by introducing a new piece of technology 
6.5.1 SANITISING THE PUBLIC ARENA 
The first and probably more crucial obstacle to the establishment of a fully 
participative cyber-space came from the way lperbole was regulated from its very birth. 
We have already mentioned that the ability of the initiative to start and flourish enjoying 
a pretty weak political opposition had come at a price. Although this could have been 
necessary in the delicate political environment of 1994 and 1995 in Italy, the fact that 
lperbole was regulated to be as neutral and conflict-free a space as possible, was 
inevitably going to limit its effectiveness. Iperbole was going to be a not too interesting 
arena from the point of view of political and social discourse. 
For the project to be acceptable and shielded from political criticisms it had to rule 
out any form of propaganda and ideological statement. In practice it had to leave 
politics and activism out. It could of course have been conceived as a totally free arena. 
Leaving this space totally open for expression of whatever political position, however, 
would have contradicted the efforts that were being made at national level to limit 
Berlusconi's media's power in the public arena. Regulation was seen as paramount and, 
in absence of rules on 1perbole generated by the local politicians, the management team 
lead by Bonaga chose to put rigid limits on what could and could not be hosted by the 
civic network. 
The management team of course was aware of the problems this was going to 
create. The discussion areas were left uncensored and non-moderated, but the ability to 
publish on Web pages was heavily regulated. Leda Guidi, talking about what was 
allowed in the 'public space' of 1perbole claimed that 
"Information coming from the various users should have 
ýpublic' and 'generic' characteristics, and here lies the 
problem. Keeping ideology out is a very complicated matter, 
and it is a constant struggle trying to regulate what type of 
information can be acceptedfrom cultural associations, trade 
unions, parties and interest groups that have some kind of 
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ideological or political character. These groups can generate 
problems" (Guidi, 199 7). 
Moreover, the users allowed to publish on Iperbole were only organised groups, 
while individuals could not obtain a Web space. In 1996 Bonaga announced in the 
newspaper L'Unith that no political campaign was allowed within the civic network, 
defining any kind of declaration of support for candidates and political advertising as 
"an improper use of the civic network7' (Sarti, 1996). These activities, however, would 
have been perfectly normal in traditional public space. 
This contradiction between the democratic participatory purposes of the project 
claimed by Bonaga and the others, and the level of political 'censorship' that was in fact 
put in practice, seemed to be a major problem of the whole initiative. Indeed, it could be 
one of the reasons that lead Bonaga to eventual resign from his advisory position and 
exiting the Iperbole scene. Although Bonaga would not speak directly about this, Guidi 
said that he had tried to overcome this situation, by suggesting that all who wanted to 
have an 'ideological' space on the network should apply for this with the Municipal 
Council, thus forcing local politicians and decision-makers to regulate this aspect. He 
had also proposed allocating 2 Mb of Web space to each applicant, declaring these sites 
as self-managed and allowing anything to be published on them that would not be either 
illegal or politically incorrect (Guidi, 1997). But the Council did not bother facing the 
problem. The initial emphasis on the project as an electronic democracy initiative was 
starting to fade somehow, as we will see better in the section about the stabilisation of 
Iperbole, and probably the mayor and his colleagues preferred not to take risks. 
Guidi, however, was very explicit in her interview about the non-sustainability of 
a censored public arena: 
"We cannot keep the situation as it is, and it does not make any 
sense either. It is clear that we had to begin in this way, or it 
would have been hellish and unmanageable. But we have learnt 
a lot now, and we should really give ourselves a 'light' 
regulation to be offered to our 460 associations " (Guidi, 1997). 
In general, the impossibility of publishing about sensitive issues certainly 
contributed to weaken Iperbole's initial role as a public space and an effective 
enhancement of Bologna's public sphere. Although debate areas were never censored, 
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according to Guidi, it can be argued that it would not have been easy to get involved in 
open discussion of issues that could not be properly explained and publicised on the 
civic network. 
6.5.2 WOULD YOU PLEASE REPLY? &NETWORKS AND OLD 
PRACTICE 
One of Iperbole's main objectives was, as we have seen, to enhance 
communication between citizens and public administration. This was expected to bring 
two connected main benefits: the first was to increase the influence of citizens and 
groups over the decision-making processes within the city. The second was to improve 
administrative transparency, so that anybody could access quickly and clearly any 
relevant infori-nation, as well as being able to make inquiries of the right offices and 
people. E-mail messages were expected to be the main tool to achieve these goals, 
together with the 'advisory' role of the information to be found in public discussion 
areas. 
Some very interesting and original efforts were made on the software 
development side to make communication between the public and the Council work. 
The most notable of these technological devices was probably the message routing 
system, which was very much appreciated by the users in a survey carried out in 1996 
(Bellagamba and Guidi, 1996). Message routing meant that citizens trying to speak to 
the Council about some kind of problem were not required to know in advance who to 
speak with. Through an electronic 'form' on Iperbole any kind of query could be made 
'to the Council'. The software, then, through matching the contents of the message with 
the contents of a keyword matrix, would find the right office or person to address the 
query to. This effort was the result of a six months preliminary study carried out on six 
European cities of the same size as Bologna. Matteuzzi explained that 
"the result of our analysis was that the primary need of citizens 
was not to have to understand the administration's complexity. 
This kind of difficulty was typically discouraging the citizen 
from talking to the Council" He also added that "the system 
analysing the content of messages was constantly being refined, 
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though it had already reached an 85% accuracy" (Matteuzzi, 
1997). 
So, citizens could easily write to the Council about all sorts of issues, engage in 
debates and send electronic messages directly to a series of selected personalities, such 
as the mayor, whose e-mail addresses were published on the Iperbole Website. And 
indeed some of them started doing so, making the electronic arena potentially alive. 
The main problem was notably on the other side. Rovinetti, as a deep connoisseur 
of the municipal machine, talked openly about the resistance to the initiative being 
experienced within the Council: 
"The Italian experience in terms of communication with citizens 
stems from situations in which the public administration could 
eitherfail to dialogue at all or be tempted to make propaganda. 
Only in the 90's we have started thinking about transparent 
communication as a service to offer. And this implies a re- 
organisation of the way the administration works. Resistance is 
widespread but hidden. Nobody would openly disagree". And he 
added that injact "Citizens write to the mayor and after a while 
start asking: 'why does not he reply? "' (Rovinetti, 1997). 
Leda Guidi highlighted the fact that changing the traditional slowness of Italian 
municipalities was going to be a long process: 
"People are used to the rule that letters have to answered within 
30 days, but replying to an e-mail message after a month 
obviously does not make sense. This organisation is a slow and 
complex 'dinosaur' of 5000 people, and now it has to deal with 
an extremely exigent telematics elite" (Guidi, 199 7). 
However, a certain resistance within the system was quite evident. Carla Brezzo, a 
user of Iperbole, coordinator of a non-profit cultural association called 'Spazio Alato', 
confirmed that council officers she had to deal with had explicitly advised her to refrain 
from using email to send them documents and queries, and to use traditional letters 
instead (Brezzo, 1997). Despite some Internet training was being offered by the Iperbole 
team to Council officers, the level of refusal to take part in the initiative was still high. 
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Gabriele Bollini, a planner contracted by the Council in a management position, 
claimed that 
"Iperbole is used much more by the people connected from 
outside than by the Council workers. Nobody inside here uses 
the email, even secretaries cannot do it. I personally end up 
downloading electronic mail, making hardcopies of the 
messages and bringing them to the councillors involved. This is 
the situation we are in " (Bollini, 1997). 
The management team was acting in two directions to try and cope with this 
difficulty: providing training and developing further software tools conceived to 
encourage, if not force, the officers to reply to e-mails. For instance, a piece of software 
was developed that would check whether messages had been replied within a few days, 
and, if not, would notify the Iperbole management team, as well as automatically 
sending messages to the faulty office, urging them to reply (Guidi, 1997). 
Matteuzzi acknowledged another related problem. He explained that, together 
with the non-moderated discussion groups, some more 'high profile' forums had been 
meant to exist, in which important personalities, such as local politicians and 
intellectuals, would be involved. Matteuzzi regretted that this part of the initiative had 
gone nowhere, as it could have been a crucial stimulus for public debate and 
participation. He gave the example of Umberto Eco as one of these Bolognese 
personalities who could have been convinced to be more active and write sometimes in 
these debate areas. 
This general lack of feedback and true two-way communication and exchange of 
ideas was certainly another factor limiting the effectiveness of lperbole as a space for 
public discourse. Even the discussion areas, which were supposed to be the main 
participative tool of the civic network, were going to lose part of their power, as we will 
see in the next section. 
6.5.3 THE FAILURE OF TECHNOLOGICAL FIXES TO PUBLIC 
PARTICIPATION 
Because of its left-wing, partisan and anti-fascist legacy, as well as its tradition of 
post-War administrative efficiency, Bologna is considered by most Italians, and by the 
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Bolognese people themselves, as a model of local democracy and participation. Indeed, 
Bologna and its region are the domain of Italian co-operatives, and citizens have a 
tradition of establishing associations of all kinds. 
But this characteristic of many active citizens who take part in the social and 
political life of the city may have been taken for granted for too long. Bollini had 
something to say about this in his interview: 
"As in many other places, in Bologna the number of 'users' in 
increasing, while the number of 'citizens' is decreasing. I am 
notfrom here, but the Bolognesi claim that the city has changed 
a lot ( .. ) Whenever we hold meetings in the neighbourhoods to 
involve local people in planning debate, we get greatly 
disappointed. Just about twenty people turn up, and they tend to 
be those elderly persons who were already used to participate 
twenty years ago. Here many take for granted that because 
Bologna is a 'democratic' city, then it is going to beforever as 
such. In the meantime, the recent referenda have been deserted" 
(Bollini, 1997). 
It could be argued that a system like Iperbole had a potential to enhance public 
participation by providing, for instance, asyncronous communication - that is not 
having to be in the same place and at the same time to communicate - through the 
availability of e-mail and discussion groups. As contemporary lifestyles mean that it 
would not be easy for working, busy people to attend certain meetings, electronic 
communication could help. Also, the ability for the Council to publish, virtually in real- 
time, information about all sorts of issues, can be seen as another crucial advantage, and 
a facilitating factor, for an improved public participation. 
However, there is no evidence that this was actually being achieved in Bologna. 
Indeed, there is evidence to show that Iperbole, three and more years after its 
establishment, had very little influence, if any at all, over the decision-making processes 
in the city. 
The previous quotation from Bollini's interview has a reference to referenda. 
These had been held on the 3 I't of January 1997 and dealt with two important issues for 
the city. The first issue was about the privatisation of municipal pharmacies, while the 
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second dealt with the design and location of the new railway station for Bologna. 
Iperbole was put in the centre of this event, as stated in the report on CityCard of the 
end 1996: 
"It is news of the past few days that the Municipality has 
decided to use the IperbolelCityCard system as the preferred 
way to give citizens information on two big issues of political 
and administrative life of the city, that in few weeks will be 
arguments of popular referenda for all the inhabitants of 
Bologna: the decisions about the future management of the 
municipal chemists'shops and that on the new railway station 
designed by architect Bofill " (Bellagamba and Guidi, 1996). 
1perbole was going to be the main information and promotion tool for the 
referenda, although voting was not going to be electronic, and people had to physically 
go to poll stations. 
Anyway, this attempt to introduce a sort of a technological 'fix' to the problems 
of participation did not work particularly well, or at least did not seem to improve the 
situation. As Bollini was mentioning, the two referenda had to be invalidated because - 
as prescribed by Italian law - the minimum 50% of voters had not been reached. In fact 
only a disappointing 35.96% of people had decided to cast their vote (La Stampa, 1997). 
Moreover, the lack of early success of Iperbole was going to generate a sort of a 
4vicious circle' effect. Many officers within the Council were going to find it perfectly 
justifiable to ignore even more what was being said within Iperbole, as users were seen 
to be few, scarcely representative and, above all, they seemed not able to provide 
quality participation and more intent in e-mailing jokes on the system rather than to 
make interesting statements on city management. In fact Matteuzzi noted that "The 
messages in the newsgroups always come from the same few people" (Matteuzzi, 1997) 
and Bollini remarked that many administrators stated that, as Iperbole was an elite 
thing, they should not waste time and resources creating things for the Internet (Bollini, 
1997). 
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Figure 6.7 - The Newsgroups page in the early lperbole 
Even Rovinetti, a member of lperbole's management tearn, admitted that, due to 
the poor contents of the discussion groups, these were rarely taken into account or used 
to improve the way the Council worked (Rovinetti, 1997). 
Indeed, observation carried out by the author two years later, in March 1999, 
confirnied that the discussion groups that were really active and utilised were the leisure 
and entertainment-oriented ones, while very little debate was going on about local 
politics, transport and general social and municipal issues. During a 12-days posting 
span, 
"the most success d discussion areas were " kes' with 110 . 
fi jo 
messages, '2 ... 1 hand' with 107 messages, and 'computers' with 
75 messages. On the other hand, 'multiethnic' had only 2 non- 
relevant messages, 'euro-citizens' had 3, and 'politics' had 8, 
just to mention aftit, " (Aurigi, 2000: 39-40) 
llov,, ever, this does not mean that lperbole could not have a role at all in 
enhancing public participation. The issue seerns to be that, as suggested by MIMI, the 
civic network should have been "one of the tools" within a much more complex set of 
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co-ordinated actions and initiatives towards revitalising a reducing participation 
(Bollini, 1997). Expecting the civic network to represent a strategy per se, within a 
fragmented set of actions and intentions within the municipality, and with still a quite 
limited amount of capable Internet users, had been a flawed approach. 
Roberto Grandi, the local politician in charge of the office for Culture within the 
city, confirmed this assessment. As an important newcomer to the project towards the 
end of 1996, Grandi acknowledged that 1perbole was not having a notable political and 
social relevance, as "it does not have the possibility to affect the decision-making 
processes, and the process itself does not take its existence into account" (Grandi, 
1997). To improve the situation, he was envisaging an inclusive process that would 
enlarge the number of subjects related to civic problems, present on the network, so that 
a certain pressure could be built to influence decisions (Grandi, 1997). 
6.6 INTEGRATING PHYSICAL AND VIRTUAL: IPERBOLE AND 
THE PLANNING OF BOLOGNA 
As a consequence of what we have just seen about the difficulties in establishing 
Iperbole as a public participation and public discourse environment, not much can be 
said about the civic network's influence over the planning of Bologna. Although some 
offices were starting to publish some transport-related information on the system, these 
early efforts tended to be limited to the uploading of existing, static text documents 
(Bollini, 1997). 
Gabriele Bollini had been introduced by Leda Guidi as possibly the most 
knowledgeable and passionate user of Iperbole among town planners within the 
Council, and he provided most of the little information available about the way that 
planners of the 'real' city were dealing with the electronic city. Bollini claimed that 
most of the Planning department in Bologna was totally ignoring Iperbole and heavily 
criticised some of colleagues, arguing that not just the civic network, but any initiative 
geared towards participation was going to be seen as a nuisance. He said that "very 
often planners here regard questions and queries from people as a useless obstacle to the 
planners' own knowledge and expertise" (Bollini, 1997). Bollini had several ideas 
which he would have liked to develop within Iperbole, such as the establishment of an 
environmental Geographical Information System (GIS) and the management of 
discussion groups. He had also worked personally on the electronic information of the 
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environmental impact of the new proposed railNvay station, and despite the poor results 
of the related referenclurn, he Nvas still seeing a possible important role for lperbole. 
Although he was the first to acknowledge the limited interest of the general public 
in local policy-related issues, what he seemed to feel as the main problem was not tile 
attitude of the citizens/users of the civic network. He pointed several times his finger 
towards tile institution itself and the fact that, as Grandi himself had mentioned, more 
efforts had to be made to involve a large number of local actors, as well as providing 
more services and information for them. He claimed that within a perspective of 
combined efforts to enhance participation "Iperbole would have been ideal, even if just 
one of tile tools available" (Bollim, 1997). Still related to this general issue, Bollitil told 
of his own disappointing experience with a discussion group lie had set up. Although 
seemingly very open and democratic, non-moderated discussion areas elided up being 
chaotic and dominated by a few protesters, he argued. Moderated and structured 
discussion would have been more useful, but this of course implied more work and 
resources for the moderation to be allocated (Bollini, 1997), and the impression was that 
these were lacking and the Council was not going to invest in them. 
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In general, then, we can link these observations with what has been said about the 
establishment of public cyberspace and the related obstacles. The difficulties for the 
Council machine to adapt and validate its own public communication system, and the 
consequent lack of a true two-way exchange between citizens and decision-makers were 
heavily affecting the way the general public was going to 'adopt' the system. 
6.7 IPERBOLE, LOCAL ECONOMYAND THE GLOBAL-LOCAL 
TENSION 
How was Iperbole's relation with Bologna's local economy and its development? 
Were local small and medium enterprises going to get a series of benefits from the civic 
network? 
Local economic development, although not central in the initial agenda, was 
nevertheless a purpose that had been considered for Iperbole, especially by mayor 
Walter Vitali in his 1994 campaign towards the local elections of '95 (Russo, 1994). 
But electioneering claims apart, it has to be noted that, in respect to the main tele- 
democracy related aims, the relationship of the initiative with the economy had not been 
planned carefully enough. The main expectation and plan about using 1perbole to help 
enterprises in Bologna had initially involved the trade associations in the area. Trade 
associations were offered a presence on the civic network's Website as well as free 
Internet and e-mail accounts. Leda Guidi claimed that "in our plans the trade 
associations had to be the promoting and 'multiplying' element to demonstrate what 
could be done on the Internet by small and medium enterprises, traders, craftsmen, 
builders and so on" (Guidi, 1997). 
At the same time, single enterprises were offered alternative Internet services and 
presence by CINECA on its 'Nettuno' network, but these were charged for, apart from a 
three-day free introduction course. Moreover, individual firms were literally kept out of 
the digital city, on the grounds that, as had happened with ideology and political 
propaganda, Iperbole had to be kept 'pure' and uncontaminated by profit-making 
initiatives (Matteuzzi, 1997). Although Matteuzzi claimed that about 250 local firms 
had decided to apply for the CINECA account, it can be argued that the missing link 
between them and the digital city was in fact leaving them somehow 'invisible'. 
Certainly 1perbole was not able to facilitate the promotion of these firms' commercial 
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activities, either locally or globally, as it could have done by hosting or at least 'linking' 
from the city site to their own sites. 
As any kind of commercial activity was off-limits in Iperbole, non-profit 
organisation, hosted on the system, that wanted to use the network to sell services and 
create new opportunities for growth, could not do it. Carla Brezzo of 'Spazio Alato' 
said: 
"We would like to widen the range of courses that we offer. 
Together with the photography, music and theatre courses we 
had thought to exploit our Jperbole account to offer Internet 
coursesfor children. A theatre asking to make their Web site has 
also contacted us. The Internet allows us to be visible and to get 
known, but the Council shouldfind a goodjustification to let us 
use Jperbole for business, as we are, after all, a non-profit 
association" (Brezzo, 1997). 
Roberto Grandi also had plans and ideas about economic regeneration initiatives 
involving cultural enterprises, that required some changes in Iperbole's closure policies. 
He claimed: 
"We should invest in culture. I am not just talking about the 
computer literac initiatives that are being carried out. I am y 
talking about a new kind of entrepreneurship that would be able 
to exploit this civic network, cultural and multimedia 
entrepreneurs (Grandi, 1997). 
Another project, this time generated by the Council itself, and called 'Million', 
aimed at putting Bologna's hotels and tourist enterprises on the Internet and offering 
electronic booking services to those who were coming to the city. It was, according to 
Guidi, a difficult project to start, as many hotel owners were very diffident about the 
idea of putting data about themselves and their businesses on the Internet. However, 
even Million could not be hosted directly by Iperbole, and the site had to reside in 
Omega Generation's server, though a link from the Council pages existed in this case. 
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As for the case of 'political' publishing, an official decision from the Council and 
its politicians about letting firms in was still awaited. Matteuzzi was quite clear about 
this, saying that 
"Projects such as Million are not to be considered part of 
1perbole. These are value-added services involving economic 
transactions, and the fact that the civic network can host 
charged services has not been decided by any politician" 
(Matteuzzi, 1997). 
Indeed, other pressures not to open the civic network for business use were being 
put by the local Internet providers, and first of all by CINECA. As Lanzarini candidly 
admitted: 
"It is not up to ourselves to decide whether commercial 
enterprises should have a presence in the digital city, to access 
lperbole's users. However, we and the other providers offer 
commercial services, and the Council should be careful and 
aware ofthis " (Lanzarini, 1997). 
At the same time, the official plan to involve the trade associations as a catalyst 
was clearly failing, as response was limited: 
"Participation of trade associations has been disappointing 
compared with what we expected. At the beginning we 
organised meetings with their representatives to encourage 
them, but eventually we stopped trying to involve them, after the 
first year of attempts ( ... ). In my opinion the trade associations 
have interpreted the initiative as something that could deprive 
them of their mediation role, with the result of losing 
membership, or at least a certain kind ofpower over members. 
Their members at the moment have to go to the association to 
get useful information and services, while with an Internet tool 
they could get these directly" (Guidi, 199 7). 
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A complex situation had therefore developed. The Council had adopted an 
approach that tended to recognise and involve just those bureaucratic trade associations 
that were supposed to support firms and enterprises. This approach implied that the role 
that the Council could play in local economic development was that of providing 
services and information to firms, but not that of creating markets, promoting these 
firms, or generating chances for business. Or, at least, this was not going to be done 
through the Internet initiative. The recent involvement of another actor, the city 
manager Sante Fermi, as we will see later, was going to reinforce this vision of the 
Council as provider of enhanced bureaucratic services, though the city manager was 
approaching this from a totally different perspective than the original members of the 
management team. Paradoxically, whilst trade associations were to have promoted the 
use of the Internet with their members, the latter and their activities were not allowed on 
the civic network, not even through a series of links. They were expected to 'inhabit' a 
different electronic city from the one that hosted the citizens of Bologna. In real terms 
this could be compared to the Council intentionally banning shops from the streets and 
squares of Bologna, to gather them in an out-of-town shopping mall, with very little 
transport connections to it. 
At the same time, even if the 'traditional' commercial sector was not very 
reactive, Grandi's idea of facilitating the development of new cultural and IT-based 
entrepreneurship, just like the one Carla Brezzo would have liked to embark on, was 
being frustrated. The general ostracism of business and profit from the civic network, as 
well as the subtle opposition of the private Internet Service Providers, including 
CINECA, were preventing a full use of Iperbole for local economic development. 
It can of course be sustained that this attitude could be beneficial because of the 
virtual absence of commodification of the information on the civic network, that was 
supposed to be there for all citizens and not to be 'bought' somehow. It is also true, 
though, that such a radical position was preventing new enterprises from finding a 
welcoming and cheap 'electronic roof' under which to develop, with potential loss of 
benefits, especially for the young population of Bologna. 
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6.8'CONSTRUCTING'THE USERS: STRATEGIES TO ENLIVEN 
IPERBOLE 
All of the themes that have been dealt with so far are of course interrelated, and all 
depended on a crucial factor: the digital city needed 'digital' citizens or, in other words, 
those access related issues that have been mentioned in the literature review had to be 
dealt with. In the case of Iperbole this was even more crucial, as one of the main 
interpretations of the project was the need to allow access to the digital world to 
virtually any citizen: 
"Access to this world [the Internet] is in my opinion a right of a 
new democracy, and therefore has to be granted by the public 
sector. Widening the use of the Internet beyond the initial elites 
was one of the aims of the initiative" (Bonaga, 199 7). 
In 1995 even the former and very popular mayor Renzo Imbeni had published an 
article in La Repubblica arguing how fundamental it was to tailor the information 
society around the needs of the disadvantaged citizens (Imbeni, 1995). This message 
was reinforced by the hyperbole present in many press articles at the time 
CityCard/Iperbole was born. The IT magazine Zerouno, for instance, celebrated the 
conception of the civic network by claiming: "Bologna has opened the way of Internet 
for all" (Bassanetti, 1994). 
But had it? It has to be said that much work and attention in the first three years of 
Iperbole had gone towards the target of encouraging and facilitating access to the civic 
system and the wider Internet to as many citizens as possible. Of the three main issues 
of support to public discourse, economic development, and universal access, the latter 
was surely the one that the management of Iperbole had tried to address most 
proactively. A steep growth of subscriptions to the service had started in the second half 
of 1996, when the 3,000 members of the first two years of life of Iperbole quickly 
became 7,000 by the end of the year and were forecast to double by the end of 1997 to 
14,000 or even 15,000. These results were extremely good in terms of the ability of 
Iperbole to involve citizens. In mid-96 Bonaga had set the target of reaching 10,000 
connections by the end of 1998 (La Repubblica, 1996), and soon after it appeared that 
this figure was to be reached well before that time. Actually, what had been forecast 
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turned out to be slightly over-optimistic, and at the end of 1997 the individual users 
were almost 12,000. This was anyway still beating the target. 
The results of 1perbole in terms of number of connections were therefore pretty 
encouraging. Matteuzzi claimed that, considering those Bolognese people being online 
through other providers, as for instance those students who had university accounts, it 
could be estimated that towards the end of 1997 about 10% of the entire population of 
Bologna would have been using Iperbole and the Internet (Matteuzzi, 1997). Leda Guidi 
also noted that the level of appreciation of the initiative by the users was very high, and 
that everybody felt the issue of facilitating access was very important. In fact, a certain 
amount of participation in the management and growth of the civic network was coming 
from groups of users. Guidi said that: "several users are already collaborating actively, 
editing for instance the 'Frequently Asked Questions', and making themselves available 
to do some voluntary work to train new users" (Guidi, 1997). 
What strategies were employed in Bologna to achieve a number of subscribers 
and users which can be considered a very good result, if compared to other civic 
networking initiatives? And, above all, what problems were encountered and what could 
have been done more or better? As outlined in the literature review, three main issues 
about social access to telematics network have been identified and addressed. The first 
was about countering the negative effects of economic polarisation towards access, and 
something pretty bold for the times was done to deal with this, as described below. The 
second issue was about countering the literacy problems - especially computer literacy 
- to allow more people to use the several IT instruments available. The third issue, 
unfortunately not properly dealt with in Bologna, or at least not subject to any precise 
strategy and planning, was about the polarisation that comes from age and diversity in 
general, and the fact that people could be marginalised - or self-marginalised - by their 
inability to deal with close, homogeneous groups. 
6.8.1 FREE CONNECTIONS ON OFFER 
The Iperbole team, and Bologna City Council as the owner of the civic network, 
decided to attract users and tackle the problems coming from some of the costs involved 
in using the Internet by subsidising Internet connections and placing public access 
computers in the city. 
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Since the very start of the initiative, citizens were allowed to use the civic network 
for free, by dialling up the Council's modems. However, the number of World Wide 
Web sites that they could access was limited to Iperbole and a few other local 
information sources, such as Bologna University Web site. In April 1996, though, it was 
decided to open up the whole Internet to lperbole's subscribers, still keeping the access 
totally free of charge, apart of course for the costs of the telephone calls (Matteuzzi, 
1996; 15). In other words, what happened was that the Council started giving Internet 
accounts for free to any citizen who would apply for one. This was in line with 
Bonaga's thinking, as he had declared just a year before that "With Iperbole, Bologna 
becomes a reference point, as it has decided that access to networks should not be 
affected by the ability to buy a service" (Il Resto del Carlino, 1995). However, this 
would not solve totally the problems related to the costs of network usage, nor did it 
address the costs of buying the necessary equipment. It was anyway certainly a way to 
encourage people who otherwise would have not spent their money to give the new 
medium a try. This has of course to be put in context of 1996, when Internet accounts in 
Italy could cost a minimum of about E150 per year and free deals with private providers 
were still a long way off 
As we have noted already, this was a very successful policy measure, as 
subscriptions increased dramatically and at the beginning of 1997 the waiting list to 
obtain an Iperbole account was as long as one and a half months (Guidi, 1997). 
This situation generated what can be regarded as the most serious opposition to 
the project itself, which rather than coming from local politicians or pressure groups, 
came from the Internet industry. Straight after Iperbole's decision to offer free Internet 
connections, four local Internet Service Providers sued the City Council. They argued 
that CINECA had been chosen as a provider by the municipality without carrying out a 
proper bidding and selection process, and that the recent decision of giving away the 
Internet for free - although Iperbole's sessions had a 30 minutes time limit - was going 
to involve a loss of profits for the private operators. Together with these local and 
relatively small enterprises, two much bigger providers, Agora, linked to the Radical 
Party and Berlusconi's right wing, and Technimedia had begun criticising the Bologna 
initiative for some time. Even if in 1994, when Iperbole was in its very infancy, it had 
immediately appeared to constitute a potential threat to businesses, and its philosophy of 
'Internet for the masses' was under attack (Miccoli, 1994). 
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However, the people managing 1perbole dismissed the attacks as unrealistic. 
Matteuzzi said that 
"Our reply to them is supported by facts. The increase in the 
number ofprivate Internet users [generated by Jperbole] makes 
the whole Internet related market improve rather than decline. 
Injact Bologna, together with Florence, has the highest number 
ofprivate local Internet providers" (Matteuzzi, 1997) 
The left wing oriented press welcomed the decision of the Regional 
Administrative Tribunal (TAR) to reject the complaint as a "revolutionary decision" 
(L'Unita, 1996). 
External opposition apart, the decision to grant free access - or rather subsidised 
access - to the Internet was going to be criticised and reviewed internally as well, as we 
will see in section 6.10. However there is no doubt that this was the main reason behind 
the steep increase in Iperbole's memberships and a factor that surely facilitated usage. 
But apart from their number, who exactly were the users, and who was Iperbole 
targeting? 
6.8.2 IDENTIFYING THE CYBER-CITIZENS 
Membership of 1perbole was, of course, open to all citizens of Bologna, and given 
the objective of universal access of the initiative, no specific groups of people were 
excluded. However, we know already how exclusive the effects of social polarisation, 
as well as differences in education and age, can be when it comes to accessing and 
above all using effectively computer networks. 1perbole was no exception to this. 
A report at the end of 1996 for the EC CityCard project, edited by Federica 
Bellagamba and Leda Guidi, provides a series of interesting figures about who the users 
of the system were. The total numbers were, as we have already mentioned, very 
encouraging: 6,200 individual citizens - and presumably their households - were 
surfing the Internet and using Iperbole together with 60 schools, 370 non-profit 
associations, 65 public administrations, 35 municipalities of Bologna's Metropolitan 
Area, and 125 municipal offices. A year later the individual subscriptions had risen to 
11,720 and the non-profit associations to 490. But the most interesting data came from a 
user validation study carried out by the Iperbole team themselves. Two sets of 
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questionnaires were produced, and answers to these obtained. The first set of responses 
came from people who had chosen to answer the questionnaire directly from the Web, 
on their own initiative. The second set of responses came from a randomly selected 
sample of 200 1perbole members who had been sent a hardcopy of the questionnaire. 
The differences between these two sets of responses give an insight on how polarised 
usage of the system still was, despite the efforts made to facilitate social inclusion by 
subsidising access. 
Of the 200 home-sent questionnaires, only 40 were returned and used to compile 
statistics. Indeed, the home survey seemed to show some promising results in terms of 
reduction of polarisation in the use of telematics networks. Over 20% of respondents 
were women, and 8% of respondents were over 55 years of age. Also, the majority of 
people had relatively low education, as 52.5% were educated to 'medium school' level, 
which in Italy is the minimum legal requirement and stops at 14. In absolute terms a 
ratio of 80% men vs. 20% women obviously cannot be seen as a satisfactory gender 
balance in the use of new technologies. Nevertheless, when put in the context of what 
these kind of initiatives were likely to achieve in the short term, it was indeed a good 
result. 
However, the low response ratio of the home questionnaires - only 20% - and the 
fact that the 'home' respondents often tended to leave many questions about lperbole's 
services and facilities unanswered, as if they had very little knowledge of the system, 
suggests that 'members' were not necessarily frequent 'users'. 
The 'online' respondents, on the other hand, numbered 228. Their gender, age, 
and education distributions showed a very different picture. Among those who filled the 
online questionnaire, in fact, only 9% were women, and half of the respondents were 
aged between 25 and 34. Education levels were also much higher, as 50% of users had a 
'secondary superior' school diploma - equivalent to 'A' levels in the UK - and 35% 
was educated at university degree level. The online questionnaires were filled in much 
more completely, showing that these people had a good knowledge of the civic network, 
as acknowledged by the authors of the report themselves: 
"We can make some observations: people that answer the online 
questionnaire are, on average, younger and generally more 
interested than the people who sent back the compiled 'home 
questionnaire'. Indeed, theyfilled out the spacesfor suggestions 
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more frequently and also made various observations on the 
service, while the 'home users' often did not answer at all ( .. ). 
Obviously, people that use the system and choose to fill the 
online questionnaire are more interested in the system itseIr' 
(Bellagamba and Guidi, 1996). 
The comparison of these two surveys, together with the data about the growth of 
Iperbole since mid 1996, suggest that the offer of free Internet accounts had indeed 
increased the number of households who were manifesting some kind on interest in the 
civic network, but that this initiative alone was certainly not enough to achieve the 
social access goals of Iperbole. It appears that a considerable number of household had 
joined the civic network because it was offered for free, but then had found themselves 
either not able, interested, or welcome to use it. Leda Guidi was fully aware of this 
when she said that 
"Data clearly reveal that a large part of our 7,000 users is 
'sleeping'. This means that many of those who obtained the 
account have used it once, and because they were not able to 
understand what it really was have given up with it. We can see 
this by observing the discussion groups and the traffic in 
general. The fact that 80 modems are enough to let 1perbole 
work is meaningful, as the ratio of 85 people per modem is 
absolutely unrealistic" (Guidi, 199 7). 
It is also evident that the 'traditional' problems of polarisation were not easy to 
overcome, and Bologna's network was still dominated by young, well-educated males, 
just like the whole of the Internet. 
6.8.3 FEW RESOURCES TO DRAW PEOPLE IN 
The Iperbole management team, and Guidi in particular, were very aware of the 
limitations to their ability to involve and include users of all ages and backgrounds, and 
were reflecting upon methods to improve this situation, beyond the free Internet deal. 
Both Guidi and Matteuzzi, for instance had the wish to involve those age groups who 
tended to be more marginalised, such as the elderly and children. The elderly especially 
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could be seen as a very sensible target, considering that this group was already very 
numerous and growing because of an increasingly ageing population in Italy and 
Bologna as well: 
"I have this dream: the elderly. 30% ofBolognese population is 
now over 60, and the elderly people of this area have very 
strong personalities and a proactive attitude. These people have 
set up the centresfor the elderly, which are very well organised 
facilities, the allotments, the University for the elderly. I am 
putting in our agenda the needfor an experiment in the centres 
for the elderly" (Guidi, 1997). 
However, this was little more than a dream, as Guidi had defined it herself, and 
Matteuzzi commented saying that "the idea about involving the elderly is interesting, 
but we need a precise strategy that has not been determined yet. We cannot leave things 
to spontaneous initiatives" (Matteuzzi, 1997). 
Gabriele Bollini was emphasising the need for complex initiatives that would go 
well beyond the offer of free accounts, arguing that 
"Demand [for using the system] has to be created proactively. 
Givingfree accounts is not enough and the general attitude is 
too deterministic. It seemsfOr instance that setting up discussion 
groups creates the conditions for participating, while the inverse 
would be truer" (Bollini, 199 7). 
In general, several needs that had not yet been addressed properly could be 
recognised. On the one hand, the relatively young age of the civic network meant that 
its potential to inform was still low, and no "real services, that have a practical effect" 
(Guidi, 1997) were present in the system. Matteuzzi, for instance, thought that the 
ability to offer electronic certification from the Council, through the civic network, 
would have become a strong attraction factor, drawing users in (Matteuzzi, 1997). This 
was seen as basically a matter of time, as some efforts were being made to develop 
interactive services and increase the number and quality of Council information on the 
site. Also, the recent involvement of new prominent actors within the Iperbole team, 
such as the city manager and Roberto Grandi, was going to facilitate this. 
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But in general, resources to implement other vital measures to increase 
inclusiveness were pretty low. The installation of public access points, that is networked 
computers owned by the Council that could be used by citizens who could not afford to 
buy a PC, was well behind schedule. Matteuzzi lamented that only 6 of these had been 
activated at public libraries and neighbourhood centres, in contrast to the target of 30 all 
over the city, and bluntly defined this as "a failure, at the moment" (Matteuzzi, 1997). 
Computer literacy courses and technical support were organised mainly for the 
Council's internal market, and low-cost Internet courses set up by private local 
organisations were encouraged and advertised. However, while Guidi was mildly 
optimistic about Iperbole's capacity for training and technical support, the interviewed 
users were less enthusiastic about the offer of support. Giovanni Pesce of AICE claimed 
that no Internet or Web training had been offered to them, even if they would have liked 
to get it. He was satisfied of the technical support obtainable by telephone, though. 
Bollini, as a user internal to the Council, complained about the courses for the 
employees by saying: "It is not clear what the priorities are in holding the courses, but I 
am sure that the training is not working well" (Bollini, 1997). 
In general, it can be argued that while at the very beginning of the project, in its 
pioneering phase, the funds received from the European Community had been enough 
to sustain it, the post-96 boom of Iperbole was opening up a serious resource problem. 
As Marco Lanzarini of CINECA suggested, "the Council should get better equipped 
now. So far, in my opinion, they have underestimated the commitment that is needed to 
sustain such an initiative" (Lanzarini, 1997). More money as well as people were 
needed to keep the momentum of the civic network's growth, otherwise the already 
present phenomenon of having many inactive members would increase further. And 
because more money was needed, the crucial issue of making the initiative sustainable 
in the long term was coming to the surface. The city manager Sante Fermi was 
expressing this through a somehow paradoxical statement: "If the number of users 
keeps growing so quickly, it will be a disaster in economic terms for the Council" 
(Fermi, 1997). The need to 'rethink' Iperbole was being pushed hard, and this was 
going to change the overarching paradigm on which the initiative had been based, as we 
are going to see in the next section. 
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6.9 TOWARDS STABILISATION? PARADIGM SHIFTS IN URBAN 
TELEMATICS 
1997 was the year in which the conditions for a general reflection on the way 
Iperbole was developing were ripe. Roberto Grandi was explicit about this by saying: 
"We have to say that a phase has ended, that ofIperbole having 
a series of very limited purposes. Another, different phase is 
opening up, and this is not the civic network as we had defined it 
initially. I think we should organise some debate days with some 
possibly interested new actors to understand what 1perbole's 
phase 2 could be" (Grandi, 199 7). 
What was the state of Iperbole at the beginning in 1997? We have seen many 
aspects of it in detail in the previous sections, but it is worth summarising here to see 
why and how changes to the initiative could be envisaged. 
Iperbole was a very successful project from the point of view of its reputation and 
consideration both nationally and internationally. It was indeed becoming a leader in 
Europe, and this was validated by the win of the 'Bangemann Challenge' award, that 
was going to be the first of a series of awards gained during the following years. This of 
course was opening up even more opportunities, as the municipality and Omega 
Generation were getting more and more invitations to conferences as well as requests to 
participate in European R&D projects (Matteuzzi, 1997). The public image of Bologna 
City Council was boosted as the first municipality in Italy to be forward-looking and 
friendly to new Information and Communication Technologies. As a consequence of 
this, the name Iperbole had become a brand itself, as Omega had chosen to use it to 
market its civic networking software to other cities. 
Relatively impressive figures in terms of membership had been developing 
especially since the launch of the free full-Internet deal in mid-96, but behind these 
numbers a certain apathy from the users was present, and levels of actual participation 
and active usage of the civic network were lower than expected. Cesare Maioli, a 
professor in the department of Maths of Bologna University, writing a paper on civic 
networks and lperbole had noted that "The project's vocation does not look well defined 
( ... ) the present bi-directional aspects cannot be appreciated" (Maioli, 1995). The 
people involved in the management of the initiative all perceived the need for richer 
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contents in terms of information and interactive services, and some of them were also 
acknowledging that inclusiveness had to be boosted. More educational initiatives, as 
well as public access points in the city, were needed, and some parts of the population, 
such as the elderly and children, could have been involved through focused initiatives 
that had not taken place yet. But resources were running low. As 1perbole was growing, 
so had money and the number of people devoted to it, and the subsidising of 
connections by the Council was itself becoming very onerous. 
These were the pre-conditions for re-thinking 1perbole in 1997 and the following 
years, a process that was going to be facilitated by the involvement of two new actors 
and their agendas: Sante Fermi, the city manager, and Roberto Grandi, the 'assessore' 
for Culture in Bologna. 
6.9.1 THE CITY MANAGER: THE COUNCIL AS A'MACHINE' 
An engineer by background, Sante Fermi was the recently appointed city manager 
- and being the first city in Italy to have a city manager was another of Bologna's proud 
achievements, apparently. Alessandro Rovinetti defined him as the 'operative mayor', 
underlining the importance and prominence of Fermi's role in taking practical decisions 
on the Council's agenda. 
Fermi did not seem to have a very detailed knowledge of the lperbole project and 
its state of the art, admitting that he had never seen its Web pages as he did not 
personally use computers in his job (Fermi, 1997). Despite this, he had some extremely 
clear ideas about where he would like to see Iperbole moving to within the next few 
years. These ideas stemmed from his agenda for the distribution of services within the 
city, and his overall approach to the relationship between Council and citizens. 
The project that Fermi was going to undertake was named 'Progetto Distribuzione 
Servizi' (Services Distribution Project), that quite ironically formed the acronym PDS, 
the same as the ruling party in Bologna. The project itself was not going to rely on the 
IperboleAVeb platform only. The computensed points of CUP, scattered around the 
city, where citizens could book public health services and visits, was the existing base 
for PDS. Synergies were also being explored with local banks for the realisation of 
DIMMI, a sub-project within PDS that would allow citizens to use their electronic 
municipal ID and their cashcard to do money transactions with the Council at banks' 
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ATMs. These transactions were initially going to include payments for Council taxes 
and parking fines. 
Fermi got interested in Iperbole as he saw the opportunity of extending these 
services to the growing network of personal computers in private houses: 
"The idea is to combine a series of ýpieces' (CUP etc) and get 
into every home. So that it is not important where the Council is, 
because it ends up being everywhere, a virtual council from 
which citizens can obtain services wherever they are" (Fermi, 
1997). 
But even more interestingly, Fen-ni would go on saying: 
"We are also re-thinking about the construction of CityCard. 
But a CityCard different from the 'Bonagian' one, something 
that could include not just the CUP, but also an electronic 
wallet that could be used to pay, for example, for the newspaper 
orfor bus and train tickets. This is a project that banks are very 
interested in" (Fermi, 1997). 
Basically, the city manager saw the primary role of the Council as that of an 
organisation producing urban services. He firmly believed that the practical 
consequences of offering good services to the people of Bologna had to take priority: 
"My strategy aims to make the machine-city work and be more 
efficient. It does not tend to give answers about social cohesion 
and socialfunctioning of the city. Those have to be dealt with by 
the mayor and the other politicians. However, it is obvious that 
a better working Council is a contribution to development and 
quality of life" (Fermi, 1997). 
Within this interpretation, Iperbole as it had been until 1997, was seen as a 
marginally relevant attempt at managing Bologna, that could - if appropriately re- 
defined - provide a great potential for the distribution of services thanks to the relative 
success that it had had in terms of membership. 
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6.9.2 CYBER-SERVICES FOR CLIENTS VS CYBER-PLACES FOR 
CITIZENS 
PDS and the other ideas from Fermi were, in a way, something that Iperbole did 
need to validate itself as something really useful in everyday life, as well as being more 
attractive to the public. However, it was clear during Fermi's interview that a paradigm 
shift, rather than just an addition of services, was underpinned by Fen-ni's positions. As 
some of the quotations in the previous section underline, the city manager envisaged a 
radical re-definition of Iperbole that would put the accent on the fact that this was going 
to be a tool used by the Council to provide services to what he defined as "the 
citizen/client" (Fermi, 1997). It is worth noticing that Stefano Bonaga - the 'father' of 
Iperbole - had been claiming a totally opposite conception of the relation 
council/citizen: 
"When we meet colleaguesfrom other European municipalities, 
and the English in particular, we willingly provoke them by 
emphasising the term 'citizens' in opposition to 'customer'. For 
us, 'citizen' is much more than 'customer' or 'client'. because 
people must not be restricted to consuming services., but they 
should intervene in the decision-making processes" (Bonaga, 
1997). 
These two conceptions were reflecting themselves in the different strategies 
envisaged to shape Iperbole, and their interaction was going to modify the initial 
character of the initiative, as we have seen it in the previous sections. 
In Bonaga's vision, the initiative was born as a way for the public sector to get to 
cyberspace first, before the private sector could commodify the local scene of 
networked information. This meant that the Council was going to grant access to the 
Internet as a right. He argued: 
"What is the public interest? Until three years ago nobody 
would have thought that givingfree Internet connections could 
be a Council's function. People expected us to build roads, 
public lights, and the like. But now this line is emerging, 
although among a restricted group as yet" (Bonaga, 199 7). 
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But the necessary introduction of more services and synergies with the private 
sector, together with the need to make the initiative economically sustainable in the 
longer term, were going to introduce a looser vision of the role of the Council. From the 
aim of granting universal access, the Council's mission was going to be re-defined as 
that of 'facilitating' access (Comune di Bologna, 2000), and the free Internet deal was 
going to be terminated. 
6.9.3 AN ENTREPRENEUR-FRIENDLY IPERBOLE: ROBERTO 
GRANDI'S VISION 
As an academic interested in new media and a local politician, Grandi represented 
for the original members of the 1perbole team, the right person who could replace 
Bonaga, who in 1997 was increasingly detaching himself from the initiative. Marco 
Lanzarini of CINECA explicitly stated his willingness to take him on board: "Assessore 
Grandi has started being interested in the project. I do hope he falls in love with it as 
Bonaga did" (Lanzarini, 1997). 
Indeed Grandi was interested in the civic network's potential, and willing to make 
a contribution. In fact he gladly accepted to be interviewed and provided a series of 
truly interesting comments on Iperbole, some of which have already been quoted. 
As the Council's appointee responsible for culture within Bologna, Grandi had of 
course his own agenda, and this appeared mainly centred on the development of a 
cultural industry of small enterprises within the city, as mentioned in the section on 
Iperbole and the local economy. Therefore, he favoured a different approach to the 
management of the civic network, as his main concern was the excessive closure and 
bureaucratic character that Iperbole had shown until then. Opening up Iperbole to all 
those groups, especially made of young people, who could use the network to create 
opportunities and liase with other similar cultural entrepreneurs around Europe and the 
World appeared as a chance not to be missed. Grandi was deeply critical about the 
(purity' of the initiative that, in his opinion, was a weakness rather than a strength, 
something that limited the power and complexity of the civic network, and kept those 
groups out of it: 
"IfIperbole keeps being ýpure' by excluding any commercial or 
entrepreneurial operation, then it has defined itsfunction. But I 
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am sure that the most interesting things will happen outside 
Iperbole "' (Grandi, 199 7). 
The need to 'open up' the civic network was seen by Grandi as extremely 
important also within a more general picture: "To have some results on the social side, 
the Council alone is not enough ", and 
"I believe that Jperbole should offer a series of virtual spaces in 
which a certain freedom of action and movement exists. 
Otherwise it is going to bejust a machinefor Council services. 
We should define ample andflexible rules, and wait to see what 
happens before going into normative details too early" (Grandi, 
1997). 
Grandi however recognised the importance of increasing the Council services 
offered through the Internet, and he was not against Fermi's PDS, although his vision 
was aimed well beyond the concept of Iperbole as a tool for service distribution. 
Leda Guidi, well aware of the problems that closure and limitations of use had 
generated, agreed that 
"We should open up to the commercial sector in order to let this 
become an element for the survival of the civic network. We 
should also address the other problem of letting ideology and 
active politics in, to bring the network closer to the actual 
reality ofthe city" (Guidi, 199 7). 
Grandi's pragmatism aimed to promote what was seen as an imperfect but viable 
and efficient form of pluralism in lperbole. Rather than trying to reach what he saw as 
an improbable universal participation, he wanted to encourage those who could and 
wanted to get in and make things happen, by giving them more freedom. This also 
meant to him that the Council's resources would have been better spent on creating 
specific opportunities rather than granting access indiscriminately: 
"I agree on thefact that we will have to re-think the offer offree 
connections. Maybe we could identify some categories to help 
that would still be entitled to free access, but in general people 
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should pay a subscription. This would let us be free to do other 
things and use the money to finance and help those who are 
willing to use the network to create new jobs and expertise" 
(Grandi, 1997). 
However, only some aspects of Grandi's vision were going to impact on the 
project. If on the one hand some opening up to private firms was going to happen, this 
was done in a much more bureaucratic and 'regulated' way compared to his 
expectations. It can be argued that the overarching bureaucratic character of IPerbole 
was extremely hard to change, and the freedom of movement and action within the 
network envisaged by Grandi was perhaps too much for an initiative driven exclusively 
by an Italian city council. In the next section we will see how these new ideas from the 
actors involved contributed to change the shape of the civic network in the following 
two years, and how the several problems of Iperbole have, or in some cases have not, 
been addressed. 
6.9.4 TOWARDS THE DIGITAL SERVICES CITY? WEAKNESSES AND 
STRENGTHS OF THE NEW IPERBOLE 
We have seen how the search for a solution to some of Iperbole's weaknesses, 
together with the closer involvement of some new actors, were putting a special 
emphasis on three main issues. The first was the need to develop and offer more 
interactive services, including those involving economic transactions. The second was 
to loosen up the rules and limitations of the original Iperbole, and let the private sector 
in. The third was to make Iperbole economically sustainable in the medium-long term. 
Some interviewees, as Guidi, Grandi, and Matteuzzi, also envisaged that, as 1perbole 
would become more complex and useful, and more resources would be available, an 
indirect consequence of these changes would be an increased participation from the 
public. This unfortunately has not been the case at least up to the date these notes are 
being written. But much was going on in the months following the beginning of 1997, 
and it is worth examining where the efforts were going and how the civic network was 
changing. 
In terms of access policies, it was soon decided that the totally free connection 
deal could not be sustained, as mentioned by some interviewees in the previous 
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sections. However, the overall spirit of offering a very cheap service, more affordable 
that the one provided by the commercial sector remained, and from 13/1/98 onwards all 
users were asked for a once-for-all contribution of 70,000 liras, the equivalent at the 
time of about 26 pounds (Comune di Bologna, 1998 (1)). 
However, three years later, in January 2001, the connection fee was waived again, 
as Internet connectivity was becoming cheaper and more choice was available in the 
marketplace. 
The number of individual users at the end 1999 was 15,600. This was possibly 
much lower than it could have been expected, having grown in two years by less than 
2,000 people. But it cannot be argued that this was just a consequence of the new 
connection charges. Also, a lower number of membership than expected did not mean at 
that time that Bolognese Internet users were not growing. As was happening in the UK, 
telephone companies had started offering free connections to the Internet too, where 
only the cost of the call would be charged. Therefore it is plausible that many people in 
Bologna could be surfing the Net and possibly using some of the civic network facilities 
from non-Iperbole accounts. This is suggested by the steep increase of the daily 'hits' - 
or visitors - to the Iperbole Web site. It is notorious that the number of hits gives a very 
superficial indication of the actual usage of an Internet site, and some of these contacts 
inevitably must have come from outside Bologna. However, the fact that at the end of 
1997 the daily hits totalled 12,800 (Comune di Bologna, 1998 (2)) and that two years 
later these had grown to 96,000 (Comune di Bologna, 1999 (1)) certainly means that 
usage of Iperbole had developed considerably. 
As could be expected, the provision of services - many still in an experimental 
phase - was the main focus of the efforts and investments within Iperbole. At the end of 
1999 it was possible to apply for Council nurseries via the system, having some taxes 
calculated and reviewed, accessing the so-called 'general protocol' and check the status 
of planning applications and other Council-related bureaucratic tasks. Electronic 
booking of cultural, tourist, and conference services were being scheduled to be 
implemented during year 2000. An experimentation on locally-based Internet shopping 
and Council payments was being held through the Web, and 700 families had been 
given a TV set-top box to connect to these services through their televisions. Because 
transactions had to be secure and reliable, research and experimentation was also going 
on in implementing digital signatures, and about 500 citizens had been given one 
(Comune di Bologna, 1999 (1)). 
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According to Guidi's intentions, the elderly were also going to be off'ered 
specially tailored sen-ices through the participation in a European pr *ect called 'Semor 01 
Online', partly funded by the EC. The good reputation of lperbole was again beneficial, 
bring, ing in new opportunities for the funding of development. I- 
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In general, lperbole was somehow managing to open up to business-related 
activities and to the private sector, but as was mentioned before, it was doing it still 
from the perspective of a quite bureaucratic organisation. The 1998 plan to establish a 
'Virtual Industrial District' envisaged the creation of a directory, organised by 
categories of business, of standard information pages about local enterprises, available 
publicly, and a series of communication services mediated by the Council between 
firms or between firms and general public (Cornune di Bologna, 1998 (3)). The Virtual 
Industrial District in its conception looked more like an intelligent database than as a 
marketplace and/or a creative and competitive environment. The whole idea seemed 
well far away from the open and lightly regulated environment that Roberto Grandi had 
envisaged for the benefit of innovative entrepreneurs. 
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With the new focus on services and economic opportunities, the discourse about 
Iperbole was changing accordingly. It is interesting to notice that new documents 
written by the project manager Leda Guidi were using expressions like "The Web from 
information to services" or "the virtual community as an efficient tool for global 
communication and business" (Guidi, 2000), that would have been unimaginable just 
three years before. 
Beyond the emphasis on services, other efforts were being made to try and keep 
the 'incusiveness' issue clearly on the agenda of the civic network. Apart from the 
project to provide services for the elderly, some progress was made on the previously 
weak front of computer literacy initiatives. The establishment of a centre dedicated to 
promoting computer and Internet literacy was - and still is at the moment of writing - 
on the agenda. However, courses started being held in 1999 geared to users outside the 
Council itself. Ten courses for a total of 150 representatives of non-profit organisations 
within Bologna's province were held in 1999, and a series of seminars and initiatives 
scheduled for the year 2000. These courses, though not totally free of charge, were 
subsidised by lperbole, costing each participant the equivalent of 40 pounds for a 30- 
hours module. Sponsorships and synergies were also being explored with several 
organisations and firms in the city, from the local branch of IBM to local computer 
clubs (Comune di Bologna, 1999 (2) and (3) and 2000 (2)). In particular, an agreement 
with ATC, the public bus company, and a local bank, meant that by buying an annual 
public transport pass one would get a complimentary Internet course, an interesting 
initiative to promote sustainable travel, both 'real' and virtual. 
However, despite some increased efforts towards the promotion of access and the 
inclusion of citizens, too little was still being done, and it appears that this, together 
with public participation to decision-making, was becoming the weakest, least 
resourced point of the agenda. 
Public access terminals, for instance, were nominally slightly more that in 1997, 
but still far too few. A total of 14 access points - often endowed of just one computer - 
were available, and out of the 14,8 were working only on a part-time basis or were 
limiting access to specific pages (Comune di Bologna, 2000 (3)). Considering that 
Matteuzzi was thinking that 30 would have been a fair amount of public points in 1997 
(Matteuzzi, 1997), it is clear that resources were still very scarce in this respect. 
Similarly, although the issue of 'Electronic democracy' was on Leda Guidi's 
agenda, and nine special discussion forums had been opened in 1999, observations 
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carried out in May that same year revealed a picture of very limited participation. At 
least a couple of these forums looked practically deserted, while the 'traditional' 
discussion groups, as mentioned before, saw considerable activity only in areas such as 
'jokes' or the second hand market. It seems evident that the hopes of an increased 
participation of users attracted by services were not being fulfilled, and that this was a 
strategically weak and maybe neglected area, that needed much more work from the 
Council. A much greater involvement of a complexity of actors, both within and outside 
the municipality, would have made possible outlining a more detailed and efficient 
strategy, which could be 'grounded' more within Bologna's communities, in the way 
Bollini had envisaged. 
6.10 CONCLUSIONS 
Carrying out this case study has proved extremely useful within the economy Of 
this research, and it has generated answers to the questions asked in the literature 
review, as well as reflections and doubts that would probably require further research 
into the field. It has also shown very clearly how important time is in the development 
of technological initiatives such as digital cities, and the opportunity to carry out 
'longitudinal' research work has definitely appeared. In general, some major points can 
be made to summarise the outcomes of the Iperbole case study. 
The usefulness of case study itself, allowed an in-depth analysis which was 
clearly not possible through the instrument of survey. In fact, the Iperbole initiative had 
a high score within the contents-based investigation. However it has to be noted that the 
relative shallowness of the instrument of survey itself meant that the presence of certain 
facilities and characteristics within the civic Web site produced a high score, regardless 
of how successfully - or unsuccessfully - these had been implemented, and what 
policies laid behind them. In a way, this implies that innovative initiatives of this kind, 
often initially accompanied by a considerable amount of hype, may present wide gaps 
between intentions, claims and actual implementation. 
On the one hand it cannot be said that the Iperbole initiative was unsuccessful. 
First of all it fulfilled quite well the political purposes that it had been supported for, and 
further improved the good public image of Bologna's administration. It also created the 
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conditions for further involvement of Bologna's team, especially the Council and 
Omega Generation, in European R&D IT projects that could turn out to be very 
beneficial for the city. From the point of view of how it managed to support social 
access to the civic network and the wider Internet, it has to be said that the free accounts 
initiative was certainly unique, and it contributed to attracting some members of the 
general public towards the telematics tools. A 'critical mass' of local users was reached 
within a relatively short time of the starting, and was certainly a most noticeable 
achievement. Iperbole in its first phase was motivated by the vision of public 
administration having the aims and duty to provide universal access to telematics 
networks. This was done within a discourse emphasising the divide between the 
functions of the public sector and the possible threats coming from the direct 
involvement of the private, commercial sector. Therefore all partnerships were shaped 
in a hierarchical way: the Council was the ultimate owner of Iperbole, and no-one else. 
This created the conditions for developing the initiative towards equal non-profit access, 
which was one of the purposes, and it 'educated' a certain amount of households. At the 
same time, though, it left out of the civic network a considerable amount of potentially 
dynamic actors. 
Leaving actors out of cyberspace, that in 'real' space would certainly have played 
an important role, was therefore a weakness of the initiative. Although this might have 
helped to preserve a certain 'purity' of Iperbole and to avoid risks of early 
commodification of information and services, it also implied somehow that the Council 
was supposed to be perfectly able on its own to represent the city on the Net. But the 
Council was not 'the city', and failure to involve a wide pool of actors - economic 
actors, certain pressure and political groups, alternative culture youth groups etc - in the 
shaping and management of lperbole was proving harmful to the potential of supporting 
public discourse and generating more interest. Also, more involvement of economic 
actors would have meant the ability to generate some money and improve the medium- 
long term sustainability of the initiative, together with more resources to work towards 
access and computer literacy within the city. 
Some problems were evident from the very beginning about fragmented strategies 
and actions towards the promotion of public participation and the support of public 
discourse within the city. The establishment of public debate areas within Iperbole 
could have worked if coupled with initiatives in the field that would be carried out in 
parallel. In other words, public participation purposes were not addressed by the 
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Council with a coherent and unitary strategy that could take advantage of the Iperbole 
resource. The civic network was also a not very negotiated initiative within the Council 
itself, as only one office was driving it, expecting all the rest of the Council to follow 
suit. It was inevitable for the Council 'machine' to be extremely slow to adapt to new 
modes of communication and distribution of information. Although this could be seen 
as physiological, and only time could overcome these kind of problems, the hype about 
Gcitizens having dialogues with the mayor' was going to prove hasty to say the least, 
and bi-directionality remained a serious problem. 
The involvement of new actors brought a shift towards a more open and service- 
oriented Iperbole, certainly improving long-term economic sustainability, and making 
the initiative more useful and alive. However, the lack of fully participant partners - 
other than the Council's project managers - in the driver's seat could still mean that the 
potential of the civic network in terms of local economic development and public 
participation was not fully exploited. 
The paradigm shift from an universal access granting initiative, mainly focused on 
innovative tools for local democracy, to a service-oriented digital city that facilitates 
familiarisation with the Internet, has not had apparently many consequences on low 
levels of public cyber-participation. The hopes that more services would bring more 
people in could be right, but would these people participate and debate anyway? Normal 
usage of the wider Internet does not seem to suggest this, and it somehow shows that 
Iperbole's management had - or had been forced to have -a relatively technologically 
deterministic attitude. The need for specific policies and initiatives, within and beyond 
Iperbole, for supporting public participation remained and meant that telematics 
initiatives must be part of wider, detailed strategies for urban and community 
regeneration. 
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CHAPTER 7- BRISTOL GOES'DIGITAU 
7.0 INTRODUCTION 
Finding a representative and significant case study of the digital city phenomenon in 
the UK was not an easy task around 1997. The survey conducted within this study pointed 
the fact that although the number of internet/web civic sites was high in the UK, the vast 
majority of these initiatives were not very interesting for the purpose of this investigation. 
Most sites, despite carrying promising titles such as 'Virtual Sheffield' or 'Wolverhampton 
Community Internet Project', were actually just promotional brochures for the city, targeted 
at non-locals, or poorly compiled directories of local organisations and telephone numbers. 
Interestingly enough, several major cities in the UK were 'represented' by many different 
sites competing with each other and all claiming somehow to be there to contribute to the 
life of their physical counterpart. Bristol was just one of these cases in 1996, with six 
different 'virtual cities' - including a Council site - all offering low standards of both 
information richness and interaction (Graham and Aurigi, 1997; 39). 
However, during 1996 a partnership between Hewlett Packard, the University of 
West of England and Bristol City Council had been working at the creation of a new 
community-oriented web site for the city of Bristol, which was going to be officially 
launched in early 1997. In particular, one of the main promoters of this initiative, Erik 
Geelhoed from Hewlett Packard Laboratories, had been presenting the project on the new 
digital city at conferences on urban themes during the previous months. The concepts 
behind this initiative were very relevant to the topic of this study, as Digital City Bristol 
Interactive (DCBI) was being envisaged as a truly versatile, community-oriented, highly 
interactive and participation-friendly project, supported by a really interesting partnership 
including a major global technology company like HP. 
This chapter deals with the field research carried out on Digital City Bristol during 
1997. As with the previous case study, this investigation involved visiting Bristol and 
interviewing the major actors involved in the shaping of the initiative, as well as collecting 
available documents on Digital City Bristol. However, as is described later in the chapter, 
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the project was at an earlier stage of development compared to Bologna, and only a few 
features had been implemented in respect to the original plan. Therefore, less information 
was available about it, including the fact the interviewees themselves had less to comment 
on. Interestingly, though, as with Iperbole, Digital City Bristol was entering a phase of 
review and possibly re-definition of some of its aims and characteristics. This makes the 
case study analysis and its narrative - that is this chapter - able to retain a very similar 
structure to that of the previous case, although the critical history of DCB is inevitably less 
rich and complex for the reasons stated. 
The chapter deals with the initial phases of the project, defining the various actors 
involved in shaping the initiative and their interpretations of the project itself and of civic 
intemetworking. Then the narrative moves on to deal with the more specific topics of the 
relationships of the digital city and the real city in terms of support of public discourse, 
economic regeneration, and enrolment of users and the management of their access to 
information. The last section examines the evolution of the initiative towards a rather 
different model and conception with respect to its very early days, and the reasons that 
contributed to generate this shift. 
7.1 BRISTOL 
Bristol is the largest city in the South West of England. Once a famous port and 
centre for international trade, the city's economy became primary location for the aircraft 
industry and home of Rolls Royce's aero engines factory. The city had been trying very 
actively to attract fresh investment, and the presence of the technology giant Hewlett 
Packard - especially with the 'softer' presence of its research laboratories rather than 
production chains of hardware - was certainly seen by some of the interviewees of this case 
study, as a major asset. 
On the local politics and administration side, it must be noted that Bristol City 
Council had become a Unitary Authority on I't of April 1996, after the abolition of the 
former County of Avon. This meant that local government had to re-organise, and this 
brought problems to solve as well as opportunities to do things differently, embarking on a 
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series of initiatives to improve the efficiency of the Council, in which IT had a central role 
(Bristol City Council, 1997; 1). 
Bristol is also a well-endowed city as far as the presence of popular universities - and 
their students - is concerned. Two universities, the University of Bristol and the University 
of West of England (UWE) guarantee the presence of a good number of young people in 
the city, and there is a high demand for leisure, cultural, and nightlife activities, and in 
general a vibrant environment. UWE, the former polytechnic, is also one of the most 
research active and dynamic 'new' universities in Britain, and this was certainly a factor - 
as we will see in the next few paragraphs - facilitating the conception and implementation 
of innovative initiatives in the city. 
7.2 ACTORS AND VISIONS FOR DIGITAL BRISTOL: HP LABS 
START RESEARCHING 
These conditions were certainly important factors influencing the birth of Digital City 
Bristol. They established an arena in which IT industry, academia, and local government 
were all represented and willing to have a project in common. 
However, an initial set of ideas and a vision for a specific project such as Digital City 
Bristol was obviously going to come from a specific promoter, or technological 
entrepreneur. In this case, it was acknowledged by all interviewees that the original idea for 
the design and establishment of a 'digital city' in Bristol that could be more sophisticated 
than the existing competing 'internet directories' came from Hewlett Packard Laboratories, 
and in particular from one of its employees: Erik Geelhoed. As Linda Skinner, the project 
manager and research coordinator from UWE put it, "all of these projects have some 
idealist or ideologist promoting them, and we had Erik" (Skinner, 1997). 
The role of Geelhoed, especially in the first phase of conception and life of the 
initiative was indeed central. A psychologist engaged in studying behavioural aspects of 
people using high technologies, Geelhoed had been in talks about similar ideas with Joe 
Lambert, from San Francisco Digital Media Center. This contact was created as HP Labs - 
whose central offices are in Palo Alto - had started liasing with Lambert to gain a better 
understanding of issues concerning digital imagery on the Internet (Geelhoed, 1997). In the 
late 1990s, as the Internet seemed to be booming, as well as all sorts of business 
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opportunities related to it, many IT giants that had so far engaged in producing hardware or 
software packages, were trying to adjust their strategies towards the production and 
management of Internet content. Microsoft Corporation, for instance, launched in that 
period its Microsoft Network portal, pages, and services, better known as MSN. Part of the 
industry was also trying to push ahead the new paradigm of software that could be loaded 
and used on demand, through the Internet, possibly charged on a pay-per-use basis, rather 
than residing on people's hard-disks. The conception and development of the innovative 
Java programming language by Sun Microsystems could be obviously seen as part of this 
strategy, as Java allows programmers to create applications that can be distributed and used 
over the Internet, on a wide variety of different platforms and operating systems. In such a 
climate for the IT industry and market, it was quite natural for a company like HP to be 
proactive in considering how Internet content could be effectively delivered, and through 
which applications. 
Hewlett Packard could therefore see itself as a potential 'shaper' of innovative, 
content-rich websites as it recognised the need for a wide-ranging research approach in the 
field, in order to understand both the technical and behavioural aspects of Internet content 
delivery. Another reason why HP would end up considering the Bristol initiative as 
feasible, was its 'good citizen' policy, that is the willingness to give some benefits back to 
the community that hosts HP's offices (Geelhoed, 1997). 
Following the contact between Geelhoed and Lambert, the first intention had been to 
work on some kind of digital 'twinning' between Bristol and San Francisco, through the 
creation of websites. However, other factors played a major role within this early phase of 
the conception of Digital Bristol. One factor was the fact that Geelhoed, probably 
facilitated by his Dutch origins, had in that same period got acquainted with the digital city 
initiative that had established itself as a European paradigm for civic Internet: De Digitale 
Stad (DDS) in Amsterdam. Geelhoed was fascinated and interested in Amsterdam's digital 
city success, and he managed to invite the 'mayor' of DDS, Marlene Stikker, to give a talk 
at HP Labs in Bristol and convinced the top managers of the Laboratories that such an 
initiative would be "a good investmenf ' (Geelhoed, 1997). 
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It seemed clear to Geelhoed that the model to base the digital counteq)art of Bristol 
on was DDS, as it had a strong emphasis on interaction and participation, and this was 
being recognised as an important component of the research: 
"We saw the digital citY as a possible research tool. The social 
aspects were interesting to its, those new ways for people to 
communicate. Our first thought was about Meditating 
communication in the digital city, rather than putting emphasis on 
hiformation " (Geelhoed, 1997) 
Reinforcing the role of DDS as the main inspiration source for what was going to 
happen in Bristol, HP Labs funded two bursaries for a Masters degree at Delft University of 
Technology, Faculty of Industrial Design Engineering, in the Netherlands. These were 
meant to support work directly related to digital cities and to layout the basic concepts, 
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ideas, and the interface itself for Digital Bristol. The results of the study and the design by 
Sierd Westerfield were summarised in a project report for HP Labs titled 'Digital City 
Bristol Interactive', a title that also became the initial name of the initiative (DCBI). 
Coherently with HP's main interests, this piece of work was based on a case study on DDS, 
and aimed at envisaging optimal user interface and communication tools for Digital Bristol 
(Westerfield, 1997). Topics like the type or quality of information and contents, or 
implementation of policies to grant universal access to the citizens were not - or only very 
marginally - touched upon. 
Figure 7.2 - The early interface of Digital City Bristol Interactive (DCB1) 
So it could be argued that the digital city in Bristol had been initially conceived as a 
minor research & development project initiated by a big multi-national company, whose 
main purpose was to study ways of creating highly interactive, grounded Internet sites. As 
Westerfield's report remarks: "The fundamental question addressed in tile Digital City 
Bristol research is: What are the opportunities for HP in the Emerging Information 
infrastructure (Ell) consumer market? " (Westerfield, 1997; 11) Technical issues of 
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software implementation, as well as on human-computer interfaces, were very much at the 
centre of the project. Another student from Delft had also been involved to study the use of 
Java programming technology within the initiative (Geelhoed, 1997). 
However, the person in HP Labs who had started DCBI, Erik Geelhoed, had a wider 
vision for it, being strongly interested in the social aspects and implications of the 
establishment of an interactive digital city. In a short paper published at the time on the HP 
Labs WWW site, in which different types of early digital cities are compared, Geelhoed 
kept remarking on the importance of people's presence: "What a digital city provides is 
people" (Geelhoed, 1996) and of their interaction and empowerment in an electronic 
equivalent of public space, as opposed to an electronic version of shopping malls. He 
quoted Geert Lovink, a Dutch philosopher and critic, endorsing his claims that: 
"A lot ofpeople in government and in business think that if they are 
just offering information, it is enough. But this is not the case. It is 
very important that the people can find an identity themselves with 
the media and that they are part of the computer network. That they 
are not just treated as consumers who are just buying something" 
(Lovink, 1995; quoted in Geelhoed, 1996) 
This interest for letting the embryonic digital Bristol actually involve and empower 
real people, and go beyond the limited scope of a human-computer interface research 
project, was motivating Geelhoed to act as a central character and facilitator, trying to 
generate support within HP as well as enlarging the circle of the actors involved: 
"ne first year of activity was about creating a network ofpeople 
who could be interested in the idea, the idea being that it should not 
have been just a commercial place for electronic trade, but a 
meetingplace " (Geelhoed, 1997) 
So, to a certain extent, Geelhoed and HP Labs could be seen as two distinct actors in 
the Digital Bristol arena, insofar as Geelhoed had been successful in enrolling HP - his own 
employer - in the initiative by highlighting those aspects that could interest the multi- 
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national company's R&D division. Geelhoed had 'sold' the idea to his employer by 
presenting an appealing interpretation of it, a set of potential benefits within something that 
could potentially become a much wider, all-round, and participated project. He has also 
made it economically very low-cost and viable, as this was seen within HP Labs as a minor 
project, and the costs were reduced to comprise a part of Geelhoed's time, the two 
studentships with Delft, and a small amount of equipment. 
However, other important actors were to be involved in the management and shaping 
of Digital City Bristol, and their participation meant that different interpretations of the role 
and nature of the initiative were to be made, and these of course were going to have a deep 
influence over the actual way the digital city was going to develop. As we noted before, 
Geelhoed was looking for people to populate the forthcoming cybertown, and as Linda 
Skinner notes: "Erik claimed that he was going to have the digital city designed, but to 
bring it to life he needed people from the city and from the university" (Skinner, 1997). 
7.2.1 THE UNIVERSITY OF WEST OF ENGLAND 
Of the two universities in Bristol, it was the University of West of England (UWE) 
which became involved in the project. A couple of reasons seem to explain this: physical 
proximity - which in itself is a fascinating issue to have to consider when it comes to 
speaking of projects involving cyberspace - and the dynamism of the management. UWE's 
campus is located out of town, within walking distance from the HP buildings, which 
facilitated frequent contacts between researchers and managers, independently from this 
specific project. 
Above all, however, it has to be noted that UWE is a second-generation university, 
one of the ex-polytechnics that had found themselves 'upgraded' in status in the 1980's, 
facing the new challenge of re-defining themselves from just teaching establishments to 
being research active institutions as well. Some of these universities were working very 
hard and proactively towards increasing their research output, and UWE was certainly 
considered to be a very positive example of this. As a consequence, UWE was bound to be 
very keen on innovative research or R&D projects that could boost its image, prospective 
funding, as well as its internal research culture. It was indeed an ideal potential partner for 
Digital City Bristol Interactive. 
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HP had been interested in collaborating with UWE for some time. Years before DCBI 
was conceived, there had been "a 'famous' dinner between the Head of HP Labs and 
UWE's Vice Chancellor" where "HP challenged the university" (Skinner, 1997). Geelhoed 
himself had been in touch with UWE before the digital city was conceived. HP and the 
university had also been in talks to organise some type of a 'media' event in Bristol that 
would "bring potentialities together" (Skinner, 1997) in the city, generating new 
partnerships and new projects. Linda Skinner was an important player in this respect, as she 
had been appointed by UWE as a manager who was expected to create momentum for 
research projects and consultancies. After these first contacts, including the already 
mentioned 'twinning' intention with San Francisco, Geelhoed started working on the new 
digital city idea, and went back to UWE to present these initial concepts to them, while the 
students from the University of Delft had already started working. 
UWE got on board quickly, as the partnership with HP Labs was interesting and 
prestigious to them. Skinner defined the initiative as a "very good research about the city of 
Bristol itself, that would enable us to give design and organisational recommendations 
about this type of initiative" (Skinner, 1997), possibly envisaging the university's ability to 
develop a know-how in innovative internet sites, that could be exploited on the consultancy 
side of academic business. 
7.2.2 BRISTOL CITY COUNCIL STEPS IN 
The other partner in DCBI had to be the 'city' itself, or rather the City Council. Linda 
Skinner took the initiative and contacted Bristol City Council shortly after Stuart Long, a 
new head of IT services had been appointed there. 
As already noted in the introductory section of this chapter, Bristol had recently 
undergone some major changes as far as local administration was concerned, becoming a 
Unitary Authority in Spring of 1996. This had lead to a process of re-organising and re- 
thinking about the ways the local authority should operate. Within this process of re- 
organisation, the idea of a specific initiative, or an 'umbrella' of initiatives involving 
information technology has started emerging, and was eventually named as 'IT in the 
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Community'. According to Bristol's documentation for bidding to get a '1997 Local 
Government IT Excellence Award' this was 
"an attempt to think creatively and laterally about how the Council 
could lever its existing and planned investment in information 
technology to contribute to a wide ranging programme of economic 
and community regeneration in the city. Key themes included 
wealth creation, reducing unemployment, improving infrastructure, 
improving quality of life and empowering local communities 
(Bristol City Council, 1997,1) 
Stuart Long saw the proposal about the digital city as something that would fit well 
within this overall IT-based strategic vision for Bristol, and found good support from 
"some of the leading politicians, who felt that there was a danger 
that the Information Age was going to pass a lot ofpeople by in the 
city, because of economic barriers. So one of the ideas was to share 
information electronically and make it accessible " (Long, 199 7) 
The interesting thing to notice about the Council's involvement in DCBI is that the 
digital city was going to be seen as just a complement to an existing and wider overall 
strategic plan for IT in the city. So, if on the one hand Bristol City Council was interested 
in participating in the initiative, this was being considered as a piece of a bigger jigsaw, and 
possibly not the central one. This was clear from the fact that - being just a partner in DCBI 
and not even the most influential - the Council would keep developing and placing most of 
its information and service resources within its own Web site. Although this should not be 
seen as a necessarily negative aspect of the initial development of DCBI, as it was fairly 
normal that partners would retain their own separate identities, it suggests that in this 
Bristol case the fragmentation of agency could be mirrored in the Internet, rather than be 
moderated by it. And that this could easily lead to a wide fragmentation of interpretations 
of what the digital city was going to be there for. However, as long as a focus on common 
benefits and opportunities could be kept, the initiative could start and progress, as we will 
see in the next section. 
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7.3 WHY DIGITAL BRISTOL? INTERPRETATIVE FLEXIBILITY IN 
ACCEPTING AND SHAPING THE CYBERCITY 
The introduction of the several main partners involved in the digital city has already 
suggested how the Bristol case could be considered an arena in which several sets of 
interests and objectives were represented, and played a role. What opportunities could 
Digital City Bristol Interactive offer to a local authority, a multi-national high-tech 
company, and an emerging university? Why and how could actors who were so diverse 
converge towards the initiative? Also, to what extent were they really converging, therefore 
making the digital city viable and supported in the long term? The answer to the latter 
question will be addressed better later in the chapter, when the evolution of the project 
towards a certain degree of stabilisation will be dealt with. However, now it is time to have 
a better look at how the different meanings the digital city was embedding for the main 
actors involved could somehow combine to facilitate the birth and initial growth of the 
Bristol cybertown. A main theme and driving factor can be identified here: the 
emancipation and 'de-provincialisation' of Bristol - including the projection of a brand 
new image of the city as a forward-looking, dynamic and efficient place. 
7.3.1 NETWORKING TO RE-BRAND THE CITY AND ITS ACTORS 
As mentioned before, Bristol in the late 1990s was a city trying to re-define itself We 
have seen how the local authority had assumed a new role, and the UWE too was working 
hard to re-launch itself as a proactive, research-based institution. Therefore a project like 
the digital city could be seen as a great opportunity for helping to establish a strong and 
forward-looking image for the actors involved. Certainly it was also a good chance to 
network for some of these institutions, and experiment with closer partnerships. Linda 
Skinner was very explicit about this by saying that 
"this digital city is about getting the city's influential organisations 
together. There is a kind of new optimism in Bristol now, and what 
we are doing with the digital city is about right, using it to get key 
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individuals and sections of the community to work together" 
(Skinner, 1997) 
It is interesting to notice the clear interpretation from Skinner of the sped ic igita 
city initiative as something to 'use', a good catalyst for collaboration among the 'key 
individuals' in Bristol. She clearly identified networking, together with the more obvious 
research, as the two main UWE's priorities. In particular she saw the digital city as a great 
opportunity to get a deeper relationship with HP, as the visually-intensive character of 
DCBI was going to be well suited to the interests of an "ex-polytechnic with a strong 
faculty of arts, media and design, as well as a strong computing section" (Skinner, 1997). 
Although from a quite different point of view, the City Council also had a clear re- 
branding agenda for the city, the council itself, and its activities. Quickly embedding the 
digital city into the wider set of projects and policies of 'IT in the Community', and 
defining DCB1 as "a milestone", the Council was aiming to demonstrate "very explicitly 
the potential of the new Unitary Council to make a real impact in the city through the 
innovative application of IT" (Bristol City Council, 1997; 2). Not surprisingly, the theme of 
efficiency was central among the reasons for the local authority to get involved, as could 
probably be observed in many other cases. Stuart Long confirmed this by describing the 
cybercity as a "new communication medium that allows the Council to do things in 
different ways and do new things. And above all do them more efficiently and spend less 
money to run certain types of services" (Long, 1997). 
The 'vision' from Erik Geelhoed of a participative, communication-intensive digital 
city close to the model of its Amsterdam predecessor, can be seen as yet another 
interpretation converging towards the general expectation of a less provincial, more lively 
and proactive Bristol. It has to be said that Geelhoed's vision would go well beyond a 
simple place-marketing ethos, or the consideration of the digital city as a good excuse for 
institutional networking. However, the will to provide a hi-tech space for facilitating 
collaboration and giving people and groups a certain degree of visibility could be easily 
seen - at least initially - by the other actors as a very coherent and desirable course of 
action towards the common goal of 'making things happen' in Bristol. 
Generally speaking, the perception formed during the face-to-face interviews in 
Bristol was that all major actors had recognised the need to 'de-provincialise' the city and 
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facilitate the emergence of a new image of forward-looking place. Image-making was 
paramount and was the real cohesive factor for the partnership, as the Council's 'IT in the 
Community' document stated openly: 
"A number of the specific areas of work completed have done much 
to transform the image of the City of Bristol towards a leading 
edge, high technology city. The profile established for the City 
Council through working with credible partners such as Hewlett 
Packard and the University of West of England on Digital City 
Bristol has been verypositive " (Bristol City Council, 1997,6) 
Although the perceptions and interpretations of what DCBI could represent were very 
different among the several actors, a common perception of 'inadequacy', or rather of a city 
that needed to regenerate its own mentality first, was clearly present. Linda Skinner, for 
instance, when asked about the issue of commercial Internet Vs universal access, dismissed 
this as something not to be considered in the short-term because it was somehow too 
advanced for Bristol. She claimed that Bristol was behind other places and cities, that not 
much had been going on there - she would repeatedly use the expression "to make things 
happen" as an absolute must - and that it needed to catch up to be competitive: 
"It is too early to think about commercial uses, or Internet access 
issues. If we had these things we would not know how to use them. 
People would talk to people in Newcastle, because the tradition 
there is better" (Skinner, 1997) 
However, as we will see later in the chapter, the common goal of 'revitalising' Bristol 
would end up being effective in putting together different interpretations only for a limited 
time. It provided a good reason to start the project at all, and to work in partnership, but it 
would not be able to address the main divergence of visions for the digital city for the long 
term. As we are going to see in the next few sections, beyond the re-branding of Bristol, the 
expectations about specific aspects of how the digital city should work could be simply 
opposite, within the managing group. This would eventually generate the need for a radical 
re-definition of the initiative. 
223 
Chapter 7- Bristol goes digital 
7.4 PUBLIC SPACE WITH NO PUBLIC PLACE: A FRAGMENTED 
DIGITAL CITY 
Was Digital City Bristol an initiative aimed at creating a public 'cyberspace' in the 
city, a site where public discourse was going to be supported and have crucial importance? 
As we have mentioned before, the preliminary studies and plans made by Geelhoed and 
Westerfield seemed to claim that DCBI was a "people to people" project. Geelhoed had 
defined this aspect as the focus of the whole R&D project (Geelhoed, 1996-2), and 
Westerfield had remarked that 
"Yhe main theme is people to people communication ( .. ) The DCBI 
will be the main site for Bristol. It will be the place where people 
can get information on the city, and a place where they can 
communicate with otherpeople in the city" (Westerfield, 1997; 12) 
Geelhoed had indeed based all his presentations about DCBI on the explicit link with 
the project of DDS Amsterdam. In a short study published as an internal HP Labs 
document and on the World Wide Web, he had compared different types of early digital 
city concluding that the most interesting was indeed the Amsterdam case, and arguing that: 
"DDS has also been a major source of inspiration for our thinking. 
We judged three aspects particularly attractive: novel ways of 
representing the information space, enhanced navigational clues 
and last but not least the social aspects of the city. Residents o the 
digital city can communicate with each other via the digital city 
computer interface as individuals or as groups, thereby energising 
the city " (Geelhoed, 1996) 
Clearly this vision was the course of action envisaged by the internal HP project 
report, and indeed by the initial design of Digital Bristol's interface and functionality. The 
digital city had been designed by HP Labs to look like a harbour, with an explicit reference 
to Bristol's past. The harbour was organised in 'piers' with virtual 'boats' moored to them. 
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Piers and boats were there to host a wealth of different WWW sites that could be owned 
and run by community organisations as well as private individuals. The piers would be 
thematic to present a coherent and easily searchable organisation of the many informational 
'fragments' present. The several functions available through this interface were activated 
by Java routines, which would have supposedly allowed a very high degree of interactivity, 
such as real-time zooming and moving within the 2D virtual environment. Communication 
functions were planned as a crucial aspect of the digital city. The HP Labs project report 
claimed that: "DCBI will provide newsgroups as the basis for a discussion platform. The 
subjects for the newsgroups have not yet been decided" (Westerfield, 1997; 36). But one 
the main challenges that HP Labs - but above all Geelhoed - were willing to face was 
working on the creation and implementation of a more intuitive and easy-to-use electronic 
environment to allow exchange of ideas among citizens. A whole chapter of the HP report 
was dedicated to the conception of what had been called the "multimedia notice board" for 
the digital city (Westerfield, 1997; 3645), a graphics and multimedia-enhanced area for the 
members of the community to discuss, post and exchange files, announce events etc. 
However, neither the innovative notice board, nor the newsgroups would end up 
being available at all in Bristol. The 'vision gap' between Geelhoed's open, interactive, 
lively, and communicative conception of the digital city, and the way the other partners 
were expecting DCBI to be, was extremely wide. 
In general, there was a strong concern for the problems that allowing free speech in 
the digital city could generate, and the majority of the actors involved shared this concern. 
The City Council was declaring an interest in encouraging the development of an 
inclusive information society in Bristol, as we will see in the section on end-users 
development strategies, but mainly from the point of view of allowing the majority of 
citizens to use the new services and information. Access to the technology was indeed seen 
as an issue and it was going to be addressed. Communication-wise, however, the 
municipality was only concentrating - and not even too strongly - on providing councillors 
with email addresses, as Stuart Long noted: 
"We have fourteen or fifteen councillors who are really 
enthusiastic. They have PCs at home connected to the council, and 
they are using email. Now it is a pilot scheme, but I hope next year 
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we will be able to extend this to all sixty-eight councillors. It is a 
step towards electronic democracy. This is the kind of vision we 
have" (Long, 199 7) 
Indeed, the Council's strategic document on 'IT in the Community' despite outlining 
a series of initiatives and prospective benefits on information provision, education, and 
economic development, had basically no significant mention of any governance-enhancing 
effects of the information society in Bristol, and no plans for increased public participation 
or consultation through the use of IT. 
Also, however genuine Long's vision for some kind of e-government trajectory for 
Bristol, thanks to increased use of email, could be, the acceptance of new ways of working 
and dealing with the public was generally pretty low within the council. Those 'fourteen or 
fifteen enthusiastic councillors' seemed to be an unrepresentative minority to other 
interviewees. For instance, Julian Mellor from the Planning department said: 
"Different people use the system in different ways. Everyone in the 
city council has an email address, but many people still refuse to 
use it. Many do not reply to emails. Some even say that they do not 
like technology and are not willing to use it" (Mellor, 199 7) 
Another important thing to notice is that Bristol City Council's policy, as far as 
Digital Bristol was concerned, had never been that of migrating council services or 
facilities - such as the councillors' email - into the digital city. Bristol City Council had its 
own well-established WWW site, which was linked - and presented in a prominent position 
- by DCBI, but nevertheless was completely independent from it. So, the limited e- 
communication plans of the Council could well be carried forward outside the digital city. 
On a similar 'line' was the attitude of the local press about the launch of DCBI. The 
local newspaper The Evening Post had been publicising the event with a positive review, 
but had been exclusively concentrating on the information 'broadcasting' benefits of the 
new medium, ignoring completely the bi-directional communication potential that the 
digital city could have embedded (Onions, 1997; 11). 
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So, despite the initial drive from Geelhoed towards a lively and participative digital 
city that could have been seen as an evolution of Amsterdam's DDS, the partnership behind 
DCBI was really not that keen on making it a cyber-Agora. Plans had been made to try and 
embed some debate facilities, but already with the clear awareness in mind that DCBI was 
not meant to be a place for free speech: 
"With HP we decided in the pilot phase that we would not do 
anything which is completelyfree speech, as HP did not want to be 
associated with something that could cause an embarrassment. 
However, we are experimenting with some kind of newsgroup in a 
controlled and moderatedform " (Skinner, 1997) 
Marc Day, the UWE researcher who had been assigned the 'harbourmaster' role 
within the project, dealing with the day-to-day business of developing the digital city, 
confirmed that 
"we are having someone developing some notice boardsfor DCBI, 
but the management committee do not want to have them as a real- 
time uncontrolled thing. So, each notice will have to be checked 
before it goes online" (Day, 1997) 
Above all, evidence seems to suggest that the free-speech sensitivity problem was 
just an obstacle reinforcing, rather than generating, the trend towards the shaping of a 
different and less communicative digital city. In fact, if bi-directional, people to people 
communication was seen as a priority by Geelhoed, it was clear that the HP Labs researcher 
was isolated with his vision. Linda Skinner of UWE, when asked about public participation 
and public discourse issues, replied very uncompromisingly that "the digital city is not 
about that. Mostly, it is about other things" (Skinner, 1997). Skinner would also mention 
explicitly the Council as having a information broadcasting target: 
"The City Council is backing this specific initiative, among the 
several Bristol 'indexes' because of the involvement of local 
community groups and health care. Because it is about public 
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information provision, it meets their public agenda. It is very 
differentfrom the Amsterdam case" (Skinner, 1997) 
So, shaping the digital city was a task embedding conflict as well as convergence and 
partnership. Above all it seemed to embed a good degree of 'fragmentation' of visions, 
when it came to deal with developing specific aspects of a low-funded, resource-thirsty 
project. The result of this was that the notice board that Day was talking about was never 
fully implemented, and that despite the claims from Geelhoed and Skinner herself that 
newsgroups would have been launched soon, none of these facilities was yet present in 
1999, two years later, as noted by Annelies de Bruine: 
"At the moment the web site is a good information source for 
Bristol. It is not very dynamic; more interaction can energize the 
digital city and make users come back to communicate with others. 
The chatyorum on the music pier and in Erik's Cafi6 is a modest 
start, but more newsgroups are needed to make the web site a 
dynamic and more interesting place on the web " (De Bruine, 2000, ý 
122) 
It cannot be argued, however, that DCBI was denying completely all forms of 
cgrassroots' expression. Indeed, the 'piers' and 'boats' were there to get populated by 
community groups and individuals who were given space for self-representation on the 
World Wide Web, and under the Digital Bristol umbrella. So, in a way the digital city was 
being shaped to become a highly diverse place. The problem, as far as encouraging public 
discourse was concerned, was that all the users - we could say the e-citizens - of the 
cybertown were able to become broadcasters and advertisers, but not to engage in debate 
within a public cyber-space. People were 'talking' to the world, but not necessarily 
together. Digital Bristol looked increasingly like a city made of unconnected - or connected 
only by the graphics of the interface - individual souls and fragments. And these fragments 
of course included the main partners working on the project: the Council, the university and 
HP. 
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The actor who was still proactively trying to establish some communication within 
DCBI, Erik Geelhoed, ended up, as a consequence, acting as a 'fragment', and taking 
individual initiatives to make space for the exchange of ideas and interactivity. He was 
tolerated but not necessarily actively supported by the rest of the management committee. 
This meant that a new 'building' appeared in the virtual harbour, called 'Erik's CaW. This 
seemed to be strongly inspired by DDS, even graphically. It was meant to be an interactive, 
multimedia-intensive space for meeting. In its extremely short life it had been equipped 
with a MP3 jukebox for digital music, a reading room, and video clips of Bristol-based 
events. Also, in 1999, following a conference on 'Music on the Web' held at HP Labs in 
February, a new 'music' pier was created and a chat/forum was implemented within it, 
targeted of course at music enthusiasts. Annelies de Bruine, another Dutch person recruited 
by Geelhoed, was the researcher working on both the Caf6 and the Music Pier, but HP 
Labs' commitment towards this was clearly very limited, as de Bruine was employed on a 
short-term contract and was soon going to move on to other occupations. 
These sporadic attempts at actually establishing some form of public space within the 
digital city remained isolated within the wider context, and had a short life. Erik's Caf6, 
despite formally occupying a space on the main pier for quite a long time, had rarely been 
active and accessible, and disappeared completely with the third re-design of the interface. 
7.5 INTERACTIVE? NO THANKSI 
The interface of Digital Bristol, as mentioned already, had been initially conceived to 
exploit a 'harbour' metaphor, and above all to make a relatively heavy use of Java routines 
that would allow end-users to navigate the information space effectively and still keep a 
view of the whole. The harbour metaphor, together with the Java-enabled navigation tools 
built into the digital city, allowed visitors to zoom in or out within the scene, and enjoy a 
sense of place. It was also considered to be an important feature that all inhabitants, 
individual users, community groups, and institutions, were sharing the same information 
space and 'graphically' lived together (Westerfield, 1997; 28). 
This approach focusing on what for the time was a high level of sophistication, 
requiring relatively high specification computers, was however not seen as appropriate by 
229 
Chapter 7- Bristol goes digital 
everybody in the management committee, and the interface was quickly re-designed in late 
1997. The 'version 2' of the digital city kept the harbour metaphor and the relative imagery, 
only slightly changed, but dropped most of the Java contents to retreat to plain HTML (tile 
basic World Wide Web Iangyua-ge). 
Again, the adjustment and re-designing of the interface was a clear sign that tile DDS 
paradigm was not really acceptable to the other partners. Stuart Long argued that the 
Council was receiving complaints from most of the users about the ineffectiveness and 
slowness of the Java site (Long, 1997), and Linda Skinner described this Situation 
highlighting the conflict in vision and aims that had been developing: 
"There are these two dýf . 
krent layers qf technical research and 
'making it happen'. People who are interested in the technical 
aspect do not want Java to be removed, while those who are trying 
to use the digital ciýv getfi-ustrated " (Skinner, 1997) 
This decision to get rid of the Java-based interface by the management committee 
meant that even the name of the initiative itself would go through a re-definition. What had 
started as 'Digital City Bristol Interactive' or DCBI, became simply 'Digital City Bristol', 
clearly stating that the focus on interaction was not going to be crucial any longer: 
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"Atfirst it was called Digital City Brisiol Interactive, hit/ we had to 
drop the Tbecausc ive are aware that it is not vei-Y, inferactive. The 
whole idea of''Eric's Cqfý'was to have a chat place, und again that 
has not happened " (Long, 1997) 
Indeed, in the year 2000 a further and yet more radical redefinition ofthe digital city 
took place, with the addition of new actors In tile management group. These ma . jor changes 
led them to abandon the 'spatial metaphor' interface, getting rid of the 'harbour' concept, 
and adopting a far more traditional newspaper-like faqade. 
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Figure 7.4 - The new, non-urban interface of Digital Bristol 
This in a way was the sign that the initiative had completed a cycle to re-define itself 
as an information broadcasting facility about Bristol, dropping the emphasis on electronic 
public space altogether. Digital City Bristol yet lost another word in its narne. 'City' was 
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dropped to leave it as 'Digital Bristol', something very different - if not opposite - from the 
DDS-like environment initially envisaged by Geelhoed. 
7.6 INTEGRATING PHYSICAL AND VIRTUAL 'STRATEGIES? DCB 
AND THE PLANNING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF 
BRISTOL 
What we have seen so far could already suggest that the initiative was not meant to 
have a bearing on the planning of Bristol at all levels. The non-central role of the City 
Council in the management and development of Digital Bristol, as well as the lack of 
interest in going beyond the shared goal of shaping up a digital city for networking and 
self-promotional purposes, certainly played a significant role in keeping public 
participation - as we have seen - and planning issues in general out of the agenda. An 
interesting 'between the lines' indication of this can be drawn from Linda Skinner's 
considerations on why and how UWE could find DCB relevant: 
-HP envisaged that the next generation of computers would rely on 
people being visually aware, and not just numerically. UWE is an 
ex-polytechnic with a strongjaculty of arts, media and design, and 
a strong computing section as well. This possibility of making the 
two communities work together was seen as very desirable" 
(Skinner, 1997) 
What is interesting in this sentence, apart from what had been said, is what had not 
been said, or recognised. Indeed, UWE had - and still has -a proactive faculty of the Built 
Environment, with a strong focus on planning. However, no mention of any relevance of 
DCB for UWE's planning section came from Skinner's analysis of the situation. Indeed, no 
connection or specific interest from the planning researchers and lecturers of UWE towards 
the digital city could be observed. In other words, the digital city was a computing and 
media exercise. 
This impression was confirmed by the visit and interviews in the Council, that 
revealed how weak - if it existed at all - was the link between planners and IT strategies - 
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and people - in the city, and how little the ICT initiatives were being considered as relevant 
by those who were supposed to deal with the economic development of Bristol. 
It has to be said that the Council was supposed to have a vision linking its ICT 
initiatives to planning and, in particular, economic development strategies in the city. Long, 
in another document produced to present Bristol's strategies for IT in the community, had 
written that 
"the City Council 'IT in the Community'project is an integral part 
of wider City Council strategies and initiatives, particularly those 
related to economic regeneration, community involvement and the 
development ofproductive partnerships with other sectors " (Bristol 
City Council, 1997-2) 
However, if the IT section of the Council seemed convinced that the municipality's 
IT strategy, and indeed the digital city that was always mentioned as an important part of it, 
was going to boost Bristol's economy, no indication of this was coming from the economic 
development section within the same institution. The Economic Development Strategy of 
Bristol City Council had been outlined by a document published in 1995, dealing with a 4- 
year long programme. This document presented a quite traditional approach to 
regeneration, or anyway a definite lack of consideration for the potential and impacts of 
new technologies. The 44-page long document scarcely mentioned ICT in relation to the 
city's development and management, apart from some brief and superficial remarks (less 
than a page) on the importance of the presence of a growing media and high technology 
industry in Bristol (Bristol City Council, 1995; 16), however this was not associated with 
any concrete references to ICT implementation. 
It has to be acknowledged that Julian Mellor, the economic development planner who 
was interviewed for this case study, was supportive of an ICT initiative that could affect 
Bristol's economy, but this, rather than Digital City Bristol, was a privately run project 
called 'SmartWest'. SmartWest was considering putting Bristol-based firms on the World 
Wide Web, and was linked to the so-called Internet Business Park, set up by HP and "run 
by mail marketing as a completely private initiative" (Mellor, 1997). So, while the IT 
department of the City Council was hailing the ICT strategy and the digital city as a crucial 
233 
Chapter 7- Bristol goes digital 
part of innovation for Bristol's development, the economic development section of the 
same municipality was relying on a totally different, and completely private, initiative. 
SmartWest however was not a priority for Mellor and his colleagues, and when asked more 
precise questions about it, he seemed to have a very limited knowledge of what the 
initiative was meant to achieve, and how. Moreover, the Council's economic development 
staff were at that very moment refurbishing their own WVW site to provide information to 
businesses. So, the digital city, and what it could have offered was basically ignored. 
Mellor was quite explicit about this lack of interest, saying that 
"at the moment I could not honestly tell that we are promoting the 
information society to businesses. Not that we would not like to, but 
it is a matter of priorities and resources. I spend 5% of my time 
working on the information society" (Mellor, 199 7) 
It has also to be noted that the main focus for Bristol's economic development 
strategies was - as was the case of many other cities - on marketing the area and attracting 
external investment, rather than trying to generate some form of endogenous economic 
rebirth. The general vision about the World Wide Web and the Internet, and what it could 
do for business in Bristol, was very much focused on place promotion and provision of 
information for the outside world: 
"From the point of view of us as users there is the way we promote 
information through the Internet and the Web. It is making 
information more accessible to people who are overseas and can 
manage property searches, for example. There are all sorts of 
potentials" (Mellor, 199 7) 
This perspective limited the vision and interpretation of ICT implementation in 
general as ways to broadcast information from Bristol to the rest of the globe, thus 
contrasting with the community-based character that the digital city was supposed to 
develop. In his interview Stuart Long claimed to feel this tension between the 'global' 
ambitions of the economic development strategy and the needs of local small enterprises 
(Long, 1997). So, despite the fact that in Bristol there seemed to be no strong concerns for 
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local businesses to be represented in the digital city (Geelhoed, 1997), a lack of a proper 
and shared strategy towards encouraging local firms to exploit Digital Bristol was in fact 
stopping this from happening. Pete Wignall from HUB45, a Bristol-based internet company 
that had been invited to become part of the management team of DCB, sent some 
interesting comments to Linda Skinner in October 1997. Wignall lamented exactly the lack 
of a more 'grounded' ethos of the digital city, beyond the promotion and networking 
exercise, stating that 
"if ways can be found of making it easy and cheap for small 
businesses with rapidly changing offerings to put them before their 
local clientele much more quickly than by press or broadcast 
publishing, if sports, entertainment and leisure concerns can 
provide short-notice details to their customers; and if matters of 
public concern can be debated widely in real time then there will be 
a genuine enhancement to the potential quality of life of the 
region's citizens" (Vignall, 1997) 
More generally, those responsible for the urban planning of Bristol were completely 
unaware of the potential and indeed the impact-related issues that the emergence of an 
urban virtual space could have generated. It can be argued that the general attitude was that 
of considering the issue irrelevant mainly because of a reactive, rather than proactive 
approach towards physical and functional planning: 
"There is no immediate concern about this [the emergence of 
digital city initiatives]. Planners can identify the themes, but cannot 
see them happening yet. With a lack of hard evidence of what the 
implications really are, they have difficulties of putting this into 
planningpolicies "(Mellor, 1997) 
So, the chance of proactively using the digital city for innovative planning actions 
was completely overlooked, considering ICT as a phenomenon totally detached from 
planning, which could in the future have generated problems or issues to react to. Mellor 
identified the 'wiring' of the city and the emergence of electronic communication as 
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something "big" that would have a heavy impact on people's work patterns, future office 
space requirements and infrastructure planning (Mellor, 1997). However, this perspective 
was indeed far too 'linear': new technologies happen, produce impacts, and planners have 
to react to these with policies. No consideration was given at all to the fact that planners 
could decide to step into the process of development of local ICT, and contribute to its 
shaping. Planners were keeping out, busy with other matters. 
7.7 POPULATING DIGITAL BRISTOL: CONSTRUCTING VIRTUAL 
CITIZENS 
It has been mentioned in the section on communication and public discourse that 
although bi-directional exchange among citizens had not been supported strongly enough 
within the digital city's management team, the theme of making the information society 
inclusive and accessible had been somehow addressed. After all, one of the main 
characteristics of Digital City Bristol was its aim to 'host' WWW sites created by 
community organisations as well as individuals living in the city and, to make this 
successful, access had to be encouraged. 
In general of course it was everybody's concern to create a body of users of the 
initiative. On the surface, the target for the users' profile seemed clear and agreed within 
the management team. Digital City Bristol was aiming at mainly 'community groups', 
providing free space for individuals, but clearly with a minor emphasis with respect to what 
had happened in Amsterdam. Erik Geelhoed saw the growing involvement of community 
organisations, that were getting free Web space within the cybercity, as a winning point of 
DCB: "There are a lot of community voluntary groups that you would not find easily in 
many digital cities. Two piers are already ftill with community groups" (Geelhoed, 1997) 
However, more deeply the different visions of the digital city, and therefore different 
interpretations on who the end-users should be and what they should be allowed to do, 
produced a 'fragmented' approach towards the 'construction' of the digital citizens and 
above all to the strategies to boost access to the virtual environment of DCB. 
As seen in the literature review, the three main topics of universal/social access to 
ICT in the city, the problems of coping with IT literacy levels, and the barriers generated by 
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age, gender, ethnicity and diversity in general form the framework employed to analyse this 
aspect of Digital Bristol's development and policies. 
7.7.1 ACCESS FOR ALL OR AN ELITE PLAYGROUND? 
The theme of universal access to urban IT infrastructure appeared to be a strong 
commitment in the City Council's IT-related agenda, and indeed the municipality was the 
actor that had planned a course of action to allow disadvantaged citizens to access the 
Internet. The vision was that "IT infrastructure is increasingly as important as roads and 
buildings" (Bristol City Council, 1997; 6) and therefore access to it could not be left only to 
the well-off. Stuart Long reinforced this in his interview by saying: 
"Why should people that are economically disadvantaged be 
jurtherly disadvantaged? This is why people should be able to 
access Digital City Bristol. The social inclusion argument is really 
a big one. Thefact that my children can use an expensive computer 
with multimedia encyclopaedias and some of their schoolmates 
cannot, does not seem right to me, and it does not seem right to the 
Council" (Long, 1997) 
In practice, this aiming towards an inclusive local information society translated into 
one ma . or policy and action from the Council: the funding and establishment of public j 
access terminals, freely accessible computers located mainly in public libraries. Initially the 
installation of sixteen terminals had been planned, of which fourteen were going to be 
located in local libraries (Bristol City Council, 1997; 4). 
Bristol City Council was serious about this, and in fact in the following years the 
number of public access points in the city grew considerably, to reach a much better 
penetration. In June 2001, four years later, the number of public computers or kiosks had 
risen to eighty-five, located in forty-seven different public or semi-public spaces in Bristol, 
twenty-seven were in libraries, ten in community centres, and ten in other buildings such as 
museums or charities (Digital Bristol, 2001). 
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This was of course a very relevant move towards facilitating access to the digital city 
itself, but it has to be noted nevertheless that it was an isolated action towards boosting 
inclusiveness, and not much more was being done to address other aspects of the same 
problem by a wider strategy. Public access terminals can be important to grant access to the 
Internet and the local intranets, but because of the nature of the shared machines offered, 
with all the time and operative limitations, they can allow citizens to read materials and 
access information, but they can do little to allow people to self-represent and participate. 
This was even truer in the case of Bristol, where the self-representation in the digital city 
was supposed to be enabled by the creation and maintenance of individual or organisational 
Web pages, something that could hardly be done from a public terminal. So, access was 
being encouraged by the Council, but mainly in the form of an ability to read information. 
Delivering content, or in other words 'broadcasting' to citizens was clearly going to be the 
main emphasis of the initiative: 
"Developing local content for local people is an important part of 
the project and significant progress has already been made at 
several of the community-based Public Access Points. The City 
Council is particularly keen to work with other agencies to enable 
public access to a wide range of electronic content, and is also 
exploring opportunities of working with the Benefits Agency, the 
Employment Service and other government agencies" (Digital 
Bristol, 2001) 
It could be argued that here lay one of the reasons why the 'residency' of individual 
Web sites - in the harbour's boats - was never a success. Mark Day was pointing at 
"English reserve" (Day, 1997) as the main cause of the lack of popularity of 'boat' spaces, 
and indeed he had a point in saying that "People do not know what to put in their home 
pages. I have been doing my personal one for a while, and I have the same problem" (Day, 
1997). 
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However, the difference between the relative success of individual self-representation 
in Amsterdam's DDS 'houses', and the deserted Bristol boats could also be explained by 
the difference in the emphasis on interaction and two-way communication in the Dutch 
case, and the growing dominant broadcasting ethos in its British 'equivalent'. Whilst 
orgamsations and charities could well be interested in the option of 'broadcasting' and 
opening their own virtual shop xindow, and indeed they would have been in general better 
resourced than individuals to take the opportunity, private citizens were offered a systern 
that as a matter of fact recognised and placed them as audience, not participants. Mark Day 
seemed to acknowledge that a more comprehensive strategy for boosting access was 
desirable by saying: "May be that providing accounts to the community groups could be a 
key element to involve them, but at the moment they have to buy them from ISPs" (Day, 
1997). Erik Geelhoed was also insisting on the bi-directional deficit of Digital Bristol as a 
239 
t-qpio -. 3 -- The empty'boats'in Digital City Btistul's harbour 
Chapter 7- Bristol goes digital 
possible key factor for the lack of involvement and the low taking-up of 'virtlial 
residencies': 
"Another thing that could make the digital city more attractive and 
encourage people to make their homepages is giving people waýys of' 
communicating with each other in the same way you can do it in 
Amsterdam the advisory committee will have to decide whether I 
to remove this aspect. fi-om the digital city or make it a reason of' 
success - (Geelhoed, 1997) 
However, as we have already seen, none of these facilities had been or were going to 
be implemented, and the setting up of the public access terminals looked like an isolated 
action, rather than a part of a wider strategy. 
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Some of the reasons for the significant yet limited action by the Council could surely 
be found in a relative weakness of British local authorities and in a consequent lack of 
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money to invest. Bristol City Council was also too young to have been able to gain a 
relevant position within the Europe-wide circuits of cities, such as Eurocities or Telecities, 
and this was limiting strongly its ability to bid successfully for EC funds. When questioned 
about the chance of implementing wider policies and actions for boosting high-quality 
citizens' access to the Internet, such as giving residents free accounts to be used from home 
or subsidising the provision of computers for low-income households, Stuart Long was 
very explicit about the limits they had to work within: 
"We are in a crisis ofpublic funding. I do not really see how we 
could ever afford to offerfree Internet to the citizens. We are having 
enough trouble funding nineteen or twenty public access points 
(Long, 1997) 
But lack of funds was not the only factor affecting the overall attitude of Digital City 
Bristol towards the encouragement of citizens' access. It is also important to remark that 
this specific digital city was not a council-driven initiative, and that the other partners could 
have done their bit towards encouraging more inclusive usage. Again, radical differences of 
interpretation of the nature and role of the digital city were going to influence the shaping - 
and the non-shaping - of the strategy to attract end-users. 
If Bristol City Council was in fact keen to encourage universal access, although to a 
somehow one-way digital city, UWE's agenda seemed definitely diverging from this. The 
strong interpretation from Linda Skinner of the digital city as an innovative way - and 
pretext - for influential actors in Bristol to liase and work together, was in fact clearly 
implying that universal access was not an important issue that had to be dealt with by the 
owners of the initiative: 
"Everybody would like to havefree access, but the Council is very 
impoverished and does not have the resources to invest in similar 
things. The UK government has claimed to want to invest in 
schools. The possibility of getting connected through the electrical 
wiring and the electrical companies could radically change things. 
But the digital city is not about achieving this. It is more about 
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getting organisations and individuals to work together" (Skinner, 
1997) 
Indeed, Skinner was seeing this project as mainly an enviromnent created for an elite 
of executive people within the city, who really needed to communicate effectively and 
broadcast their decisions, whilst the majority of citizens could be informed by this or other 
more traditional - and one-way - media: 
"I am not saying that this has to replace other media. It adds to 
them, but the radio stations could contribute to communication. It 
allows people who have responsibility to communicate with people 
who can disseminate messages " (Skinner, 1997) 
So, it seems evident that the tension between the 'broadcasting' digital city and the 
more complex 'participative' one that was noted in the section on public cyberspace and 
participation, was really a central, crucial theme within the Bristol case, and that the first 
paradigm was winning over the latter for a series of reasons involving interpretation as well 
as financial constraints. Broadcasting of course implied the existence of broadcasters, who 
were going to be an elite of individuals and organisations empowered to use the digital city 
to its full potential, and convey messages to the wider audience of the citizens, for whom 
access was mainly the ability to read and retrieve information. A three-tier structure seemed 
to take shape, in which managers and key institutions had control over the cybercity, 
community organisations were empowered to have a voice, and were offered some training, 
but had no control over the shaping of the environment, and citizens ended up as audience. 
Consideration at the level of the community organisations can further enrich the 
understanding of this model. 
7.7.2 WHAT REALLY IS'COMMUNITY'? SELECTING WHO ACCESSES 
HELP AND TRAINING 
Although the 'community' orientation of Digital City Bristol was recognised by all 
actors involved as one of its major assets, it is worth considering what 'community' was 
going to mean within this specific context. The word itself can be used in several different 
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ways, so that it can refer to a 'holistic' social entity corresponding with the whole city - as 
it was used by the Council in their 'IT in the Community' manifesto, or it can refer to 
particular social 'fragments' of a strongly diverse city. It should be noted, also, that 
generically defined 'community groups' were supposed to get the benefits of free training, 
offered to them by UWE (Geelhoed, 1997). So, what community, or communities, are we 
talking about in the case of Bristol? 
Despite the fact that Bristol definitely is a very diverse city, hosting for instance a 
numerous Caribbean and Asian minority, as well as a town with two universities and a 
consequently large student population, the perspective on 'community groups' in DCB had 
initially a very clear emphasis, and it was relatively narrow. Mark Day helped define this. 
"I say community groups broadly speaking, but they are mostly charities that involve arts 
and culture" (Day, 1997). On the one hand, this is to be expected, as the project itself had to 
find leverage somewhere to kick off its offer of Web spaces, and arts groups that would 
have been naturally interested in experimenting with new media could be a good choice. 
Needless to say, HP had a lot to learn from these multimedia experiments, and it was keen 
to encourage them. This interest was evident for instance in the 1999 conference on 'Music 
on the Web', held at HP Labs and openly linked with the ongoing experience of Digital 
Bristol and its virtual spaces (de Bruine, 2000; 121). 
Some institutions had also been approached, above all Avon Health Authority had 
been offered training to become an information provider within DCB. 
Certainly a large number of groups were considered for help and some form of 
training. As Mark Day said in his interview there was a mail shot geared at 250 different 
organisations in the city (Day, 1997). However, the fact was that everything was eventually 
dealt with by one individual, Mark Day himself, who had complete responsibility for 
organising and physically providing advice and training. This shows the limited nature of 
the concrete perspective on the involvement of communities. This actually reflected, again, 
the interpretation of DCB as a research project that both UWE and, to some extent HP, had. 
A one-man-band managing the involvement and literacy of people could hardly be enough 
for even a small research project. It was obviously too little for a growing digital city. 
Indirectly confirming this, Linda Skinner was very focused and precise in who UWE 
wanted to include in terms of communities: 
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"We do not want to involve everybody. This is still a pilot phase, 
and we just want to work with three different groups, and do it 
intensively. The first one is the 'health pier' and we have worked 
hard and long with the Avon Health Authority. This is a major 
success and evidence that digital city Bristol produces results ( .. ) 
The second pier is the 'community groups'. We encourage them to 
think that they need a presence, and once they have a presence to 
monitor what actually happens - what they do, what it takes to get 
involved. The third group are businesses" (Skinner, 1997) 
So, although DCB's main aim was allegedly targeted at communities, linking it to the 
wider Council IT strategy as well, the limited character that the initiative ended up having, 
and the difference in the interpretation of what it should be about, narrowed the practical 
application of this vocation. Ethnic minorities were not in the picture at all, and were never 
mentioned by any of the interviewees - or indeed the documents obtained - and other 
sections of Bristol population, such as schools and pupils, were identified just by one actor 
(Geelhoed, 1997), but not addressed for lack of resources and, possibly, interest. It can be 
argued that Digital Bristol was opening up to an institutional or cultural elite that was 
instrumental to its immediate success as a research operation. It had defined the restricted 
environment it had to operate in its early stage of development, which could well be seen as 
a sensible and viable approach, but at the same time it had not defined any medium and 
long-term strategy towards involving the complex mosaic of people inhabiting the city of 
Bristol. This was clearly denounced as a problem of the project by Annelies de Bruine, who 
highlighted the lack of participation of more citizens in publishing and indeed shaping the 
digital city: 
"At the moment people see Digital City Bristol as a top-down 
organisation, although that is not the intention of the partners 
involved in the project. More citizens should get involved in 
building and maintaining the digital city. The management 
committee should think about a policy how to involve the people of 
Bristol more" (De Bruine, 2000; 122) 
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But Digital Bristol was going to further transform itself, as it has been already 
mentioned in the section on interactivity, towards a more static and traditional model of 
civic website. 
7.8 REDEFINITION AND STABILISA TION OF THE INITIATIVE: NEW 
ACTORS, NEW VISION AND INTERPRETATIONS, CHANGED 
ATTITUDES AND TENSIONS 
Shortly after it had been launched officially, Digital City Bristol was already in the 
need of a re-definition, as the power of novelty, together with the initial targets set by some 
of its shapers, had started wearing off. All of the main actors involved were recognising 
elements of success, which were of course related to their own expectations from the 
project. Obviously the shared goal of facilitating partnership, and linking some influential 
Bristolian organisations had been achieved. 
As we have noted before, the City Council was certainly satisfied about the image 
return from the operation, its coherence with the wider 'IT in the Community' strategy, and 
interestingly the fact that the Council's own website, clearly linked and advertised on 
Digital Bristol, had increased its visibility. The marketing of the city and of the Council 
itself seemed to work fine: "The most frequently visited areas of DCB are in fact the city 
council pages, and within our pages the tourist information and 'about Bristol' pages are 
the most popular" (Bristol City Council, 1997; 6). 
Hewlett Packard Labs had been able to do some 'live' experiments with Java-based 
community networking, and content distribution, enacting their 'good neighbour' policy. 
UWE had started networking with the other two important actors involved, and had carried 
out some prominent research and development. 
However, differences and divergent visions had soon become stronger than the good 
reasons to work together. The cohesion of the management team, and above all the 
trajectory of the project and its momentum, had suffered because of these different 
interpretations and expectations. 
As a result, despite a certain amount of self-confidence manifested in talks by the 
interviewees as well as in their documents and papers, Digital City Bristol's role and 
character were not very clear at all towards the end of 1997. And indeed tensions and 
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dualisms were going to last throughout the two or three years to follow, if we have to judge 
things from de Bruine's paper presented at a conference at the end of 1999. In her paper she 
still refers to the tensions existing between the DDS-based paradigm supported by 
Geelhoed, and the broadcasting model that was increasingly becoming dominant: "It is 
important to focus on communication in the web site to make it more than an information 
database" (De Bruine, 2000; 124). 
Several similar tensions had been developing between different aspects of the project. 
The limited resources, both human and equipment, allocated to the digital city were 
appropriate for a research operation with a limited scope, but definitely insufficient for a 
fully-fledged civic service, even if just mono-directional, as noted by Stuart Long: 
"What happens with many of the directories on the Internet is that 
they are started on the wave of enthusiasm byjust one bloke in his 
bedroom, but then keeping them up to date and working is 
demanding and they do not go forward. That is why DCB needs to 
have a proper organisation, with staff, money, etc. It has to be a 
mini-business. It needs to have a life of its own " (Long, 1997) 
And Mark Day, who was in fact acting as a "bloke in his bedroonf' described by 
Long, confirmed that the pressure was mounting and making the project unsustainable: 
"I knowfor afact that in the nextfew months I will be overworking. 
Almost everybody who is being mailed by us replies asking to be in 
the directory, and many want a Web page and they need assistance. 
So the answer is no, I do not think that one person can be enough 
(Day, 1997) 
Another important issue that was creating problems was about the interface and 
functionality of the digital city. We have seen how strong the dualism between the 
participative paradigm and the broadcasting one had been. This was clearly reflected in the 
rejection by some partners of the initial concept design of DCBI, and its radical 
transformation that has already been mentioned in the previous sections, abandoning the 
DDS-like model: 
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"The fact that the design was derived from DDS Amsterdam has 
had also a potentially bad influence over some influential people in 
Bristol, who have made some negative comments about the design 
like 7t looks madefor a eight year old"' (Skinner, 1997) 
Still connected to this, a 'browsing vs searching' dualism had been developing, about 
what was best for the digital city's interface. This was not just a matter of technological 
preference, but a dilemma deeply rooted in the different conceptions of the initiative. 
Geelhoed claimed that DCB had to be 'browsed' to make people do more than just 
retrieving the specific bit of information they needed (Geelhoed, 1997), a perspective very 
similar to those observed in the literature review about creating 'virtual sidewalks' and 
forcing people to interact. At the same time Day, who was working for UWE, complained 
exactly about the fact that too much browsing was involved, and that people had to 
download pages they were not interested in, before reaching the relevant information (Day, 
1997). This was of course a perfectly legitimate thing to argue, if the digital city had to be 
considered a 'civic database' service, but it was nevertheless totally opposite to Geelhoed's 
position, and his vision of a communicative, bi-directional, 'social' environment. 
What was DCB at the end of 1997 and in the following years? The interpretations 
that had contributed to start it, could also contribute to terminate it, and all of the actors 
could let the initiative go downhill without losing out significantly, having already enjoyed 
a series of benefits from it. 
Most of the envisaged trajectories that had motivated the partners had either reached 
their end or not progressed at all because of tensions in the different approaches. Bristol 
City Council, although willing to keep collaborating in the project, had always kept itself 
on the safe side by relying on its own 'corporate' Web site that was linked to the digital 
city. If DCB had to die, this would not have too heavy a bearing on the Council's 
operations, and many of its initiatives could find another platform to be put onto. UWE had 
reached its networking aims, and did not have the capacity for letting the project grow 
further and in a sustainable way. Skinner was "not going to be upset if [the digital city] 
dies" (Skinner, 1997) and was openly considering a change of ownership for the initiative: 
247 
Chapter 7- Bristol goes digital 
"This is a phase when we are starting debating about 'what to do 
next' after the pilot phase is ended. How do we hand this thing to 
the city? Do we want it to continue and what do we want to 
develop? This means that somebody else will have to get 
ownership" (Skinner, 1997) 
HP had experimented with innovative interfaces and Java, and as the experiment was 
gradually diverging from the initial intentions and paradigm, Geelohoed himself was 
willing to hand the project over to someone else: 
"Linda Stewart and I got the thing off the ground, but as we went 
along we started talking to more and more people. These people are 
part of the advisory committee. This committee has just met once 
with the view to work towards a sustainable model of the digital 
city. The running of the digital city in thefuture will have to do less 
and less with me, and I will tend to concentrate on research rather 
than practicalities " (Geelhoed, 1997) 
So, Digital Bristol had really reached the end of its first phase of development. The 
partners had got some of the things they wanted out of it. The project was seen as having 
the potential to reach a critical mass of publishers and users that would make it 
unmanageable with the current, scarce resources. Sustainability was a key issue, and one 
that the current owners did not want to face on the frontline. 
There seemed to be an agreement among all of the main actors on the fact that 
ownership of the digital city had to be handed over, to start a second phase of development 
of the initiative. This was mainly seen as stemming from the need to make DCB 
economically sustainable: "Sustainability is the issue now. How we take this from a 
research project to a mature thing" (Long, 1997), and: "All of this does not come cheap. If I 
see one thing that is going to stop it from working, it is going to be money" (Day, 1997). 
Someone with money, or with the ability to turn the project into a money-making 
enterprise, was needed. 
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But the handing over process was not going to be an easy one, and in fact it would 
take a much longer time than expected. Beyond the agreement on the need to find new 
managers, clear tensions had been developing among the three partners. This looked like a 
consequence of several factors such as the loss of momentum and interest from the actors, 
the fulfilment of the initial, narrow common aims of the group, the emergence of the 
fragmentation of the paradigms and the shift towards a broadcasting one, and the crucial 
gradual withdrawal of the central technological entrepreneur, embodied by Geelhoed. 
Stuart Long was explicit about these growing tensions, confirming much of what has 
been argued so far: 
"The taking over process is going to be much more dijficult than I 
expected at the beginning, because there are some tensions. They 
are organisational tensions. For example, HPs vision about this is 
-I guess - that people would buy more computers etc. UWE are a 
research academic institution, and this is from their point of view 
an interesting research project. It also publicises their courses and 
the university. In a way we could have a similar view, as we have 
developed quite a substantial Web site that will continue even if 
DCB does not ( .. ). Each of the organisations has different 
objectives towards the site. Ericfor instance is very keen on the 
Java side, for obvious reasons. But we are getting complaints about 
Java from most of the users. So, where do we go? Do we drop the 
Java? HP would not be very happy about it. UWE will have new 
research projects coming along that could be more exciting and 
innovative than this, and their interest may wane overtime" (Long, 
1997) 
In order to discuss and plan the future of the digital city, an advisory group had been 
formed, including up to sixteen representatives from businesses and organisations based in 
Bristol. However, the effectiveness of the committee was doubtful, possibly because of the 
fact that the obvious fragmentation of ideas and possible trajectories was weakly managed 
by the core management team. Pete Wignall from Hub45, a member of the committee, in a 
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letter sent to Linda Skinner lamented a lack of definition of strategy and direction for the 
initiative, arguing that such uncertainty would make it difficult for an external organisation 
like his to decide to get involved (Wignall, 1997). The advisory committee was not 
providing a real answer to the urgent problems of DCB, being itself encumbered by 
fragmentation and lack of direction, as shown by De Bruine's remarks a couple of years 
later: 
"An advisory committee, which represents a range of citywide 
community, business, and training organisations, exists to gain 
valuable grassroots feedback and advice. Yhe advisory committee is 
a group of around sixteen organ isations from all sectors with focus 
on voluntary sector involvement. The advisory committee meets in 
theory quarterly and is chaired by a Councillor from Bristol City 
Council. In fact this group meets very infrequently and has not met 
for some time " (De Bruine, 2000; 113) 
As mentioned earlier, eventually some new partners would emerge, one of them from 
the advisory group, to re-shape the digital city as an information service and a relatively 
smart directory for the city and area of Bristol. In a way was adopted what had been left in 
terms of a trajectory by the previous management team: a broadcasting paradigm that 
seemed to be the lowest common denominator for DCB. This attracted two new partners: 
Kaliba Netgates - formerly City Netgates -a local software house and Internet Service 
Provider, able to provide infrastructure and hosting, and the Bristol arm of the BBC, which 
confirmed that the broadcasting paradigm was becoming dominant in the digital city. In 
June 2001, nearly four years after the handing over process was supposed to begin, the 
new-look Web site of Digital Bristol was launched, and with it the so-called phase two of 
the development. This was still supposed to becharacterised by "The introduction of more 
interactive elements to the website, to include virtual meeting and communication areas, 
multi-media and interactive spaces and dynamic news feeds" (Digital Bristol, 2001-2), and 
Erik Geelhoed was still mentioned as an active member of the management team. But 
observations of the site carried out in 2002 still revealed a digital city completely geared at 
being a hi-tech directory for Bristol-related sites. Although no further interviews could be 
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carried out in 2001-2002, and therefore hard evidence is not available on the reasons for 
this, it could be argued that the many years in which the initiative had not been interactive 
and participative, and the consequent trend that we have mentioned, could well have 
contributed to the 'stabilisation' of the idea and vision behind Digital Bristol as a 
broadcasting, mainly mono-directional urban facility. 
7.9 CONCLUSIONS 
This second case study has been dealing with another supposedly advanced example 
of Web-based digital city, developed within a different context, and through a different 
approach, than the first case. The analysis of this case study has reviewed the arena, 
processes, and interpretations that were behind the electronic fagade of an interesting civic 
Web site. This has proved invaluable to understand better how this technology and its 
development trajectory are strictly related to factors that are essentially non-technological. 
It has also enriched the knowledge of the digital city phenomenon in Europe, by dealing 
with a Northern-European case. In particular, the following issues have been raised by the 
case study: 
Digital City Bristol underwent a very long 'pilot' phase in which there was great 
uncertainty in its development trajectory and feasibility. Although this limited its capacity 
to actively attract and retain citizens/users, the potential to grow seemed to be there, as 
proved by the worries for its future economic viability, and lack of resources to 
accommodate demand. So, DCB could have relatively quickly reached a critical mass of 
users if a clearer, more concerted and proactive strategy had been in place. 
The presence of a partnership and a management group which did not limit the 
ownership of the initiative to just one actor, had the potential of letting the digital city reach 
different parts of Bristol's communities. Having the Council and university working 
together, for instance could have meant being able to address groups that often have little 
contact, and could have facilitated their participation. However, the balance between 
converging interests from the partners on the one hand, and fragmented visions and 
interpretations on the other, proved to be an extremely delicate - and crucial - element of 
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the digital city's life. The common aims of the partnership were weak and short-term, and 
some of the very reasons that had generated the idea and initial paradigm for Digital Bristol 
had been never fully accepted by some of the partners, making the project quickly lose its 
momentum. 
Leadership from the main technological entrepreneur - Geelhoed and HP - had been 
strong and visionary at the beginning, but as some of its main ideas were being 
marginalised, this had weakened, and the central role was not been taken over by anybody 
else. This case study seems to confirm how crucial the role - and presence - of the 
"champion" of the technology is, as indicated in Guthrie and Dutton (1992; 592). 
Despite the fact that the partnership involved three very important entities within 
Bristol, the level of participation within those organisations was extremely low. Moreover, 
no professionals of the Built Environment were in the picture. No planners and economic 
development people, for instance, were involved on the Council side, and the digital city 
was being dealt with only by the IT section of the municipality. Likewise, on the UWE 
side, nobody from the department of the Built Environment had been included. So, the 
potentially beneficial effects of the partnership were greatly compromised by the lack of 
inclusiveness and communication within the single organisations. For the same reason, no 
serious perspective on the role of the digital city in relation with the planning of the real 
one had been developed. 
As a consequence of the previous issues, the winning paradigm in Bristol ended up 
being what could be seen as a 'lowest common denominator' among the interpretations of 
the main actors: the digital city as a broadcasting entity, from organisations and institutions 
to people. All the two-way, community-building communication elements that had been 
envisaged at the dawn of Digital Bristol had been losing support, and were never properly 
developed, apart from some short-lived, voluntary experiments. 
The only really inclusive policy to be implemented came from the Council and its 
initiative to establish a good number of public access points to the Internet in the city. 
However, this remained only loosely related to the development of the digital city, and did 
not have corresponding 'soft' initiatives to facilitate the establishment of a public 
cyberspace and encourage debate and public discourse. 
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CHAPTER 8- WHAT CAN BE LEARNT FROM BOLOGNA 
AND BRISTOL? 
8.0 INTRODUCTION 
Having observed and analysed the case studies of the digital cities of Bologna and 
Bristol, this chapter aims to compare and cross-reference the two narratives in order to 
identify common and different results within the main themes of the cases, and try to 
explain these. 
As Yin (1994) notes, it would be a mistake to try and generalise conclusions from 
a multiple case-study strategy in the same way as could be done from a survey. Cases 
should not be considered as a significant 'sample' of a wider population. Therefore, it is 
important to be aware that the results of this part of the investigation could not be 
generalised as 'what happened for all digital cities in Europe at the end of the 1990's'. 
A survey to give some answers to such a question was conducted as the first half of the 
strategy of this project. 
However, the insights that nevertheless came from the two case studies that were 
carried out, ideally complemented the survey work, providing a chance to investigate in- 
depth some of the underlying themes and possible explanations of the ways two very 
prominent digital cities were being shaped. 
Yin (1994) argues further, that it should be a very similar approach to scientific 
experiments, where replication and non-replication of results inform and modify 
theories, and leave scope for further and more sophisticated experiments, rather than 
providing generalised evidence. 
Due to the explorative nature of the whole study, as well as to the fact that the 
field of investigation was relatively new, little pre-existing theoretical basis was 
available to explain the shaping of digital cities. The survey and the case studies could 
contribute towards the construction of a basis to interpret and observe this new 
phenomenon. 
This chapter is organised in sections that address the main issues that the study on 
the two cities raised. These issues have a direct link with the main research questions 
that were determined by the review of the literature. They relate to the social arena 
involved in constructing the digital city, and its ownership, to the relation between 
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digital cities and strategies for urban economic development, to cyberspace as an 
extension of the public realm and the social access to it, and to the relation between 
physical and virtual town. The chapter aims to show how different interpretations and 
adopted paradigms affected the development of the cases considered, and their specific 
characteristics. It concludes by considering how processes of interpretation and social 
construction can be at least as important as the 'contents' of an initiative, in determining 
its fortunes, and its character. 
8.1 PUBLIC VS PRIVATE: WHO OWNED AND CONTROLLED 
THE DIGITAL CITY? 
Although superficially it could be said that both Iperbole and Digital City Bristol 
were the result of a partnership among different agencies, and that in both cases some 
sort of 'convergence' of aims had facilitated this, comparing the two would highlight far 
more differences than similarities. The different socio-economic and political 
contingencies played a major role in the initial shaping of the two initiatives. The Italian 
digital city was configured as basically a Council-driven enterprise, with the other 
partners playing an important role on the technical side, but ending up holding a much 
less central position as far as the decision-making was concerned. Omega Generation 
had started as a proactive partner within the initial phase of design, but had gradually 
concentrated on the software development and its commercial exploitation with other 
public administrations. CINECA offered consultancies and services, without really 
assuming active co-ownership of the initiative. In Bologna, the role of the public 
administration as the sole owner of Iperbole was really never questioned by anybody. 
This is likely to be associated with the fact that Southern European local authorities, 
especially those governing major cities, tend to have considerably more power and 
autonomy than those in other countries, especially the UK. Although governance issues 
are getting more important in Italy, and more and more locally operating municipal 
companies are being privatised, city government still retains a great degree of 
prominence in urban affairs, and it is much more likely for a public administration to be 
perceived as 'the city' as a whole, rather than just one of the actors of a very fragmented 
institutional picture. This seems to be confirmed and reinforced by the more general 
observations drawn from the survey work on a good number of Italian cases, where 
single council ownership tended to be the prevalent model. 
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In Bristol, on the other hand, the municipality tended to follow a logic of co- 
operation and co-fanding of the initiative that would not just involve elements of the 
private sector participating in decision-making, but would allow industry - in this case 
HP - to lead as the co-ordinating partner. 
Whilst in Bologna the initial 'vision' for the digital city was mainly born within 
the council's walls, with a local politician and councillor setting the shape of things, in 
Bristol it came from an HP employee who then started 'selling' the idea to the 
university and the local authority. 
This obviously had its implications in the public/private relationship and in the 
way this relationship was interpreted and managed within the two digital cities. 
1perbole had been conceived as a timely alternative to any form of commodified 
urban cyberspace that sooner or later would have been sold in the city. It was the 
concretisation of a very clear political statement from the left-wing politicians and 
intellectuals who were opposing a growing ethos of privatisations in the country. 
Iperbole was intended to arouse attention well beyond the boundaries of the town. 
Initially at least, it was a highly symbolic initiative against the right-wing liberal politics 
of the government lead by the media tycoon Silvio Berlusconi. It was going to 
symbolise the medium of the left wing, interactive rather than mono-directional in the 
way of Berlusconi's television channels, free to access and liberated from advertising of 
all sorts, including the political ones. Moreover, Iperbole was also meant to boost 
political and administrative transparency within the council-citizens' relationship, a 
need strongly felt in bureaucracy-haunted Italy. 
So, Iperbole had to be almost exaggeratedly public, lead by the local authority as a 
means to grant universal access to the Internet to its citizens, reinforcing its social 
mission but also its perceived need to control the virtual environment in order to avoid 
any feared commercial contamination, or any chance of groups or individuals exploiting 
the net for their own political advantage. 
Digital City Bristol had to be managed in a totally different way. The council had 
a much weaker influence than its Italian counterpart within the urban scene. However, it 
could be argued that it was itself responding - positively in this case - to the political 
climate and the guidelines set by the country's central government, by which the need to 
launch and manage initiatives by public-private partnerships was becoming an 
imperative. The mixed ownership of Digital Bristol meant that the initiative was not 
going to be run by a municipal office - as in the case of Bologna - but by a 
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n=gcmcnt committee including rcprcscntativcs from the three actors. Having been 
generated by the pri%-atc sector, although Eirk Gcclhocd"s vision . %ms inspired by a non- 
profit and inclusive cntcrprisc such as the early Digital City Amsterdam, the Bristol 
experiment was much less %vary of private or commercial influences on the digital city. 
Indccd. one or the main reasons for pursuing this partnership from all parties %,. -as 
openly a promotional one and4 in the case of the city council, a clear emphasis on the 
economic dc%-clopmcnt potential or urban cyberspacc, rather than universal social 
access as in 11oloSm's case. 
In the t-. %o cases them sccmcd to be a correlation, thcrcrorc, between the specific 
socio-political contingmics at the time of the establishment of the digital cities, and the 
way they urm initially organiscd and shaped. This in a %%-ay would not come as a 
surpriw. as it confimwd pmious case studies on the construction of urban technology 
initiatives. such as the %%-otk by Guthrie and Dutton (1992), which gives reasons to 
reflect on these case studies. 
In gcncr; il. the obscmation of Ipcrbo1c and Digital City Bristol suggested the 
validity of thc social constructi%ist theories and approach to technology. Despite the fact 
that the tuo initiati%vs u-cre devc1oped roughly at the same time, and by implcmcnting 
vcry similar icchnological devices - primarily the World Wide Web - in two Europcan 
cities. the choices bchind their shapes and fortunes were dictatcd by political, 
cconomical. and social visionsý and the related interpretations of what a city is and how 
it %-OILS. 
8.1.1 THE LEADERSHIP FACTOR: TECHNOLOGICAL 
ENTREPRENEURS AND THE DIGITAL CITY 
One of the main and most interesting findings of the research carried out by 
Guthrie and Dutton %%zs the mcial importancc of clear and committed leadership, for 
tile succcssful initiation of an urban computcr-mcdiatcd communication project. 11cy 
noIcd dut: -in cach city. a particular department emerged as a primary proponent of an 
inromution utility. Abscnt this champion, it was not built" (Guthrie and Dutton, 1992; 
592). 
The mo case studics of this thesis seem to confirm the importance of this issue, as 
boil, fpctbolc and Digital City Bristol bccamc rcalitics, through the activities of their 
nuin icclinological cntrrpmncurs, %%ho %%-crc, at least in the initial phases of 
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dcvclopmcnt. the constructors of the arena, by their activities in enrolling other actors 
and parincm as wcll as being the pro%idcrs of the visions that would help 'sell' the 
initiative and give it a trajectory. 
Tbc paxtncr-Jiip bct-. %-ccn Bonaza and Guidi in Bolognawas particularly effective 
as it could addrtss diffcrcnt audiences such as local politicians as well as office 
managcrs and -. %, otkcrs of the council. Tbc strong political vision from Bonaga, %vas also 
%-M tin-xly and 3cccptablc by the leaders of the Italian lcft wing, a fact that provided a 
very good lc%-cl of support from the local and national press. 11at same vision ended up 
generating - and gaining acccptance of - the strong statement and policy about 
univcwl acms and fm-c Internet in Bologna, that although it would make much less 
sc= no%vadiys. as many telecommunications companies arc offering 'free' Internet 
deals. was at the time sccn asa truly rcvolutionary move. 
We Juvc also sccn how Digital Bristol %%-as conceived and promoted by Erik 
Gcclhocd of I IC%vlctI Packard, %% ho before anything else managed to sell the idea to his 
o-. %-n company and his managers. I Ic actually started a preliminary study that outlined 
same or the main %isions bchind his conception or the digital city, and that were then 
uwd to draw in othcr actors - even though these ended up having some quite different 
cxpwations. But it can surtly be argucd that without Gcclhoed, Digital Bristol would 
not hive bccn born. as the council had an ambitious but dcrinitcly less 'holistic' agenda 
to pursue about IT and the city. 
ror both cascs thcrc uvm, of course, some further important contextual factors to 
be takcn into account. Tbc cultural, economic and technological 'climate' of the time 
could be s= as a fundamcrital rcason for the establishment of these initiatives. The 
cnttcptcncurs %%rtc lacilitatcd' by the historical moment. The 1990's, and their second 
hair in junicular, %%rrc the idcal context in %vhich to launch an Intcrnct-based urban 
initiative. and indccd, any lntcmct initiative. The 'hypC' %vas high about new 
icchnologim the mcdia scrtsitivc and interested in what %vas happening, and IT giants 
like III, %%ctc rnorc than Lccn on investing and going for areas that dcrinitcly looked 
able to providc a stccp and long-lasting growth. If Gcclhocd or Bonaga would have tried 
to &scll* the digital city idca in 2002 - at an all-time point of low conridcnce in the 
cconomic patcnti3l of IT cntcrpriscs - the story might well have been different. 
Tile othcr factor that was playing a major rolc in inspiring and giving credibility to 
11011, ptOicct Icadcts %%-as the cnicrgcncc of other similar experiments of virtual 
cornmunitics lu5cd on the utban mcuphor in the US and Europe. In particular, the more 
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mature and highly cclcbmtcd digital city in Amsterdam, better known as DDS, %%-as very 
, wcll known to both project tcams. and indeed had directly inspired Gcelhoed's vision. 
It is also important to notice, homvc%vrý that in both cases the 'weight' of the main 
technological cnttrprcncur and of his. 1hcr %isions tended to weaken or disappear with the 
advancctncnt of the dc-s-clopmcrit process, and the emergence of other actors' visions 
and nccdL This was c%idcni both in Bologna and Bristol, and it showed how less 
vision: try and Icu potentially innovative the initiatives were becoming as both Bonaga 
and Gcclhoed's influcn, -cs lost momcntumL This was particularly true for the idcas of 
cstablishing a parallcl "cybcr" form of public space, which had initially driven both 
digital citim although %%ith slightly different emphases. Ipcrbolc and Digital Bristol 
tended to bcconx vchicics to dclivcr a relatively fragmented series of services or 
inforrnation. UNIc the Italian cybcrcity could still benefit from a certain amount of 
colictmc gi%-cn by its "single o%%-ncrship' and the continuous presence of Lcda Guidi, 
Digital Bristol found itself ficing - since the end of 1997 -a dcrinitc lack of leadership, 
and a conscqucnt crisis or identity and doubts over its viability, that eventually resulted 
in a radical change of ownership. mission, and design. 
The pfcscricc or a strongly motivated and visionary technological entrepreneur 
wnu thcrtforr to have been crucial for the initial success of both the initiatives, 
rcprdlcs. s of %% lictlicr this promoter was coming from the public or the privatc sector. 
8.2 LOCAL VS GLOBAL: HOW WERE LOCAL ECONOMIC 
BENEFITS PURSUED? 
Wcfc 111c 1%%o digital citics obscrved pursuing c1car stmtcgics for the cconomic 
dc%-clopmcm and rcgcncration of thcir host places? \\Iiat \\-as the attitude towards 
businas and cconomy in gcncral? How wcrc lpcrboIc and Digital City Bristol 
addrruing the wnsion bct%%-ccn plobally oricntcd cconornic actions, and locally bascd 
oncs? 
Iloth Initiativcs had bm bom and dcvclopcd with a clear awareness of their 
poicnti: il for the promotion of placcs and organisations. Indecd, onc of the main 
functions of both c%pctimcnts %vas promotional, althougli in somcwhat. narrow tcrms. 
ljologna City Council . %-as counting on lpcrboic as yct anothcr c1car sign of its 
cajucity for innovation and Icadership widiin the clubs of Europcan local authoritics, 
sucl, a, % Eutmitics and Tclccitics. Ilis was incvitably going to havc a wcight in the 
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municipality*s ability to %in EC funds, and to be a very desirable partner for joint 
rcs, carch and dcvclopn=t projects. At the national level, Ipcrbolc, %%-as a strong image- 
minfoming cxcrcisc for the lcft uing party governing the city, in a critical moment of its 
life. So. Bologna's digital city was hca%ily marketing its creators and managers - the 
Council a. -A of course the political coalition behind it - %%ithin a global 'market' of 
com; vting municipalities. 
This aspect of scif-promotion was very strong in Bristol as well. One of the main 
fcawnsý wW indccd the onc that allowcd the convcrgcncc of partners to%%-ards the digital 
city idciý for DCH was cmating a 'club" of influcntial organ isations %%ithin the to%%m, so 
that op; vnunitics would be gcncratcd for furthcr collaboration. Bristol City Council 
wis obviously intcmtcd in promoting its imagc nationally and with the central 
govcrnmcnt. as a new wul innovativc local authority. 
Apart ftom institutional promotion. place promotion was rclath-cly strong in both 
cities, but not so clcwly dcrincd within the digital initiatives. Obviously these were 
going to contribute. and especially Bristol's policies of economic development were 
heavily gcawd to%wds attraction of cxogcnous investment, but no strategy to do so had 
bccn clewly Liid out in either of the t, %%-o cases. Nor was there a strategy to encourage 
1=1 rrTns to dc%-clop. co-operatc, crcatc a larger market, or get proper visibility on the 
Internet. 
All in all it wmcd thit rather than having a problem of global Vs local economic 
dc%-cloPn-wn1. both Hologna, and Bristol wcre failing to have a strategy for their digital 
cities as caul)-su of regeneration. Bristol City Council mentioned economic 
fcgcncration as the main rcason behind its IT initiatives, but nevertheless failed to 
introduccany clcar guidclincs on how DCB could contribute to this. 
Differcnt rriwns could be identified for the relative lack of cffcctivcncss of the 
tuo digital citics. to%%wds cconornic dcvclopnicnt. As mcritioned before, Bologna had 
bm configumd and run as a %vq strictly public initiative. This had involved rqJccting 
any kind or c()nUncTCi, 2I prcscnce that could compromise the 'purity' of the 
cnvitonnicni. At most thc Council had bccn trying to involve trade organisations and - 
%%I)cn thc city nunagcr got in%-ol%vd in taking dccisions, on lperbolc - provide better 
council sa%iccs to busincs-sm As notcd in the case study, the most busincss-fricndly 
iniliitivc hid bccn the 199S plan to cstablish a Wirtual Industrial District', although this 
%-is anyway going to be just a public dircctory of standard infonnation about local 
businc. *ws. This attitudc cndcd up 'ovcrprotccting" the digital city by keeping out not 
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just the feared media giants and big telecom corporations, but also local, young people's 
enterprises, which would have benefited greatly from the support of the public digital 
city. 
A shared factor between the two cases was local competition. In Bologna this 
came from other information providers, some of which got to the point of suing the 
Council for unfair competition. The municipality had to live with this tension, and leave 
the commercial slice of the market to both CINECA and other private ISPs. Although 
this was quite coherent with the council's protective attitude towards the 'purity' of 
lperbole, it widened the gap between the digital city and anything that could mean 
business and commerce, with possibly the only exception of the 'Million' project for 
local hotels. 
In Bristol, although the more open attitude towards the private sector was going to 
facilitate collaboration with local ISPs - and in fact one of them was going to become a 
manager of DCB in its second phase - firms looking for Internet presence and visibility 
were not encouraged towards the digital city. The economic development section of the 
council was in fact liasing with a private IT company called SmartWest, that was 
providing spaces in a sort of a virtual business park for Bristol. 
As it was noted in the case studies, in both cities the result of this separation 
between the digital city and local companies was in a way equivalent - in terms of 
spatial planning - of stripping the city from its businesses and relocating them in out-of- 
town business parks and shopping malls. 
This phenomenon could be explained by - yet again - considering the 
interpretations of the initiatives given by the several actors involved, as Bologna was to 
be seen as a democratic forum where equality could not be compromised by commercial 
activity, and Bristol was more an inward looking enterprise, for research and liaison, 
than something that had to reach a multitude of local economic actors. 
Limitations of planning policies and attitudes also strongly reflected into the 
digital city. A balance between public and private/commercial interests could possibly 
have been found, but it would have required an innovative approach towards policy 
making, not just the implementation of technological innovation. 
The absence of a clear strategy towards using digital cities to support economic 
regeneration in both cities, apart from a relative lack of interest for this by some actors, 
seemed to reflect a dangerous but frequent deterministic attitude, creating the 
expectation that the deployment of an urban cyber-environment would generate by itself 
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innovation in economic regeneration practices. Some of the interviewees in both cities 
were ready to claim that the Web-based initiative was surely going to be beneficial for 
the local economy, but they were not able to explain exactly how this was going to 
happen. 
Another point to consider was the absence from the picture of those people who 
should have been involved when it came to regeneration: planners. 
8.3 DIGITAL VS PHYSICAL: WHAT STRATEGIES FOR 
PLANNING CITIES? 
The relationship between the digital city and the planning of the physical city, in 
both Bologna and Bristol, could be described through a history of absences rather than 
presences, of non-facts rather than facts. 
This is because, despite an interesting theoretical perspective on the interplay 
between virtual and physical spaces, and cities and telecommunications, which was 
already being developed at the time of the interviews by scholars like William Mitchell 
or Stephen Graham, among others, city planners seemed almost totally uninterested in 
it. 
It is a history of absences from the process of shaping the digital city itself, as in 
both towns no planners were even marginally involved in taking any decisions on what 
Iperbole or DC13 should be like, and what functions they should be carrying out. Indeed, 
in Bristol not even the planning academics of UWE ended up actively contributing to 
the digital city, despite the fact that their university was one of the main players in the 
enterprise. 
Both initiatives had, at least initially, been conceived as (cyber)spaces that would 
allow communication and participation. They were also meant to be 'holistic', as most 
layers of urban information, services, and communities were intended to be included 
and represented. This could have suggested using cyberspace as a planning element, an 
intelligent layer to juxtapose to the physical city to 'augment' or enhance some of its 
functionality. 
But among planners the paradigm that prevailed was the 'broadcasting' one. Both 
digital cities were seen as a vehicle to deliver information from planners to citizens, 
mainly to market what was being done. A few planners could see some value in an 
interpretation of the digital city as a 'tool' that could be used instead of brochures and 
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leaflets, rather than as an actual part of the city itself, that could have played a role in 
the actual town planning. 
The most innovative approach towards the digital city that could be observed in 
the case studies was Gabriele Bollini's ideas of setting up an online interactive GIS for 
enviromnental information within Bologna. This was surely an interesting initiative, but 
still stemming from the vision of the cybertown as a sophisticated planning-aid tool. 
Another way to understanding and explain the absence of planners is to consider 
Bollini himself when he criticised some of his colleagues for trying to keep participation 
mechanisms off their area of work. As the digital city could certainly be seen as a 
possible vehicle for participation, this could end up being an additional reason of its 
unpopularity among some planners, who considered public participation as a nuisance 
and an obsta cle to their work and professionalism. 
For both cases it could be argued that the lack of engagement of town planners 
with information society related themes, including concrete examples of the digital city, 
derived from a reactive rather than proactive attitude towards managing the city, and a 
deterministic way of looking at the development of new technologies as a linear process 
and trajectory where planners stayed at the receiving end. 
The interviews with planners in both Bologna and Bristol indicated that most if 
not all planners saw themselves as people who put things right when they go wrong, 
rather than designers, in a wide sense, of the future. 
This meant serious limitations in thinking strategically. Most planners would 
approach their tasks in a very traditional way, concentrating on one 'fragment' of the 
equation rather than considering all aspects of urban society as well as the possible 
interplay between space and cyberspace. 
All of this demonstrated once again how a cultural and attitude shift was needed 
to address these issues and exploit the possibilities that could come with the new 
technologies, and how the mere implementation of the technology was nearly useless 
without this shift. A stronger emphasis on strategic planning, for instance, would have 
probably helped towards a more active approach with both 1perbole and DCB. The 
characteristics and the limits of the physical city and its planning practices, rather than 
being innovated by cyberspace, hampered its effectiveness and were somehow mirrored 
in it. 
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8.4 CITIZENS, CONSUMERS, AND ELITES: HOW WAS THE 
RIGHT TO ACCESS CYBERSPACE INTERPRETED IN THE 
DIGITAL CITY? 
Iperbole started its operation with a clear and provocative statement from its 
creators about the role of the city council being that of serving citizens and not 'clients'. 
There was a clear will to highlight the differences in interpretations of the users of 
council services between Northern European, more liberal forms of government, and the 
Bolognese social democracy. 
This, together with the already mentioned wariness for any kind of commercial 
influence within the initiative, kept the conceptions of 'users' of the digital city and 
6consumers' well apart and somehow incompatible. The digital city had to be used, not 
consumed. It was an environment, not a commodity. 
Access to the Internet world was seen by Bonaga as a democratic right of all 
citizens, something the public sector should have been providing universally, the very 
same way roads or public lights had to be provided and maintained. Access would have 
been the key to encourage more citizens to get acquainted with the Net, and improve 
their computer literacy and ability to deal with the new frontier of cyberspace. 
This opened the way for what was seen in 1996 as truly revolutionary policy 
making: offering free full-Internet connections to all citizens. In the short term such a 
measure worked out to be extremely successful for Iperbole, as membership grew 
rapidly and beyond expectations. It could be argued that Bologna was certainly one of 
the most cyberspace friendly and aware cities in Europe, if not the most. 
This attitude however changed radically when other actors, like the city manager, 
started getting involved - and Bonaga gradually disappeared from the scene. The new 
management talked more happily about 'clients' and had a more consumer-oriented 
ethos. The city manager was also strongly doubtful of the worthiness of the free Internet 
policy, and claimed that universal access issues were not relevant to him. This was a 
major culture shift for Iperbole, changing its mission from being a 'cyber-place' 
targeted at everybody to becoming a 'cyber-service' for a series of more specific groups 
of council's customers. 
Of course it would not have made sense to keep the free Internet provision alive 
for much longer, as similar offers were starting being available from telecom providers. 
But beyond the practicalities, the shift of emphasis and interpretation of what the role of 
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Iperbole had to be, and who its users were was a major change. The free Internet 
initiative was, apart from its usefulness at the time, a powerful symbol of what the ethos 
of Iperbole was supposed to be. Although, that initiative was becoming economically 
hard to sustain, and pretty out of date anyway, other more appropriate symbolic 
statements on the same line of thought could have followed it, but the shift in 
interpretation did not allow this. 
It has to be acknowledged how Bologna achieved some notable results on the 
accessibility side thanks to strategic thinking, which coupled the mere implementation 
of new technologies with actual policy making at the urban government level. However, 
more could and should have been done in terms of implementing policies to tackle the 
computer literacy, gender and age barriers, as demonstrated by the results of the internal 
Iperbole survey. 
It cannot be argued though that the second, more service-oriented phase of the 
Italian initiative had nothing to do with access. Indeed, better and more versatile 
services could attract people and constitute a strong motivational element to join the 
civic network. 
However, the shift from one interpretation to the other meant changes in the ways 
technology itself was going to be implemented. For instance, at the beginning of the 
project the need for public access points had been identified with the need of deploying 
publicly owned and manned PCs in libraries and public or semi-public spaces. This 
made perfect sense as public participation in debates, and empowerment of the citizens 
through access to the vast repository of information that the Internet was, meant 
enabling people to use a fully-fledged computer. The following phase, though, saw a 
partial re-definition of these expectations, and the implementation targets that came with 
them. Shifting the emphasis from a participative environment to the distribution of 
advanced urban services, meant that the public access points could be identified with 
already existing ATM machines, as what was needed was the ability to initiate simple 
transactions, in some cases involving the transfer of money. So, Iperbole's managers 
started concentrating on ways to liase with local banks in order to enhance their cash 
machines with civic services. Needless to say, a cash machine is not a suitable interface 
for exchanging ideas, finding jobs, or learning about a voluntary group. The idea of 
public PCs was not abandoned altogether in Bologna, but the expectations about this 
were definitely lowered, and the intervention was heavily downsized. 
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In Bristol there was a strong interest from the Council towards granting access to 
disadvantaged groups and in general achieving universal coverage for the access to the 
network. This was a very similar conception of the importance of urban cyberspace to 
that of Bonaga in Bologna was well stated in Bristol's IT agenda, where IT 
infrastructure was seen as becoming as crucial as roads and buildings (Bristol City 
Council, 1997; 6). Whilst Bologna City Council was trying to actively include and grow 
'home' users through its free Internet policy first and the subsidised training later, its 
Bristol counterpart seemed to be trying to boost usage and hopefully literacy through a 
wide provision of public computers. 
Again, lack of an overall, holistic strategy towards IT and the city, and IT and the 
citizens, meant that in Bristol the Council ended up being very active on the public 
access terminals side, but not active at all in other important aspects of the relationship 
between cyberspace and the city. It happened in a different way than in Bologna, where 
the municipality had overall control over the 'soft' side of the cybercity. It has also been 
noted how Bristol was a much younger and less prominent local authority than Bologna, 
within both national and international arenas, and that this meant that Bristol had less 
ability to win external funding, especially from the European Community. 
This concern for universal access was however not mirrored by the interest of 
other partners in the Bristol case, and their way to interpret the initiative. UWE in 
particular had been considering the digital city as a research experiment, and a tool to 
reinforce a network of influential institutions in Bristol. This meant that from the point 
of view of the university, it would have made very little sense to try and include 
everybody, as all that was needed was an interesting 'sample' of participants for the 
research, and a very specific and low number of significant institutions for the 
networking exercise. 
This more 'elitist' view of the cybertown arena, coupled with the financial 
constraints of a situation in which none of the partners was ready or able to invest large 
sums of money, opened the way to a convergence of visions towards a more mono- 
directional digital city, where selected groups could inform the mass. This 
'broadcasting' paradigm - present in many other initiatives as noted by the survey work 
- was in Bristol a sort of minimum common denominator allowing the partnership to 
work together, and head towards handing the initiative over to other actors from the 
private sector. 
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In both initiatives an emphasis was put on organised groups rather than 
individuals, giving the former more rights and privileges. In Bologna in particular, web 
space in the digital city was available only to recognised associations, and their ability 
to update information was strictly controlled, an attitude reflecting the fact that in Italian 
cities the emphasis was very much still on urban government, rather than governance, 
and this was mirrored in the Council-driven cybertown. Bologna City Council was 
keeping a very firm editorial control over the electronic city, as the single owner and 
manager of it. However, even in the Northern European Bristol, control over the digital 
city contents and inhabitants was strong, as the leading institutions tended to select 
those groups and associations that were seen as functional to the project, and 
appropriate for the development of Digital Bristol. Concern about potential damage to 
the image of the owners of the initiative was also a driving factor for controlling access 
and contents. 
So, a tension was apparent in both cases, between the desire to open access and 
allow an increasing number of citizens and organisations to use the digital city facilities, 
and the need to keep 'order', recognisable meanings, and above all retain control over 
urban cyberspace. The case studies confirmed how important it is to consider 
differential levels of access and ability to engage in activities, as explored in the 
literature review. 
8.5 ACTIVE VS PASSIVE ACCESS: HOW WERE THE LEADING 
PARADIGMS AND TRAJECTORIES AFFECTING PUBLIC 
DISCOURSE? 
CityCard/Iperbole started with a clear and very strong emphasis towards the 
construction of a public cyberspace for the citizens to share and use actively. The view 
from Bonaga and the other main actors involved was centred on two-way 
communication between the citizens, as well as between citizens and the public 
administration. Discussion areas as well as facilities to email the Mayor and many 
council offices were put in place early in the project, and kept alive throughout it. 
Beside these, over 400 voluntary and non-profit local organisations had been drawn into 
the digital city, and had been allowed to build their own web-based presence. The 
democratising potential of the initiative was explicitly recognised and fostered by its 
managers as well as the very friendly press commenting on it. 
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Similarly in Bristol the initial intention of the main technological entrepreneur had 
been towards the establishment of a digital city as a communicative place, a people-to- 
people arena similar to the paradigmatic solution that had inspired it in the first place: 
Amsterdam's DDS. The early efforts of Geelhoed and its HP-funded team to define the 
digital counterpart of Bristol were geared towards designing public cyberspace and 
some tools to allow its inhabitants to communicate. 
However, as we have seen in the case studies, the strong emphasis towards public 
participation and public discourse weakened in both digital cities, to the point of 
disappearing almost completely in Bristol. We have also seen that in Bologna, even 
though more had been done to facilitate bi-directional communication and exchange, the 
impacts of this on the enhancement of public participation in the city had been 
negligible. 
Interestingly, a comparison of these two rather different initiatives points at some 
factors that were in common, with some obvious slight discrepancies, to determine the 
lack of effectiveness in enhancing public discourse in both digital cities. 
A main, overall, factor could surely be recognised as - yet again -a deterministic 
expectancy that the introduction of digital technologies at the urban level would 
necessarily induce a change for the better. 
In Bologna, Stefano Bonaga was convinced that the deployment of Iperbole's 
communication facilities would boost governance processes, self-representation, and 
participation in an otherwise increasingly unmanageable city. In Bristol Long was 
foreseeing the enhancement of communication between local government and citizens, 
thanks to the provision of email accounts to Councillors. 
In both cities, the expectations were high, and based on a 'linear' conception of 
the relationship between technological advancements and the urban environment: 
technology was an 'independent' exogenous variable, that was going to have an impact 
- and change - the 'dependent' city. What happened in both cases, instead, was 
somehow circular, or at least bi-directional. Technology might have introduced some 
changes to the city, but it was also evident that the city, its problems, its institutions and 
the way these worked and thought, impacted heavily on technological implementation, 
and changed its trajectory significantly. 
So, in both cities Council officials and several institutions tended to resist the 
innovation, or kept applying old working practices and paradigms to the new tools, such 
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as treating emails the same way as normal letters, and allowing up to 30 days to answer 
them. 
In Bologna, in the wider urban scene, increased public participation apathy was 
not tackled proactively within neighbourhoods, with non-digital strategies, and the 
'technological fix' was expected to work by itself. Evidence shows that it did not, and 
was rather negatively affected by the more general lack of participation, instead of 
changing it. This also reinforced a sort of a vicious circle of interpretation of the 
efficiency of the digital city. Being seen by Council officials and local politicians as 
inadequate and not representative enough, these people would not support it or use it 
properly, thus making it even less effective. 
Another hurdle still very much linked to old practices and visions affecting new 
technologies was in both cases the 'sanitation' of the public cyber-arena, for fear of 
adverse political reactions or 'embarrassment' that could have resulted from people 
speaking freely within public cyberspace. If on the one hand, in fact, a vision of 
governance and openness seemed to characterise the ethos of the early design of these 
digital cities, government and strict control was still going to prevail in the intentions 
and actions not just of Bologna City Council, but of the elitist public-private 
management group in Bristol, too. This was reinforced by the slow marginalisation of 
those technological entrepreneurs who had started the projects. 
Soon, the city was not seen any longer as a complex and fragmented organism 
that could have been managed only by acquiring the local knowledge and creativity of 
its fragments, therefore involving communities heavily in the running of the city. It was 
rather seen as a machine to fine tune, and an audience ready to consume information 
and services, rather than taking decisions or contributing to them. In a way this 
happened too soon, especially in Bristol, where the shift from the DDS-like city 
imagined by Geelhoed to the more controlled and mono-directional environment 
preferred by the other partners, did not allow enough time and resources for any truly 
bi-directional communication facility to be developed and deployed in the digital city. 
So, no public discourse friendly configuration could stabilise at all in Bristol, and the 
momentum of the initial stages did not leave a concrete legacy. 
The 'broadcasting' paradigm became quickly the suitable and successful one in 
Bristol, while Bologna was re-configuring itself as an advanced urban service and 
information site, still retaining its participative facilities, but being able to allocate not 
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enough resources and strategic thinking to make them really work as they had been 
intended. 
8.6 CONCLUSIONS: HOW VISIONS AND PARADIGMS REALLY 
MADE A DIFFERENCE 
Analysing and comparing the early history of the shaping of two leading examples 
of the digital city phenomenon in Europe lead to a series of reflections about the crucial 
importance of the processes that laid behind what could be directly observed about these 
initiatives in terms of their contents and officially declared intentions. 
Visions, it can be argued, were extremely important. And by 'visions' it should 
not just be meant ways to look at technology. How the several actors involved in the 
shaping of these 'digital cities' were interpreting the nature of the physical city, the role 
of government and governance within the urban arena, the meaning of community, and 
their own role within this context, was making all the difference. 
it was noted how important had been the presence of a strongly motivated and 
empowered main technological entrepreneur, and how one or more initial exemplar 
technological solutions could inspire the early design of the initiative. 
But despite this, widespread tendencies to pigeonholing urban functions - and 
therefore actors themselves - had affected negatively the potential of the digital cities 
considered to produce concrete effects in the physical town. On the one hand there was 
a strong culture within municipal organisations reinforcing a clear divide between 
computer people and matters, and planning issues, even if on the other hand the 
problems and issues of the physical city were very much mirrored and relevant in the 
digital city, weakening its potential for innovation in economic and community 
development. 
In both cases there was a clear and strong tension between a vision of the city as a 
fragmented, organic, complex entity or as a machine to control and improve. Different 
needs were associated to these visions, leading towards a more anarchic and 
participative system, or to a more controlled set of advanced urban services and 
broadcasting facility for an empowered political and institutional elite. 
Paradigms were adopted, the prevailing ones being a service facility in Bologna 
and an Internet-based broadcasting station in Bristol, and the relevant urban technology 
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and policies were deployed and run accordingly. A summary of these issues and their 
relation with the evolution of the two projects is provided in figure 8.1. 
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Figure 8.1 - Case studies 
comparison summary 
Iperbole - establishment 
Strong role of 'champion' 
Complex, postmodem city 
Need for communication and 
participation 
Urban cyberspace as a basic 
civic right and public service 
Public sector at the helm 
Institutional promotion 
Political statetement 
DCBI - establishment 
Strong role of 'champion' 
Complex but disconnected 
city 
Need for communication and 
high interactivity 
Strong influence of DDS 
Institutional promotion 
Institutional networking 
R&D opportunity 
--, 
77--- 
Iperbole - evolution 
No 'champion' 
City of 'clients' and 
economic subjects 
Need for effective 
management and services 
Urban cyberspace as a 
vehicle for service delivery 
Participation secondary, and 
as consequence of good 
deliverv of services 
DCB - evolution 
No 'champion' 
City of institutions and 
citizens as audience 
Need for effective 
broadcasting and universal 
information delivery 
Institutional promotion 
lperbole DCB 
Economic Place promotion Place promotion. 
Development Strict public ethos. Businesses 
Only trade involvement 
organisations envisaged, but no 
involved. strategy. 
Businesses kept out Council supports 
parallel initiative 
Relation with No involvement of Symbolic. 
physical city planners, and no Expressed in the 
strategies for interface, but no 
articulating this. involvement of 
Potential for online planners and no 
planning strategies for 
information articulating this. 
Access and users Universal Open to residents, 
subsidised access. but no subsidies. 
Training for Council's own 
content providers, effort for public 
but strong control access terminals 
on contents. 
Limited effort on 
public access 
points 
Support for public Discussion People to people 
discourse facilities as strong arena ethos, but 
point, but no facilities never 
parallel, physical developed 
initiatives and properly. 
overall strategies. Deterministic 
Deterministic hopes 
hopes. 
lperbole DC13 
Economic More open to Open to business 
Development businesses but still links but no overall 
pursuing strategies for 
centralised economic 
governed solutions development 
Relation with Planning and GIS No strategic 
physical city information planning and 
implemented planners involved. 
online, but still no Shifts further from 
strategies for city and gets more 
physical/cyber globally oriented 
articulation 
Access and users No subisdised Increasing 
access. Users as emphasis on 
recipient of selected groups and 
services. Cheap institutions as 
training available privileged users. 
on basic Internet. General population 
ATMs as public as 'audience' 
terminals 
Support for public Changed emphasis Broadcasting 
discourse towards services. emphasis takes 
Participation over. No 
facilities still participation 
present, but in facilities. 
background 
II 
271 
Chapter 8- What can be learrit from Bologna and Bristol? 
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, these observations as well as the 
reflections associated with them cannot be automatically generalised, and they should 
be regarded as results of an experiment. As an experiment, however, they suggest 
possibly important issues to consider for the development of a wider theory about the 
shaping and the deployment of urban ICT initiatives. 
Inevitably, these experiments call for further experiments and research, whilst at 
the same time can provide suggestions for those policy makers and technological 
entrepreneurs willing to innovate or improve their own urban public information and 
communication systems, or simply reflect about them. Indeed, application of the 
recommendations that can be generated by this study will be in itself cause for further 
experimentation on the field, and will allow - if followed by an appropriate and 
rigorous analysis - further enrichment and refinement of the theory. 
The next and final chapter is dedicated to drawing everything together into a 
critical picture of the European digital city phenomenon at the turn of the century, and 
proposing recommendations for the construction and implementation of these 
initiatives, and the further research that should accompany these efforts. 
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CHAPTER 9- CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
9.0 -A MULTI-FACETED STUDY 
In the mid 1990's, the booming technological development of the Internet and the 
World Wide Web seemed unstoppable and destined to grow exponentially. Together with 
the fast deployment of new products for information and communication, both in terms of 
hardware and software, a massive amount of hype was generated in the press, the media, 
and in scholarly papers as well, on the forecast revolutionary and beneficial impacts of the 
Internet on Western societies. This had also encouraged visions of urban futures in which 
information and communication technologies were going to be central to city management 
and the exercise of local democracy. 
This research work has considered one of the most notable urban technological 
developments bom and emerged in the 1990's: digital cities in the European context. This 
study's overall emphasis was on doing 'real world' research rather than indulging on 
forecasting futures, in looking at what was happening 'there and then' and going beyond 
the hype that was dominating the debate on urban new technologies in the 90's. 
Moreover, another significant characteristic of this work was not just considering the 
contents, and what was immediately observable, of the digital city phenomenon, but also 
going beyond these, and looking at the processes, rather than just the products, underlying 
the emergence of these initiatives. 
Such a composite approach was very appropriate to address the complex question of 
trying to understand how European cities were developing their own virtual spaces on the 
Internet, and what consequences this could have for the 'augmentation' of the physical city 
by its digital counterpart. 
This major 'how' question was then addressed through a series of sub-questions that 
identified a clear need to deal with both contents and processes, implementation as well as 
social construction, visions, interpretations. 
The initial survey work proved a valuable way to observe and analyse the 'surface' of 
many city-related web sites, and understand what the state of the art was in the 
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development of such initiatives all around the EU countries. But above all it was extremely 
significant in making sense of the whole 'movement', orienteering in what was very much 
uncharted territory, and creating a content-based typology of these initiatives. 
The case study work was inevitably much more focused, less generalisable - at least 
within a sampling logic that would not suit case study research well at all - but nonetheless 
very enlightening. Case studies provided an insight on what lay beyond the contents and the 
gloss of the web pages. A critical history of two very relevant initiatives was built and 
analysed on the basis of a social constructivist perspective, and this generated reflections 
and ideas that could definitely offer contribution to theory-making on cities and high 
technologies, as well as a deeper awareness to those practitioners involved in creating and 
managing digital cities, who often are far too busy to look beyond the immediate problems 
of deploying technologies and initiatives. 
The purpose of this chapter is to put together results and reflections from the study, 
not just to summarise what was achieved, but to suggest possible ideas for improving the 
economic and above all community development potential of urban telematics initiatives, in 
the light of the findings of this research. 
9.1 HOW CIVIC INTERNET SITES WERE IMPLEMENTED IN THE EU 
The survey showed how the digital city phenomenon within the EU was much less 
homogeneous than might have appeared through the over-enthusiastic contemporary 
comments on the forthcoming civic cyberspace that could be found in newspapers, 
magazines, television documentaries, as well as the some of the promotional information 
produced by organisations like Tclecities or European Digital Cities. 
A wide range of experiments was observed, and indeed the fact that a vast majority of 
these could be identified as having the sole purpose of being a 'global' brochure, or at most 
a static and mono-directional database, helped recognise how implementing a civic web site 
and establishing some local, public fon-n of cyberspace could not be considered to be the 
same thing. The fact that many web sites in Europe were proactive in exploiting the urban 
metaphor to present their information, and called themselves a digital city or a digital 
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community, did not mean that initiatives of this kind were necessarily and thoroughly 
geared at local communities, citizens, and urban regeneration. 
In most cases, the relationship between the electronic and the physical city was very 
loose, and the 'impacts' of those kinds of urban cyberspace on the 'real' environment were 
basically non-existent. 
A typology of initiatives was established, and existing experiments were classified 
accordingly. From this, a group of just over twenty initiatives could be identified as the 
&model' of development of a digital city in the late 1990's, as they tried to address, through 
their contents and interfaces, the needs to provide original, wide-ranging local information 
and accessible participatory cyber-spaces, as well as retain some local emphasis, with 
contents geared at local citizens and markets. These were defined as 'holistic', or 
&embedded' digital cities. 
The in-the-field, qualitative investigation of two of these 'embedded' examples 
derived from the survey lead to an in-depth consideration of those organisational and social 
aspects of the construction of digital cities that could not be observed from a distance. 
Through all of this a series of conclusions and recommendations for best practice in 
developing and managing digital cities could be drawn. 
9.1.1 IN THE EYE OF THE BEHOLDER: OWNERSHIP OF DIGITAL 
CITIES, AND THE NEED TO BE AWARE OF THE VISIONS INFORMING 
THEIR SHAPING 
Throughout this work it was highlighted how crucial different visions about the city 
and its government and governance were to determine the shaping of high technology 
urban initiatives like the digital cities. These however could not be linked directly and 
deterministically to certain types of ownership of the technologies. 
The survey showed that in fact the presence of advanced experiments of the 
gembedded' type could not be related to either single ownership from the public sector, or 
forms of collaboration through public-private partnerships, or indeed sole private 
ownership. 
The study suggested how different ways of owning and managing the initiatives were 
indeed a consequence of the socio-political climate of different countries and realities, and 
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the consequent different attitudes towards city government and governance. But it seemed 
that good practice could not be simplistically linked to distinctions between 'public', 
'public-private', and 'private'. The case studies showed how important it was to look 
beyond those labels, and find out how post-modem, governance keen attitudes and 
operations could be more theoretical than actual within a public-private scenario like the 
one of Bristol digital city. 
What seemed really to matter was the interpretation that different technological 
entrepreneurs would make of the city itself, its management, and the role of digital 
technologies within this context, regardless of whether these entrepreneurs were belonging 
to the public or private sector. 
So, the augmented city with its physical and digital layers, could be seen as a 
machine-like entity in desperate need of central expert control, endowed with an audience 
of citizens in desperate need of efficient information broadcasting, or a complex, nearly 
unmanageable organism of relatively autonomous and intelligent fragments that needed to 
be the real city 'managers', as well as its true repository of expert knowledge. 
The city, through its advanced technology, could behave as the ultimate 'control- 
freak' dream, where the digital town would restore the ability to centrally control and 
govem urban society, or it could be the sublimation of a post-modem vision of wisdom and 
governance of the fragments, enabling community groups and individuals to self-represent 
themselves in the liveliest arena ever available: urban cyberspace. 
Obviously, it could not be among the aims of this research to try to recommend one 
specific 'vision' instead of another. What can be recommended, though, is that a constant 
awareness of what vision is being chosen and is being implemented would be crucial. 
Aims, strategies, and developments should be closely compared, and actions taken if these 
do not match. This involves research and analysis to run in parallel with the design and 
deployment of the initiatives, and inform these. But this is something that no entrepreneur 
really took seriously and that indeed was probably feared, rather than encouraged. The very 
low participation of academic researchers and social scientists in practitioners dominated 
meetings like the Telecities conferences and workshops, and the fact that this participation 
was not proactively encouraged by these organisations, highlights the problem of the gap 
between practice and social analysis. This is as true in 2003 as it was in the Nineties, and 
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the results of this research seem to suggest that a closer collaboration between university 
researchers and technological entrepreneurs could have given the digital city initiatives a 
deeper self-awareness, ultimately making their shaping more coherent and effective. 
9.1.2 THE TROUBLE WITH DETERMINISM 
Collaborative research and reflection could have helped creators and managers of the 
initiatives to be less mislead by the deterministic assumptions that just implementing 
technology would inevitably set a precise, immutable trajectory for the city. 
Technological determinism could be recognised as a factor causing digital city 
entrepreneurs to concentrate solely on the adoption and deployment of specific parts of the 
initiatives, and expecting technological development to become an unstoppable force 
driving change by itself. So, embedded, holistic digital cities tended to be 'planned' only in 
terms of the quantity and quality of their contents and, in the best examples, the ability for a 
large amount of people to access these. As has been noted above for the visions and 
interpretations of the city, what was nearly if not totally absent was reflection or research 
on the processes that were being put in place. The emphasis was put on the final product 
and its features, without considering deeply enough the many possible ways to get to those 
results, in terms of who should be involved and how, and what problems of the physical 
city were likely to be replicated, if not amplified, in the virtual one. 
Indeed, rather than being either an effective control device for a supposedly 
homogenous city, or an innovative and efficient arena facilitating the dialogue among many 
urban fragments, the digital cities observed tended to mirror many of the problems and 
limitations showed by their physical counterparts. It seemed that if technology could affect 
urban society, it was also very true that society could affect technology within a circular 
relationship rather than a linear trajectory. 
This also meant that in Bologna a technological fix to the need for governance - 
envisaged by Bonaga - could not materialise, as the Council's ethos towards city 
management - and so the digital city itself - would still be rather exclusive and 
government-centred. 
But even the apparently more open public-private partnership in Bristol failed to 
really boost and enlarge the public arena, and involve many fragments of the city in the 
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running and shaping of its digital counterpart. This, rather than a technological type of 
determinism, could be related to a political one. That is, the assumption, widely promoted 
by successive central governments in Britain, that public-private concerted action would be 
a recipe for success and sustainability. The Bristol case study proved that the processes and 
choices behind - and beyond - the 'format' were crucial, and that a more composite and 
diverse type of management structure could not ensure 'per se' the enhancement of 
governance and participation in Digital City Bristol. 
9.1.3 PLANNING AND THE DIGITAL CITY 
What could avoiding a technological deterministic attitude mean in terms of the 
planning of the digital city, as well as the relationship of the digital city with the planning 
of the physical one? 
From the findings of this research, it could be argued that the nature of the digital city 
initiative as a process, rather than a product or a tool, should not have been overlooked by 
those responsible for the physical planning of Bologna and Bristol. In other words, it could 
be said that instead of interpreting the cybercity as a 'device, an innovative policy- 
enhancing mechanism that was going to impact on the existing city, its shaping would have 
benefited considerably by identifying it as a complex part of the city itself As shown by its 
ability to mirror existing problems and interpretations, the digital city really was a part of 
the city, not something 'above' it. 
This highlights the extreme importance for cities and technological entrepreneurs of 
fostering a holistic, strategic view for the relationship between the city and its new 
technological artefacts, especially those based on IT. As already noted, urban technological 
innovation is not just about the mere adoption of technologies, in terms of what to 
implement and what not to. Digital cities might have been good for planning, but they 
seemed to require careful planning themselves that would not be disjointed from the 
planning of the physical city. Policy-making for the digital city and for the physical ones 
should not have been interpreted as two completely different exercises. 
Some issues could be recognised as strategically crucial for the planning of digital 
city initiatives. A first issue to be mentioned here is the need for a concerted set of policies, 
not all necessarily directly IT related. This research showed that just implementing a piece 
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of technology, however sophisticated this could be, could not significantly affect or boost - 
for instance - economic regeneration or public participation. 
Rather than being seen as two different strategies, 'digital' and spatial planning could 
have been seen as intertwining aspects - or methods - of the same overall strategic 
planning approach. This could also mean not just employing digital means towards physical 
'results', but the converse as well. None of the digital cities observed in the study, either in 
the survey or the case studies, seemed to be supported by or associated to any 'physical' 
initiatives, apart from the establishment of a certain number of 'public terminal' points in 
the city. In general a very weak connection - or no connection at all - was observed in both 
case studies between strategies of spatial planning, economic regeneration, and public 
participation, and the potential of the digital city. 
But how could this have been otherwise, considering how restricted the 'arena' of 
digital city decision makers had been? This is the second issue to consider, which is 
obviously closely connected to the previous point. 
A factor for more successful and 'embedded' digital cites, seemed therefore to be the 
presence of efforts to construct an arena as complex and diverse as possible, and in 
particular the importance of involving those built environment specialists - architects, 
planners, urban designers, urban economists - who could really build meaningful links 
between the physical and the virtual city. 
The practice of 'pigeonholing' competences and activities, widespread within most 
organisations and municipalities, and observed within this study, seemed to be a serious 
limit for the effectiveness of urban initiatives. This seemed particularly true in the case of 
IT related experiments and policies, where a good amount of conservatism made it possible 
for groups and built environment professionals not traditionally associated with computers 
and networks, to consider the initiative irrelevant to them and their own strategies. 
This lack of involvement was strongly evident within the case studies considered. 
Digital cities were interpreted mainly as something for computer scientists or at most for 
media specialists, and were therefore going to evolve exactly that way, as broadcasting 
'internet stations' with a strong urban flavour but a loose link to city planning and 
economic and community regeneration strategies. 
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9.1.4 - BOOSTING COMMUNITIES? ENTERING THE DIGITAL CITY AND 
PARTICIPATING IN IT 
These limitations to the decision-making arena were evident and crucial when it came 
to making the digital cities really participative, and participated in, so that such initiatives 
could be seen as facilitating public discourse, and expanding the public sphere of adopting 
cities. 
The survey indicated how limited was the percentage of web-based urban information 
systems actively trying to implement some two-way form of communication. The presence 
of discussion areas - or newsgroups - allowing citizens to debate on relevant local issues, 
was especially rare in European digital cities. Moreover, even in those cases where some 
concrete steps had been taken to implement such facilities, the results in terms of increased 
participation, had often been disappointing, as the Bologna case study - together with 
observations of other relevant initiatives (Aurigi, 2000), seem to confirm. 
So, setting up and managing 'public' cyber-spaces where discussion is possible, 
although a highly desirable thing to do, proved to be a necessary but not sufficient measure 
to actually support public discourse. Again, adoption and deployment of technology per se 
could not ensure that a certain, beneficial trajectory of community regeneration and public 
participation could be followed. 
Interpretations of the digital city informed by traditional visions of power, 
government, elitism and the need for top-down control of the urban resource were still too 
rooted in the cases considered to allow for a much-needed, relaxed approach towards 
ownership, ability to publish information, and participative design of the digital city. Users 
were therefore seen and constructed as mainly end-users of an infort-nation service. There 
was a growing tendency to see them as passive, empowered above all to retrieve 
information. Even when local organisations were allowed and facilitated to publish their 
own information, a certain degree of editorial control on the one hand, and the exclusion of 
them from taking part in any decision-making on the shape of the initiative as a whole on 
the other, kept the arena of the digital city protagonists very restricted, and definitely not 
diverse. 
The expectation of creating lively public space within an environment much more 
highly controlled than that of the already battered physical space of the city was hard - or 
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impossible at all - to come true, despite the alleged potential of new technologies. The 
political and managerial climate around digital cities - after the bold and innovative visions 
of the initial entrepreneurs had been fading out - seemed to be much more preoccupied 
about the government - rather than the governance - of cyberspace. 
So, because of these limitations on the number and type of actors involved in creating 
and running the initiative, digital cities seemed to be more inspired by a modernist 
paradigm of the provision of homogeneous, ordered, good for everybody, urban 
(cyber)spaces, than by a postmodemist vision of an environment of autonomous, 
intelligent, empowered fragments that are made sense of, and can collaborate, through the 
power of the new technologies. 
For these same reasons, digital cities were very much a 'pushed' technology - 
something that was not being asked for by citizens, and not necessarily that way - rather 
than an innovation 'pulled' by grassroots' needs. 
it could have been different if participative, inclusive processes could have been set 
up to let community groups take part in the design and shaping of the digital city, 
empowering some of their members to be proactive and able to contribute to decision- 
making. This could have also, very likely, called for the need for a more flexible way of 
designing the cybertown, a way of allowing growth but above all customisation. If physical 
urban space often carries the signs of the communities, cultures, ethnicities that inhabit it, 
the same was not really true for the pigeonholed, tidy and sanitised urban cyberspaces 
observed in this study. 
9.2 - EPILOGUE: THE NEED FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Although this work provided some answers to its initial questions, by filling some of 
the knowledge gaps on a phenomenon that had been object of very little investigation, the 
need for a better understanding of urban ICT initiatives is certainly far from exhausted. Any 
research work on the one hand can produce results, answers, and sometimes solutions' to 
problems and dilemmas, but on the other hand surely generates new challenges and new 
needs to expand knowledge, as well as the need to constantly test and validate what has 
already been defined. 
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It could be said that this was particularly true for this study, as the phenomenon it 
dealt with was so new and little developed and explored, that a great deal of further 
research, as well as refining of methods to conduct it, would be definitely needed. 
Three general areas or needs can be identified, to envisage further work. 
First of all has to be mentioned the strong need for more 'vertical' longitudinal 
research. Although this study provided some observations and reflections that cover a time 
span of up to 4-5 years, its main focus and richness of materials was about digital cities in 
the late 1990s, and in particular it was able to take an accurate snapshot - both 
quantitatively and qualitatively - of what had been going on around 1997. Although World 
Wide Web technology has not changed very substantially since then, other changes have 
occurred, such as a relative reduction of connectivity costs. 
Above all, the socio-economic situation of European countries has changed since the 
1990s. In particular, the attitude from private companies, investors, policy-makers, and the 
general public towards IT and telecommunications innovation has changed dramatically 
since the so-called 'technology bubble burst' of the beginning of the millennium. Much less 
hype and irrational expectations from technology characterise the very historical moment 
when these final sections are being compiled. As Cassidy notes, an overall more balanced 
approach towards the potential of new technologies to radically change the economy, and 
society, is now being employed: 
"There are several reasons why the New Economy argument turned 
out to beflawed. One of the most basic was that it exaggerated the 
role that information technology plays in the economy. Despite the 
rapid growth of the Internet, firms still spend more money on old- 
fashioned capital equipment, such as drills and welding machines, 
than they do on computers, telephones, and other information 
gadgets ( .. ) Wings have to be attached to planes; roofs have to be 
put on houses; airbags have to be installed in SUPs. The Internet 
helps with the planning and organization of such tasks, but it 
doesn't turn screws or lay bricks. Nor does it operate on patients or 
serve businessmen lunch " (Cassidy, 2002; 318-319) 
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Many - if not all - high technology companies are going through the most difficult 
phase of their life and operations, with many e-businesses bom right at the end of the 1990s 
having already gone bankrupt. 
This climate inevitably is going to affect interpretations of technologies, their 
potential and viability, and the images associated to them, from policy makers, politicians, 
entrepreneurs and community groups. It would therefore be extremely interesting - and 
indeed useful - to consider how these different visions can affect the deployment and 
shaping of urban ICTs now, and in the near future. 
Also, these societal changes will have very likely affected the viability and survival 
of many of the initiatives that were surveyed in the study. It is extremely significant, for 
instance, that probably the most famous example of digital city in Europe, Amsterdam's 
DDS, although still existing has in the past few years radically changed its characteristics 
and lost its paradigmatic role as an Internet-based community based on a clear urban 
metaphor. Lovink explains that 
41 D.. By 1998-99 the free DDS facilities were available everywhere. 
Scores ofnew commercial providers and services hadpopped up all 
over the place (such as Hotmail, Geocities, and even free dial-up 
providers), offering the same services (often more extensive, better 
ones) than the DDS was able to provide. Thefree Internet services 
advertised massively and attracted a customers pool far removed 
from the idealistic concerns that used to inform the original Digital 
City. This resulted in a substantial quantitative, but more 
importantly qualitative, erosion of the DDS user base. Even if the 
absolute number of accounts had risen to reach an all time high 
mark of 160,000 in early 2000, an analysis of the use patterns 
showed that these could no longer be considered conducive to 
community building or even to socio-politically relevant 
information exchange - homepage building and upkeep for 
instance, no longer attracted much interest. The once so valuable 
website had turned into empty lots. Despite an overall growth of 
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Internet use, the Digital City had lost its attractiveness for users" 
(Lovink, forthcoming) 
It would be important and meaningful, therefore, to rethink the role and aims of 
existing digital city experiments, as these might have been modified by pressures coming 
from the commercial world, needs changes, as well as subtle but extremely important 
changes in the ways we now 'live' our ordinary everyday lives with high technology rather 
than considering it something new and revolutionary. 
Haythornthwaite and Wellman, in their interesting edited book The Internet in 
Everyday Life, support some of the considerations made so far and argue that 
"The rapid contraction of the dot. com economy has brought down 
to earth the once-euphoric belief in the infinite possibility of 
Internet life. It is not as if the Internet disappeared. Instead, the 
light that dazzled overhead has become embedded in everyday 
things. A reality check is now underway about where the Internet 
fits into the ways in which people behave offline as well as online. 
We are moving from a world of Internet wizards to a world of 
ordinary people routinely using the Internet as an embedded part of 
their lives. It has become clear that the Internet is a very important 
thing, but not a special thing" (Haythornthwaite and Wellman, 
2002; 5-6) 
So, we could expect to observe a set of somehow different aims as well as 
interpretations and usage patterns of urban ICT. 
Is there still a role for digital cities in Europe? There might well be, although these 
initiatives could tend to be a much less 'hyped' phenomenon, something that on the one 
hand has to deal with a much more mature public, technologically speaking, and on the 
other has apparently lost its aura of innovation, to become yet another everyday 'object'. 
Agre claims that 
"Computing is to become ubiquitous and invisible, industrial design 
is to merge with system design, and indeed the very concept of 
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computing is to give way to concepts such as writing reports, 
driving to work, and keeping in touch with one'sfamily. Computing, 
in short, is increasingly about the activities and relationships of 
real life, and the boundary between the real world and the world of 
computer-mediated services is steadily blurring away " (Agre, 
forthcoming) 
So, we can probably expect to see digital city initiatives becoming more ordinary and 
less 'revolutionary' - and indeed we have seen this beginning to happen somehow within 
this study's observations. Cybercity-style projects will somehow possibly be even less 
'visible' as well-identifiable entities within the urban arena. But they would not be less 
relevant for our lives, less worthy of observation and analysis, or even less present. 1perbole 
in Bologna is still there, still works, and is probably used by far more people - and in a 
more thorough way - than it was in the second half of the 90s. The difference - or at least 
one of the differences - is that it is now become 'ordinary'. Newspapers have stopped 
celebrating it, and maybe less students are interested in writing essays and dissertations 
about it. 
These are all very good reasons why further study and concentration on urban ICT 
projects and digital city-like initiatives should be welcomed. If digital cities are becoming 
more 'hidden', this should probably encourage scholars not to lose sight of them. As 
Stephen Graham suggests for a wider context: 
"Ais is an important stage of development because technologies 
often have their biggest effects on society when they become, in a 
sense, invisible because they are takenfor granted and assumed. In 
many cases this shift to invisibility is both a metaphorical and a 
physical one. People fail to notice technological artefacts and 
connections because they cease to be novel or exciting. But those 
technological artefacts and connections also tend to become more 
hidden, more miniaturised, and more embedded into the every day 
environment of homes, workplaces, transport systems, artefacts, 
and cities" (Graham, forthcoming) 
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This also makes this particular study on the origins of the digital city phenomenon a 
useful basis to keep observing how the Internet and the World Wide Web are being 
deployed and used within our cities. 
It would be particularly interesting and relevant re-designing the survey - taking 
account of all the changes mentioned so far - and taking a new snapshot of the situation a 
few years later, as well as extending the case study histories to 2003 and beyond. More than 
being able to compare the results from the two surveys directly - something that in this case 
should not be expected to be possible - this would help greatly identifying new trends and 
overall attitudes towards civic ICT. 
Coupled with the previous issue, the need for further 'horizontal, research is 
inevitable. This study was obviously affected by its constraints of time and money 
available. A deeper and more complex methodological approach to the survey, allowing an 
expansion of the sample examined as well the observation and analysis of more aspects of 
the initiative, would have returned a more accurate reading of the phenomenon. Even more 
importantly, further case studies would have reinforced - or maybe contradicted, but 
certainly enriched - the arguments, theoretical issues, and recommendations, developed 
within this research. Indeed, it would be expected, for the logic of 'replicating the 
experiment' of case study research itself, that more cases are considered to widen reflection 
and deepen knowledge of the digital city phenomenon. This would be particularly true 
given the need - stated before in this section - of re-defining the digital city concept and 
observing its latest developments. 
Last, but possibly not least, there is the need to apply the research guidelines to real- 
world experiences. It has been mentioned before how collaboration between academic 
research and actual policy-making would have benefited the initiatives by providing, 
perhaps uncomfortably, useful in-depth knowledge gained from a detached viewpoint. It 
has to be mentioned here how beneficial this collaboration could be for academic research 
itself, by opening up more avenues to acquire knowledge, and above all by providing a 
'test-bed' for the research findings and recommendations. It would be most important to 
apply some of the principles and suggestions stemming from works such as this one to a 
real-world urban ICT project, in particular something involving public participation, willing 
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to put them into practice, in order to check and refine on the field - through further 
observation and research - the theoretical and practical issues at stake. 
More in general, it would be necessary to add flexibility to the 'digital city' concept, 
as increased use of the WWW for the implementation of a variety of services is surely 
widening the scope of projects that could still fall within the cybercity category. If on the 
one had we can reasonably expect that urban brochure-like websites can still exist - but 
have surely stopped impressing anybody - many other ideas and urban technological 
'fragments' have been thought and developed, adding complexity to the overall picture of 
the digital city phenomenon. 
Indeed, this increased complexity calls now for research that can concentrate on 
looking at the many tasks performed by 'digital city' projects and facilities, and the 
articulation of these within the economy of city management and regeneration. 
In the 1990's could be legitimate to concentrate on those relatively few examples of 
Web implementation in major European cities. Now, however, the much higher penetration 
of high technologies into urban and regional environments, coupled with the increased 
functionality of these implementations and the availability of facilities not just from one 
centralised source - the 'digital city' as we have considered it in this study - but from a 
variety of public and commercial actors, suggest that a more task-oriented, regeneration- 
focused approach, rather than a Web-focused one, is necessary to make sense of this 
increased complexity. 
As noted before, many of the services and facilities that had such a strong symbolic 
role in the 90's are now becoming 'ordinary' aspects of our everyday lives, and our 
everyday cities. As Gumpert and Drucker note: "Where does the 'digital city' exist in the 
scheme of things? By this time, all cities, whether by design or by accident, whether in a 
deteriorating or renaissance state are, to some degree, 'digital"' (Gumpert and Drucker, 
2003). This research has itself - as the case studies it has dealt with - inevitably been 
influenced and characterised by the strength of a paradigm - the digital city as an holistic 
Web-based resource - which had emerged towards the end on the century. But the 'digital 
city', in its wider sense, is here to stay, and most of the reflections of this thesis will be 
useful and relevant for further investigations on how urban cyberspace evolves in the 
future. 
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APPENDIX Al 
EUROPEAN DIGITAL CITIES - PILOT SURVEY 
NAME: CITY: COUNTRY: 
URL: 
Ownership/Management Public, local authorities a 
Academic institution b 
Joint venture public/private c 
Totally private d 
Advertising Direct, present on public pages a 
Indirect, through the presence of firms sites b 
Not present at all C 
Access (economic side) free to everyone a 
Partly charged for b 
Fully charged for C 
Access (selectivity) Fully or partly limited to non-local users a 
Full access to everybody b 
partly limited to local registered users c 
Fully limited to local registered users d 
Language local a 
local + some parts in foreign language b 
local as much as foreign language c 
foreign language only d 
Information Mainly own information a 
Mainly links and third party info b 
Links only C 
Public Forums local issues + generic issues a 
generic issues only b 
No public forums C 
Tourist Information with full list of hotels and other businesses a 
with partial list of facilities b 
only descriptive C 
not present d 
Interaction very high - e-mail, usenet, forms, transactions a 
high - e-mail, usenet, forms b 
e-mail to multiple subjects c 
e-mail to webmaster only d 
No interaction at all e 
Interface Well designed and relatively fast a 
Overloaded with graphics/scripts, slow b 
Poorly designed, not friendly at all C 
Personal pages and links Free Individual pages + local groups + firms a 
Charged individual + Groups + firms b 
Firms only (local + global), local privileged c 
Firms only (local + global) d 
Only global firms and global links e 
No guests, no links f 
Urban public Services, Wide range a 
Local Information Limited range b 
Few descriptions only, no updated information C 
No offer of services/local information d 
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APPENDIX A2 
NAME: 
URL: 
Ownership/Management 
Advertising 
Selecbvity 
Language 
Information 
Public Forums 
Tourist Information 
Interaction 
Information Providers 
Individual Pages 
Urban Public Services 
Local Information 
SURVEY ON EUROPEAN DIGITAL CITIES 
CITY: COUNTRY: 
Public, local authorities 
Academic institution 
Joint venture public/private 
Totally private 
Direct, present on public pages 
IndirecL through the presence of firms sites 
Not present at all 
Fully or partly limited to non-local users 
Full access to everybody 
Partly limited to local users 
local 
local + some parts in foreign language 
local as much as foreign language 
foreign language only 
Mainly own information 
Mainly links and third party info 
Links only 
local issues + generic issues 
generic issues only 
No public forums 
with extensive list of hotels and other businesses 
only some facilities listed 
only descriptive about the place 
not present 
e-mail, usenet. non-commercial forms, chats 
e-mail and one of the above 
e-mail to multiple subjects 
e-mail to webmaster only 
No interaction at all 
no-profit + firms a no-profit free 
firms b charged 
none c 
free a strictly local 
charged b local privileged 
selected c global 
none d 
a 
b 
a 
b 
c 
a 
b 
c 
d 
a 
b 
c 
a 
b 
c 
d 
a 
c 
a 
b 
c 
a 
b 
c 
d 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
b 
strictly local 
local privileged 
global 
a 
b 
c 
intormation brief desc. Complete - up to date Local Authorities 1 5 
Culture 5 
Free time/Sport 5 
Planning/Environment 1 5 
Traffic/Trans ports 5 
Commerce/Business 5 
Social Services/Jobs 5 
Education 5 
Health 5 
Police/Fire Brigade 5 
Utilities 5 
Other 5 
Wide range (score >25) a Limited range (score > 12) b Descriptions only (score >3) c No offer of services/local information d 
299 
Appendices 
APPENDIX A3 
SURVEY SCORING SYSTEM 
INFORMATIVE Tourist Information 0-20 20-10-5-0 
Information Providersl 0-20 20-10-0 
Public Services-Local Information 0-60 60-40-10-0 
PARTICIPATIVE Selectivity 0-10 0-10-10 
Public Forums 0-20 20-20-0 
Interaction 0-30 30-20-10-0-0 
Information Providers2 0-20 20-10-(0) 
Individual Pagesl 0-20 20-10-0-0 
GROUNDED Selectivity 0-15 0-0-15 
Language 0-20 20-20-10-0 
Public Forums 0-15 15-0-0 
Information Providers3 0-15 15-10-0 
Individual Pages 0-15 15-10-0 
Public services and local information 0-20 20-20-0-0 
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APPENDIX A4 
RELATION SCORING-TYPOLOGY 
VARIABLE OPTIONS INFORM. PARTIC. GROUND. 
Ownership/Managemen 
t 
Public, local authorities 
Academic institution 
Joint venture public/private 
Totally private 
Advertising Direct, present on public pages 
Indirect, through the presence of firms sites 
Not present at all 
Selectivity Fully or partly limited to non-local users 0 0 
Full access to everybody 10 0 
Partly limited to local users 10 15 
Language local 20 
local + some parts in foreign language 20 
local as much as foreign language 10 
foreiqn language only 0 
Information Mainly own information 
Mainly links and third party info 
Links only - 
Public Forums local issues + generic issues 20 15 
generic issues only 20 0 
No public forums 0 0 
Tourist Information with extensive list of hotels and other 
businesses 
20 
only some facilities listed 10 
only descriptive about the place 5 
not present 0 
Interaction e-mail, usenet, non-commercial forms, chats 30 
e-mail and one of the above 20 
e-mail to multiple subjects 10 
e-mail to webmaster only 0 
No interaction at all 0 
Information Providers no-profit + firms 20 
Firms 10 
None 0 
no-profit free 20 
charged 10 
strictly local 15 
local privileged 10 
Global 0 
individual Pages Free 20 
Charged 10 
Selected 0 
None 0 
strictly local 15 
local privileged 10 
Global 0 
Urban Public Services I Wide range 60 20 
Local Information Limited range 40 20 
1 Descriptions only 10 0 
1 No offer of services/local information 0 0 
APPENDIX A5 
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SURVEYED SITES SUMMARY 
SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS: 
" EU cities with 200.000 inhabitants, or more. When in doubt, the city is included. 
" Maximum of 3 sites surveyed per city. So, some of the cities with 3 sites could actually have 
more. In cases where more than 3 sites were found, sites owned by the public 
administration, or'official' sites had the priority. 
" The sites were searched through City. Net and Yahoo. In some cases local directories (as 
CCTA in the UK, or the Dutch Digital Cities Page) were also used. Sometimes some sites 
themselves offered useful links to other local web cities. 
" All of the sites self-defining as exclusively tourist-oriented sites, or present in the tourist 
information section of City. Net, were excluded, unless presenting themselves with an 
explicit name such as 'digital' or'virtual' city. 
AUSTRIA 
Vienna yes -2 sites 
Graz yes -3 sites 
Linz yes -'Linz Virtual City' - site not found 
Salzburg yes 
Total: 7 
BELGIUM 
Antwerp yes -2 sites 
Brussels No Web cities only a self-defining tourist information site 
Ghent yes -2 sites (council + digital city) 
Li6ge yes - other 2 sites down or temporary closed 
Mons No sites 
Total: 5 
DENMARK 
Aarhus yes -3 sites 
Copenhagen yes -2 sites 
Total: 5 
FINLAND 
Helsinki yes 
Total: 1 
FRANCE 
Angers No sites 
Bordeaux yes -2 sites 
Brest No sites 
Clermont-Ferrand No sites 
Dijon No sites 
Douai No sites 
Grenoble yes 
Lens No sites 
Le Havre yes 
Lille yes 
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Lyon yes -2 sites 
Marseille yes 
Montpellier No sites 
Mulhouse yes 
Nancy No sites 
Nantes yes 
Nice yes 
Pads yes -2 sites 
Rennes No sites 
Reims No sites 
Saint Etienne yes 
Strasbourg yes -2 sites 
Toulouse yes -2 sites (offical site found through link) 
Toulon no connection for site at www. tvt. fr 
Tours No sites 
Valencienne No sites 
Total: 18 
GERMANY 
Aachen yes -'Citygate' not found 
Augsburg yes 
Berlin yes -3 sites 
Bielefeld Empty site - under construction 
Bochum yes 
Bonn No sites 
Braunschweig Not found 
Bremen yes -2 sites plus official site under costruction (empty) 
Chemnitz yes 
Cologne (Koeln) yes -3 sites 
Dusseldorf yes -3 sites 
Dortmund yes 
Dresden yes -2 sites 
Duisburg No sites 
Erfurt No sites 
Essen No sites 
Frankfurt am Main yes -2 sites 
Gelsenkirche No sites 
Hamburg yes -2 sites 
Halle No sites 
Hagen yes 
Hannover yes 
Karlsruhe yes -2 sites 
Kiel yes -2 sites 
Krefeld No sites 
Kassel yes 
Lubeck yes 
Leipzig yes -2 sites 
Monchengladbach yes 
Munster yes -2 sites 
Magdeburg yes -2 sites 
Mannheim yes 
Munich yes -3 sites 
Neuremberg yes 
Oberhausen No sites 
Rostock No sites - (there are 2 addresses but no sites) Saarbruecken yes -3 sites 
Stuttgart yes -2 sites 
Wiesbaden yes -2 sites 
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Wuppertal yes -3 sites 
Total: 52 
GREECE 
Athens yes -2 sites 
Thessaloniki yes -2 sites 
Total: 4 
IRELAND 
Dublin yes 
Total: I 
ITALY 
Bad yes -I site was not found and 'RCB' looks down 
Bergamo yes 
Bologna yes -3 sites 
Brescia yes 
Cagliari yes 
Caserta No sites -1 site looks down 
Catania yes -3 sites 
Firenze yes -3 sites (but 1 is malfunctioning) 
Genova yes -2 sites 
Messina yes -3 sites 
Milano yes -I site was not found 
Napoli yes -I site does not reply 
Padova yes 
Palermo yes 
Roma yes -2 sites 
Salerno No sites 
Taranto yes 
Torino yes 
Trieste yes -2 sites 
Venezia yes -I site ('Milione') looks down 
Verona No sites 
Total: 28 
LUXEMBOURG 
No cities over 200.000 
THE NETHERLANDS (The Dutch Digital Cities page http: //www. dhp. nil was also used for the 
search) 
Amsterdam 
Arnhem 
Eindhoven 
Haarlem 
Nijmegen 
Rotterdam 
Den Haag 
Utrecht 
Total: 13 
yes -2 sites 
No sites 
yes 
yes 
yes -2 sites 
yes -2 sites 
yes -3 sites 
yes -2 sites 
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PORTUGAL 
Lisboa 
Porto 
Total: 1 
SPAIN 
yes 
Looks down 
Alicante No sites 
Barcelona yes 
Bilbao yes -2 sites 
Cadiz No sites 
Cordoba yes 
Granada No sites 
La Coruna yes -3 sites 
Las Palmas No sites 
Madrid yes -'Ozu' has national character 
Malaga yes 
Murcia yes -2 sites 
Palma de Mallorca No sites 
Pamplona No sites 
San Sebastian yes -2 sites 
Santander yes 
Sevilla yes 
Tarragona No reply from site 
Valencia yes 
Valladolid No sites 
Vigo yes 
Vitoria yes 
Zaragoza yes 
Total: 19 
SWEDEN 
Goteborg yes -3 sites 
Malmo yes -2 sites +1 site does not reply 
Stockholm yes -2 sites 
Total: 7 
UK (The CCTA Government Information Service was also used for the search) 
Aldershot No sites 
Belfast yes -2 sites 
Birmingham yes 
Blackpool yes 
Bournemouth No sites 
Bradford yes -3 sites 
Brighton yes -3 sites 
Bristol yes -3 sites 
Cardiff yes -2 sites 
Coventry yes -3 sites 
Derby yes -2 sites 
Edinburgh yes 
Glasgow yes -2 sites 
Kingston upon Hull yes -2 sites 
Leeds yes -2 sites 
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Leicester yes 
Liverpool yes -2 sites -'Virtual Liverpool' is down 
London yes -3 sites - many others but not Web cities 
Luton yes 
Manchester yes -3 sites 
Newcastle upon Tyne yes -3 sites 
Nottingham yes -3 sites 
Plymouth yes -2 sites 
Portsmouth yes 
Preston No sites 
Sheffield yes -2 sites 
Southampton yes 
Southend-on-sea No sites 
Swansea yes 
Wolverhampton yes -2 sites 
Total: 52 
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